Commissioner of Income Tax,
Haryana,Himachal Pradesh & Delh Vs. Tarsem Kumar & ANR [1986] INSC 146
(17 July 1986)
MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J) MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI
(J) PATHAK, R.S.
CITATION: 1986 AIR 1477 1986 SCR (3) 294 1986
SCC (3) 489 JT 1986 220 1986 SCALE (2)47
ACT:
Search and Seizure-seizure amount in custody
of customs authorities-Court directing the customs authorities to return the
amount to the respondent-Whether the said amount could be seized by the
Income-tax authorities under section 132 of the Income tax Act, 1961 read with
Rule 112(II) of the Income Tax Act, 1962 from the customs authorities- Whether
it militates the provisions of section 110(II) of the Customs Act, 1962-Words
and phrases-Meaning of "Search", "Seizure" and
"Possession", explained.
HEADNOTE:
On 23rd August, 1970, when the respondent was
travelling by car, alleged to be belonging to his brother, from Ambala to
Batala, the Customs officer intercepted him near the Beas river and forcibly
taken along with the driver, Gurunam Singh to the Customs House at Amritsar.
The respondent along with the driver was searched and the customs authorities
took into possession Rs.33,500 in Indian currency, 10 gold sovereigns and the
car in which he travelled. The Customs authorities, thereupon initiated
departmental proceedings under section 110(II) of the Customs Act, 1962 and
extended the period of issuing of the show-cause notice under section 124 of
the Customs Act, 1962. These proceedings were quashed by an order of the
Learned Single Judge of the High Court of Punjab on 24th April, 1372 following
an earlier decision of that Court.
After the said judgment, the respondent
approached the customs authorities for the return of the money and the car on
11.5.1972. The gold sovereigns were not demanded because ac cording to the
respondent these did not belong to him. He had been directed to come on the
following day to get back the currency notes and the car. On the next day,
however the Income Tax officer served the warrant of authorisation dated 10th
May, 1972 issued under section 132 of the Income Tax Act, read with Rule
112(II) of the Rules on the respondent as well as on the customs department
with the result the cash was taken possession of by the Income Tax authorities.
Thereafter 295 the respondent filed another
writ petition under Article 226 and 227 of A the Constitution. The customs
authorities also filed an appeal against the decision of the Single Judge dated
24th April, 1972. The writ petition and the appeal were heard together by a
Division Bench of the Punjab High Court. Dismissing the appeal and allowing the
writ petition the High Court held that where the amount was seized by the
customs authorities and the seizure was held illegal by the Court customs
authorities were bound to return the money to the person entitled to it under the
relevant provisions of section 110 of the Customs Act, 1962; that the Income
Tax authorities could not seize such an amount from the customs authorities
under section 132 of the Income Tax Act and authorisation of search and seizure
was illegal if issued in the name of the person who did not have possession of
the Article in respect of which it was issued. Hence this appeal by the revenue
by special leave.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court, ^
HELD: 1.1 on a construction of section 132 of
Income Tax Act, 1961 and the context, in which the words "search",
"possession", and "seizure" have been used in the said
section and the rules indicate that there cannot be any order in respect of
goods or moneys or papers which are in the custody of another department under
legal authority where the location of the property was known to the Government
one government department could not search another department and seize them.
[301E-F]
1.2 Sub-Section (3) of section 132 of the Act
uses the expression "who is in immediate possession or control
thereof". "Possession" is a word of ambiguous meaning and its
legal senses do not always coincide with the popular sense. Possession again may
not always be synonymous with manual detention or physical retention of the
goods or moneys. When the physical custody of the moneys and goods were with
the customs authorities, and that too by a legal sanction and authority to have
that custody, it cannot be said that possession as used in section 132 of the
Act was still with the respondent Tarsem Kumar. [30 1F-H]
1.3 Reading the expressions
"retention" and "custody" in some of the sub-sections of
section 132 in the context these have been used, it cannot be said, that where
an authority or a person has retention and custody with the legal sanction
behind it, it was not the intention of the legislature to say that he was not
in possession as contemplated in section 132 of the Income Tax Act, 1961.
[302A-B] 296 The Commissioner of Income Tax
v. Ramesh Chander & Ors., 93 ITR 450 PunJab; Tarsem Kumar & Anr. v. The
Commissioner of Income Tax, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh & Delhi & ors.,
94 ITR 567; Laxmipat Chororia v. K.K. Ganguli
Motilal and ors. v. Preventive Intelligence
officer, Central Excise and Customs, Agra & Ors., 80 ITR 418 Allahabad,
distinguished and partly overruled.
