D.K.
Soni Vs. P.K. Mukerjee & Ors [1987] INSC 295 (27 October 1987)
MUKHARJI,
SABYASACHI (J) MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J) OZA, G.L. (J)
CITATION:
1988 AIR 30 1988 SCR (1) 617 1988 SCC (1) 29 JT 1987 (4) 225 1987 SCALE (2)887
CITATOR
INFO :
R
1988 SC 94 (6)
ACT:
Landlord-Tenant
matter-order of eviction of the tenant on grounds of personal need of the
landlord challenged- Provisions of U. P. Act No. 3 of 1947 (Temporary Control
of Rent and Eviction Act) and the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting,
Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972- Proceedings there under.
HEADNOTE:
%
Respondent No. 1, Shri P.K. Mukerjee, filed an application under the U.P. Act
No. 3 of 1947 (Temporary Control of Rent and Eviction Act) (OLD Act), seeking
permission to file a suit for eviction of his tenant, Harbans Lal Soni, the
father of the appellant, D.K. Soni, on the grounds of his bona fide requirement
for his personal need. The Rent Control and Eviction officer rejected the
application, holding that the respondent's requirement was not bona fide. A
revision was filed by the respondent No. 1 before the Commissioner who allowed
the same.
The
U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (new
Act) came into effect on July 15, 1972. On August 2, 1972, the State Government
rejected the representation of the tenant (father of the appellant) filed under
section 7 of the old Act against the order of the Commissioner aforementioned.
The tenant then moved a writ petition in the High Court. A Single Judge of the
High Court allowed the petition and set aside the above said orders of the
Commissioner and the State Government. Upon an appeal being filed by the
respondent (No. 1) against the order of the Single Judge, a Division Bench of
the High Court allowed the same, setting aside the order of the Single Judge
and upholding the above-said orders of the commissioner and the State
Government, allowing the eviction of the tenant.
In
September, 1978, the respondent No. 1 moved an application under section 21,
read with section 43(2)(rr) of the new Act. Thereafter, the respondent executed
an agreement as vendor to sell the premises in dispute in favour of the vendee,
the wife of the appellant, Smt. Madhu Soni-daughter-in-law of the tenant,
Harbans Lal. The agreement was dated November 7, 1978, and it mentioned therein
that the landlord, respondent No. 1 had filed an application against the tenant
above- 617 named. The father-in-law of the vendee-for permission to file a suit
for eviction of the tenant from the premises in dispute on account of the
respondent's personal need, and that the permission had been granted. The
agreement recited that a vacant portion of the land of the disputed premises,
would be in the exclusive possession of the vendor and the rest of the
property-the disputed premises would be sold to the vendee, Smt. Madhu Soni.
The agreement stipulated that the vendee or the other members of the family had
no right over the portion of the land to be kept with the vendor, and that the
appellant had given up his tenancy rights in respect of the same, and also that
premises would be built on the said vacant land with the money to be obtained
by selling the disputed house to Smt. Madhu Soni. The price of the house was
settled at Rs.1,00,000 out of which a sum of Rs.5000 was paid as earnest money,
and it was stipulated that the rest of the amount would be paid at the time of
registration. It was agreed that the parties would move the authorities for
permission to transfer as early as possible and the saledeed would be executed
within one month of the grant of permission and notice to the vendee. It was
stated that if the vendee failed to get the sale-deed executed within the time
stipulated, the earnest money of Rs.5000 would be forfeited and the property
would stand released in favour of the vendor. It was also stipulated that the
need of the vendor for the premises subsisted and the agreement had been
entered into to enable the vendor to get money out of the sale to construct a
house for him self on the vacant piece of land. On December 12, 1978, the
father of the appellant, who was the tenant, died, leaving behind a widow, two
sons, including the appellant, and a daughter. On December 22, 1978, the
appellant informed the Prescribed Authority before whom the application under
section 21(1)(a) of the New Act, read with section 43(2)(rr), was pending,
about the death of the tenant, Shri Harbans Lal Soni.
On
March 23, 1979, the respondent No. 1 filed an application (in Case No. 53 of
1978) for substitution of the legal heirs of the deceased tenant, along with an
application under section 5 of the Limitation Act. The Prescribed Authority
rejected the application for substitution on grounds of delay. On December 11,
1979, the respondent No. 1 moved a second application under section 21(1)(a),
read with section 43(2)(rr) of the new Act (on the ground as in his earlier
application), which was registered as Case No. 68 of 1979.
