Dipak
Kumar Biswas Vs. Director of Public Instruction & Ors [1987] INSC 73 (6 March 1987)
Natrajan,
S. (J) Natrajan, S. (J) Sen, A.P. (J)
CITATION:
1987 AIR 1422 1987 SCR (2) 572 1987 SCC (2) 252 JT 1987 (1) 631 1987 SCALE
(1)544
CITATOR
INFO : D 1989 SC1607 (11,12) R 1990 SC 415 (17,22,25)
ACT:
Constitution
of India: Article 136--Powers of the Court
to enlarge relief.
Service
Law: Lecturer of private aided college--Status of-Wrongful termination of
service of--Nature of relief--Whether entitled to declaration of continuance in
service--Aided colleges--Whether statutory bodies.
Assam
Aided College Employees Rules, 1960: Assam Aided College Management Rules,
1965--Whether adopted in State of Meghalya.
HEAD NOTE:
The
appellant, who was holding a permanent post in a Central Government department,
was selected for the post of Lecturer in a private aided college in Meghalya.
The order of appointment stated that it was subject to the approval of the
first respondent. On his seeking clarification from the Principal he was
assured that the approval was a mere formality. Acting on the said assurance
the appellant resigned his permanent post in the Government department and
joined the college. However, he found his services terminated just within five
months for want of prior approval of the first respondent.
A suit
filed by the appellant challenging the order of termination and for a
declaration and permanent injunction was dismissed by the trial court. The
first Appellate Court found that the Assam Aided Colleges Management Rules,
1965 had not been adopted by the State Government at the time of the
appellant's appointment and that the Director of Public Instruction had acted
wrongly in refusing to give approval to the appellant's appointment, and as
such the order of termination of service of the appellant was manifestly wrong.
It, therefore, declared appellant's continuance in service.
The
High Court while concurring with the view of the first Appellate Court that the
termination of services of the appellant was unlawful, awarded one year's
salary and allowances as damages since the 573 appellant did not belong to the
category of either Government servants, industrial workmen or employees of
statutory bodies, for which alone reinstatement could be ordered.
In
this appeal by special leave it was contended for the appellant that the
Appellate Court and the High Court having found the termination of service to
be wrong and illegal, he should have been granted the relief sought for in the
suit, that is, a declaration of continuance in service and reinstatement with
full back wages and allowances. It was further submitted that since the college
was a private institution provided and by the Government and Government had
full supervisory control over it, it was for all practical purposes a
Government institution. As such, he was entitled to parity of treatment with a
Government servant wrongly removed from service. For the respondent it was
contended that the only remedy for the appellant was to file a suit for damages
and not to seek a declaration of continuance in service, because it would
amount to seeking specific performance of a contract of service.
Allowing
the Appeal in part, the Court,
HELD:
The appellant was not entitled to a declaration that he continued to be in the
service of the college and that he was entitled to all the benefits flowing
from the declaration. [581G] Even though the College in question may be
governed by the statutes of the University and the Education Code framed by the
Government of Meghalaya and even though the college may be receiving financial
aid from the Government, it would not be a statutory body because it haS not
been created by any statute and its existence is not dependent upon any
statutory provision. [580F-G] Vaish College v. Lakshmi Narain, [1976] 2 SCR
1006 and J. Tewari v. Jwala Devi Vidya Mandir & Others, [1979] 4 SCC 160,
referred to.
There
was no violation of the provisions of any Act or any Regulations made thereunder
in the instant case. The first respondent in declining to approve the
appointment of the appellant had proceeded on the erroneous assumption that the
Assam Aided College Employees Rules, 1960
and the Assam Aided College Management Rules, 1965 had been adopted by the
State of Meghalya. No doubt such action has been held
to be wrongful but even so it was not in contravention of any 574 statutory
provisions or regulations or procedural rules.
[581E-G]
I.P. Gupta v. Inter College, Thora, [1984] 3 SCR 752, distinguished.
The
misfortune that has overtaken the appellant was partly due to his own hasty
action in resigning his permanent post and partly on account of the first
respondent disapproving the appellant's appointment on the basis of rules which
had not been formulated and communicated to the aided colleges. In spite of the
sad plight of the appellant, therefore, it will not be possible to grant the
relief of declaration as sought for by him.[578C-D] [In the facts and
circumstances of the case and in exercise of its powers under Article 136 of
the Constitution, the Court enlarged the relief grunted to the appellant by the
High Court by directing the State of Meghalaya to grant three years salary and
allowances to the appellant at the rates prevalent when his services were
terminated. It further directed that in the event of there being a vacancy in
the College in question for the post of Lecturer in English, and in the event
of the Management willing to appoint him as Lecturer once again, the Management
should be permitted to do so by granting relaxation of rules and regulations. ]
CIVIL
APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2318 of 1985 From the Judgment and
Order dated 1.8.83 of the Gauhati High Court in S.A. No. 19 of 1978.
