Smt.
Gulwant Kaur & ANR Vs. Mohinder Singh & Ors [1987] INSC 178 (20 July
1987)
REDDY,
O. CHINNAPPA (J) REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J) SHETTY, K.J. (J)
CITATION:
1987 AIR 2251 1987 SCR (3) 576 1987 SCC (3) 674 JT 1987 (3) 121 1987 SCALE
(2)82
CITATOR
INFO : D 1991 SC1581 (9,10)
ACT:
Hindu
Succession Act, 1956--Section 14--Hindu lady receiving land from husband in
lieu of maintenance--Sufficient title to enable ripening of possession into
full ownership.
HEADNOTE:
The
appellant-wife and her husband were estranged and living apart. The husband, by
a letter dated July 28, 1956, entrusted .to the appellant the land in dispute
along with another piece of land and a house and agreed to pay a sum of Rs.100
per mouth for her maintenance. After a few years, the husband conceived the
idea of selling the land in dispute.
The
appellant protested by her letter dated June 15, 1966 and implored him not to
sell the land. Despite this, the husband sold the said land to the
plaintiff-respondents.
The
purchaser instituted a suit for an injunction re- straining the appellants from
interfering with possession, which was contested initially on the ground that
the land had been gifted to the appellant orally by the husband, and that title
had been acquired by adverse possession. Later, the written statement was
amended and a further plea was taken that the said land had been given in lieu
of maintenance and that she had become the absolute owner of the land under
Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act. All courts found that there was no oral
gift.
A
Single Judge of the High Court held that the land was given to the appellant by
her husband in lieu of maintenance and that by Section 14 of the Hindu
Succession Act, she had become full owner of the property.
On
appeal under the Letters Patent, a Division Bench of the High Court held that
"The reading of the letter left no meaning of doubt that there was never
any intention on the part of the husband to give away the land to the lady and
that instead of sending the total amount in cash he allowed her to utilise the
amount of ckakota for meeting her day to day expenses", that she did not
at all acquire any such right or interest in the property as could be termed
'limited ownership' so as to permit 577 her to take the benefit of the
provisions of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, that "if the
husband had given over the land in dispute completely to the lady, then the
question of sending more money could not have arisen" and reversed the
Judgment of the Single Judge.
The
appellant appealed to this Court. On behalf of the respondents, it was
contended that even if the land was given to the appellant in lieu of
maintenance, it must be established that what was given to her was a limited
estate in the sense of ownership without the right of alienation and that under
Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act only such a limited estate would blossom
into an absolute estate.
Allowing
the appeal, this Court,
HELD:
1.1 Section 14 is aimed at removing restrictions or limitations on the right of
a female Hindu to enjoy, as a full owner, property possessed by her so long as
her possession is traceable to a lawful origin, that is to say, if she has a
vestige of a title. It makes no difference whether the property is acquired by inheritance
or devise or at a partition or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance
or by gift or by her own skill or exertion or by purchase or by prescription or
in any other manner whatsoever. The Explanation to the Section expressly refers
to property acquired in lieu of maintenance and the widow is not required to
establish her further title before she could claim full owner- ship, under
Section 14(1) in respect of property given to her and possessed by her in lieu
of maintenance. [582F-H]
1.2
The very right to receive maintenance is sufficient title to enable the
ripening of possession into full owner- ship if she is in possession of the
property in lieu of maintenance. Sub-section (2) of Section 14 is in the nature
of an exception to Section 14(1) and provides for a situation where property is
acquired by a female Hindu under a written instrument or a decree of court and
not where such acquisition is traceable to any antecedent right. [582H; 583A]
2.
If a female Hindu is put in possession of property pursuant to or in
recognition of a right to maintenance, it cannot be denied that she has
acquired a limited right or interest in the property and once that position is
accepted, it follows that the right gets enlarged to full ownership under Section
14(1) of the Act. That is clear from the language of Section 14(1) of the Act.
[586B-C]
3.1
In the instant case, the question was not whether the husband 578 intended to
give away the land in dispute absolutely but whether the land was given to her
in lieu of maintenance. A perusal of the letters exchanged between the husband
and the appellant-wife clearly establishes that the land in dispute was given
by the husband in lieu of maintenance. The Division Bench of the High Court was
wrong in making distinction between day-to-day expenses and maintenance.