On
March 12, 1981, the respondent No. 1 executed two separate agreements for sale
of the property in dispute, in favour of R.P. Kanodia and P.K. Kanodia,
respectively.
618
The Prescribed Authority decided the Case No. 68 of 1979 abovementioned on July
7, 1981, directing the tenant to be evicted from the premises in dispute. The
Additional District Judge dismissed the appeal against the order of eviction
passed by the Prescribed Authority.
On
March 11, 1983, the appellant's wife, Smt. Madhu Soni filed a suit for
injunction, restraining the respondent No. 1 from dispossessing her from the
premises in dispute on the strength of the registered agreement, asserting that
she resided in the premises in part performance of the agreement under section
53A of the Transfer of Property Act. The trial Court dismissed the suit. The
High Court was then moved for relief by a writ petition against the orders of
the Prescribed Authority for eviction and the order of the Additional District
Judge. The writ petition was dismissed, followed by the dismissal of a Review
Petition too.
Aggrieved
thereby the appellant has appealed to this Court by special leave.
Dismissing
the appeal, the Court, ^ HELD: The questions involved in the appeal are:
Firstly,
in view of the provisions of section 43(2)(rr), was the High Court right in its
decision, in the facts and circumstances of the case, specially the factum of
the death of the (original) tenant being alleged, and in view of the fact that
the execution of the order for eviction had become final before the new Act
came into operation? Secondly, how far do the subsequent events, namely, the
agreements by the respondent No. 1 with the wife of one of the sons of the
tenant and with the Kanodias to sell the property in dispute, demolish or
destroy the case of a bona fide need of the landlord? [622G-H; 623A] In
substance, the need was there of the landlord for his occupation of his
premises as he wanted to reside in his house after his retirement from
Government service, and for this purpose he had sought eviction and obtained
the order of eviction prior to the coming into operation of the new Act. The
object of the landlord was not defeated by the provisions of the New Act.
[626G-H] Considering the subsequent events, namely, the refusal of permission
by the Urban Ceiling Authorities, the escalation of building cost (upto 1987),
failure on the part of the vendee to register and execute the document, it is
not possible to hold that the subsequent events have so materially altered the
position as to defeat the original order for possession passed in favour of the
landlord. The subsequent events do not in 619 any way affect the existence of
the need of the landlord for possession of premises in question. [627C-E] There
was no failure on the part of the landlord to take steps for the substitution.
Nothing was proved before the Court that the agreements with R.P. Kanodia and
P.K. Kanodia were valid today or given effect to in view of the provision of
the Land ceiling Act. It was not proved to the satisfaction of the authorities
below that any agreement to sell the premises to Kanodias had been given effect
to and acted upon and in that view of the matter, the need of the landlord
indubitably succeeds, and any allegations made do not merit any revision of the
order which had become final.
Finality
of the judicial decisions is one of the essential ingredients upon which the
administration of justice must rest. In that view of the matter, even if the
contentions advanced on behalf of the respondents are taken into consideration
and a new look is taken because of the subsequent events, which cannot be done
in view of the specific provisions in clause (rr) of section 43(2) of the new
Act, the appellant has no case. The High Court was right in not interfering
with the order of the Prescribed Authority. Finality of the decisions of the
authorities under the Act has to be given due reverence and place in the
judicial administration. [629A-C] The appeal fails. As the appellant had been
staying in the premises for quite some time, time till April 30, 1988 granted
to him to deliver vacant possession of the house to the landlord, subject to
his filing usual undertaking within four weeks. [629E-F] Pasupuleti
Venkateswarlu v. The motor and general Traders, [1975] 3 SCR 958; Pattersion v.
State of Alabama, 294 U.S. 600 at 607; Ramji Dayawala and Sons(P) Ltd. v.
Invest Import, [1981] 1 SCR 899; Hasmat Rai and Anr. v. Raghunath Prasad,
[1981] 3 SCR 605; Syed Asadullah Kazmi v. The Addl. District Judge, Allahabad
and Ors., [1982] 1 SCR 77; Sher Singh and Ors. v. The State of Punjab, [1983] 2
SCR 582; Bansilal Sahu v. The Prescribed Authority and Anr, [1980] All L.J.
