Smt. Dhanwanti Vs. D.D. Gupta [1986] INSC
120 (9 May 1986)
PATHAK, R.S. PATHAK, R.S. MUKHARJI,
SABYASACHI (J)
CITATION: 1986 AIR 1184 1986 SCR (3) 18 1986
SCC (3) 1 1986 SCALE (1)1109
CITATOR INFO:
RF 1987 SC 986 (23) R 1987 SC1996 (10) R 1990
SC 325 (17) RF 1991 SC1233 (16) RF 1992 SC1555 (2,18)
ACT:
Constitution of India, ,1950, Article
136-Interference by the Supreme Court with findings of fact by Courts below -
Supreme Court can interfere when grave injustice results consequent upon an
order passed by a statutory authority based on misconstruction of facts and
circumstances.
Delhi Rent Control Act, section 7 ', scope
of-Whether successive letting out of the premises to the same party after
obtaining on each occasion permission under section 21 tantamounts to fraud.
HEADNOTE:
The appellant land-lady is the owner of, a
single storeyed house, at Vasant Vihar, New Delhi. It was constructed in the
year 1973. The premises was let out to an official of the government after
obtaining necessary permission under section 21 of the Delhi Rent Control Act
for a period of one year. The tenant vacated the premises after six or seven
months and thereafter the premises were let out to the respondent on April 15, 1974, after obtaining permission again under section 21. The respondent vacated
the premises on 27.2. 1977 after settling account in respect of the rent. The
premises were again let out by the appellant to the respondent on March 11, 1977 after obtaining permission under section 21 of the Act for a period of
three years. After the expiry of the said period the respondent again vacated
the premises and thereafter once again at his request the appellant let out the
premises for a limited period of two years after obtaining the permission under
section 21. The two years period expired on April 21, 1982 but the respondent did not hand over possession of the premises to the appellant, forcing her
to move the Rent Controller for an order directing delivery of possession of
the premises. In the Execution Application, the respondent filed his objection
on October 20, 1982 alleging that the permission under section 21 of the Act
was obtained by fraud practised on the Rent Controller. On January 21, 1384 the
First Additional Rent Controller, Delhi upheld the objection filed by the
respondent and dismissed the execu- 19 tion application. In appeal, the Rent
Control Tribunal held:
(i) that the A allegation of the respondent
that he had already entered into possession of the premises before permission
was granted under section 21 of the Act in 1374 was false, and even if it be
assumed that he had done so there was nothing to prevent him from surrendering
the tenancy; and (ii) that the respondent cannot be considered to be a tenant
in possession without interruption ever since 197.1 and that it was only the
tenancy pursuant to the last permission that he continued. Basing on a
statement made by the appellant regarding the transfer of her son to Delhi and
her omission to mention in her application about the additional fact of
unsuitability of climate of Bangalore and her grandson's illness, the Tribunal,
however, held that the appellant had practised fraud on the Rent Controller and
dismissed the appeal. The second appeal by the appellant was dismissed
summarily by the High Court. Hence the appeal by special leave.
