Smt.
Shanti Sharma & Ors Vs. Smt. Ved Prabha & Ors [1987] INSC 229 (26
August 1987)
OZA,
G.L. (J) OZA, G.L. (J) MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J)
CITATION:
1987 AIR 2028 1987 SCR (3)1075 1987 SCC (4) 193 JT 1987 (3) 409 1987 SCALE
(2)393
ACT:
Delhi
Rent Control Act, 1958: Section 14(1)(e)--'If he is owner
thereof'--Interpretation of--Landlord constructing building on land taken on
lease from DDA--Whether landlord 'owner' and entitled to eviction--Cancellation
of the lease of land and subsequent staying of the cancellation--Effect of.
Words
and Phrases: 'Owner'--Meaning of.
HEADNOTE:
An
application was filed seeking eviction of the tenant-appellant by the
landlord-respondent on various grounds. The Rent Controller granted an order
for eviction only under Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act for bona
fide use and occupation. The order of the Rent Controller for eviction was
confirmed in appeal by the Tribunal.
Before
the High Court, it was contended on behalf of the appellant that as the lease of
the plot on which the building stood was cancelled by the DDA, the
landlord-respondent ceased to be the owner thereof and, therefore, the
requirement of Section 14(1)(e) was not satisfied and the respondent was not
entitled to the decree for eviction. The High Court held that the landlord,
whose lease had been terminated, but was in possession, continued to be a
tenant holding over and, therefore, he continued to be the owner, and
maintained the decree for eviction.
In
the appeal before this Court, it was contended on behalf of the appellant that
in order to get a decree for eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement,
the landlord must establish that he was the owner of such property, that where
the property was built up on a plot of land taken on lease from the Delhi
Development Authority, it could not be said that the landlord was the owner of
the property and that as the lease had been terminated, the landlord could not
claim to be the owner of the property, and, therefore, the decree for eviction on
ground of bona fide requirement could not be maintained.
1076
On behalf of the respondent it was contended that although notice was issued,
but subsequently the matter remained stayed and the respondent-landlord
continued to be in possession and did not cease to be the owner of the
property, that whole of the premises in question did not stand on the plot,
lease of which had been cancelled by DDA and a major part of. the premises
stood on another plot which continued to be on lease in favour of the respondent,
and that the tenant was estopped from challenging the title of the landlord, as
the relationship of the landlord and tenant was admitted and it was not open to
the tenant to contend that the respondent-landlord had no title to the
property.
Dismissing
the appeal, this Court
HELD:
The word "owner" has not been defined in the Delhi Rent Control Act.
[1081E] The term "owner" has to be understood in the context of the
background of the law and what is contemplated in the scheme of the Act. The
Act has been enacted for protection of the tenants. But, at the same time, it
has provided that the landlord under certain circumstances will be entitled to
eviction and bona fide requirement is one of such grounds.
[1081G-H;
1082D] Ordinarily, the concept of the ownership may be absolute ownership in
the land as well as of the structure standing thereon. But in the modern
context, where all lands belong to the State, the persons who hold properties
will only be lessees or the persons holding the land on some term from the
Government or the authorities constituted by the State. The legislature, when
it used the term "owner" in s. 14(1)(e), did not think of ownership
as absolute ownership.
[1081F-G]
The meaning of the term "owner" is vis-a-vis the tenant i.e. the owner
should be something more than the tenant. In cases where the plot of land is
taken on lease, the structure is built by the landlord and he is the owner of
the structure. So far as the land is concerned, he holds the long lease and as
against the tenant he will fail within the ambit of the meaning of the term
"owner" as contemplated under s. 14(1)(e). [1082B-C] In the instant
case, although there were some proceedings for the cancellation of the lease,
the lease had not come to an end. No steps have been taken for disposition and
only the formality of depositing the penalties and filing of the Indemnity Bond
remained to be done, on fulfilling which the lease would he restored in the
name of the legal 1077 representatives. Therefore, it could not be said that
the respondent landlord had ceased to be the owner of the premises. [1085G-H,
1086B] T.C. Rekhi v. Smt. Usha Gujaral, [1971] Rent Control Journal Page 322 at
326, referred to.
CIVIL
APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2935 of 1981.
From
the Judgment and Order dated 5.5. 1981 of the Delhi High Court in S.A.O. No.
366 of 1980.