Noor Mohd. Rahimatulla Gillani v. The
Commissioner of Income-tax Vidrabha and Marathwada, Nagpurand Anr., [1976]
Taxation Law Reports, 688, Bombay; Pannalal v. Income Tax officer, Ward.
Chhindwara and ors., 93 ITR p. 480 Madhya Pradesh; Gulab and Company and Anr.
v. Superintendent of Central Excise (Preventive) Trichy, and ors., 98 ITR 581
Madras; Assainar and Anr. v. Income-tax officer, Calicut and ors., 101 ITR 854
Kerala, overruled.
1.4 It is true that in the instant case, the
title was not transferred to the Customs authorities by seizure under the Customs
Act. But in the context, in which the expressions "possession" and
"seizure" have been used, it cannot be considered to mean that the
possession was where the legal title was, physical possession was with the
Customs authorities, title was with the respondent herein.
In this context, the physical possession
having regard to the language used is relevant and material. Physical
possession was with the Customs authorities when the seizure authorisation was
passed. Therefore, where the exact location of the property was known and there
was no need to seize the money, the Income tax department could direct handing
over the money to the Income-tax authorities or take steps for such direction
through appropriate authorities and not by resort to section 132 of the Income
Tax Act. This is so because if the location was certain then there was nothing
to search or look for. [304G-H; 305A-B]
1.5 The lacuna in the law having been
subsequently filled in by introducing section 132A of the Act with effect from
October, 1975, it will be open to the income tax authorities to approach the
appropriate authorities to realise any amount of money or to recover any books
of account or documents in accordance with the law. [307D-E] & CIVIL
APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.1666 (NT) of 1974.
297 From the judgment and order dated 26th
November, 1973 of the A Punjab & Haryana High Court in Civil Writ No. 3355
of 1972.
S.C. Manchanda, M.B. Rai and Ms. A.
Subhashini for the Appellants.
Harbans Singh for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SABYASACHI MIJKHARJI, J. This appeal is by special leave from a judgment and
order of Punjab and Haryana High Court in an application under article 226 of
the Constitution. The judgment in question is reported in 94 I.T.R. 567. By a
petition under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution the order of the Income
Tax Department dated 10th May, 1972, passed under section 132 of the Income-tax
Act, 1961 (hereinafter called the 'Act') and Rule 112(II) of the Income-tax
Rules, 1962 (hereinafter called the 'Rules') was challenged. The division bench
by the impugned judgment allowed the petition, quashed the search and seizure
warrants and directed the Income-Tax Department to return the moneys to the
Customs authorities and gave certain consequential directions. In order to
appreciate the points involved, it is necessary to refer to certain facts as
found by the High Court. On 23rd August, 1970 the petitioner before the High
Court, who is the respondent here, was travelling by car, alleged to be
belonging to his brother from Ambala to Batala. He was intercepted near the
Beas river by the Customs officer and was forcibly taken along with the driver,
Gurnam Singh, to the Customs House at Amritsar. The said petitioner in that
application was searched along with his driver and the Customs authorities took
into possesion Rs.93,500 in Indian currency, 10 gold sovereigns and the car. On
the 24th August, 1970, the petitioner was produced before a Duty Magistrate at
Amritsar and was granted bail. In the meantime, the Customs department took
proceedings under section 110(2) of the Customs Act, 1962 and extended the
period of issuing of the show cause notice under section 124 of the Customs
Act, 1962. These proceedings were challenged in the High Court by Writ Petition
and the order of the Customs authority under section 110(2) was quashed by an
order of the learned single judge of the High Court on 24th April, 1972. The
appeal against that decision was dismissed by the division bench along with
this petition by the High Court. After the said judgment of the learned single
judge, the respondent had approached the Customs authorities for the return of
H 298 the money and the car. The gold sovereigns were not demanded be cause
according to the said petitioner, these did not belong to him. He had been
directed to come on the following day to get back the currency notes and the
car. In the meantime on 12th May, 1972 the Income-tax officer, had served the
warrant of authorisation dated 10th May, 1972 issued under section 132 of the
Act and rule 112(II) of the Rules on the respondent as well as on the Customs
department, with the result that only the cash was taken possession of by the
income tax authorities. Thereafter, the respondent filed the petition under
articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution before the High Court in respect of
which the judgment impugned here was rendered.
