Jagan@,Jagannath
Umaji Vs. Gokuldas Hiralal Tawari [1987] INSC 301 (28 October 1987)
KANIA,
M.H. KANIA, M.H. DUTT, M.M. (J) CITATION: 1987 AIR 2429 1988 SCR (1) 672 1987
SCC Supl. 566 JT 1987 (4) 215 1987 SCALE (2)870
ACT:
Bombay
Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region) Act, 1958 Whether the
appellant was a deemed tenant of the lands he was cultivating, under section 6
thereof.
HEADNOTE:
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Under an agreement with the respondent-landlord, the appellant had been
appointed to do worshipping in a temple as pujari to look after the management
of two dharamshalas and to cultivate three agricultural, lands, and for all
these services, he had been allowed to take crop share-the whole crop from the
lands cultivated by him, instead of his being paid any wages in cash. The
respondent filed a suit for possession of the agricultural lands. The
appellant's defence was that he was a deemed tenant as understood under section
6 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region) Act, 1958, and
was in lawful cultivation of the lands. The Naib-Tahsildar, who decided the
suit, passed an order, holding the appellant to be a tenant. The Sub-Divisional
officer, in appeal by the respondent, set aside the order of the Naib-Tahsildar
and remanded the matter. Against the order of the Sub-Divisional officer, the
appellant appealed in revision to the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal. The Revenue
Tribunal set aside the order of the Sub-Divisional officer and restored that of
the Naib Tahsildar. The respondent moved the High Court. The High Court decided
that the appellant was not entitled to claim the rights of a deemed tenant, and
quashed the orders of the authorities below holding the contrary view. The
appellant appealed to this Court by Special Leave against the order of the High
Court.
Allowing
the appeal, the Court, ^
HELD:
The appellant was lawfully cultivating the lands, having been permitted to do
so by the landlord. He was not a member of the landlord's family, nor was he
his hired labourer. The landlord did not belong to any of the classes specified
in Sub-Section (2) of section 41. The appellant was rendering service as pujari
and the service of looking after the dharamshalas, and for these services, he
had been given the right to cultivate the lands and appropriate the crop
share-the entire 673 crop instead of being paid any wages in cash. The
appellant was not hit by the provisions of clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of
section 6 of the Act, and he must be held to be a deemed tenant under the
provisions of section 6. [676G- H;677B-C] Dahya Lal and others v. Rasul
Mohammad Abdul Rahim, [1963] 3 S.C.R. 1 at 6, 7, referred to.
CIVIL
APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 668(N) of 1971, From the Judgment and
order dated 14.1.1970 of the Bombay High Court in S.C.A. No. 789 of 1969.
E.C.
Agarwala, Vijay Pandita and Atul Sharma for the Appellant.
The
Judgment of the Court was delivered by KANIA, J. This is an appeal by Special
Leave against the judgment of a learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court.
The
facts necessary for the disposal of the Appeal can be shortly stated. The
Respondent before us, who was the petitioner before the Bombay High Court, is
the owner of three agricultural lands described in the judgment appealed
against, situated at Talkhed, Taluk Malkapur, District Buldana in the Vidarbha
area of Maharashtra. Originally, these fields belonged to one Hiralal who died
in 1916.
Hiralal
started the construction of a dharamshala and a temple in 1912 in the said
lands which construction was completed by the Respondent's mother during the
minority of the Respondent. The Respondent's mother also constructed another
dharamshala on a separate piece of land. The facts on record show that Umaji,
the father of the Appellant, was appointed a Pujari by the then landlord to
worship the idols in the aforesaid temple and to look after the management of
the dharamshalas on behalf of the landlord. Under an agreement with the
landlord, the aforesaid three agricultural lands were cultivated by Umaji but
instead of being paid in cash for the services rendered by him to the landlord
in the form of looking after the management of the property and worshipping in
the temple, Umaji was allowed to cultivate the said fields and to take the
crops. The Appellant is the son of Umaji and records show that, after the death
of Umaji, he was given the same work as Umaji on the same terms and conditions.