[581F-G]
3.2
It is rather late in the day to contend that the land which was given to the
appellant in lieu of maintenance did not vest in her absolutely. [586F] [The
Judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court set aside and that of the
Single Judge restored. ] Eramma v. Verrupanna & Ors., [1966] 2 SCR 626,
distin- guished. Badri Pershad v. Smt. Kanso Devi, [1970] 2 SCR 95;
Naraini
Devi v. Smt. Rano Devi and Ors., [1976] 3 SCR 55; V. Tulasamma & Ors. vs.
V. Sesha Reddi (Dead) by L.Rs., [1977] 3 SCR 261; Bai Vajia (Dead) by L.R.S. v.
Thakorbhai Chelabhai and Ors., [1979] 3 SCR 291; Santhanam v. Subramanya AIR
1977 SC 2024 and Jagannathan Pillai v. Kunjithapadam Pillai, [1987] 2 SCC 572,
referred to.
Civil
Appellate Jurisdiction: Civil Appeal No. 1112 of 1980.
From
the Judgment and Order dated 13.5. 1980 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in
L.P.A. No. 521 of 1976. Ms. Kamini Jaiswal for the Appellants.
V.M.
Tarkunde, Harbans Singh and S.K. Bagga for the Respondents.
The
Judgment of the Court was delivered by CHINNAPPA REDDY, J. Major General Gurbux
Singh and his wife Gulwant Kaur were estranged and were living apart.
Their
son and daughter-in-law were living with Gulwant Kaur at Chandigarh. Gulwant
Kaur was apparently complaining that Major General Gurbux Singh was not
providing her with adequate maintenance. Therefore, on July 28, 1958, he wrote
her a letter, the relevant parts of which are as follows:.
579
"To, Shrimati Gulwant Kaur, You have been complaining that I have not paid
even a penny for maintenance for the last seven/eight months. Here is an
account from November 1957 to July, 1958, the details of which run as under:
XXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXX XXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXX Now, so far as the question of
future expenses is concerned, the maintenance shall be like this:
FOR
YOURSELF:
1.
The land and house situated at Mangwal, which was constructed with the earning
of my whole life, is entrusted to you, the half portion of which already stands
in your name and in lieu of the produce thereof Madanjit shall provide to you,
if not more, free lodging and boarding (expenses for maintenance). You stay in
your own home.
2.
The land at Khurana is also entrusted to you. Its produce, lease money, etc.
will fetch you a minimum of Rs. 1200 annually i.e. Rs. 100 per month for
maintenance.
3.
I shall pay Rs. 100 every month for maintenance.
xxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx XXXXXX The letter of Gurbux Singh suggested that
he was making adequate provision for meeting the expenses of Gulwant Kaur even
at the cost of great inconvenience and discomfort to himself and so. Gulwant
Kaur was not entitled to complain.
Gulwant
Kaur apparently felt disgusted and frustrated at the tone of the letter and by
her letter dated August 5, 2958, she queried if she was not to take maintenance
from 580 Gurbux Singh from who else was she to get any maintenance.
She
said that she was not demanding anything and made no claim on him and that
everything including the land and kothi belonged to him. The Khurana land also
belonged to him. He might give her maintenance or not give her maintenance as
he chose. She said that she was nothing more than a heap of dust and her life
was not worth living. In another portion of the letter, she mentioned that the
Khurana land had not yet been leased and that there had been some delay.
Other
correspondence passed between the parties which is not important for the
present case. Later, after a few years, Gurbux Singh conceived the idea of
selling the Khurana land.
The
wife protested. Her letter dated January 15, 1966 was as follows:- "Most
respected husband, Sat Siri Akal; Previously in the summer, Col. Gurcharan Singh
told us that you want to sell the land of Khurana. Now, on the day you visited
Sangrur, it was learnt from you that you were interested in selling the land. I
also told you that we depend upon only that.
This
land was given to me by you voluntarily.
You
had written letters to me and Madanjit on July 28, 1958 copy whereof is being
sent to you by me. Therein, it was decided that I would continue enjoying the
produce thereof till my life. Now, on hearing that you want to sell it, I was
very much shocked ................ Now this letter is being written to you in
order to impress upon you not to sell the land of Khurana because Madanjit and
I depend upon it. You are very well aware that we do not possess anything else
................... I fully hope that you will continue giving me this land and
the maintenance grants to me as per your decision and will not think of selling
this land. You are aware how we are hardly maintaining ourselves. I have made
this prayer to you. I have full right over it. I hope that you will reply
soon." Gulwant Kaur's letter did not have any effect on Major General
Gurbux Singh. Instead of replying her, he sold the Khurana land to the
plaintiff-respondents on June 18, 1968.