Allowing the appeal, the Court ^
HELD: l. Ordinarily, the Supreme Court
declines to interfere with findings of fact and refuses to entertain special
leave petitions questioning such findings under Article 136 of the
Constitution. However, this is a case, where the entire approach of the
statutory authorities has been vitiated by a gross misconstruction of the facts
and circumstances of the case, ignoring material evidence of the record, and
arriving at inferences which fly in the face of reason and the law, -all
resulting in grave injustice-, calling for necessary interference. [23 D-F] The
evidence in this case, does not make out that any fraud was practised on the
Rent Controller when permission was granted in 1980 under section 21 of the
Delhi Rent Control Act. The changing facts of social existence do not permit
the application of unimaginative perspectives and inflexible assumptions. The
mutating kaleidoscope of human life portrays a different reality. It is this
fundamental error into which the Rent Control Tribunal has fallen and because
of that it has unwittingly fallen further into the error of misconstruing the
significance of the statement made by the appellant. [24 C-D]
2. It is perfectly possible for the owner of
a premises, on looking to the immediate future, to find that for certain
reasons he is unable to occupy the premises forthwith himself but that he may
do so later in the not every distant future. It is not always that a man can
plan his life ahead with any degree of definiteness. Prevailing uncertainty in
the 20 circumstances surrounding him may not permit clear sighted vision into
the future. The circumstances may justify his envisioning his need for the
premises two or three years later, and therefore, applying for permission under
section 21 of the Act to let out the premises accordingly. And yet, thereafter,
on the expiry of that period he may find that the circumstances have changed
and his use of the premises has now to be postponed by another few years. In
cases such as this the mere fact that the owner has let out the premises after
obtaining permission under section 21 of the Act for a limited period, and
thereafter on the expiry of that period has found it necessary to obtain
permission to let out the premises again for another limited period cannot
necessarily lead to the inference that from the very beginning the premises
were available for letting out indefinitely. [2G-H; 24A-C]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal
No. 1795 of 1986:
From the Judgment and order dated 25.9.1984
of the Delhi High Court in S.A.O. No. 283 of 1984.
Mrs. Shyamla Pappu, N.S. Das Bahl, P.K. Bahl
and P.S. Mahindra for the Appellant.
R.P.Bansal, K.C.Dua and P.O.Gupta for the
Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
PATHAK, J. Special leave granted.
This is a land-lady's appeal by special leave
directed against the order of the High Court of Delhi dismissing her second
appeal in limine. The appellant is the owner of the premises No. F-8/ 17,
Vasant Vihar, New Delhi. It is a single storeyed house. She let out the
premises for a limited period of two years to the respondent, who is a judicial
officer. She did so after obtaining the requisite permission under s. 21 of the
Delhi Rent Control Act on April 22, 1980. A registered deed was executed
between the parties in that behalf. The deed recorded the undertaking of the
respondent to vacate the premises at the end of two years. The two years
expired on April 21, 1982 but the respondent did not hand over possession of
the premises to the appellant. Accordingly the appellant prayed for an order
directing delivery of possession of the premises to her. A warrant of
possession was issued.
21 On October 20, 1982 the respondent filed
his objection, alleging that the order granting permission under s. 21 of the
Act was obtained by fraud practised on the Rent Controller and was a nullity.
It was asserted that the premises were constructed in the year 1973 and were
let out to an official of the Government under s. 21 of the Act for a period of
one year. On the official vacating the premises after one year, it was alleged,
they were let out to the respondent at a rent of Rs. 725 per mensem in the
first week of April 1974 as a regular tenant. It was said that on the request
of the appellant the respondent joined in an application for permission under
s. 21 of the Act. When the appellant applied for permission, it is alleged, she
did not disclose to the Rent Controller that earlier also she had inducted a
person as tenant after obtaining such permission.
On the expiry of three years, the respondent
said, the appellant again, in the year 1977, obtained permission under s. 21 of
the Act for letting out the premises at an enhanced rent of R.S.. 825 per
mensem for a limited period of two years to the respondent. That period expired
in April 1980.
It was thereafter that the appellant obtained
permission under s. 21 of the Act for letting out the premises to the
respondent for a period of two years. The respondent urged that he was in
uninterrupted possession since April 1974 and that no ground had been disclosed
by the appellant in the application for permission under s. 21 of the Act made
in the year 1980 indicating the reason for letting out the premises for a limited
period of two years. It is alleged that permission was granted mechanically by
the Rent Controller, and that it could not be recognised as binding on the
respondent.
The appellant filed her reply to the
objection and vehemently denied that the order under s. 21 of the Act granting
permission in 198() was nullity or had been obtained by fraud or that any
material fact had been withheld in the application for permission. The
appellant asserted that in the beginning the premises had been let out to an
official of the Government for a period of three years commencing from August
29, 1973, but the tenant vacated the premises after 6 or 7 months and
thereafter it became necessary to let out the premises to the respondent on
April 15, 1974 after obtaining permission under s. 21 of the Act.
