Sarwan
Kumar Onkar Nath Vs. Subhas Kumar Agarwalla [1987] INSC 279 (9 October 1987)
VENKATARAMIAH,
E.S. (J) VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J) SINGH, K.N. (J) RANGNATHAN, S.
CITATION:
1987 AIR 2302 1988 SCR (1) 414 1987 SCC (4) 546 JT 1987 (4) 64 1987 SCALE
(2)723
CITATOR
INFO :
D
1988 SC1821 (7) F 1989 SC1510 (9)
ACT:
Bihar
Building (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947-S. 11(1)(d)-Eviction of
tenant for default in payment of rent-In the absence of any agreement to the
contrary, tenant can claim set off against advance payment of rent accepted by
landlord in violation of s. 3 of the Act and the Court cannot order eviction by
invoking the doctrine of in pari delicto.
HEADNOTE:
When
the appellant did not pay rent for September and October, 1972, the respondent
filed a petition for its eviction from the premises in question under s.
ll(l)(d) of the Bihar Building (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1947 which
provided that on failure to pay two months' rent a tenant was liable to be
evicted from the premises taken on lease. The appellant's defence was that it
had paid two months' rent in advance at the inception of the tenancy with an
understanding that it could be set off against the rent whenever necessary or
required and, further, that since under s. 3 of the Act it was not lawful for
the landlord to have received any sum exceeding one month's rent in advance, it
could not be considered as a defaulter in payment of rent for purposes of s.
ll(l)(d) as, at least one month's rent which had been paid in excess of what
was permitted under s.
3
was liable to be adjusted towards the arrears. The Trial Court dismissed the
suit, and his appeal against the same having been rejected by the Additional
Subordinate Judge, the respondent approached the High Court by a Second Appeal.
Although
it accepted the plea that the appellant had paid two months' rent in advance at
the inception of the tenancy, the High Court arrived at the finding that the
appellant had failed to pay the rent for the months of September and October,
1972, on the ground that the appellant had not requested the respondent to
adjust it towards the rent due for the aforesaid two months. Observing that the
rule of in pari delicto did not help the appellant in this case, the High Court
set aside the concurrent judgments of the two courts below and directed
eviction.
Allowing
the appeal by special leave, 415 ^
HELD:
The appellant could not be treated as a defaulter who had A failed to pay rent
for two months. [418E] (i) The High Court approached the entire case in a
technical fashion. The respondent was not entitled to receive more than one
month's rent by way of advance. Yet, the respondent had received in advance the
rent for two months. The receipt under which the said advance was received does
not state that the amount received was liable to be adjusted towards the
arrears of rent only on the appellant informing the respondent orally or in
writing that such adjustment is to be made. In the written statement, however,
the appellant pleaded that the amount paid by way of advance could be set off
by way of rent whenever necessary or required. This is not a case where there
was any agreement to the effect that such adjustment could be made only on the
tenant asking the landlord to make such adjustment. Nor is this a case where
the tenant was liable to the landlord on any other account. The only
transaction between them was the lease in question and the amount in question had
been paid as rent in advance. There was also no agreement that the amount was
liable to be adjusted at the termination of the lease. It was, therefore, open
to the respondent to appropriate the said sum towards the arrears even without
any option being exercised as regards such adjustment by the appellant.
[418A-D] (ii) The High Court was also wrong in coming to the conclusion that
the appellant could not rely on the provisions of s. 3 of the Act on the ground
that if the parties were in pari delicto the court would not come to the rescue
of either. [418E] Mohd. Salimuddin v. Misri Lal & Anr., [1986] 1 S.C.R.
622, relied on.
Gulab
Chand Prasad v. Budwanti & Anr., A.I.R. 1985 Pat. 327, referred to.
Budhwanti
& Anr. v. Gulab Chand Prasad., [1987] 1 Scale 501, distinguished.
Civil
Appellate Jurisdiction: Civil Appeal No. 2607 of 1987.
From
the Judgment and order dated 6.1.1986 of the Patna High Court in Appeal Decree
No. 75 of 1978.
416
Avadh Behari and Y.K. Jain for the Appellant. Shanker Ghosh and M. P. Jha for
the Respondent.