On 674 February 12, 1963, the Appellant was served with a notice calling upon
him to hand over the belongings of the temple as well as the immovable property
to the Respondent. The Respondent then filed a suit for possession of the
aforesaid lands in which the Appellant took a defence that he was a tenant of
these lands and protected under the relevant legislation against eviction. The
issue whether the Appellant was the tenant of the said lands was framed and
referred to the Tahsildar for decision.
The
aforesaid issue was decided in the first instance by the Naib Tahsildar. Before
him the Appellant contended that he was a deemed tenant as understood under
Section 6 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region) Act,
1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Vidarbha Tenancy Act'). It was contended
by the Appellant that he was in lawful cultivation of the said agricultural
lands and should be declared to be a tenant. The Respondent, on the other hand,
reiterated his claim that the Appellant was not a tenant. The Naib Tahsildar
passed an order on November 30, 1965 holding that the Appellant was the tenant
in respect of the said lands because he was lawfully cultivating the said lands
which belonged to the Respondent. Against this order the Respondent herein
filed an appeal. The Sub-Divisional officer, who decided the appeal, set aside
the order of Naib Tahsildar and remanded the matter for fresh inquiry on
several issues including the issue as to how the Appellant herein came to be in
possession of the said lands. The Appellant then filed a revision application
before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal against this decision. The Revenue
Tribunal set aside the order of the Sub-Divisional officer and restored the
order of the Naib Tahsildar. The Tribunal took notice. Of the admission of the
Respondent that the Appellant herein was cultivating the said lands lawfully
and on this basis came to the conclusion that the Appellant herein was the
tenant of the said lands. This conclusion of the Tribunal was challenged by the
Respondent herein before the Bombay High Court.
The
learned Judge, who disposed of the Special Civil Application or writ petition
noted that it was not in dispute that the Appellant was cultivating the said
lands but he was doing so and appropriating the crop in lieu of payment of
services which he rendered to the landlord as the Pujari worshipping the Gods
in the said temple and looking after the management of the dharamshalas.
Instead of being paid in cash for these services, the Appellant was allowed to
cultivate the fields and take the crops thereof. The learned Judge came to the
conclusion that, on these facts, the lawful cultivation of the fields by 675
the Appellant was referable to a particular contract which alone must govern
the relationship between the parties. That contract constituted or created a
relationship of employer and employee. It was held that the Appellant herein
was an employee of the Respondent in his capacity as a Pujari and person
looking after the management of the dharamshalas. On these facts, the learned
Judge came to the conclusion that the Appellant herein was not entitled to
claim the rights of a deemed tenant, and held that the decision to the contrary
arrived at by the Tribunal was erroneous and liable to be set aside. The
learned Judge allowed the writ petition and quashed the order made by the
Tribunal and the Revenue Authorities and held that the Appellant had failed to
prove that he was a tenant of the said agricultural lands. It is this
conclusion of the learned Judge which is challenged in this appeal.
The
contention of Mr. Aggarwala, learned counsel for the Appellant, is that his
client was admittedly in lawful possession of the lands in question and was
cultivating the same at the relevant time. In view of this, it must he held
that he was a deemed tenant of the said lands under the provisions of Section 6
of the Vidarbha Tenancy Act and the Respondent was not entitled to evict him.
It was submitted by him that the learned Judge of the High Court who disposed
of the Special Leave Application was in error when he proceeded on the footing
that the Appellant was not the tenant of the said lands as the right to
cultivate the lands and appropriate the produce was given to him and his father
earlier as the Pujari of the aforesaid temple and for looking after the
management of the dharamshalas and the said lands. It was urged by him that
even if the Appellant could be said to be a servant of the Respondent, he was
admittedly in lawful personal cultivation of the said lands and was not paid in
cash or kind but by way of a crop share, the crop share being equivalent to the
entire crop. The Respondent has not chosen to appear before us.
In
order to examine the correctness of the aforesaid contentions of Mr. Aggarwala,
we may, at this stage, take note of the relevant provisions of the Vidarbha
Tenancy Act.
