Shri
Balaganesan Metals Vs. Shri M.N. Shanmugham Chetty & Ors [1987] INSC 131
(23 April 1987)
NATRAJAN,
S. (J) NATRAJAN, S. (J) MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J) CITATION: 1987 AIR 1668 1987
SCR (2)1173 1987 SCC (2) 707 JT 1987 (2) 247 1987 SCALE (1)1110
CITATOR
INFO : R 1987 SC2166 (1) RF 1989 SC 302 (4) RF 1989 SC 682 (12) F 1989 SC1420
(10)
ACT:
Tamil
Nadu Buildings (lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960: ss. 2(2) and 10(3)(a) &
(c)--Eviction--Bona fide requirement for additional accommodation--Comparative
hardship--Consideration of Building'--Whether includes part of a building.
Statutory
Interpretation.
Provisions
of Statutes--Not to be interpreted so as to render any other provision otiose.
Words
& Phrases: Expression 'as the case may be--Connection of Word 'Any
'--Meaning of.
HEADNOTE:
Clause
(c) of sub-s. (3) of s. 10 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control)
Act, 1960, enables a landlord occupying only a part of a building, whether residential
or non-residential, to seek eviction of a tenant occupying the whole or any
portion of the remaining part of the building, notwithstanding anything
contained in cl. (a), for bona fide requirement of additional accommodation.
The first proviso thereto enjoins the Rent Controller to reject the application
of the landlord under that clause even where the need is found to be genuine,
if the hardship caused to the tenant would outweigh the advantage to the
landlord.
Sub-clause
(i) of cl. (a) of s. 10(3) enables eviction from residential building if the
landlord or any member of his family is not occupying a residential building of
his own in the city, while sub-cl. (iii) enable eviction from non- residential
building if the landlord or any member of his family is not occupying for
purposes of a business a non- residential building in the city. A 'building' is
defined in s. 2(2) to mean any building or hut or part of a building or hut,
let or to be let separately for residential or non- residential purposes.
The
respondent-legatees of the landlady, using the first floor of the building for
residence sought eviction of the appellant-tenant from the ground floor used by
him as a godown for storing his business wares on the ground that they bona
fide required additional accommodation 1174 for their residential needs. The
Rein Controller upheld their claim. The Appellate Authority reversed the
findings of the Rent Controller but in revision the High Court re- stored the
order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller.
In
this Appeal by Special leave it was contended that since the ground floor
constituted a building by itself within the meaning of s. 2(2) of the Act. the
respondents could seek eviction of the appellant only under s.
10(3)(a)(i)
of the Act and not under s. 10(3)(c), that even if the respondents were
entitled to invoke s. 10(3)(c) they could seek eviction only if they required
the ground floor for non-residential purposes and not for residential purposes,
that the factors of relative hardship between the parties weighed more in
favour of the appellant than the respondents, and that the High Court was in
error in interfering with the findings of fact rendered by the Appellate
Authority while exercising its revisional powers under s. 25 of the Act.
Dismissing
the Appeal, the Court,
HELD:
1.1 The ground floor of the building in occupation of the appellant did not
constitute a distinct and separate unit. The respondent-landlords could.
therefore seek eviction under s. 10(3)(c) of the Act.
1.2
A 'building' has been defined in s. 2(2) of the Act as not only a building or
hut but also part of a building or hut, let separately for residential or
non-residential purposes, which could only means that a part of a building that
has been let out or that has to be let out separately can also be construed as
a separate and independent building without reference to the other portion or
portions of the building where it is not necessary to treat the entire building
as one whole and inseparable unit. A limitation has thereby been placed by the
Legislature itself, by providing that the application of the definition is
subject to the contextual position. It follows there from that where the
context warrants. the entire building being construed as one integral unit. It
would be inappropriate to view the building as consisting of several
disintegrated units and not as one integrated structure.
1.3
In enacting s. 10(3)(c) the Legislature has intended that the entire building.
irrespective of one portion being occupied by the landlord and the other
portion or portions being occupied by a tenant or tenants should be viewed as
one whole and integrated unit and not as different entities.