331; Smt. Sarju Devi v. Prescribed Authority, Kanpur, [1977] All L.J. 251 and
Tara Chand Khandelwal v. Prescribed Authority, Agra, [1976] All L.J. 708,
referred to. G CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 6626 of 1983.
From
the Judgment and order dated 18.5.1983 of the Allahabad High Court in C.M.W.P.
No. 13741 of 1982. H 620 S.N. Kacker and R.B. Mehrotra for the Appellant.
B.D.
Agarwala and Miss Asha Rani for the Respondents.
The
Judgment of the Court was delivered by Sabyasachi Mukharji, J. This is an
appeal by the tenant against an order upholding the order of eviction. The
ground of eviction was on the landlord's bona fide need and requirement. The
appeal arises out of the judgment and order of the High Court of Allahabad
dated 18th of May, 1983 and also against the order dated 23rd of May, 1983
dismissing a review application by the said High Court. Shri P.K. Mukerjee,
respondent No. 1 herein had filed an application under section 3 of the U.P.
Act No. 3 of 1947 (Temporary Control of Rent and Eviction Act), hereinafter
referred to as the old Act, seeking permission to file the suit for eviction of
the tenant, the father of the appellant herein, on the ground that
accommodation in dispute was bona fide required by the landlord for his
personal need. In September, 1971 the Rent Control and Eviction officer
rejected the application of the landlord and held that his requirement was not
bona fide. On 12th of November, 1971 the Commissioner allowed the revision
filed by respondent No. 1 against the order of the Rent Control and Eviction
officer dated 5th of September, 1971. It may be mentioned that on 15th of July,
1972 the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972
hereinafter referred to as the new Act came into effect. On 2nd of August, 1972
the State Government rejected the representation of the tenant namely, the
father of the appellant filed under section 7 of the old Act against the order
of the Commissioner dated 2nd of November, 1971. On or about 7th of February,
1975 the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Allahabad allowed the writ
petition of the tenant and set aside the orders of the Commissioner and the
State Government hereinbefore mentioned. On 3rd of August, 1978 a Division
Bench of the High Court of Allahabad allowed the appeal of respondent No. 1 and
set aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge of the High Court dated 7th
of February, 1975 and upheld the orders of the Commissioner and the State
Government allowing the eviction of the tenant. In September, 1978 respondent
No. 1 moved an application under section 21 read with section 43(2)(rr) of the
new Act.
Thereafter
it is alleged that respondent No. 1 had executed an agreement to sell the
disputed premises in favour of the appellant's wife namely, Smt. Madhu Soni. It
is material to refer to the said agreement in brief. The agreement is dated as
mentioned hereinbefore 7th of November, 1978 621 and was entered into between
Shri P.K. Mukerjee, the landlord and Smt. Madhu Soni wife of Shri D.K. Soni
(son of Shri Harbans Lal Soni) the then tenant. It was stated that the landlord
had filed an application against Shri H.L. Soni the father-in-law of vendee for
permission to file a suit for eviction against him on account of his personal
need for the aforesaid premises and permission had been granted. It also
recited that a portion of the said land which was demarcated in the site plan
measuring about 121' x 101.5' of the vendor which would be for the construction
of a house would be in exclusive possession of the vendor and the rest of the
property at 8, Panna Lal Road, Allahabad being the disputed premises would be
sold to Smt. Soni. It also recited that the vendee or his family members would have
no right of whatsoever nature and the vendee, that is to say, the appellant had
given up his tenancy right in respect of the same, that is to say, the portion
to be kept with the vendor and the premises will be built on the vacant land
with the money that would be obtained by selling the property to Smt. Madhu
Soni. The property was sold for Rs. 1,00,000 out of which Rs.5,000 was paid as
earnest money and it was stipulated that the rest of the money would be paid at
the time of the registration. It was further agreed that the parties would move
the proper authorities as early as possible for permission to transfer and the
sale deed would be executed within one month of the grant of the permission and
notice to the vendee. It was further stated that if the vendee failed to get
the sale deed executed after one month from the date of permission and notice
to the vendee by the vendor, the earnest money of Rs.5,000 would be forfeited
and the right of the vendor would be as it subsisted prior to the agreement. It
was further provided that in the event of non-execution of the sale deed on
account of any act or failure on the part of the vendee in pursuance of the
agreement to sell, the property would stand released in favour of the vendor
and the earnest money of Rs.5,000 would be forfeited. It was clearly stipulated
that the need of the vendor for the premises still subsisted and this agreement
was being entered into since it would be possible for the vendor to construct a
house for himself on the land not agreed to be transferred measuring 121' x
101.5 ' . On that basis the parties had signed agreement on 7th November, 1978.