The
Judgment of the Court was delivered by VENKATARAMIAH, J. The appellant is a
firm carrying on business at Jharia. It took on lease a room bearing No. 1 in a
building belonging to the respondent on a monthly rent of Rs.70 on 7.11.1960
and paid in advance two months' rent, i.e., Rs.140. The appellant paid rents
regularly but did not pay the rent for the months of September and October,
1972.
Taking
advantage of the non-payment of the rent in respect of the said two months the
respondent filed a petition for eviction against the appellant contending that
the appellant had become liable to be evicted from the premises in question
under clause (d) of sub-section (1) of section 11 of the Bihar Building (Lease,
Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act')
which provided that on failure to pay two months' rent a tenant was liable to
be evicted from the premises taken on lease.
The
appellant pleaded inter alia in his written statement that at the time of the
inception of the tenancy it had paid the respondent a sum of Rs.140 as advance
rent with an understanding that the amount of advance could be set off against
the rent whenever necessary or required and that since under section 3 of the
Act it was not lawful for a landlord to claim or receive, in consideration of
the grant, renewal or continuance of a tenancy of any building, the payment of
any premium, salami, fine or any other like sum in addition to the rent or
payment of any sum exceeding one month's rent of such building as rent, in
advance, the appellant could not be considered as a defaulter in payment of
rent for purposes of clause (d) of section 11(1) of the Act as at least one
month's rent which had been paid in excess of what was permitted under section
3 of the Act was liable to be adjusted towards the arrears. The appellant,
therefore, contended that in any view of the matter it could not be treated as
a defaulter liable to be ejected from the premises. Agreeing with the pleas of
the appellant the trial court dismissed the suit and the appeal filed by the
respondent before the {[; Additional Subordinate Judge, Dhanbad against the
judgment of the trial court was also dismissed. The respondent filed a second
appeal before the High Court against the judgment of the Additional Subordinate
Judge. The High Court found that the appellant had failed to pay the rent for
the months of September and October, 1972 although it accepted the plea of the
appellant that he had paid the sum of Rs.140 as rent in advance on the ground
that the appellant had not requested 417 the respondent to adjust the rent
which he had paid in advance A towards the rent due for the months of September
and October, 1972. The relevant part of the judgment of the High Court reads
thus:
"6.
In paragraph 9 of the written statement, the respondent stated that Rs.140 was
advanced to the appellant, with an understanding that it could be set off
against the rent whenever necessary or required. It will, therefore, appear
that the respondent was entitled to claim adjustment if it was necessary or
required. The respondent neither orally nor in writing informed that it was
exercising its option under the agreement for adjusting the amount paid in
advance towards the rent of September and October, 197,..
Accordingly
to the respondent's own showing, it remitted the rent for these two months also
along with rent of November and December, 1972 in January, 1973.
If
it had exercised its option under the agreement, there was no necessity for it
to remit the rent for the months of September and October because that amount
was not due as it had been paid by adjustment? Mr. Sinha submitted that the
pleading should not be construed in a pedantic manner. There is no question of
construing the pleadings in this case in a pedantic manner because according to
its own case, the respondent was entitled to adjust the amount if necessary or
required and for that it was necessary for it to intimate the appellant that it
was exercising his option. Further, in the written statement no where it is
asserted that it may be allowed to adjust the amount against the rent of
September and October, 1972. Since the option was not exercised at any stage,
the respondent cannot get the benefit of the amount paid by it in advance to the
appellant. Mr. Merathia tried to make out that section 3 of the Act prohibits
the landlord to accept the rent for more than one month and as the advance was
for two months; no benefit can be given to the respondent as the contract was
against the statute. It is true that if the parties are in pari delicto court
will not come in rescue of either. However, that does not help the
appellant." Accordingly the High Court set aside the concurrent judgments
of the two courts below and directed the eviction.
This
appeal by special leave is filed by the appellant against the judgment of the
High Court. H 418 It is unfortunate that the High Court has approached the
entire case in a technical fashion. It is not disputed that the respondent was
not entitled to receive more than one month's rent by way of advance. Yet, the
respondent had received in advance the rent for two months. The receipt under
which the said advance was received does not state that the amount received was
liable to be adjusted towards the arrears of rent only on the appellant
informing the respondent orally or in writing that such adjustment is to be
made. In the written statement, however, the appellant pleaded that the amount
paid by way of advance could be set off by way of rent whenever necessary or
required. This is not a case where there was any agreement to the effect that
such adjustment could be made only on the tenant asking the landlord to make
such adjustment. Nor is this a case where the tenant was liable to the landlord
on any other account.