1175
1.4
There is vast difference between the words "residential building" and
"non-residential building" used in s.
10(3)(a)(i)
and (iii) on the one hand and s. 10(3)(c) on the other. While s. 10(3)(a)(i)
and (iii) refer to a building only as residential or non-residential, s.
10(3)(c) refers to a landlord occupying a part of a building, whether residential
or non-residential. Furthermore, s. 10(3)(c) states that a landlord may apply
to the Controller for an order of eviction being passed against the tenant
occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building.
1.5
TO import the expansive definition of the word "building" in s. 2(2)
into s. 10(3)(c) would result in rendering meaningless the words "part of
a building" occupied by the landlord and a tenant "occupying the
whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building", leaving no
scope for such a landlord to seek eviction.
1.6
The provisions of an Act should be interpreted in such a manner as pot to
render any of its provisions otiose unless there are compelling reasons for the
Court to resort to the extreme contingency. If a portion of a building let out
to a tenant is to be treated in all situations as a separate and independent
building then s. 10(3)(c) will be rendered otiose because the landlord can
never then ask for additional accommodation since s. 10(3)(a) does not provide
for eviction of tenants on the ground of additional accommodation for the
landlord either for residential or non-resi- dential purposes.
Saraswathi
Sriraman v.P.C.R. Chetty's Charities, [1972] 2 M.L.J. 515; Mohammed Jaffar v.
Palaniappa Chettiar, [1964] 1 M .L.J. 112 and Cheilaromal v. Accommodation
Controller, [1967] 2 M.L.J. 453, approved.
2.1
It cannot be said that a landlord can seek addition- al accommodation for
residence only if the building is a residential one and likewise he can seek
additional accommodation for business purposes only if the building is a non-
residential one.
2.2
Section 10(3)(c) provides for both situations, viz.
a
landlord occupying a part of a building which is residential or
non-residential. The words used in it arc "any tenant" and not
"a tenant" who can be called upon to vacate the portion in his
occupation. Unless the legislature had intended that both classes of tenant
i.e. residential or nonresidential, can be asked to vacate by the Rent Controller
for providing landlord the additional accommodation it would not have used the
1176 words "any" instead of using the letter "a" to denote
a tenant. Further, the words "as the case may be" in cl. (0) only
mean "whichever the case may be", i.e. either residential or
non-residential. They do not restrict the landlord's right to secure additional
accommodation for residential purposes only in respect of a residential building
and in the case of additional accommodation for business purposes only to a
non-residential building.
2.3
Section 10(3)(c) stands on a different footing from s. 10(3)(a) (i) and s.
10(3)(a)(iii). The non-obstante clause has been added to cl. (c) to give it an
overriding effect over both the restrictions placed by cls. (a)(i) and
(a)(iii), viz., landlord seeking eviction of a tenant should not be occupying a
building of his own and secondly the nature of user of the leased property by
the tenant must correspond to the nature of the requirement of the landlord.
Thus,
the requirement of additional accommodation under cl. (c) is not a case of a
landlord not occupying a residential or non-residential building of his own but
a case of a landlord occupying a part of a residential or non-residential
building of his own and putting it to such user as deemed fit by him. If it was
the intention of the legislature that only a tenant occupying a residential
portion of a building can be asked to vacate for providing additional
residential accommodation to the landlord and correspondingly a tenant
occupying a portion of a building for non-residential purposes alone being
asked to vacate for the non- residential requirements of the landlord. it would
have provided specific stipulation to that effect in cl. (c).
In
the instant case. the requirement of additional accommodation pertains to the
need of the landlord and the manner of user of the portion of the building
already in his occupation and consequently the bona fides of his requirement
will outweigh all the restrictions imposed by s. 10(3)(a).
K.
Parasuramaiah v. Lakshmamma, (AIR 1965: 220). approved. Thirupathi v. Kanta
Rao. [1981] Vol. 1 ILR Madras 128 overruled.