On
12th of December, 1978 the father of the present appellant Shri H.L. Soni who
was the original tenant died leaving behind his widow and two sons including
the appellant and one daughter. It was alleged that on 18th of December, 1978
respondent No. l sent a letter of condolence to the appellant on the death of
appellant's father. On 622 22nd of December, 1978 appellant informed the Prescribed
Authority before whom the application under section 2 1(1)(a) of the new Act
red with section 43(2)(rr) was pending about the death of Shri H.L Soni. On
23rd of March, 1979 respondent No. 1 moved an application for substitution in
Case No. 53 of 1978 for bringing on record the heirs of deceased Shri H.L. Soni
along with application under section 5 of the Limitation Act. On 10th of
November, 1979, the Prescribed Authority rejected the petitioners application
for substitution and held that respondent No. 1 had full knowledge of the death
of Shri H.L. Soni and he did not move the application within time. On 11th of
December, 1979 respondent No. 1 moved a second application under section 2
1(1)(a) read with section 43(2)(rr) of the new Act on the same ground on which
the first application was moved. The second application was registered as Case
No. 68 of 1979. It is alleged further that on 12th of March, 1981 respondent
No. 1 executed two separate agreements to sell the property in dispute in
favour of R.P. Kanodia and P.K. Kanodia respectively. The Prescribed Authority
on 7th of July, 198 1 held that the second application under section 2 1(1)(a)
read with section 43(2)(rr) of the new Act being Case No. 68 of 1979 was within
time and directed the tenant to be evicted from the premises in dispute. The
Additional District Judge, Allahabad on 25th of October, 1982 dismissed the
appeal of the tenant filed against the order of the Prescribed Authority dated
7th of July, 1981. On 11th of March, 1983 the appellant's wife Smt. Madhu Soni
filed a suit for injunction restraining Respondent No. 1 from dispossessing her
from the premises in dispute on the strength of registered agreement and she
asserted that she resided in the accommodation as a result of part performance
under section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.
Initially
injunction was granted ex parte by the Trial Court and thereafter it was
vacated after hearing respondent No. 1. Aggrieved thereby an appeal } was filed
by Smt. Madhu Soni in which the High Court had stayed dispossession. The High
Court thereafter dismissed the writ petition of the tenant against the orders
of the Prescribed Authority for eviction and the order of the Additional
District Judge. A review petition was filed by the appellant and the same was
dismissed. This appeal by special leave is against that decision of the High
Court dated 18th of May, 1983 Behind this long tale of dates the questions
involved in this appeal are short, namely, firstly in view of the provisions of
section 43(2)(rr) was the High Court right, in the facts and circumstances of
the case specially the death of original tenant being alleged, and in view of
the fact that the execution of the order passed for eviction had 623 become
final before coming into operation of the new Act the order was proper and
secondly, how far the subsequent events, namely, the A agreement with the wife
of one of the sons of the original tenant to purchase property as well as the
agreement with the Kanodias mentioned hereinbefore demolish or destroy the case
of a bona fide need of the landlord. In other words are these not sufficient
subsequent events which destroy the landlord's bona fide need and as such
should be taken note of by the appropriate courts in ordering eviction. In this
appeal, therefore, we have to keep in mind two aspects of law namely, the
finality of the decisions and secondly, how far and to what extent subsequent
events should be taken note of in order to do justice between the parties.
Before
we refer to the judgment of the High Court and the submissions made before us,
it is necessary for us to bear in mind certain decisions of this Court on these
aspects on which reliance was placed. This Court in Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v.