The
only transaction between them was the lease in question and the amount in
question had been paid as rent in advance.
There
was also no agreement that the amount was liable to be adjusted at the
termination of the lease. It was, therefore, open to the respondent to
appropriate the said sum towards the arrears even without any option being
exercised as regards such adjustment by the appellant. The High Court erred in
observing that the appellant had not asserted in its written. Statement that it
may be allowed to adjust the advance amount towards the rent due for the months
of September and October, 1972 In substance the plea set out in para 9 of the
written statement, amounts to such an assertion. In any case the appellant
could not be treated as a defaulter who had failed to pay rent for two months.
The High Court was also wrong in coming to the conclusion that the appellant
could not rely on the provisions of section 3 of the Act on the ground that if
the parties were in pari delicto the court would not come to the rescue of
either.
In
Mohd. Salimuddin v. Misri Lal and another, [19861 1 S.C.R. 622 this Court has
held that where in a suit by landlord for eviction of tenant it was found that
the tenant, in order to secure the tenancy advanced certain amount to the
landlord (although in violation of prohibition to do so as embodied in section
3 of the Act) under an agreement containing a stipulation that the loan amount
was to be adjusted against the rent which accrued, and the amount so advanced
was sufficient to cover the landlord's claim of arrears of rent for the
relevant period, it could not be said that the tenant was not entitled to claim
adjustment of the loan amount so advanced against the rent which accrued
subsequently, simply because the loan advanced was in violation of the
prohibition contained in the Act.
Accordingly,
this Court held that as the tenant was not in arrears of rent after the 419
adjustment of loan amount towards the rent, he was not liable to be evicted from
the premises in question. This Court further observed that the doctrine of in
pari delicto was not attracted to such a situation. The principle enunciated in
the above case is equally applicable to the case before us.
The
learned counsel for the respondent, however, relied upon a Full Bench decision
of the High Court of Patna in Galab Chand Prasad v. Budhwanti and another,
A.I.R. 1985 Pat. 327 in which it had been held that any excess rent paid by a
tenant to his landlord in pursuance of a mutually agreed enhancement of rent
which was illegal did not get automatically adjusted against all the subsequent
defaults in the payment of the monthly rent under the Act. The decree for
eviction passed by the High Court of Patna in the above case has no doubt been affirmed
by this Court in Budhwanti & Anr. v. Gulab Chand Prasad., [1987] 1 SCALE
501. But, this Court affirmed the judgment of the High Court not on the ground
that the tenant in that case was a defaulter in payment of rent but on the
ground that the landlord required the premises for his bona fide use and
occupation. This Court in its judgment observed that "in the view we
propose to take .................. we do not think it necessary to go into the
question whether the appellants had committed default in payment of rent and
secondly even if they had committed default, they are entitled to adjust the
excess rent paid by them over a span of 30 years without reference to the rule
of in paridelic to. The reason for our refraining to go into these questions is
because we find the decree for eviction passed against the appellants can be
sustained on the second ground, viz., bona fide requirement of the shop for the
business requirements of the members of the joint family." It is not now
necessary for us to consider the correctness of the observation made by the
Full Bench of Patna High Court on the question of default and the right of the
tenant to claim adjustment because what was claimed by way of adjustment in the
said case was a certain excess amount paid over a long period of 30 years as
enhanced rent under a mutual agreement though such payment was contrary to law.
But in the case before us the amount of Rs.140 had not been paid as enhanced
rent under any such agreement. It was, in fact, an amount which had been paid
in advance which was liable to be adjusted whenever it was necessary or
required.
On
the facts and in the circumstances of the case we are satisfied that the
appellant was not in arrears of two months' rent. We are of opinion that the
High Court was in error in holding that the appellant was a defaulter who was
liable to be evicted under clause (d) of sub- 420 section (1) of section 11 of
the Act. The judgment of the High Court is, there fore, liable to be set aside
and we accordingly set it aside. The judgment of the trial court which has been
affirmed by the first appellate court is restored. The appeal is accordingly
allowed with costs.
H.L.C.
Appeal allowed.
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