Shankar
Ghosh and B.P. Maheshwari for the Appellants.
A.B.
Rohtagi, C.L. Sahu, Jose Verghese and O.P. Verma for the Respondents.
The
Judgment of the Court was delivered by OZA, J. This appeal has been filed after
grant of special leave in this Court by the tenant-appellant challenging a
decree for eviction.
It
appears that the respondent-landlord filed an application for eviction before
the Rent Controller, Delhi on various grounds. The Rent Controller who heard
the petition of the respondent rejected the petition on other grounds but only
granted an order for eviction under Section 14(1)(e) i.e. the premises were
bona fide required by the respondent-landlord for their own residence. It is
not disputed that these premises are residential and the courts below, the
trial court and the appellate court both came to the conclusion that the
respondent-landlord has established his bona fide requirement and on these
findings the order of eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement under
Sec. 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 has been maintained.
Before
the Tribunal a contention was advanced that the appellant-tenant had come to
know that the Delhi Development Authority ('DDA' for short) has cancelled the
lease in favour of the respondent-landlord and therefore the respondent ceased
to be the owner of the property and as such is not entitled to a decree for
eviction under Sec. 14(1)(e).
The
landlord-respondent, on the other hand, contended that as a small portion of
the premises in occupation of the appellant-tenant is on another plot which
under the conditions 1078 of the DDA was meant for non-residential purposes and
in this view of the matter a notice for cancellation of the lease was given but
on representation made by the respondent-landlord the DDA has stayed further
action and it therefore could not be contended that the lease has been
terminated by the DDA or that the respondent has ceased to be the owner of the
property in question. The learned Tribunal therefore repelled the contention
advanced by the tenant appellant before it and maintained the order of the Rent
Controller for eviction.
Before
the High Court the contention advanced on behalf of the appellant was that as
the lease of the plot on which the building stands is cancelled by the DDA the
landlord i.e. the respondent ceases to be the owner thereof and in this view of
the matter, it was contended that the requirement of Sec. 14(1)(e) of the Act
is not satisfied and therefore the respondent is not entitled to the decree for
eviction.
The
High Court after considering circumstances and the affidavit filed by one of
the appellants that the lease was cancelled but the proceedings for taking
possession have been stayed on a representation made by the landlord,
considered the question and felt that the landlord whose lease has been
terminated but is in possession as possession has not been taken, he continues
to be a tenant holding over and on that basis came to the conclusion that it
could not be held that he ceases to be the owner and did not accept the
contention advanced by the appellant and maintained the decree for eviction.
Before
us on the basis of language of Section 14(1)(e) the learned counsel for the
appellant contended that in order to get a decree for eviction on the ground of
bona fide requirement the landlord must establish that he is the owner of such
property and learned counsel attempted to contend that where the property is
built up on a plot of land taken on lease from the Delhi Development Authority
it could not be said that the landlord is the owner of the property and on this
basis an attempt was made to contend that no eviction could be sought on the
ground of bona fide requirement. Although learned counsel had to concede that
in the Act itself the word 'owner' has not been defined and in the modern
context it could not be contended that merely because the property situated on
a plot of land taken on long lease that the landlord could not be said to be
the owner. The other contention advanced on behalf of the appellant was that as
there was a notice from the DDA cancelling the lease of the respondent-landlord
and as the lease has been cancelled of the plot of land on which part of the premises
in dispute stands the landlord-respondent is not entitled to this decree for
eviction.
1079
It is admitted that this question was not raised in the trial court and the
parties had no opportunity to lead evidence. It is only based on two papers and
an affidavit which has been considered by the High Court. On the basis of these
papers what appears to be, is that notice was issued to the landlord for
cancellation of the lease and later on their representation the further
proceedings have been stayed and it has been further observed in the subsequent
paper from the DDA that the Authority is considering the restoration of the
lease on the basis of payment of penalty or other dues that may ultimately be
settled. It is nobody's case that ultimately the matter has been disposed of
and it is also not in dispute that the landlord-respondent's possession has not
been taken by the DDA. It is also. not in dispute that although the land
beneath the property is of the DDA given on lease to the landlord but the
structure thereupon is of the ownership of the respondent-landlord. It is also
not in dispute that the portion of the premises only stands on the plot of land
the lease of which is alleged to have been cancelled but later on the
proceedings for restoration are pending and the matter has been stayed. Nothing
further has taken place.