3.
Once a landlord is able to satisfy the Controller that he is bona fide in need
of additional accommodation for residential or nonresidential purposes and that
the advantage derived by him by an order of eviction will outweigh the hardship
caused to the tenant. then he is entitled to an order of eviction irrespective
of any other consideration.
1177
4.
The Rent Controller has gone into the question of comparative hardship and
rendered a finding in favour or the respondents. The Appellate Authority's
findings have been vitiated because of its non advertance to the evidence and
application of wrong tests in assessing the comparative hardship between the
parties. The High Court was. Therefore, entitled to allow the revision.
Civil
Appellate Jurisdiction: Civil Appeal No. 1314 of 1980.
From
the Judgment and Order dated 28.9.1978 of the Madras High Court in Civil
Revision Petition No. 782 of 1977.
A.T.M.
Sampath for the Appellant.
S.
Padmanabhan and M. Raghuraman for the Respondents.
The
Judgment of the Court was delivered by Natarajan, J. This appeal by special
leave is by a tenant against whom an order of eviction passed under Section
10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960,
hereinafter referred to as the "Act", by the Rent Controller was
restored by the High Court of Madras after setting aside the dismissal of the
eviction petition by the Appellate Authority.
The
facts are not in controversy and may briefly be set out as under. A one-stored
building in Wall Tax Road, Madras was originally owned by one Unnamalai Ammal.
She was using the first floor for her residence and had leased out the ground
floor to the appellant herein to be used as a godown for storing his business
ware. It is common ground the appellant's shop is situate in an adjoining
building.
The
tease was for a period of 10 years with an option for renewal for a further
period of 5 years. Unnamalai Ammal however refused to renew the lease and filed
a suit against the appellant for eviction on the ground she bona fide.
required
the ground floor also for her residential use. The suit did not meet with
success. Unnamalai Ammal bequeathed the property to her son-in-law and grand
son who are the respondents herein. As legatees of the premises the respondents
filed a petition under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act praying for eviction of the
appellant on the ground they bona fide required additional accommodation for
their residential needs. The Rent Controller upheld their claim, after finding
the relevant factors of bona fide need and com- 1178 parative hardship in their
favour and ordered eviction. On appeal by the appellant, the Appellant
Authority reversed the findings of the Rent Controller and further held that
the respondent were not entitled to recover possession of non-residential
premises for their residential requirements and dismissed the petition for
eviction. On further revision to the High Court by the respondents Remaprasada
Rao, C.J. set aside the order of the Appellant Authority and resorted the order
of eviction passed by the Rent Controller. The aggrieved tenant has preferred
this appeal.
The
judgment under appeal is assailed by the appellant on four grounds viz. (1)
Since the ground floor constitutes a building by itself within the meaning of
Section 2(2) of the Act, the respondents can seek eviction of the appellant
only under Section 10(3)(a)(i) of the Act and not under Section 10(3)(c);
(2)
Even if the respondents are entitled to invoke Section 10(3)(c) they can seek
eviction only if they require the ground floor for non-residential purposes and
not for residential purposes;
(3)
In any event the factors of relative hardship between the parties weigh more in
favour of the appellant than the respondent; and (4) The High Court was in
error in interfering with the findings of fact rendered by the Appellate
Authority while exercising its revisional powers under Section 25 of the Act.
Before
proceeding to examine the merits of the contentions, it will be relevant to
state a few facts. The ground floor, though used as a godown, is of a residential
pattern and consists of two rooms and a hall besides a kitchen and toilet
rooms. The first floor is being used as their residence by the respondents, the
other members of the family being the wife and daughter of the second
respondent. The first floor consists of only two rooms and it is the case of
the respondents that the accommodation in the first floor has become inadequate
for their growing residential needs.
It
is also their case that the first respondent who is over 65 years of age finds
it difficult to climb the stairs on account of his old age and frail health.