It was denied that the respondent had already
occupied the premises as a regular tenant before permission under s. 21 of the
Act had been granted. lt was maintained that the respondent occupied the
premises on April 15, 1974 pursuant to the permission under s. 21 of the Act.
The appellant stated further that the respondent had given notice to the
appellant on February 27, 1977 expressing his intention to 22 vacate the
premises and that in fact he did vacate the premises on that date after
settling the account in respect of the rent. But a few days after leaving the
premises the respondent again approached the appellant for taking the premises
on rent. Accordingly, the premises were let out by the appellant to the
respondent on March 11, 1977 after obtaining permission under s. 21 of the Act.
It was pointed out that in the application under s. 21 of the Act. the
respondent gave his address as Village Khandsara, near Gurgaon, Haryana where
he was then residing in the factory premises of his son. The possession of the
premises was handed over to the respondent on March 11, 1977 in pursuance of
the permission, and the rate of rent agreed to was Rs.825 per mensem. The
appellant further stated that on the expiry of the period, the respondent again
vacated the premises and shifted to 13, Palam Marg, New Delhi. Thereafter the
respondent approached the appellant again to let out the premises for a limited
period of two years. As the appellant's second son, who is an officer in the
Indian Air Force, was posted at Bangalore and the appellant was not in a
position to occupy the premises all alone, she agreed to let out the premises
to the respondent. On April 21, 198() the appellant and the respondent joined
in the application for obtaining permission under s.21 of the Act to enable the
appellant to let out the premises to the respondent for a period of two years.
The appellant urged that the premises were now required by her as her son, an
Indian Air Force officer, had to shift his family to Delhi, and it was further
pointed out that the premises were to be occupied by the appellant and the
family members of that son as the climate of Bangalore did not suit them. It
was denied that the premises were available for indefinite letting, and the periodic
tenancies, it was asserted, were entered into because of the circumstances
prevailing on each occasion.
On January 21, 1984 the First Additional Rent
Controller, Delhi upheld the objection filed by the respondent and dismissed
the execution application of the appellant made under s. 21 of the Act. The
appellant appealed to the Rent Control Tribunal and the Tribunal held that the
allegation of the respondent that he had already entered into possession of the
premises before permission was granted under s. 21 of the Act in 1974 was
false, and even if it be assumed that he had done so there was nothing to
prevent him from surrendering the tenancy. That was evident when he joined the
appellant in the application for permission under s. 21 of the Act in 1974. The
case of the respondent that he must be considered to be a tenant in possession
without interruption ever since 1974 could not, in the opinion of the Rent
Control 23 Tribunal, be accepted on the facts and circumstances of the case.
and that it was only the tenancy pursuant to the last permission which could be
questioned. The Rent Control Tribunal then addressed itself to the principal
issue whether fraud had been practised on the Rent Controller in obtaining
permission under s. 21 of the Act in 1980. The Tribunal referred to the
circumstance that the appellant had let out the premises from time to time for
limited periods on earlier occasions and observed that it was evident that the
premises were available for being let out for an indefinite period. It adverted
to a statement made by the appellant regarding the transfer of her son to
Delhi, and deduced from the language employed by her that she wanted to convey
that her son had been posted earlier in Delhi and that he was now being
transferred back to Delhi. It also pointed out that the unsuitability of the
climate of Bangalore in regard to her grandson as the reason for the family
desiring to settle in Delhi had not been mentioned at the initial stage of the
litigation. Upon that, the Rent Control Tribunal held that the appellant had
practised fraud on the Rent Controller when obtaining permission under s. 21 of
the Act in 198(). A second appeal by the appellant was dismissed summarily by
the High Court.
We have considered the case with great care.
Ordinarily, this Court declines to interfere
with findings of fact and refuses to entertain special leave petitions
questioning such findings. But it seems to us that in this case the entire
approach of the statutory authorities has been vitiated by a gross
misconstruction of the facts and circumstances of the case, ignoring material
evidence on the record, and arriving at inferences which fly in the face of
reason and the law. All this has resulted in grave injustice. At the outset it
is apparent from the record that the finding of the Rent Control Tribunal that
the property was available for being let for an indefinite period proceeds on
the unwarranted assumption that the grant of the three leases, from 1974
through 1977 to 1980, points to that as the only conclusion. That assumption
would have been justified if there was positive material to indicate that from
the very beginning there was never any intention on the part of the appellant
to occupy the premises herself. There is no such material at all on the record.