Arguments
were advanced at length on behalf of appellant that as the lease has been
terminated and therefore the landlord could not claim to be the owner of the
property and therefore the decree for eviction on the ground of bona fide
requirement could not be maintained. Learned counsel for the respondent, on the
other hand, contended that although some notice appears to have been issued but
subsequently the matter remains stayed and admittedly the respondent-landlord
continues to be in possession and therefore it could not be said that the
respondent ceases to be the owner of the property. It was also contended on
behalf of the respondent that unless and until the respondent's possession is
taken it could not be said that he ceases to be the owner as possession is
substantially the ownership of the property.
It
was also contended by learned counsel for the respondent that even if the lease
of the respondent-landlady is terminated by the DDA, DDA has to file a suit for
possession and so long as she continues to be in possession, it could not be
said that she is not the owner of the property.
It
was also contended that the premises in question do not stand on the plot the
lease of which has been cancelled but it is only a small portion of the
premises standing on that plot as apparently the plot Nos. 34 & 35 are both
allotted to the respondent and the property in dispute stands on these two
plots, the major part of the premises in question stands on No. 34 whereas a
small portion stands 1080 on No. 35 and it is alleged that the proceedings or
the notice for termination of the lease pertain to plot No. 35 and on this
basis it was contended that as the major part of the plot on which the premises
stand continues to be on lease in favour of the respondent the contention that
respondent ceases to be the owner of the property is of no avail to the
appellant.
It
was also contended on behalf of the respondent that the tenant is estopped from
challenging the title of the landlord and as the relationship of landlord and
tenant is admitted, it is not open to the tenant to contend that the
respondent-landlord has no title to the property. Counsel for parties also
referred to some decisions on the question of Transfer of Property Act,
ownership and also on the question of estoppels.
Sec.
14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act reads as under:
"14(1)
xxx xxx xxx Provided that the Controller, may, on an application made to him in
the prescribed manner, make an order for the recovery of possession of the
premises on one or more of the following grounds only, namely:(a) to (d) xxx
xxx xxx (e) that the premises let for residential purposes are required bona
fide by the landlord for occupation as a residence for himself or for any
member of his family dependent on him, if he is the owner thereof, or for any
person for whose benefit the premises are held and that the landlord or such
person has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation;
Explanation--For
the purposes of this clause "premises let for residential purposes"
include any premises which having been let for use as a residence are, without
the consent of the landlord, used incidentally for commercial or other
purposes;
xx
xxx xxx ' ' The phrase used in this provision is "if he is the owner
thereof" and it 1081 is on the basis of these words that the present
controversy has been raised and it appears to be the only point on the basis of
which the learned counsel for the appellant had argued this appeal.
As
regards the first contention that the word 'owner' thereof indicates absolute
ownership and where property stands on a plot of land taken on long lease from
the DDA, it could not be said that he is the owner thereof and therefore the
eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement under Section 14(1)(e) could
not be granted.
Admittedly
if this contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is accepted in
Delhi more than 50% of the properties stand on leasehold plots and therefore it
would not be possible for any landlord to seek an order or decree for eviction
on the ground of bona fide requirement. It appears that it is therefore clear
that if the Legislature had this narrow meaning of ownership in mind. it would
not have used it, as it could not be contended that the Legislature did not
keep in view that in most of the modern township in India the properties stand
on plots of land leased out either by the Govt. or the Development Authorities
and therefore it was not contemplated that for a11 such properties the landlord
or the owner of the property used in common parlance will not be entitled to
eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement and it is in this context that
we have to examine this contention.
The
word 'owner' has not been defined in this Act and the word 'owner' has also not
been defined in the Transfer of Property Act. The contention of the learned
counsel for the appellant appears to be is that ownership means absolute
ownership in the land as well as of the structure standing thereupon.