Appellant-in-person
D.N. Mukherjee for the Respondents.
The
Judgment of the Court was delivered by NATARAJAN, J'-' This appeal by special
leave is directed against a judgment of the Gauhati High Court rendered in
Second Appeal No. 19 of 1978. By a quirk of fate the appellant who was holding
a permanent post of Auditor in the Office of the Accountant General, Assam
resigned his job and took up appointment as a Lecturer in an aided college in Meghalya
only to find his appointment terminated in five months' time for want of
approval for the appointment by the Director 575 of Public Instruction. The backdrop
of events for this appeal are as narrated below.
The
appellant who was a confirmed Auditor in the Office of the Accountant General,
Assam responded to an advertisement in the Assam Tribune dated 21.2.75 and
offered himself as a candidate for appointment as a Lecturer in English in Lady
Keane Girls College, Shillong. Respondents 2 and 3 are respectively the
Principal and the President of the Governing Body of the said College. After
being interviewed along with other candidates on 27.3.75 the appellant was
selected for the post and was issued an order of appointment on 7.4.75. The
order of appointment, however, stated that the appointment was subject to the
approval of the Director of Public Instruction, Meghalya, the first respondent herein.
On the
appellant seeking clarification from the Principal about this condition he was
assured that the sanction of approval was a formality and there was no jeopardy
to his appointment. Acting on this assurance the appellant resigned his post in
the Accountant General's Office and joined the College on 2.5.75. To his shock
he received a communication from the Principal on 11.9.75 enclosing a copy of
letter of the first respondent dated 28.8.75 informing him that his services
would be terminated with effect from 17.9.75. By reason of the appellant's
representations the matter was kept in abeyance till 1.12.75 when he received a
further communication stating that his services were being terminated with
immediate effect for want of prior approval of the first respondent.
The
appellant filed a suit in the Court of the Assistant District Judge, Shillong
to challenge the order of termination and sought the reliefs of declaration and
permanent injunction. The trial court granted ad interim injunction and later
made it absolute and in terms thereof the appellant continued to be in service
till 20.4.77 on which date the trial court dismissed the suit and vacated the
injunction.
The
Assistant District Judge held that the appointment of the appellant without prior
approval of the Director of Public Instruction was irregular and furthermore
the appointment contravened the Government's Resolution regarding the
reservation of posts for backward sections of the people of the State and that
the policy applied to all Government institutions as well as private
institutions aided by the Government. The trial court further held that in any
event the appellant will not be entitled to a relief of declaration regarding
his continuance in service and that the remedy for the appellant under law, if
any, is to file a suit for damages for wrongful dismissal and seek reliefs.
576
The appellant preferred an appeal to the District Judge, Shillong. The learned
Appellate Judge held that except the oral testimony of the Deputy Director of
Public Instruction regarding the Government's reservation policy there was no
material on record to show the formation of any such policy and much less that
the policy of the Government had been published or even communicated to the
aided colleges prior to the appellant being appointed. The learned Judge also
held that in the absence of any notification or circular by the Government (of Meghalya)
showing that the Assam Aided Colleges Management Rules, 1965, had been adopted
it was not possible to hold that the Government had actually adopted the said
rules. The Appellate Judge, therefore, held that the Director of Public
Instruction had acted wrongly in refusing to give approval to the appellant's
appointment and as such the order of termination of service of the appellant
was manifestly wrong. In accordance with such findings the Appellate Judge
allowed the appeal and decreed the suit and declared the appellant's
continuance in service as a Lecturer in English in the second respondent's
college.
The judgment
and decree of the Appellate Judge was challenged in Second Appeal before the Gauhati
High Court by the first respondent. A learned Single Judge of the High Court
concurred with the findings of the Appellate Judge and held that the State of Meghalya had not adopted the Assam College
Management Rules, 1960 at the time of the appellant's appointment and as such
the termination of the services of the appellant was unlawful. However, on the
question of relief that can be granted to the appellant the learned Judge
differed from the view of the Appellate Judge and held that reinstatement of
the appellant in service was not possible as the appellant did not belong to
one of those categories for which alone reinstatement can be ordered viz.