The Motor & General Traders, [1975] 3 S.C.R. 958 dealing with the Andhra
Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960, dealt with the
question as to how far the subsequent events can be taken note of. This Court
held that for making the right or remedy, claimed by a party justly and
meaningfully as also legally and factually in accordance with the current
realities, the court can, and in many cases must, take cautious cognizance of
events and developments subsequent to the institution of the proceeding
provided the rules of fairness to both sides are scrupulously obeyed. In the
facts of that case, this Court said that the High Court was right in taking
into consideration the facts which came into being subsequent to the
commencement of the proceedings. Therefore the fact that in determining what
justice required the Court was bound to consider any change, either in fact or
in law, which had supervened since the judgment was given. F This general
principle and proposition of law was of ancient vintage. See the observations
of the U.S. Supreme Court in Pattersion v. State of Alabama, (294 U.S. 600 at
page 607). The actual facts, however, of this case were entirely different, and
so it was not necessary to refer to those facts. In Ramji Dayawala & Sons
(P) Ltd. v. Invest Import, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 899, this principle was again
reiterated entirely under different context. This Court also reiterated the
same principle in Hasmat Rai and another v. Raghunath Prasad, [1981] 3 S.C.R.
605 where referring to Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. The Motor and General
Traders (supra), this Court held that when an action was brought by the
landlord under Rent Restriction Act for eviction on the H 624 ground of
personal requirement, his need must not only be shown to A exist at the date of
the suit, but must exist on the date of appellate decree, or the date when a
higher court dealt with the matter. It was emphasised by this Court that if
during the progress and passage of proceeding from court to court subsequent
events had occurred which if noticed would non-suit the plaintiff, the court
had to examine and evaluate the same and mould the decree accordingly. The
tenant was entitled to show that the need or requirement no more existed by
pointing out such subsequent events, to the court including the appellate
court. Otherwise the landlord would derive an unfair advantage, and it would be
against the spirit or intendment of Rent Restriction Act which was enacted to
fetter the unfettered right of re-entry. In such a situation, it was reiterated
that, it would be incorrect to say that as the decree or order for eviction was
passed against the tenant he could not invite the court to take into
consideration subsequent events. But the tenant could be precluded from so
contending when decree or order for eviction had become final. (Emphasis
supplied-see the observations of Desai, J. at page 617(G.H) of the report). In
Syed Asadullah Kazmi v. The Addl. District Judge, Allahabad and others, [1982]
1 S.C.R. 77, this Court was concerned with a residence at Allahabad. It was
held by this Court that the order dated 25th March, 1977 of the appellate
authority releasing a portion of the premises in favour of the third respondent
therein and leaving the remaining portion in the tenancy of the appellant
therein acquired finality when the proceedings taken against it by the
appellant had failed. The Prescribed Authority was bound to give effect to that
final order and was not acting outside its jurisdiction or contrary to law
where he ordered eviction. This Court reiterated that it was true that
subsequent events had to be taken into account by a statutory authority or
court when considering proceeding arising out of a landlord's petition for
ejectment of a tenant on the ground of the landlord's personal need. But in
that case the order for release of a portion of the accommodation had acquired
finality before the death of the landlord and the controversy concluded by it
could not be reopened thereafter. This Court further reiterated that inasmuch
as the question which arose before the Prescribed Authority on the application
of the appellant after the proceedings for release had acquired finality, it
was not open even for this Court to reopen the proceeding for release. Not
quite relevant to the present controversy, there is, however, just an
observation in Sher Singh & Ors.
v.
The State of Punjab, [1983] 2 S.C.R. 582. It was a decision dealing with
Article 21 of the Constitution. There is an observation that traditionally,
subsequent events had to be taken into account in the area of civil law. It is
necessary, however, to refer to a 625 decision of the special bench of the
Allahabad high Court in Bansilal Sahu v. The Prescribed Authority and another,
[ 19801 ALL. L.J. 331 which arose under the new Act. It was held therein that
the question whether the eviction of the tenant had to be ordered from any
specified part of the building under tenancy was not within the jurisdiction of
the Prescribed Authority, while acting under clause (rr) of section 43(2),
irrespective of the occurrence of subsequent events which might make it improper
to order the eviction from the entire building or which might tend to establish
that the need set up by the landlord could be satisfied by ordering eviction of
the tenant from a specified part of the building under tenancy. It was held
that subsequent events or facts could not be considered so as to defeat the
final order and the Prescribed Authority was bound to order eviction. The
Special Bench of the Allahabad High Court overruled another Bench decision of
the Allahabad High Court in the case of Smt. Sarju Devi v. Prescribed
Authority, Kanpur, [19771 All. L.J. 251 and accepted the proposition laid down
in Tara Chand Khandelwal v. Prescribed Authority, Agra, [1976] All L.J. 708.