The
purchaser instituted the present suit out of which the appeal arises for an
injunction restraining Gulwant Kaur and Madanjit Singh from interfering with
their possession. The defendants contested the suit initially on the ground
that the 581 land had been gifted to Gulwant Kaur orally by Major General Gurbux
Singh. It was also claimed that Gulwant Kaur had acquired title by adverse
possession. Later the written statement was amended and a further plea was
taken that the land in dispute had been given to Gulwant Kaur in lieu of
maintenance and that she had become the absolute owner of the land under sec.
14 of the Hindu Succession Act. All the courts found that there was no oral
gift. A learned single Judge of the High Court who heard the second appeal held
that the Khurana Land was given to Gulwant Kaur by her husband Major General
Gurbux Singh in lieu of maintenance and that by virtue of sec. 14 of the Hindu
Succession Act, she had become full owner of the property. On an appeal under
the Letters Patent, a Division Bench of the High Court of Punjab & Haryana
held that Gulwant Kaur was merely al- lowed to receive the proceeds of the land
in dispute in order to meet her day-to-day expenses and that she did not at all
acquire any such right or interest in the property as could be termed 'limited
ownership' so as to permit her to take the benefit of the provisions of sec.
14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act. According to the learned Judges, "If
the General had given over the land in dispute completely to the lady then the
question of sending more money could not have arisen ..... The reading of the
letter leaves no manner of doubt that there was never any intention on the part
of the General to give away the land of village Khurana to the lady and that
instead of sending the total amount in cash, the General allowed her to utilise
the amount of ckakota for meeting her day-to-day expenses." The Division
Bench reversed the judgment of the learned Single Judge.
We
are unable to agree with the conclusions of the Division Bench of the High
Court. The question was not whether Major General Gurbux Singh intended to give
away the Khurana land absolutely to Gulwant Kaur but whether the land was given
to her in lieu of maintenance. A perusal of the letter dated July 28, 1958 from
Major General Gurbux Singh to Gulwant Kaur and the letter dated January 15,
1966 clearly establish that the Khurana land was given to Gulwant Kaur by
Gurbux Singh in lieu of her maintenance. We are unable to understand the
distinction made by the High Court between day-today expenses and maintenance. It
was argued by Shri Tarkunde, learned counsel for the respondents that even if
the land was given to Gulwant Kaur in lieu of maintenance, it must be
established that what was given to her was a limited estate in the sense of
ownership without the right of alienation and that under sec. 14 of the Hindu
Succession Act only such a limited estate would blossom into an absolute
estate. We are unable to agree with the submission of Shri Tarkunde. Shri 582
Tarkunde invited our attention to some decisions of this court as supporting
the preposition stated by him. We will presently refer to all of them.
Sec.
14 of the Hindu Succession Act is as follows:
"(1)
Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the
commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as
a limited owner.
Explanation--In
this sub-section, "property" includes both movable and immovable
property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or devise, or at a
partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift from
any person, whether a relative or not, before, at or after her marriage, or by
her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other
manner whatsoever, and also any such property held by her as stridhana
immediately before the commencement of this Act.
(2)
Nothing contained in sub- section (1) shall apply to any property acquired by
any of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a decree or order
of a civil court or under an award where the terms of the gift, will or other
instrument or the decree, order or award prescribe a restricted estate in such
property." It is obvious that sec. 14 is aimed at removing restric tions
or limitations on the right of a female Hindu to enjoy, as a full owner,
property possessed by her so long as her possession is traceable to a lawful
origin, that is to say, if she has a vestige of a title. It makes no difference
whether the property is acquired by inheritance or devise or at a partition or in
lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance or by gift or by her own skill or
exertion or by purchase or by prescription or in any other manner whatsoev- er.
The explanation expressly refers to property acquired in lieu of maintenance
and we do not see what further title the widow is required to establish before
she can claim full ownership under sec. 14(1) in respect of property given to
her and possessed by her in lieu of maintenance. The very right to receive
maintenance is sufficient title to enable the ripening of possession into full
ownership if she is in possession of the property in lieu of maintenance.
Sub-sec.
2
of sec. 14 is in the nature of an exception to sec.
583
14(1) and provides for a situation where property is ac- quired by a female Hindu
under a written instrument or a decree of court and not where such acquisition
is traceable to any antecedents right.