It seems to have been ignored altogether that it is perfectly possible for the
owner of a premises, on looking to the immediate future, to find that for
certain reasons he is unable to occupy the premises forthwith himself but that
he may do so later in the not very distant future. It is not always that a man
can plan his life ahead with any degree of definiteness.
Prevailing uncertainty in the circumstances
surrounding him may not permit clear sighted vision 24 into the future. The
circumstances may justify his envisioning his need for the premises two or
three years later, and therefore applying for permission under s. 21 of the Act
to let out the premises accordingly. And yet, thereafter, on the expiry of that
period he may find that the circumstances have changed and his use of the
premises has now to be postponed by another few years. In cases such as this
the mere fact that the owner has let out the premises after obtaining
permission under s.21 of the Act for a limited period, and thereafter on the
expiry of that period has found it necessary to obtain permission to let out
the premises again for another limited period cannot necessarily lead to the
inference that from the very beginning the premises were available for letting
out indefinitely. The Rent Controller and the Rent Control Tribunal should have
examined the circumstances prevailing on each occasion when an application was
made under s. 21 of the Act. The changing facts of social existence do not
permit the application of unimaginative perspectives and inflexible
assumptions. The mutating kaleidoscope of human life portrays a different
reality. It is this fundamental error into which the Rent Control Tribunal has
fallen.
Because of that it has unwittingly fallen
further into the error of misconstruing the significance of the statement made
by the appellant. A copy of her statement is before us, and all that the
appellant said was that the premises could be spared for letting because her
son had been posted at Bangalore and that after two years he would be back in
Delhi. Much has been made by the Rent Control Tribunal of this minor
inconsistency, of the circumstance that instead of stating that her son would
be posted in Delhi the appellant had stated that her son would be posted "back"
in Delhi. It seems to us wholly irrelevant to the issue in the case whether the
son was being posted in Delhi for the first time or was being posted again in
the city. It was wholly immaterial to the question in 1980 whether the
premises, which had been constructed a few years before, should be let out for
a period of two years. What was material was the expectation that the son and
his family would be in Delhi after two years. The central issue in the case has
been clouded by a circumstance which has no bearing on it.
In our judgment, the orders of the First
Additional Rent Con troller, the Rent Control Tribunal and of the High Court
cannot be sustained An attempt was made by learned counsel for the appellant to
refer to material, now placed on the record, establishing that the appellant's
son had in fact been transferred to Delhi in May 1985 and that 25 he was
compelled, with a family of six members, to share a small accommodation with a
friend at Delhi. There is also clear evidence showing that his eldest child was
suffering from bronchial asthma and had been hospitalised in the Command
Hospital at Bangalore three times, and that medical specialists had advised a
change of place immediately. We need not take this material into consideration.
After examining the material already on the record, a task to which we are
compelled by the erroneous approach adopted by the statutory authorities to the
case, we have come to the conclusion that the evidence does not make out that
any fraud was practised on the Rent Controller when permission was granted in
1980 under s. 21 of the Act, and there is nothing to show that the permission
can be regarded as a nullity or that material facts were concealed. On the
contrary, it seems to us that the haphazard manner in which the case has been
dealt with by the First Additional Rent Controller and the Rent Control
Tribunal leaves much to be desired.
The appeal is allowed, the order dated
January 21, 1984 of the First Additional Rent Controller, the order dated May
2, 1984 of the Rent Control Tribunal and the order dated September 25, 1984 of
the High Court are set aside and the objection filed by the respondent to the
appellant's application for possession under s. 21 of the Delhi Rent Control
Act is rejected and the said application is allowed.
The appellant will be entitled to delivery of
possession of the premises. But in the circumstances, we allow the respondent a
period of two months from today for vacating the premises. There is no order as
to costs.
S.R. Appeal allowed.
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