(1)
Government servants,
(2) industrial
workmen and
(3) employees
of statutory bodies.
The
learned Judge, therefore, held that the appellant would only be entitled to
damages for wrongful termination of service. Even then after taking into
consideration the unnviable position of the appellant and his continuance in
service for about one and half years during the pendency of the suit, the
learned Judge awarded one year's salary and allowances as damages and disposed
of the appeal with the above said modification. It is against this judgment of
the High Court the appellant has preferred this appeal.
The
appellant appeared in person and argued the appeal before us. He contended that
neither in the advertisement made by the college authorities nor at the time of
the interview, nor in the order of 577 appointment was there anything to show
that the Government of Meghalya had adopted the Assam Aided College Management
Rules, 1965 and the Assam Aided College Employees Rules, 1960 and as such he
had reason to believe that when once the Selection Committee found him suitable
for the appointment he would be confirmed in the post of Lecturer after his
successful completion of probation. He further stated that he verified from ,he
Principal as to whether his appointment would be disapproved by the first
respondent for any reason and he was assured by the Principal that the sanction
of approval was only a formality and, therefore, his appointment would not be
in jeopardy in any manner. Having regard to all these factors he resigned his permanent
post in the office of the Accountant General, Assam and had devoted himself fully to his task as a Lecturer in
the college.
Therefore,
it was a rude shock to him when he was issued an order of termination of
service on the ground that the first respondent had not approved the
appointment. It was also urged by him that he had established in the trial of
the suit that his was the first case where approval was not given and that
there had been no previous instance of denial of approval of appointments made
in any of the aided colleges in the State of Meghalya. The appellant laid stress on the fact that the Appellate
Court as well as High Court have both sustained his contentions and held that
his appointment had not been made in contravention of any of the rules framed
by the Government and as such the refusal of the first respondent to approve
his appointment was wrong and the termination of his service was illegal. The
further submission of the appellant was that since the Appellate Court and the High
Court have found the termination of his service to be wrong and illegal, he
should have been granted the relief sought for in the suit viz. a declaration
that he continued to be in service all along and that he was entitled to
reinstatement with full back pay and allowances. The appellant also contended
that though the Lady Keane Girls College is a private institution it was being
provided aid by the Government and Government had full supervisory control over
it and as such the college is for all practical purposes a Government
institution and in such circumstances he is entitled to parity of treatment
with a Government servant wrongly removed from service. The prayer of the
appellant, therefore, was that he should be granted a declaration regarding his
continuance in service so as to entitle him to all the benefits ensuing from
such a declaration viz.
reinstatement
in service together with back pay, allowance 'and other benefits.
Opposing
the arguments of the appellant the learned counsel for the first respondent
argued that the Lady Keane Girls College is a 578 private institution and not a
Government institution, that merely because it receives aid from the Government
and the appointments made by the Management are subject to the approval of the
first respondent, the college would not become a Government institution nor can
the appellant claim parity of treatment with Government servants. The learned
counsel also stated that in spite of the findings of the Appellate Court and
the High Court that the termination of service of the appellant was wrongful,
the only remedy for the appellant is to file a suit and not to seek a
declaration of continuance in service because it would amount to seeking
specific performance of a contract of service.
We
have bestowed our anxious consideration to the arguments advanced by the
appellant because of the misfortune that has overtaken him partly due to his
own hasty action in resigning his permanent post and partly on account of the
first respondent disapproving the appellant's appointment on the basis of rules
which had not been formulated and communicated to the aided colleges. On an
examination we find that in spite of the sad plight of the appellant it will
not be possible to grant him a relief of declaration as sought for by him. The
reasons for our view may now be set out.
The
legal status of an employee in a privately managed college and whether a
contract for personal service can be specifically enforced came up for
consideration before this Court in Vaish College v. Lakshmi Narain, [1976] 2
S.C.R. 1006. The facts in that case were as follows. Vaish Degree College which
was registered under the Registration of Cooperative Societies Act was initial
affiliated to the Agra University and later to the Meerut University. A
Principal of the college who was appointed after obtaining formal approval of
the Vice-Chancellor was terminated from service about two years later. The
Principal challenged the order of termination in a suit filed by him on various
grounds and he sought for a declaration regarding his continuous in service.