Satish Chandra, C.J. speaking for the Allahabad High Court observed that the
opening clause of this provision entitled the Prescribed Authority to find out
whether permission under section 3 of the old Act had been obtained on any
ground specified in subsection (1) or sub- section (2) of section 21 of the
present Act and that the same had become final. It was, therefore, according to
the Chief Justice, the beginning as well as the end of his jurisdiction to
record findings. If the conclusion was in the affirmative the Prescribed
Authority had no discretion but to order the eviction of the tenant from the
building under tenancy. It was further held that the jurisdiction of the
Prescribed Authority was to order the eviction of the tenant from the building
under tenancy. It had not expressly been conferred any power to order eviction
from a portion or part of the building under tenancy. It was further held that
the jurisdiction of the Prescribed Authority while deciding an application
under section 2 1 of the present Act could not be equated with the jurisdiction
which had been conferred for giving effect to the permission granted under
section 3 of the old Act. The two situations were different.
Clause
(rr) of section 43(2) of the present Act specifically prohibited the Prescribed
Authority from satisfying itself afresh that the grounds existed. We are of the
opinion that this is the correct state of law and if that is the position the
so-called subsequent events are not germane to the question to be decided by
the High Court.
In
the aforesaid light, in our opinion, in the facts of this case the High Court
was right.
626
It may be mentioned that clause (rr) of section 43(2) of the new Act provides
as follows:
"where
any permission referred to in Section 3 of the old Act has been obtained on any
ground specified in sub section (1) or sub-section (2) of section 21 and has
become final, either before the commencement of this Act or in accordance with
the provisions of this sub-section after the commencement of this Act (whether
or not a suit for the eviction of the tenant has been instituted), the landlord
may apply to the prescribed authority for his eviction under section 21, and
thereupon the prescribed authority shall order the eviction of the tenant from
the building under tenancy, and it shall not be necessary for prescribed authority
to satisfy itself afresh as to the existence of any ground as aforesaid, and
such order shall be final and shall not be open to appeal under section 22:
Provided
that no application under this clause shall be maintainable on the basis of a
permission granted under section 3 of the old Act, where such permission became
final more than three years before the commencement of this Act:
Provided
further that in computing the period of three years, the time during which the
applicant has been prosecuting with due diligence any civil proceeding whether
in a court of first instance or appeal or revision shall be excluded" All
these aspects were considered by the High Court. We recognise that unless the
statute expressly prohibits as it did in the instant case, by the aforesaid
clause, cautious recognition of subsequent events to mould the relief should be
taken note of. In the instant case in substance the need was there of the
landlord for his occupation of his own premises. The landlord was a Government
servant and wanted to reside in Allahabad and for this purpose he sought
eviction and had obtained an order of eviction prior to coming into operation
of the new Act. The hope of the landlord to come back to his origin was not
defeated by the provisions of the new Act. In vain he moved from court to court
and in the meantime there has been escalation of prices and restrictions on
alienation of land and in order to save him self from this situation the
landlord tried to sell part of the premises in question 627 subsequent to the
decree to the wife of one of the sons of the tenant. This is not material. The
agreement in question further stipulated that the present need of the landlord
subsisted, and out of this agreement only Rs.5,000 was advanced in 1978 and nothing
was paid thereafter. The agreement for sale to Smt. Madhu Soni reads as
follows:
"That
it is made clear that the need of the vendor for the premises still subsists
and this agreement is being entered into since it will be possible for the
vendor to construct a house for himself on the land not agreed to be
transferred measuring 121' x 101.5'. The parties, therefore, have signed this
Deed on the 7th day of November, 1978 In view of the subsequent events, namely,
non-permission of the Urban Ceiling Authorities, failure to register and
execute the document, delay for permission on the part of the vendee and the
escalation of prices, that is to say, if in 1979 perhaps it was possible to
build some kind of accommodation with the amount of sale price to be obtained
from the execution of the document which it is not possible in 1987 and further
there is no readiness or willingness on the part of the vendee to execute the
document, after the existence of the basic need of the landlord, for which
originally the proceedings were taken and finalised, we do not find it possible
to hold that subsequent events have so materially altered as to defeat the
original order for possession passed in favour of the respondents.
We
do not find perusing the records that there was any failure for substitution on
the part of the landlord to take steps. The other son of the deceased was not
residing with the deceased in the premises in question, therefore, there was no
need to substitute him.