It was submitted that the authorisation
warrant was illegal, be cause the money was not in his possession but was in
the possession of the Customs authorities. It was secondly urged that the
action taken by the Income-tax authorities under section 132 of the Act
militated the provisions of section 110(2) of the Customs Act. The High Court
felt that so far as the first contention was concerned, it was concluded by the
decision of the said High Court in The Commissioner of Income-tax v. Ramesh
Chander & Ors., 93 I.T.R. 450 (Pb). The High Court relied on the following
observations at pages 478-479 of the report:
"I have come to the conclusion that the
search and seizure warrants issued under sub-section (1) of section 132 of the
Income-tax Act were illegal, firstly, because the search and seizure warrants
were issued in the name of Ramesh Chander and he was in fact not in possession
of either the currency notes or account books, and secondly, the income tax
authorities could not seize the currency notes and account books from the
police officer who is duty bound to proceed with the case property in
accordance with the pro visions of the Code of Criminal Procedure." The
High Court held that where the amount was seized by the Customs authorities and
the seizure was held illegal by the Court, Customs authorities were bound to
return the money to the person entitled to it under the relevant provisions of
section 110 of the Customs Act, 1962. The Income-tax authorities could not
seize such an amount from the Customs authorities under section 132 of the Act.
Moreover, the authorisation was illegal if
issued in the name of the person who did not have possession of the article, in
respect of which it was issued. The High Court further held that in the facts
and circum- 299 stances of the case the order under section 132 of the Act was
not Justified.Therefore, the High Court held that the search and seizure
warrants were liable to be quashed and the money returned to the customs
department. The judgment of the High Court is reported in 94 I.T.R. 567. The
validity of the judgment is impugned in this appeal.
It is necessary in order to appreciate the
contentions urged in this case to refer to the relevant provisions of section
132 of the Act. Sub-section ( I) of section 132 provides as follows:
"Search and Seizure-(1) Where the Director
of Inspection or the Commissioner [or any such Deputy Director of Inspection or
Inspecting Assistant Commissioner as may be empowered in this behalf by the
Board,] in consequence of information in his possession, has reason to believe
that (a) any person to whom a summons under sub section (1) of section 37 of
the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (XI of 1922), or under sub-section (1) of
section 131 of this Act, or a notice under sub section (4) of section 22 of the
Indian Income Tax Act, 1922, or under sub-section (1) of section 112 of this
Act was issued to produce or cause to be produced any books of account or other
documents has omitted or failed to produce, or cause to be produced, such books
of account or other documents as required by such summons or notice, or (b) any
person to whom a summons or notice as aforesaid has been or might be issued
will not, or would not, produce or cause to be produced, any books of account
or other documents which will be useful for, or relevant to any proceeding
under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (XI of 1922), or under this Act, or (c)
any person is in possession of any money, bullion, jewellery or other valuable
article or thing and such money, bullion, jewellery or other valuable article
or thing represents either wholly or partly income or property [which has not
been, or would not be, disclosed] for the purposes of the Indian Income-tax
Act, 1922 (XI of 1922), or this Act H 300 (hereinafter in this section referred
to as the undisclosed income or property), [then,- (A) the Director of
Inspection or the Commissioner, as the case may be, may authorise any Deputy
Director of Inspection, Inspecting Assistant Commissioner, Assistant Director
of Inspection or Income-tax officer, or (B) such Deputy Director of Inspection
or Inspecting Assistant Commissioner, as the case may be, may authorise any
Assistant Director of Inspection or Income-tax officer, (the officer so
authorised in all cases being hereinafter referred to as the authorised officer
to -) (i) enter and search any [building, place, vessel, vehicle or aircraft]
where he has reason to suspect that such books of account, other documents,
money, bullion, jewellery or other valuable article or thing are kept;
(ii) break open the lock of any door, box,
locker, safe, almirah or other receptacle for exercising the powers conferred
by clause (i) where the keys thereof are not available;
(iia)search any person who has got out of, or
is about to get into, or is in, the building, place, vessel, vehicle or
aircraft, if the authorised officer has reason to suspect that such person has
secreted about his person any such books of account, other documents, money,
bullion, jewellery or other valuable article or thing;] (iii)seize any such
books of account, other documents, money, bullion, jewellery or other valuable
article or thing found as a result of such search;
(iv) place mark of identification on any
books of ac count or other documents or make or cause to be made extracts or
copies therefrom;
301 (v) make a note or an inventory of any
such money, bullion, jewellery or other valuable article or thing; " The
only other sub-section to which reference need be made is sub-section (3) which
is as follows:- B "The authorised officer may, where it is not practicable
to seize any such books of account, other document, money bullion, jewellery or
other valuable article or thing, serve an order on the owner or the person who
is in immediate possession or control thereof that he shall not remove, part
with or otherwise deal with it except with the previous permission of such
officer and such officer may take such steps as may be necessary for ensuring
compliance with this sub-section. " It is not necessary to refer to the
other provisions for the present purpose. But the procedure indicated that if
necessary, force may be used for search seizure. Rule 112 of the said Rules
provides the manner in which such search and seizure should be conducted.