Their further plea is that the water supply to the first floor is inadequate in
spite of the electric motor and pump set installed in the ground floor to pump
up water. In contrast the appellant is said to have a spacious three stored
building in Door No. 39 adjoining the leased premises and also to have another
godown close by. 1179 One of the contentions of the appellant was that the
eviction proceedings were a continuation of the unsuccessful attempt by
Unnamalai Ammal herself to get the tenant evicted and, therefore, the eviction
petition lacked bona fides. The High Court has rejected his contention and in
our opinion, rightly too, because the respondents who are the legatees of the
building cannot be attributed mala fides because of the earlier eviction suit
filed by their predecessor in title.
We
may also dispose of another contention of the appellant at this juncture itself
which had found favour with the Appellate Authority. The contention was that
with the death of Unnamalai Ammal the family had become smaller and hence there
was no need for additional accommodation. This argument overlooks the fact that
additional accommodation is sought for because of the difficulty experienced by
the first respondent in climbing the stairs in his old age and the need for the
second respondent's daughter, growing in years, to have a room all for herself
for keeping her books and reading at home.
We
will now proceed to consider the legal contentions of the appellant in
seriatim. The first and foremost contention was that under the Act the ground
floor constitutes a separate building and as such the respondents can seek
recovery of possession of the ground floor only under Section 10(3)(a)(i) and
not under Section 10(3)(c). For dealing with this contention, the relevant
provisions of the Act need setting out.
Section
2 which is the definition Section reads as under:- "Definitions:- In this
Act, unless the context otherwise requires-- (2) "building" means any
building or hut or part of a building or hut, let or to be let separately for residential
or non-residential purpose and includes-- (a) .........
(b)
.........
Section
10 sets out the grounds on which the eviction of a tenant can be ordered. For
our purpose it is enough to refer to the following provisions alone:-
"Section 10(3)(a):- A landlord may, subject to the 1180 provisions of
clause (d), apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put
the landlord in possession of the building—
(i)
in case it is a residential building, if the landlord requires it for his own
occupation or for the occupation of any member of his family and if he or any
member of his family is not occupying a residential building of his own in the
city, town or village concerned;
(ii)
omitted
(iii)
in case it is any other non-residential building if the landlord or any member
of his family is not occupying for purposes of a business which he or any
member of his family is carrying on, non-residential building in the city, town
or village concerned which is his own:
(b)
Omitted.
(c)
A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, whether residential or
non-residential, may, notwithstanding anything contained in clause (a), apply
to the Controller for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any
portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession
thereof, it he requires additional accommodation for residential purposes or
for purposes of a business which he is carrying on, as the case may be.
Provided
that, in the case of an application under clause (c), the Controller, shall
reject the application if he is satisfied that the hardship which may be caused
to the tenant by granting it will outweigh the advantage to the landlord:
Provided
further that the Controller may give the tenant a reasonable time for putting
the landlord in possession of the building and may extend such time so as not
to exceed three months in the aggregate." It is no doubt true that under
Section 2(2) a building has been. defined as not building or hut but also part
of a building or hut let separately for residential or non-residential purpose.
That would, however, only mean that a part of a building which has been let out
or which is to be let out separately can also be construed as a separate and
1181 independent building without reference to the other portion or portions of
the building where it is not necessary to treat the entire building as one
Whole and inseparable unit.
A
limitation on the definition has been placed by the Legislature itself by
providing that the application of the definition is subject to the contextual
position. Therefore, it follows that where the context warrants the entire
building being construed as one integral unit, it would be inappropriate to
view the building as consisting of several disintegerated units and not as one
integerated structure.