The
term 'tenant' is defined in sub-section (32) of Section 2 of that Act as
follows:
"(32)`tenant'
means a person who holds land on lease and includes- (a) person who is deemed
to be a tenant under Sections 6, 7 or 8, 676 (b) a person who is a protected
lessee or occupancy tenant and the word 'landlord' shall be cons trued
accordingly".
Under
sub-section ( 17) of Section 2, land, inter alia, means, land which is used or
capable of being used for agricultural purposes and 13 includes the sites of
farm building appurtenant to such land. Subsection (1) of Section 6 which is
the material provision before us runs as follows:
"6.
Persons deemed to be tenants.
(1)
A person lawfully cultivating any land belonging to another person shall be
deemed to be a tenant if such land is not cultivated personally by the owner
and if such person is not- (a) a member of the owner's family, or (b) a servant
on wages payable in cash or kind but not in crop share or a hired labourer
cultivating the land under the personal supervision of the owner or any member
of the owner's family, or (c) a mortgage in possession." Section 41 of the
Vidarbha Tenancy Act deals with the right of a tenant to purchase land held by
him as a tenant. Under the provisions of that Act, a tenant other than an
occupancy tenant shall be entitled to purchase from the landlord the land held
by him as a tenant and cultivated by him personally except whether the landlord
belongs to any category specified in sub-section (2). Section 46 of the
Vidarbha Tenancy Act, inter alia, provides that with effect on and from the
first day of April, 1961, the ownership of all lands held by tenants which they
are entitled to purchase from their landlords under the provisions of Chapter
III of the Vidarbha Tenancy Act shall stand transferred to ( i and vested in
such tenants.
As
far as the case before us is concerned as we have already pointed out that the
Appellant was admittedly cultivating the lands in question and was not a member
of the landlord's family nor was he a hired labourer. The landlord did not belong
to any of the classes specified in sub-section (2) of Section 41. The aforesaid
cultivation was 677 clearly lawful because the Respondent to whom the lands
belonged had permitted him to do so. It is true that the record shows that this
right to cultivate the land and appropriate the produce was given to the
Appellant because of the services he was performing as a Pujari of the
aforesaid temple of the Respondent and as he was looking after the
dharamshalas. By reason of these facts, it might be said that he was
cultivating the said lands as a servant of the Respondent, but he was not being
paid any wages in cash or kind but by way of a crop share, the share being the
entire crop. In these circumstances, he must be held to be a deemed tenant of
the said lands under the provisions of Section 6 of the Vidarbha Tenancy Act.
The fact of his cultivating the land as a servant of the Respondent would make
no difference because he was being paid for his services by way of a crop share
and hence was not covered by the provisions of clause (b) of sub-section (1) of
Section
6.
The learned Judge of the High Court was in error in coming to the conclusion
that, merely because the Appellant was a servant of the Respondent, he could
not be held to be a tenant in respect of the said lands. The learned Judge
altogether failed to notice that although the appellant was a servant, he was
not given wages payable either in cash or kind but by way of a crop share and
hence not covered by the exception carved out by clause (b) of sub-section (1)
of Section 6. From the observations made by the learned Judge, it appears that
he proceeded on the wrong footing that in order to be a deemed tenant, a person
must show that his lawful cultivation owes its origin to some sort of tenancy.
In
fact, the whole aim of Section 6 is to confer deemed tenancy upon persons who
are not already tenants of the land in question. We may point out that this
conclusion finds some support from the decision of this Court in Dahya Lal and
others v. Rasul Mohammed Abdul Rahim, [ 1963] 3 S.C.R. l at pp 6-7 decided by a
Bench of five learned Judges of this Court. In that case the provision which
came up for consideration was Section 4 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural
Land Act, 1948, the material portion of which runs as follows .
"A
person lawfully cultivating any land belonging to another person shall be
deemed to be a tenant if such land is not ......
It
was held that this Act encompassed with its beneficent provisions not only
tenants who held land for purpose of cultivation under contracts from the land
owners but persons who are deemed to be the tenants.
678
In the result, the Appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment and order of the
High Court are set aside and the order of Naib Tahsildar, confirmed by Revenue
Tribunal, is restored.
There
will be no order as to the costs of the Appeal.
S.L.
Appeal allowed.
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