The
other agreements to which reference had been made were the alleged agreement
with R.P. Kanodia and P.K. Kanodia respectively. Nothing was proved before us
that agreement is valid today or given effect to in view of the provisions of
the Land Ceiling Act.
It
may be mentioned that the Competent Authority under the Urban Land (Ceiling
& Regulation) Act, 1976 by the order dated 20th of April, 1979 refused
permission to sell in favour of Smt. Madhu Soni. On 7th November, 1978 the wife
of the appellant and the landlord had entered into an agreement to sell a
portion of the land as well as the house in dispute to the appellant's wife,
and for that purpose a sum of 628 Rs.5,000 had been paid as earnest money as
mentioned hereinbefore, A and in the agreement, it was clearly stated that the
parties would move the proper authorities as early as possible for permission
to transfer the property and the sale deed would be executed within one month
of the grant of such permission and notice to the vendee. Clause 6 of the
agreement further stipulated that if the vendee failed to get the agreement
executed after one month from the date of permission and notice to the vendee
the earnest money of Rs.5,000 would be forfeited and the right of the vendor
will be as it subsisted prior to the agreement. The requisite permission in
terms of the agreement was obtained by the landlord in the year 1979 and a
registered notice consequently was also sent to the appellant's wife requiring
her to get the sale deed executed in accordance with the agreement. Thereafter
a reply dated 2 1st September, 1979 was also received by the landlord. However,
the appellant's wife failed to get the sale deed executed and consequently the
agreement itself became in fructuous and the earnest money stood forefeited.
The
need as it has been reiterated in the agreement of the landlord for his own
purpose still subsisted. There was no delay in bringing the heirs of the
deceased tenant on record. In the aforesaid view of the matter there was no
substance in the objection filed against the execution of the order of eviction
in terms of clause (rr) of section 43(2) of the new Act. In any event such
events were frivolous after the order had become final. The subsequent events
which we have examined do not in any way effect the decision of need for possession
of the premises in question of the respondent-landlord. It may be mentioned
that there was an application by the respondent for the review. This was heard
and no order was made on that application. It was reiterated in the counter
affidavit filed by the respondent that since 1st of December, 1978 till todate
the appellant had not paid any money to the landlord nor deposited the damages
in the court. At the time of his death late H.L. Soni was residing in the house
in dispute with his eldest son Shri D.K. Soni, the appellant, his wife, Smt.
Madhu Soni and Mrs. Kailash Soni, the widow. Other son Shri A.K. Soni and
daughter Mrs. Kangan Khanna were not residing with Late Shri H.L. Soni at the
time of his death and as such they were not heirs as contemplated by section
3(g) of the new Act. The landlord was a Government servant and was posted at
Lucknow and as such during his tenure he had to reside at Lucknow but after his
retirement he wanted to settle down at his ancestral house at Allahabad and it
was for this reason that the proceedings for eviction were taken.
629
It was not proved to the satisfaction of the authorities below that any
agreement to sell the premises to Kanodias has been given effect to and had
been acted upon or can be acted upon. It that the view of the matter the need
indubitably succeeds and even if the allegations made are taken into
consideration do not merit any revision of the order which had become final.
Finality of the judicial decisions is one of the essential ingredients upon
which the administration of justice must rest. In that view of the matter we
are of the opinion, even if the contentions advanced on behalf of the
respondents are taken into consideration and a new look is taken because of the
subsequent events, which in our opinion cannot be done in view of the specific
prohibition in clause (rr) of section 43(2) of the new Act, the appellant has
no case.
In
the aforesaid view of the matter we are of the opinion that the High Court was
right in not interfering with the order of the Prescribed Authority. After all
finality of the decisions of the authorities under the Act has to be given due
reverence and place in the judicial administration. Taking cautious note of the
relevant subsequent events, we find no merit in the appellant's contentions
inasmuch as there is nothing on record to show that the landlord's bona fide
need for his residence in Allahabad has been met or can be met in the state of
affairs except by the order which is impugned in this appeal.
In
the premises, the appeal must fail and is accordingly dismissed without any
order as to costs. Since, however, the appellant has been staying in the
disputed premises for quite some time, we grant time till 30th of April, 1988
to deliver vacant possession of the premises subject to filing usual
undertaking within four weeks from today. In default in filing undertaking the
order would become executable forthwith.
S.L.
Appeal dismissed.
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