In
Bramma v. Verrupanna, [1966] 2 SCR 626 on the death of the last male holder,
his two step mothers who had no vestige of title to the properties got
possession of the properties and in answer to a suit by the rightful heirs, one
of them claimed that she had become full owner of the property under sec. 14 of
the Hindu Succession Act. The Supreme Court pointed out that the object of sec.
14 was to extinguish the estate called limited estate and to make a Hindu woman
who would otherwise be a limited owner, a full owner of the property but it was
not to confer a title on a female Hindu, who did not in fact possess any
vestige of title. The case did not deal with the case of Hindu a woman who was
given property in lieu of maintenance and in whom therefore a right or interest
was created in the property.
In
Badri Pershad v, Smt, Kanso Devi, [1970] 2 SCR 95.
The
Court pointed out that a Hindu widow who after the death of her husband
obtained properties under a partition award between herself and her sons, would
be entitled to an abso- lute estate under sec. 14(1) of the Act and that merely
because the partition was by means of an arbitration award, sec. 14(2) would
not be attracted. It was made clear that sec. 14(2) was in the nature of a
proviso or an exception to sec. 14(1) and that it came into operation only if
the Hindu woman required the property in any of the methods indicated therein
for the first time without their being any pre- existing right in her to the
property. The principle of the case far from supporting Shri Tarkunde's
submission supports the submission of the appellants, In Naraini Devi v. Smt.
Rano Devi and Ors., [1976] 3 SCR 55 the case of Badri Pershad v. Smt. Kanso
Devi (supra) was distinguished on the ground that the widow had no pre-exist-
ing right in the property which she obtained under an award and therefore, the
case fell squarely within sec. 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act.
In
Tulasamma v. Sesha Reddi, [1977] 3 SCR 261, it was clearly laid down that sec.
14(1) would be applicable to property given to a female Hindu in lieu of
maintenance. It was also made clear that sec. 14(2) would apply only to cases
where the acquisition of property was made by a Hindu female without any
pre-existing right. It was said.
"It
will, therefore, be seen that sub-sec. (1) of sec.
584
14 is large in its amplitude and covers every kind of acqui- sition of property
by a female Hindu including acquisition in lieu of maintenance and where such
property was possessed by her at the date of commencement of the Act or
subsequently acquired and possessed, she would become the full owner of the
property. Now, sub-section (2) of sec. 14 provides that nothing contained in
sub-sec. (1) shall apply to another property acquired by way of gift or under a
will or any instrument or under a decree by order of a civil court or under an
award when the terms of the gift, will or other instrument or the decree, order
or award prescribed a restricted estate in such property. This provision is
more in the nature of a proviso or an exception to sub-sec. (1) and it was
regarded as such by this court in Badri Pershad v. Kanso Devi (supra)
...................................
...........................................................
It
is, therefore, clear that under the Shastric Hindu Law a widow has a right to
be maintained out of joint family property and this right would ripen into a
charge if the widow takes the necessary steps for having her maintenance
ascertained and specifically charged in the joint family property and even if
no specific charge is created, this right would be enforceable against joint
family property in the hands of a volunteer or a purchaser taking it with
notice of her claim. The right of the widow to be maintained is of course not a
jus in rem, since it does not give her any interest in the joint family
property but it is certainly jus ad rem, i.e., a right against the joint family
property. Therefore, when specific property is allotted to the widow in lieu of
her claim for maintenance, the allotment would be in satisfaction of her jusad
rem, namely, the right to be maintained out of the joint family property. It
would not be a grant for the first time without any preexisting right, in the
widow. The widow would be getting the property in virtue of her pre-existing
right, the instrument giving the property being merely a document effectuating
such pre-existing right and not making a grant of the property to her for the
first time without any antecedent right 'or title. There is also another
consideration which is very relevant to this issue and it is that, even if the
instrument were silent as to the nature of the interest given 585 to the widow
in the property and did not, in so many terms, prescribe that she would have a
limited interest, she would have no more than a limited interest in the
property under the Hindu Law 'as it stood prior to the enactment of the Act and
hence a provision in the instrument prescribing that she would have only a
limited interest in the property would be, to quote the words of this Court in
Nirmal Chand's case (supra), "merely recording the true legal
position" and that would not attract the applicability of sub-section (2)
but would be governed by sub-section (1) of section 14. The conclusion is,
therefore, inescapable that where property is allotted to a widow under an
instrument, decree, order or award prescribes a restricted estate for her in