Secondly
there is vast difference between the words "residential building" and
"non-residential building" used in Section 10(3)(a)(i) and (iii) on
the one hand and Section 10(3)(c) on the other. While Section 10(3)(a)(i) and
(iii) refer to a building only as residential or non-residential Section
10(3)(c) refers to a landlord occupying a pan of a building, 'whether
residential or non-residential. (Emphasis supplied). Further-more, Section
10(3)(c) states that a landlord may apply to the Controller for an order of
eviction being passed against the tenant "occupying the whole or any
portion of the remaining pan of the building" (Emphasis supplied). If as
contended by the appellant each portion of a building let out separately should
always be construed as an independent unit by itself then there is no scope for
a landlord occupying "a part of a building" seeking eviction of a
tenant "occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the
building". It is, therefore, obvious that in so far as Section 10(3)(c) is
concerned the Legislature has intended that the entire building, irrespective
of one portion being occupied by the landlord and the other portion or portions
being occupied by a tenant or tenants should be viewed as one whole and
integrated unit and not as different entities. To import the expansive
definition of the word "building" in Section 2(2) into section
10(3)(c) would result in rendering meaningless the words "part of a
building" occupied by the landlord and a tenant "occupying the whole
or any portion of the remaining part of the building". The third factor
militating against the contention of the appellant is that if a portion of a
building let out to a tenant is to be treated in all situations as a separate
and independent building then Section 10(3)(c) will be rendered otiose because
the landlord can never then ask for additional accommodation since Section
10(3)(a) does not provide for eviction of tenants on the ground of additional
accommodation for the landlord either for residential or non-residential
purposes. It is a well settled rule of interpretation of statutes that the
provisions of the Act should be interpreted in such a manner as not to render
any of its provisions otiose unless there are compelling reasons for the Court
to resort to that extreme contingency.
1182
Yet another noteworthy feature to be borne in mind is that Section 10(3)(c) is
governed by two provisos which is not the case when eviction orders are made
under any of the sub-clauses of Section 10(3)(a). The first proviso enjoins the
Controller to reject the application of a landlord under Section. 10(3)(c) for
additional accommodation, even where the need of the landlord is found to be
genuine, if the hardship caused to the tenant by an order of eviction will
outweigh the advantage to the landlord by the said order.
The
second proviso empowers the Controller to give the tenant a reasonable time not
exceeding three months in the aggregate to vacate the portion in his occupation
and put the landlord in possession thereof. Obviously the second proviso has
been made to facilitate the tenant to find alternate residential or
non-residential accommodation elsewhere, since the landlord who is already in
possession of a portion of the building can put up with the hardship of
inadequate accommodation for a period of three months at the most.
The
above analytical consideration of the relevant provisions bring out clearly the
fallacy contained in and the un-tenability of the contention that the ground
floor occupied by the appellant is a distinct and separate unit and as such the
respondents cannot seek his eviction under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act.
This
aspect of the matter has been considered in varying degrees in the following
decisions and interpreted in ac- cordance with our conclusion; vide Saraswathi
Sriraman v.P.C.R. Chetty's Charities, [1972] 2 M.L.J. 515; Mohammed Jarfar v.
Palaniappa Chettiar, [1964] 1 M.L.J. 112 and Chellammal v. Accommodation
Controller, [1967] 2 M.L.J. 453.
Even
the Division Bench ruling relied on by Mr. Sampath concedes this position and
has observed as follows:
"Therefore,
if the context in a particular provision requires that the word building should
not be understood as defined in Section 22, certainly it is open to the Court
to give the normal, natural and ordinary meaning which it is capable of and for
that purpose, it is not necessary to rely upon any decision. (vide page 153 of
the report)." Taking up now for consideration the second contention, there
were conflicting decisions in the Madras High Court and this led to a reference
of the case in Thirupathi v. Kanta Rao, [1981] Vol. 1 ILR Madras 128 to a
Division Bench.
While
the Division Bench has taken one view. a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh
High Court has 1183 taken a contrary view on the identical issue. It is pertinent
to state here that the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent
and Eviction Control) Act are in paritnetria with the provisions of the Madras
Act in so far as Sections 10(3)(a) and (c) are concerned. The conflict was with
reference to the interpretation of Section 10(3)(c) viz. whether a landlord
occupying a part of a building for residential purposes is entitled to seek
eviction of a tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part
of the building for non-residential purposes for his (landlord's) residential
use and vice versa. While it was held in Govindan v. Rajagopal Nadar, [1968] 2
M.L.J. 315 that a landlord can seek eviction of a tenant under Section 10(3)(c)
for additional residential purposes only if the tenant also is putting the
building to residential use and likewise a landlord can seek additional
accommodation for business purposes only if the tenant is also putting the
building to non-residential use, it was held to the contrary in Premchand
Motichand v. Hatneed Sultan, [1958] 1 M.L.J. 32 (S.N.); P.I. Kurian v.