The trial court dismissed the suit but the Appellate Court decreed the same. In
the second appeal there was a reference to a Full Bench regarding the
jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain the suit and eventually the second
appeal filed by the management was dismissed and the management came up in
appeal to this Court by special leave. This Court held that the Executive
Committee of the college was not a statutory body because it had not been created
by or under the statute and did not owe its existence to a statute. But on the
contrary it was a body which came into existence on its own and was only
governed by certain statutory provisions for the proper mainte579 nance and
administration of the institution. The Court summed up the law in the following
words: "It is, therefore, clear that there is a well marked distinction
between a body which is created by the statute and a body which after having
come into existence is governed in accordance with the provisions of the
statute.
In
other words the position seems to be that the institution concerned must owe
its very existence to a statute which would be the fountain-head of its powers.
The question in such cases to be asked is, if there is no statute would the
institution have any legal existence. If the answer is in the negative, then
undoubtedly it is a statutory body, but if the institution has a separate
existence of its own without any reference to the statute concerned but is
merely governed by the statutory provisions it cannot be said to be a statutory
body. The High Court, in our opinion, was in error in holding that merely
because the Executive Committee followed certain statutory provisions of the
University Act or the statutes made there under it must be deemed to be a
statutory body." The Court then proceeded to consider the next question
regarding a contract of personal service being specifically enforceable. After
referring to the decisions in S.R. Tewari v. District Board, Agra & Anr.,
[1964] 3 SCR 55, 59, Executive Committee of U.P. State Warehousing Corporation
Ltd. v. Chandra Kiran Tyagi, [1970] 2 SCR 250, 265; Bank of Baroda v. Jewan Lal
Mehrotra, [1970] 2 L.L.J. 54, 55 and Sirsi Municipality v. Kom Francis, [1973]
3 SCR 348, the Court held as follows:"On a consideration of the
authorities mentioned above, it is, therefore, clear that a contract of
personal service cannot ordinarily be specifically enforced and a Court
normally would not give a declaration that the contract subsists and the
employee, even after having been removed from service can be deemed to be in
service against the will and consent of the employer. This rule, however, is
subject to three well recognised exceptions---
(i) where
a public servant is sought to be removed from service in contravention of the
provisions of Art. 3 11 of the Constitution of India;
(ii) where
a worker is sought to be reinstated on being dismissed under the Industrial
Law; and
(iii) where
a 580 statutory body acts in breach of violation of the mandatory provisions of
the statute."
The
matter again came to be considered in the case of J. Tewari v. Jwala Devi Vidya
Mandir & Others, [1979] 4 SCC 160. In that case the appellant, Smt.J. Tewari
was appointed as the Headmistress of the Jwala Devi Vidya Mandir, Kanpur which was a Society registered
under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. Smt. J. Tewari who later became the
Principal of the institution challenged her order of suspension in an earlier
suit and her order of termination from service in a later suit. The second suit
was partly decreed by the trial judge and he upheld that the termination of
service of Mrs. J. Tewari was not legal and awarded her a sum of Rs. 15,250 as
arrears of pay for a period of 3 years together with interest and provident
fund contribution. The High Court confirmed the decree but held that the sum
awarded to her should be by way of damages and not towards arrears of salary
since Smt. J. Tewari will not be entitled to a declaration that she continued
to be in the service of the institution and to a consequent order of
reinstatement. In further appeal to this Court by certificate it was contended
that the institution was a statutory body and that Smt. J.
Tewari
was entitled to a declaration regarding her continuance in service. This Court
repelled the contention and held that the Vidya Mandir, in spite of being
governed by the University regulations and the provisions of the Education Code
framed by the State Government and also being aided by educational grants, still
constituted only a private institution and as such Smt. J. Tewari would only be
entitled to a decree for damages, if her dismissal was wrongful and not to an
order of reinstatement or a declaration that notwithstanding the termination of
her services she continued to be in service.
The
law enunciated in these decisions stand fully attracted to this case also. Even
though the Lady Keane Girls College may be governed by the statutes of the
University and the Education Code framed by the Government of Meghalya and even
though the college may be receiving financial aid from the Government it would
not be a statutory body because it has not been created by any statute and its
existence is not dependent upon any statutory provision.
The
appellant, however, placed reliance on another decision of this Court in I.R.
Gupta v. Inter College, Thora, [1984] 3 SCR 752. In that case Shri I.P. Gupta
who was appointed as Principal of the college on probation for one year was
placed on further probation for one more year.