Ordinarily, the concept of ownership may be what is contended by the counsel
for the appellant but in the modern context where it is more or less admitted
that all lands belong to the State, the persons who hold properties will only
be lessees or the persons holding the land on some term from the Govt. or the
authorities constituted by the State and in this view of the matter it could
not be thought of that the Legislature when it used the term 'owner' in the
provision of Sec. 14(1)(e) it thought of ownership as absolute ownership. It
must be presumed that the concept of ownership only will be as it is understood
at present. It could not be doubted that the term 'owner' has to be understood
in the context of the background of the law and what is contemplated in the
scheme of the Act. This Act has been enacted for protection of the tenants. But
at the same time it has provided that the landlord under certain circumstances
will be entitled to eviction and bona fide requirement is one of such grounds
on the basis of which landlords have been permitted to have eviction of a
tenant. In this context, the phrase 'owner' thereof has to be understood, and
it is clear that what is contemplated is that where the person builds up his
property and lets out to the tenant and subsequently needs it for his own use,
he should be entitled to an order or decree for eviction, the only thing
necessary for him to prove is bona fide requirement and that he is the owner
thereof, In this context, what appears to be the meaning of the term 'owner' is
vis-a-vis the tenant i.e. the owner should be something more than the tenant.
Admittedly in these cases where the plot of land is taken on lease the
structure is built by the landlord and admittedly he is the owner of the
structure. So far as the land is concerned he holds a long lease and in view of
the matter as against the tenant it could not be doubted that he will fall
within the ambit of the meaning of the term 'owner' as is contemplated under
this Section. This term came up for consideration before the Delhi High Court
and it was also in reference to Section 14(1)(e) and it was held by the Delhi
High Court in T.C. Rekhi v. Smt. Usha Gujral, [1971] Rent Control Journal Page
322 at 326 as under:
"The
word "owner" as used in this clause, has to be construed in the
background of the purpose and object of enacting it. The use of the word
'owner' in this clause seems to me to have been inspired by the definition of
the word 'landlord' as contained in section 2(e) of the Act which is wide
enough to include a person receiving or entitled to receive the rent of any premises
on account of or on behalf of or for the benefit of any other person. Construed
in the context in which the word "owner" is used in clause (e), it
seems to me to include all persons in the position of Smt. Usha Gujaral who
have taken a long lease of sites from the Government for the purpose of
building houses thereon. The concept of ownership seems now to be eclipsed by
its social and political significance and the idea of ownership, in case like
the present is one of the better Right to be in possession and to obtain it. To
accede to the contention raised by Shri Kapur would virtually nullify the
effect of clause (e) and would render all such landlords remedy less against
tenants however badly they may need the premises for their own personal residence.
I do not think such a result was intended by the Legislature and I repel the
appellant's contention. I consider it proper before passing on to the next
challenge to point out that the word 1083 "owner" as used in clause
(e) in Section 14(1) does not postulate absolute ownership in the sense that he
has an absolutely unrestricted right to deal with the property as he likes.
To
describe some one as owner, and perhaps even as an absolute owner, of property
is to say two things: it is to assert that his title to the property is
indisputable and that he has all the rights of ownership allowed by the legal
system in question. Rights of ownership may, therefore, be limited by special
provisions of law and include in those provisions such as are in force in New
Delhi according to which citizens are granted long leases of sites for
constructing buildings thereon. Now, the words of a statute, though normally
construed in their ordinary meaning, may contain inherent restrictions due to
their subject matter and object and the occasion on which and the circumstances
with reference to which they are used. They call for construction in the light
of their context rather than in what may be either their strict etymological
sense or their popular meaning part from the context (See Halsbury's Laws of
England Third Edition Vol. 36 Paragraph 843 P. 394). The meaning of the word
"owner" in clause (e) is influenced and controlled by its context and
the appellant's construction is unacceptable because it seems to be quite
clearly contrary to the reasonable operation of the statutory provision."
Learned counsel for the appellant also frankly conceded that it will not be
possible for him to contend that the term 'owner' should be so construed that
all those persons who have their houses standing on the leasehold plots will be
deprived of the benefit of Section 14(1)(e).
The
next contention advanced on behalf of the appellant is that as there is a
notice addressed to the respondent landlord about the cancellation of the lease
of a plot over which a small portion of the premises stands he ceases to be an
owner thereof and therefore will not be entitled to the decree for eviction.
In
this connection the two documents, on which reliance has been placed are: one
is a notice purporting to be of some date in Sept. 1981 which reads as under:
"DELHI
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY Regd. A.D. Old Scheme Branch Process Server 9th Floor,
Vikas Minar, New Delhi, the Sept. 81 1084 NOTICE It is notified for information
of all concerned that the lease of the Plot No. 35, Block No. 15-A, W.E.A.
scheme
stands cancelled since 28.8.74. The action under PP. Act 197 1 is being taken
for taking over physical possession of the plot and building standing thereon.