Government of Tamil Nadu, 85 L.W. 364 and Saraswathi Sriraman v. P.C.R. Chetty's
Charities (supra). The latter view was taken by Ismail, J., also, as he then
was, in an unreported case viz. Rangaswami Reddiar v. Minor N. Jayaraj (C.R.P.
No. 2380 of 1977). Subsequently in the referred case, the Division Bench
consisting of Ismail, C.J. and Rathnam J. rendered judgment in Thirupathi v.
Kanta Rao, (supra). (Ismail, C.J., changing his earlier view) holding that a
landlord will be entitled under Section 10(3)(c) to seek additional
accommodation for residential purposes only if it is a residential building in
the occupation Of a tenant and likewise a landlord can seek additional
accommodation for non-residential purposes only if the building is a
non-residential one.
The
Division Bench has further taken the view that the non obstante clause is only
to entitle a landlord to seek eviction even when he is in possession of a
portion of a building .belonging to him and nothing more.
In
a later decision G.N. Rajaram v. Mukunthu N. Venkatarama Iyer. MLJ 1985(2) 173
the Division Bench ruling has been followed and eviction was ordered of a
tenant occupying a room in the ground floor of a residential building for his
business purposes. On the other hand a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh
High Court in K. Parasuramaiah v. Lakshmamma, AIR 1965 220 has held that if a
landlord satisfies the Controller that he wants additional accommodation in the
same building for his residential or non-residential requirements then
notwithstanding the user to which the tenant was putting the 1184 leased
portion. the landlord is entitled to an order of eviction so that he can re-adjust
the additional accommodation in the manner convenient to him and it is not
necessary that the additional accommodation sought for should be used by the
landlord for the same purpose for which the tenant sought to be evicted was
using it. In the words of the Division Bench:- "Clause (c) makes it twice
clear that a land- lord who occupies a part of a building, whether residential
or nonresidential can ask for eviction of a tenant occupying another portion
whatever may be his requirements, whether residential or non-residential".
For
holding so, the Andhra Pradesh High Court has taken the words
"notwithstanding anything in clause (a)" as having over riding effect
over both the conditions laid down in Section 10(3)(a) and (iii) viz. a
landlord (1) not having a building of his own for residential or nonresidential
purposes; and (2) seeking the eviction of a tenant from residential premises
only for residential purposes; and (3) seeking eviction of a tenant from
non-residential premises only for nonresidential purposes.
We
will now examine for ourselves the interpretation to be given to Section
10(3)(c). In so doing we will first see the legislative intent behind Section
10(3)(c) before considering the thrust given by non-obstante clause in it.
Since Section 10(3)(c) provides for both situations viz. a land- lord occupying
a part of a building which is residential or non-residential, the sub-clause
can be read separately so as to have reference exclusively to a residential
building or a non-residential building. In Thirupathy v. Kanta Rao, (supra) the
learned Judges have noticed this position and set out Section 10(3)(c)
distinctively. But in so doing they have restricted the relief of additional
accommodation to the landlord for residential purposes to residential buildings
alone and the relief of additional accommodation for business purposes to
nonresidential buildings alone and therein the error has crept in. In our view.
this restriction is not envisaged by Section 10(3)(c). The proper way of
distinctively viewing the Section should be as under:- "A landlord who is
occupying only a part of a residential building may notwithstanding anything
contained in clause (a), apply to the Controller for an order directing any
tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building
to put the landlord in possession 1185 thereof. if he requires additional
accommodation for residential purposes or for purposes of a business which he
is carrying on, as the case may be." "A landlord who is occupying
only a part of a non-residential building may notwithstanding anything
contained in clause (a), apply to the Controller for an order directing any
tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building
to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional
accommodation for residential purposes or for purposes of a business which he
is carrying on, as the case may be." If clause (3) is construed in this
manner there can be no scope for a contention that a landlord cab seek
addition- al accommodation for residence only if the building is a residential
one and likewise he can seek additional accommodation for business purposes
only if the building is a non- residential one.