During
the period of the extended probation his services 581 were terminated. Although
the order of termination was innocuous in its terms it was accompanied by an
enclosure containing the resolution of the Managing Committee with a reference
therein to an adverse report given by the Manager against the Principal. It
was, therefore, contended that the order of termination cast a stigma on the
Principal and hence his services ought not to have been terminated without due
notice and enquiry. It was this contention which was the principal issue in
that case. Dealing with that contention this Court found that the college was
an institution recognised under the Intermediate Education Act and was governed
by the provisions of the Act and the regulations made thereunder and that
Regulations 35 to 38 prescribed the procedure to be followed before the
services of an employee can be terminated by way of punishment. The management,
however, did not follow the procedure prescribed by the regulations which were
virtually the same as provided by Article 311(2) of the Constitution. This
Court, therefore, held that the principles which should govern the case should
be the same as those underlying Article 311(2). It was in that view of the
matter this Court allowed the appeal and restored the judgment of the Single
Judge of the High Court declaring that the appellant contained to be in the
service of the college and that he was entitled to all the benefits flowing
from the declaration including the salary and allowances as if there was no
break in his service. The facts of the above said case are clearly
distinguishable because the case pertained to termination of service by way of
disciplinary action. In the instant case there is no such violation of the
provisions of any Act or any Regulations made there under. This is a case where
the first respondent had proceeded on the erroneous assumption that the Assam
Aided College Employees Rules, 1960 and the Assam Aided College Management
Rules, 1965 had been adopted by the State of Meghalya and therefore, the
appellant's appointment was in contravention of the rules and consequently he
should decline to approve the appointment of the appellant. No doubt his action
has been held to be wrongful but even so it is not in contravention of any
statutory provisions or regulations or procedural rules. We are, therefore,
unable to accept the appellant's contention that he should be granted a
declaration that he continues to be in the service of the college and that he
is entitled to all the benefits flowing from the declaration.
Notwithstanding
this conclusion we feel that the peculiar facts of the case which are indeed
distressing, call for some relief being given to the appellant instead of a
brusque dismissal of the appeal on account of the legal impediments for
granting the relief of declaration of his continuance in service. We have
already set out the tragic situa582 tion that has resulted on account of the
appellant's services being terminated after he had closed his options to revert
back to his service in the Accountant General's Office. The trial court which
dismissed the suit and the High Court which has modified the decree of the
Appellate Court have also noticed this position and expressed their compassion
for the appellant. It was on account of that the High Court has granted
monetary compensation of one year's salary to the appellant as damages. We
think that in the fact and circumstances of the case and in exercise of our
powers under Article 136 of the Constitution we should enlarge the relief
granted to the appellant by the High Court by directing the State of Meghalya
represented by the first respondent to grant 3 years' salary and allowances to
the appellant at the rates prevalent when his services were terminated on
1.12.75. Though the appellant had remained in service till 20.4.77 in spite of
the termination order, the salary payable for that period is towards the
services actually rendered by him in the college. Hence no portion of that
amount can be treated as damages. If the appellant has not been paid the salary
and allowances for any portion of the period between 1.12.75 to 20.4.77, the
first respondent is further directed to release such sums of money as would be
required to make good the unpaid salary and allowances.
We
give this direction because we find a letter in the paper book written by the
second respondent stating that they are unable to pay the salary and allowances
due to the appellant on account of non-release of funds by the first
respondent.
The
first respondent will make the payments indicated above on or before 30th June,
1987. The grant of this relief will be in consonance with the reliefs granted
by this Court to the affected parties in Vaish College case (supra) and Smt. J.
Tewari's case (supra). In the former case the Principal whose services were
terminated was allowed to retain a total sum of Rs.21,100 deposited by the
Educational Institution under orders of court during the pendency of the
proceedings. In the latter case Smt. J. Tewari had been granted 3 years' salary
by way of damages. In addition to the payment of the abovesaid sums we also
direct that in the event of there being a vacancy in the Lady Keane Girls
College for the post of Lecturer in English and in the event of the Management
willing to appoint the appellant as a Lecturer once again the Management should
be permitted to do so by the first respondent by granting relaxation of rules
and regulations currently in force governing the filling up of posts of
Lecturers in aided colleges in the State of Meghalya. To the extent, additional
reliefs are given to the appellant the appeal will stand allowed. The appellant
will be entitled to costs in the appeal payable by the first respondent.
P.S.S.
Appeal allowed.
Back