On a construction of the section; and the
context, in which the words "search", "possession" and
"seizure" have been used in the said section and the rules indicate
that there cannot be any order in respect of goods or moneys or papers which
are in the custody of another department under legal authority. It is important
to note that the expression "possession" has not been defined in the
Act.
It may be noted that sub-section (3) of
section 132 of the Act uses the expression "who is in immediate possession
or control thereof". "Possession" is a word of ambiguous meaning
and its legal senses do not always coincide with the popular sense. Reference
may be made to Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 35, 4th Edn. articles
1111-11267 pages 617- 627. Possession again may not always be synonymous with
manual detention or physical retention of the goods or moneys. It appears to us
that when the physical custody of the moneys and goods were with the customs
authorities, and that too by a legal sanction and authority to have that
custody, it would be improper to contend that possession as used in section 132
of the Act was still with the respondent. The use of the expression
"immediate possession" in sub-section 302 (3) of section 132 does not
detract from the meaning of possession in the popular sense. This construction
is not unmindful of the fact that in some of the sub-sections of section 132
the expressions "retention" and "custody" have been used,
but reading these expressions in the context these have been used, it cannot be
said that where an authority or a person has retention and custody with the
legal sanction behind it, it was not the intention of the legislature to say
that he was not in possession as contemplated in section 132 of the Income-tax
Act, 1961.
In this connection, reference may be made to
Burrows Words & Phrases Judicial Dictionary, 4th Edn. page 306. All these
aspects were discussed by the Calcutta High Court (by one of us, Sabyasachi
Mukharji, J singly) in Laxmipat Chororia v. K.K. Ganguli & ors., 82 l.T.R.
306 (Cal). This decision was affirmed on appeal and the bench decision of the
said Court is reported in 93 I.T'R. at p. 489. This aspect of the matter has
been clearly dealt with by a judgment of the division bench of the Allahabad
High Court in Motilal and ors. v. Preventive Intelligence officer, Central
Excise and Customs, Agra and others, 80 I.T.R. 418. (Allah.) where the judgment
was delivered by one of us (R.S. Pathak, J.). There the Court held that the
power conferred under section 132(1) of the Act was contemplated in relation to
those cases where the precise location of the article or thing was not known to
the Income-tax department and therefore, a search was necessary for it, and
where it would not be ordinarily yielded over by the person having possession
of it. The view that section 132(3) of the Act would include a case where the
location of the article or thing was known and where ordinarily the person
holding custody of it would readily deliver it up to the Income-tax department
was not correct, it was so held by the division bench of the Allahabad High
Court.
It was further held that consequently goods
in the custody of the Assistant Collector of Customs and Central Excise were
not things which could be the subject of an order under section 132(3) of the
Act. Pathak, J. spoke for the division bench there at p. 422 of the report
thus:
"In my opinion, the power conferred
under section 132(1) is contemplated in relation to those cases where the
precise location of the article or thing is not known to the income-tax
department and, therefore, a search must be made for it, and where it will not
be ordinarily yielded over by the person having possession of it and, therefore
it is necessary to seize it. If it is only such article or thing which 303 is
contemplated by section 132(1) then it is such article or A thing alone which
can be the subject of an order under section 132(3). I am unable to accept the
contention on behalf of the Income-tax department that section 132(3) will
include a case where the location of the article or thing is known and where
ordinarily the person holding custody of it will readily deliver it up to the
Income-tax department. Such article or thing, I think, requires neither search
nor seizure. " Mr. S.C. Manchanda, learned advocate for the revenue, drew
our attention to several decisions including the decision in Noor Mohd.