the property and sub-section (2) of section 14 would have no application in
such a case." In Bai Vajia v. Thakorbhai Chelabhai, [1979] 3 SCR 291, the
court referred to the earlier judgment in Tulsamma's case and said, "All
the three Judges were thus unanimous in accepting the appeal on the ground that
Tulsamma's right to maintenance was a pre-existing right, that it was in
recognition of such a right that she obtained property under the compromise and
that the compromise therefore did not fall within the ambit of sub-section (2)
of section 14 of the Act but would attract the provisions of sub- section (1)
thereof coupled with the Explanation thereto. With respect we find ourselves in
complete agreement with the conclusions arrived at by Bhagwati and Fazal Ali,
JJ., as also the reasons which weighed with them in coming to those
conclusions." Shri Tarkunde particulary relied on the following passage in
Bai Vajia v. Thakorbhai's case:
"A
plain reading of sub-section(1) makes it clear that the concerned Hindu female must
have limited ownership in property, which limited ownership would get enlarged
by the operation of that sub-section. If it was intended to enlarge any sort of
a right which could in no sense be described as ownership, the expression
"and not as a limited owner" would not have been used at all and
becomes redundant, which is against the well recognised 586 principle of
interpretation of statutes that the Legislature does not employ meaningless
language." We do not understand the court as laying down that what was
enlarged by sub-sec. 1 of sec. 14 into a full estate was the Hindu woman's
estate known to Hindu law. When the court uses the word 'limited estate', the
words are used to connote a right in the property to which the possession of
the female Hindu may be legitimately traced, but which is not a full right of
ownership. If a female Hindu is put in possession of property pursuant to or in
recognition of a right to maintenance, it cannot be denied that she has
acquired a limited right or interest in the property and once that position is
accepted, it follows that the right gets enlarged to full ownership under sec.
14(1) of the Act. That seems to us to follow clearly from the language of sec.
14(1)
of the Act.
In
Sellammal v. Nellammal, AIR 1977 SC 1265, the court held that property allotted
to a Hindu widow in lieu of her maintenance in recognition of her pre-existing
right became her the asbolute property.
In
Santnanam v. Subramanya, AIR 1977 SC 2024, it was again held that property in
the possession of a widow of the deceased coparcener which had been allotted to
her for life in lieu of maintenance without power of alienation became her
absolute property under s. 14(1) of the Act with powers of alienation.
In
Krishna Das v. Venkayya, AIR 1978 SC 36 1, it was reiterated that where a widow
was put in possession of joint family property in lieu of her right to
maintenance, her right to the property became enlarged into an absolute estate
under s. 14(1). We, therefore, think that it is rather late in the day for Shri
Tarkunde to contend that the Khurana land which was given to Gulwant Kaur in
lieu of maintenance did not vest in her absolutely.
We
may finally refer to a recent decision of this Court in Jagannathan Pillai v.
Kunjithapadam Pillai, [1987] 2 SCC 572 where Thakkar and Ray, JJ. pointed out.
"
On an analysis of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act of 1955, it is
evident that the legislature has abolished the concept of limited ownership in
respect of a Hindu female and has enacted that any property possessed by her
would thereafter be held by her as a full owner. Section 14(1) would come into
operation if the property 587 (Sic) at the point of time when she has an
occasion to claim or assert a title thereto.
Or,
in other words, at the point of time when her right to the said property is
called into question. The legal effect of section 14(1) would be that after the
coming into operation of the Act there would be no property in respect of which
it could be contended by anyone that a Hindu female is only a limited owner and
not a full owner. (We are for the moment not concerned with the fact that sub-
section(2) of section 14 which provides that Section 14(1) will not prevent
creating a restricted estate in favour of a Hindu female either by gift or will
or any instrument or decree of a civil court or award provided the very
document creating title unto her confers a restricted estate on her). There is
nothing in Section 14 which supports the proposition that a Hindu female should
be in actual physical possession or in constructive possession of any property
on the date of the coming into operation of the Act. The expression 'proposed'
has been used in the sense of having a right to the property or control over
the property. The expression 'any property possessed by a Hindu female whether
acquired before or after the commencement of the Act' on an analysis yields to
the following interpretation:
(1)
Any property possessed by a Hindu female acquired before the commencement of
the Act will be held by her as a full owner thereof and not as a limited owner.
(2)
Any property possessed by a Hindu female acquired after the commencement of the
Act will be held as a full owner thereof and not as a limited owner." In
view of the foregoing discussion, we allow the appeal, set aside the judgment
of the Division Bench of the High Court and restore that of the learned single
Judge.
N.P.V.
Appeal allowed.
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