There
are several reasons which persuade us to take this view. In the first place it
has to be noted that Section 10(3)(c) stands on a different footing from
Section 10(3)(a)(i) and Section 10(3)(a)(iii). It is not a case of a landlord
not occupying a residential or non-residential building of his own but a case
of a landlord occupying a part of a residential or non-residential building of
his own and putting it to such user as deemed fit by him. Since the requirement
of additional accommodation by the landlord is with reference to the manner of
his user of that part of the building which is in his occupation it is the
nature of that requirement that should prevail over the manner of user of the
tenant of the portion leased out to him. In other words, the additional
accommodation is for extending the user of the building by the landlord to the
leased portion for the same purpose for which the portion not leased out is
being put to. Such being the case which the landlord is genuinely in need of
additional accommodation for residential or non- residential requirements, as
the case may be, he can be given relief only it the tenant occupying the other
portion of the building is asked to vacate. If it is to be held that Section
10(3)(c) can be invoked only if the nature of the requirement of the landlord
and the nature of user of the leased portion by the tenant coalesce then the
landlord will be left without any remedy when the nature of his need and the
nature of the user of the leased portion by the tenant do not tally. Take for
example, a case where a landlord has got grown-up sons and daughters or there
is a married son and growing daughters or there 1186 are old parents who cannot
climb stairs etc. If the landlord is to be refused additional accommodation for
residential purposes merely because the tenant is making use of the leased
portion for nonresidential purposes the landlord would be placed in an awful
predicament. Similarly. if a landlord bona fide requires additional
accommodation for his business and his business would suffer serious detriment
if he cannot secure additional accommodation, it would cause great hardship and
gave injustice to the landlord if he is to be denied accommodation merely
because the tenant is making use of the leased portion for residential
purposes.
It
is, therefore, that the Legislature has provided Section 10(3)(c) in its
present form so that a landlord bona fide requiring additional accommodation is
not confronted with a permanently irremediable situation. In its anxiety that
Section 10(3)(c) should fully serve the purpose for which it has been enacted
the Legislature has also added the non obstante clause. Having regard to the
object of Section 10(3)(c) and the terms in which it is worded there is war- rant
and justification for holding that the non obstante clause has been provided to
have overriding effect over both the restrictions placed by Section 10(3)(a)(i)
and (iii) viz. landlord seeking eviction of a tenant should not be occupying a
building of his own and secondly the nature of user of the leased property by
the tenant must correspond to the nature of the requirement of the landlord.
In
construing Section 10(3)(c) it is pertinent to note that the words used are
"any tenant" and not "a tenant" who can be called upon to
vacate the portion in his occupation.
The
word "any" has the following meaning:- "Some; one out of many;
an indefinite number.
One
indiscriminately of whatever kind or quantity." Word "any" has a
diversity of meaning and may be employed to indicate "all" or
"every" as well as "some" or "one" and its
meaning in a given statute depends upon the context and the subject matter of
the statute.
It
is often synonymous with "either", "every" or
"all". Its generality may be restricted by context; (Black's Law Dictionary;
Fifth Edition).
Unless
the legislature had intended that both classes of tenants can be asked to
vacate by the Rent Controller for providing the. landlord additional
accommodation. be it for residential or non-residential 1187 purposes. it would
not have used the word "any" instead of using the letter
"a" to denote a tenant.