Rahimatulla Gillani, v. The Commissioner of Income-tax Vidrabha and Marathwada,
Nagpur and another, 1976 Taxation Law Reports 688 (Bombay).
In that case, after referring to the views
expressed by the division bench of Allahabad High Court and division bench of
Punjab and Haryana High Court in the judgment under appeal and the Calcutta
High Court, as indicated before, Chandurkar J. Of the Bombay High Court
observed as follows:
"We are not inclined to accept the
submission that no valid authorisation to seize the amount Lying with the
Collector of Central Excise and Customs, Nagpur could have been issued under
Section 132(1). The relevant provision in the instant case is to be found in
Section 132(1) (c) of the Act and all that is required in order to issue an
authorisation under Section 132(1) is that either the Director of Inspection or
the Commissioner must have reason to believe that any person is in possession
of any money, bullion, jewellery or other valuable article or thing and such money,
bullion, jewellery or other valuable article or thing represents either wholly
or partly income or property which has not been disclosed for the purposes of
the Act or the Income-tax Act of 1922. It is the character of money or assets
as undisclosed income or property and their possession that gives jurisdiction
to issue the authori- risation. Merely because some authority has seized that
money or property, its character which is believed to be that of undisclosed
income or property does not change.
The seizure of the cash amount of Rs.3.05.530
by the 304 Central Excise Authorities in the instant case no doubt transferred
physical possession of that amount from the petitioner to the Central Excise
Department, but the legal ownership of that money still continued to be with
the petitioner. As long as that amount was not confiscated or did not become
the property of the Central Excise Depart- ment by virtue of an order passed
under the relevant provision of law if at all any order could be so passed the property
or the money did not cease to be that of the petitioner. Though the Collector
of Central Excise and Customs was in possession of the money, since its alleged
character of being undisclosed income or property remained unattended the
Collector satisfied the description of "any person" being in
possession of undisclosed income or property though the property represented
the undisclosed income or property of the petitioner himself. The words used in
s.
132(1) (c) are "any person". Such a
person may be a person who is in possession of his own undisclosed income or
property or a person who is in possession of somebody else's undisclosed income
or property. The fact that the Collector of Central Excise and Customs happened
to be an officer of the Government of India was not relevant because the
Income-tax Authorities and the Central Excise Authorities were functioning
under two separate enactments which created two different liabilities the
enforcement of which was entrusted to independent authorities under the law.
Disagreeing, therefore, with the authorities relied upon by the 3 petitioner,
we must hold that the authorisation issued even against the Collector of
Central Excise and Customs enabling the Income-tax officer to seize that amount
was a valid authorisation. In any case, in the instant case, a subsequent order
under s. 132(3) was already made and even by the order under s. 132(5) that
amount was directed to be released." It is true that the title was not
transferred to the Customs authorities by seizure under the Customs Act. But in
the context. in which the expressions "possession" and
"seizure" have been used, it p cannot be considered to mean that the
possession was where the legal title was, physical possession was with the
Customs authorities, title Was with the respondent herein. In this context, the
physical possession having regard to the language used is relevent and
material. Physical possession was with the Customs authorities when the seizure
authorisation was passed.
Therefore, where the exact location of the
property was known and there was no need to seize the money, the Income- tax
department could direct handing over the money to the Income-tax authorities or
take steps for such direction through appropriate authorities. In that view of
the matter we are unable to sustain the view of Chandurkar, J. as the learned
Chief Justice then was of the Bombay High Court.
Mr. Manchanda also drew our attention to the
case of Pannalal v. Income-Tax officer, B-Ward, Chhindwara and ors., 93 I.T.R.
p.480 (M.P.) where the division bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court was of
the view that an order under section 132(3) could only be passed after an
authorisation for search and seizure had been made under section 132(1) of the
Act. The thing in respect of which the order is made must be one regarding
which the conditions mentioned in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of section 132 are
satisfied. But there was nothing in the requirements of section 132 to support
the view that if the Commissioner has definite knowledge that the books of
account, documents, money, bullion, etc., sought to be searched and seized are
in the possession of a particular person he cannot issue an authorisation for
search and seizure of the same. In our opinion. it may be mentioned that if the
location was certain, then there was nothing to search or look for.