The occupants of the plot and building are, therefore, advised not to deal with
any person except the D.D.A. who is now the lawful owner of the premises and
not to pay rent, if anybody deals with any other person, he will be doing so at
his own risk and cost. Sd/(S.L. JAIN) EXECUTIVE OFFICER (VI) 17.9.81 To: All
tenants:
1.
M/S Nanik Ram and Sons, 15-A/135, W.E.A.
2.
M/s Modern Centre, 15-A/35, W.E.A, Karol Bagh" The other document is a
letter to Smt. Ved Prabha and purporting to have been issued by the Deputy
Director, DDA.
This
document apparently is dated October 30. 1981 and the relevant portion of this
reads as under:
"I
am directed to inform you that your unconditional request for the purpose of
being considered and necessary penalties for the past misuse and the continuing
misuse till the date of its vacation by the tenants of the said premises under
restoration of charges etc. are being worked out and the same will be
communicated to you in due course." It is further stated in this letter
that "after the necessary dues on this account are recovered and requisite
formalities like submission of Indemnity Bond etc. are completed and accepted
by the DDA, the lease of the plot would be restored in the name of the legal
representatives of late R.S. Dinanath." A perusal of these documents
therefore 1085 clearly indicates that about plot No. 35 same notice was issued
which is understood to mean that the lease was cancelled and later on a
representation made by the landlord to the legal representatives of the
original allotted the further proceedings are suspended and it is clearly
stated that the question of penalty and other dues is being worked out and on
them being worked out and paid and Indemnity Bond being filed, the lease will
be restored. It is also apparent that nothing further has happened and therefore
it could not be said that the lease has come to an end even what is attempted
to be contended on the basis of the first document that the lease is cancelled.
The second document, reference to which has been made above, clearly goes to
show that has been suspended and at present it could not be said that the lease
has come to an end. Admittedly nothing has been started for taking possession.
Under these circumstances therefore it is only on these facts that all these
contentions have been advanced by learned counsel for the appellant.
Before
going into the legal questions as to whether this question could be raised at
this stage and also as to the question of estoppels or whether the tenant has a
right to challenge the title of the landlord, as quoted above from the two
documents which are the basis of all this controversy if are carefully
examined, it appears to be certain that a notice for determination of the lease
appears to have been issued by the DDA sometime before 198 1. The document
which is purporting to be a notice in 1981 shows that this notice is issued
showing the cancellation of the lease and the subsequent letter from the DDA
addressed to the legal representatives of the original allotted i.e. the
present respondents indicates that on their representation the DDA is working
out the penalties and details of payment which have to be recovered and on the
payment being made and Indemnity Bond being filed the restoration of the lease
will be considered and no further steps are being taken either for
dispossession of the allotted or for any other purpose. In view of these two
documents what appears to be clear is that although there were some proceedings
for the cancellation of the lease but at present it could not be contended that
the lease has come to an end. It is also clear that no steps have been taken
for dispossession and the second document which has been quoted above clearly
shows that only the formality of depositing the penalties which are being
worked out in the Office of the DDA and the filing of the Indemnity Bond
remains thereupon the lease will be restored in the name of the legal
representatives. Under these circumstances at the best what could be contended
is that so far as plot No. 35 is concerned some shadow was cast on its title.
That shadow also appears to by very thin. 1086 Apart from it the subsequent
letter from the DDA indicates that what remains is only a formality of
depositing the penalties and the Indemnity Bond. It is also clear that so far
as the structure in the building is concerned it is not disputed that that is
one of the ownership of the respondent. It is also not in dispute that the
premises mainly stand on plot No. 34 about which there is not even a shadow of
doubt about its title either of the property or of the land and in this view of
the matter, on the basis of the two documents put together in the context of
the circumstances as they stand it could not be said that the respondent landlord
has ceased to be the owner thereof, in view of broad meaning of term 'owner' as
has been discussed and considered above. In our opinion, it could not be said
that the landlord is not the owner of the premises and therefore we see no
substance in the contention advanced by learned counsel for the appellant.
No
other question was raised. We therefore see no reason to entertain this appeal.
It is, therefore, dismissed. The respondents shall be entitled to the costs of
this appeal.
N.P.V.
Appeal dismissed.
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