Thirdly
it is significant to note that there is no reference in clause (c) to the
nature of the user of the tenant occupying the leased portion of the building
viz.
whether
he is using it for residential or nonresidential purposes. If it was the
intention of the legislature that only a tenant occupying a residential portion
of a building can be asked to vacate for providing additional residential
accommodation to the landlord and correspondingly a tenant occupying a portion
of a building for non-residential purposes alone being asked to vacate for the
nonresidential requirements of the landlord, the legislature would have
provided specific stipulations to that effect in clause (c).
On
that ground also it must be construed that clause (c) has been provided. in
order to enable a landlord to seek the eviction of any tenant occupying the
whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building for residential or
non- residential purposes for satisfying the additional needs of the landlord
irrespective of whether the need is for residential or business purposes.
The
words "as the case may be" in sub clause (c) have been construed by
the Division Bench of the Madras High Court to mean that they restrict the
landlord's right to secure additional accommodation for residential purposes
only in respect of a residential building and in the case of additional
accommodation for business purpose only to a non-residential building. We are
of the view that in the context of sub-clause (c). the words "as the case
may be" would only mean "whichever the case may be" i.e. either residential
or non-residential.
To
sum up, the requirement of additional accommodation pertains to the need of the
landlord and the manner of user of the portion of the building already in his
occupation and consequently the bona fides of his requirement will outweigh all
the restrictions imposed by Section 10(3)(a) i.e. nature of the building.
nature of user of the leased portion by the tenant etc. Even so, the
Legislature has taken care to safeguard the interests of the tenant by means of
the provisos to the sub-clause. The first proviso enjoins the Controller to
balance the interests of the landlord and the tenant and to refuse eviction if
the hardship caused to the tenant will out weight the advantage to the landlord
by reason of the eviction. The second proviso empowers the Controller to grant
adequate time to the tenant upto a maximum of three months to vacate the
building and secure accommodation elsewhere. It. Therefore. follows that once a
landlord is able to satisfy the 1188 Controller that he is bona fide in need of
additional accommodation for residential or non-residential purposes and that
the advantage derived by him by an order of eviction will outweigh the hardship
caused to the tenant, then he is entitled to an order of eviction irrespective
of any other consideration.
In
the light of our conclusion we approve the ratio in K. Prasuramaiah v.
Lakshmamma, (supra) and disapprove the ratio in Thirupathy v. Kanta Rao.
(supra).
The
third and fourth question posed for consideration do not present any
difficulty. The Rent Controller has gone into the question of comparative
hardship and rendered a finding in favour of the respondents. The High Court
has observed that the Appellate Authority. while reversing the order. has
failed to take due note of relevant materials placed by the respondents. The
High Court has, therefore, held that the Appellate Authority's findings have
been vitiated because of its non-advertence to the evidence and the apparent
errors noticed in its assessment of the comparative hardship between the
parties. In so far as the High Court interfering with the findings of the
Appellate Authority is concerned, the High Court has justified its action by
pointing out that Appellate Authority had applied wrong tests and had also failed
to give effect to unchallenged findings of the Rent Controller and hence the
order of the Appellate Authority suffered from manifest errors in the exercise
of its jurisdiction. The High Court was, therefore.
entitled
to allow the revision and consequently the third and fourth contentions also
fail.
In
the result we find no merit in the appeal and accordingly it will stand
dismissed. Mr. Sampath, learned counsel for the appellant made a request that
in the event of the appeal being dismissed, the appellant should be given
sufficiently long time to secure another godown and shift his stock of goods to
that place. Mr. Padmanabhan learned counsel for the respondents very fairly
stated that the respondents are agreeable to give time to the appellant till 31.12.87
to vacate the leased portion. Accordingly we order that in spite of the
dismissal of the appeal the appellant will have time till 31.12.87 to vacate
the ground floor premises in his occupation and deliver peaceful and vacant
possession to the respondents subject however to the appellant filing an
under-taking in the usual terms in this behalf within 4 weeks from today
failing which the respondents will be entitled to recover possession of the
building forthwith. The parties will bear their respective costs.
P.S.
S Appeal dismissed.
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