Madhya Pradesh High Court, however, observed
that the expression "has reason to believe" signified that the
Commissioner has reason to be satisfied that the things to be searched are in
the possession of a particular person.
The object of section 132 was according to
the High Court, not merely to get information of the undisclosed income but
also to seize the money, bullion, etc. representing the undisclosed income and
to retain. them for purposes mentioned in section 132(5). Section 132(1)(C) of
the Act did not contain a condition either expressly or impliedly that the
thing to be seized should not be in the possession of a person who may
willingly part with his possession.
There is no obligation on any one, not even
on Government officers of other department, to deliver anything to G the
income-tax authorities except when the law requires them to do so. The person
authorised by the Commissioner could enter and search any building, break open
the lock of any door etc. But that did not mean that in every case the person
authorised by the warrant would have to exercise all those powers in making the
search and seizing the thing, according to the High Court. It was not necessary
that an actual 306 search must precede an order under section 132(3) directing
a person not to part with articles in his possession.
Section 132(1)(c) did not contemplate that
the person who has not disclosed his income or property for the purposes of the
Income-tax Act should himself be in possession of money, bullion, etc.
representing such income. Clause (c) spoke of "any person who is in
possession" and it did not specifically refer to possession by the person
who had not disclosed his income. All that the clause required was that the
money, bullion etc. should be such which represents either wholly or partly
income or property which had not been disclosed for purposes of the Income-tax
Act and such money, bullion, etc. should be in the possession of a person. This
construction was supported by the use of words "immediate possession"
in section 132(3) of the Act. This was the view of the High Court.
There an order under section 132(3) was
passed by the Commissioner of Income-tax on the Collector of Customs and
Central Excise in respect of currency notes of the value of Rs.2,02.500
belonging to a firm, which the Collector was holding under the Gold Control Act
and which, as no offence was committed under that Act, the Collector had
ordered to be released. It was also held by the High Court that the Collector
was under a legal obligation to return the currency notes to the firm after the
proceedings under the Gold Control Act had been finalised. The power of the
Collector was only to retain the currency notes for a limited period. It could
be held that the currency notes were held by the Collector for and on behalf of
the firm and the order passed under section 132 was valid.
For the reasons mentioned hereinbefore, we
are unable to sustain that view of the High Court. As mentioned before though
legal title might have been with the person whose income was sought to be taxed
the physical possession was with the Customs authorities. Our attention was
drawn to a bench decision of the Madras High Court where similar view was taken
in Gulab and Company and Anr. v. Superintendent of Central Excise (Preventive)
Trichy, and ors.. 98 I.T.R. 581 (Mad.). For the reasons we have indicated
hereinbefore, we are also unable to sustain this view. The Kerala High Court in
the case of Assainar and Anr. v. Income-tax Officer, Calicut and on,., 101
I.T.R. 854 (Kerala) also accepted this view. We are, for the aforesaid reasons,
unable to sustain this view with respect. The High Court observed that the word
"search" has varied meanings and it should be given the general
meanings "to look for" or "seek" which are also well known.
But in the context the expression "seizure" and in the context 307
the expression "search" where the location of the property was known
A to the Government, we are of the opinion that it could not be said that one
government department could search any other government department, and seize
those documents.
Relying on the decision of the Allahabad High
Court in Motilal's case (supra) as well as the decision of the Calcutta High
Court in Laxmipat's case (supra), the learned single judge of the Punjab and
Haryana High Court in Ramesh Chander v. Commissioner of Income Tax (supra) held
that the word "seizure" implied forcibly taking from the owner or who
has the possession and who was unwilling to part with the possession. In that
case custody was with the police and it would be inappropriate to accept the
position that the income tax department which was another department of the
Union of India had to be armed with authority to seize from the unwilling
persons. We are in agreement with these views of the learned single judge. This
view of the learned single judge has been confirmed in the judgment of the
division bench, already referred to hereinbefore (reported in 93 I.T.R. p.
450). The lacuna in law has subsequently been filled in by 132A of the Act with
effect from October, 1975.
In the view of the law as it stood at the
relevant time, we are unable to sustain the challenge to the order, impugned in
this appeal. The appeal, therefore, fails and is accordingly dismissed with the
. observations that it will be open to the Income-tax authorities to approach
the appropriate authorities to realise any amount of money or to recover any
books of account or documents in accordance with law. In the facts and the
circumstances of the case, parties will pay and bear their respective costs.
S.R. Appeal dismissed.
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