Ganpat Giri Vs. Iind Additional
District Judge, Balia & Ors [1986] INSC 1 (7 January 1986)
VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J) VENKATARAMIAH, E.S.
(J) MISRA, R.B. (J)
CITATION: 1986 AIR 589 1986 SCR (1) 15 1986
SCC (1) 615 1986 SCALE (1)21
ACT:
Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act 1976
- S. 97 - Scope of - Amending Act - Effect of - On entire Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908.
Order 21 Rule 72 (as in force in State of
U.P.) - Whether ceases to operate on commencement of the Code of Civil
Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976.
HEADNOTE:
Code of Civil Procedure prior to its
amendment by Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act 1976, by sub-rules (1) and
(3) of Rule 72, Order 21 laid down that no holder of a decree in execution of
which property is sold shall, without the express permission of the Court, bid
for or purchase the property and that where a decree-holder pruchases, by
himself or through another person, without such permission, the court may, if
it thinks fit, on the application of the judgment-debtor or any other person
whose interests are affected by the sale, by order set aside the sale. In the
State of Uttar Pradesh, the High Court of Allahabad, by an amendment made to
the aforesaid Rule, deleted sub-rules (1) and (3). The result was that in the
case of a decree-holder the need for obtaining the express permission of the
executing court before offering the bid for or purchasing the property put up
for sale under sub-rule (1) was not there and the power of the court to set
aside the sale under sub-rule (3) of Rule 72 in the absence of such permission
had also been taken away.
By the Amending Act, 1976 several amendments
were carried out to the Code on the basis of the recommendations of the Indian
Law Commission in its 54th Report in 1973.
Since there were in force in different parts
of India several amendments to the code which had been effected by the State
Legislatures or by the High Courts, the Law Commission recommended that a new
Rule 72-A may be added to Order 21 in which there was reference to sub-rules (2)
and (3) of Rule 72 16 in sub-rule (3) of Rule 72-A. Hence, even though Rule 72
was not amended by the Amending Act, its retention in the form in which it was
in the code had been recommended by the Law Commission. Section 97(1) of the
Amending Act provides that "any amendment made, or any provision inserted
in the principal Act by a State Legislature or a High Court before the
commencement of this Act shall, except in so far as such amendment or provision
is consistent with the provisions of the principal Act as amended by this Act,
stand repealed." Respondent No.3 obtained a decree for recovery of money
on July 29, 1977 against the appellant. In execution of the said decree, the
immoveable property belonging to the appellant was brought to sale by court on
August 4, 1978 and at that court sale respondent No.3 was declared as the
successful bidder. Before the sale was confirmed, the appellant filed an
application for setting aside the sale on the ground that the decree holder had
not obtained prior permission of the executing court under Rule 72(1) of Order
21 of the Code. The executing court set aside the sale, since admittedly no
such permission had been obtained by the decree-holder.
The District Judge affirmed the aforesaid
order in a revision petition filed by respondent No.3 - Decree-holder on the
ground that on the commencement of the Amending Act by virtue of section 97(1)
thereof the local amendment made to Rule 72 of Order 21 of the Code prior to
that date ceased to operate and the Code as amended by the Amending Act applied
to the case. Aggrieved by the decision of the District Judge, respondent No.3
filed a petition under Art.226 before the High Court of Allahabad. The High
Court allowed the Writ Petition holding that since the amending Act had not
made amendment of any kind in so far as Rule 72 of Order 21 was concerned, the
amendment made by the High Court of Allahabad to Rule 72 of Order 21 of the
Code prior to the commencement of the Amending Act remained intact.
Allowing the appeal to this Court, ^
HELD: 1. The High Court was in error in
holding that the amended Rule 72 of Order 21 which was in force in the State of
Uttar Pradesh prior to February 1, 1977 continued to be in force after that
date and that the court sale held in which the decree-holder had purchased the
property without the express permission of the executing court was unassailable
under sub-rule (3) of Rule 72. Therefore, the order passed by the High Court is
set aside and the order passed by the 17 District Judge affirming the order of
the executing court is restored. [24 C; 24 F]
2.1 The object of section 97 of the Amending
Act appears to be that on and after February 1, 1977 throughout India wherever
the Code was in force, there should be same procedural law in operation in all
the Civil Courts subject, of course, to any future local amendment that may be
made either by the State Legislature or by the High Court, as the case may be,
in accordance with law. Until such amendment is made the code as amended by the
Amending Act alone should govern the procedure in civil courts which are
governed by the Code. [19 F-G]
2.2 The effect of section 97(1) is that all
local amendments made to any of the provisions of the Code either by a State
Legislature or by a High Court which were inconsistent with the Code as amended
by the Amending Act stood repealed irrespective of the fact whether the
corresponding provision in the Code had been amended or modified by the
Amending Act and that was subject only to what was found in sub-section (2) of
section 97. Moreover, sub-section (3) of section 97 sets at rest doubts, if
any, by making the Code as amended by the Amending Act applicable to all
proceedings referred to therein subject to sub- section (2) of section 97. [23
G-H]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal
No. 18 of 1986.
From the Judgment and Order dated 9.4.1985 of
the Allahabad High Court in C.M.W.P. No. 2754 of 1981.
S.N. Kacker (Amicus curie) and B.S. Chauhan
for the Appellant.
Sunil K. Jain for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
VENKATARAMIAH, J. We are principally concerned in this case with the effect of
section 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 (104 of 1976)
(hereinafter referred to as 'the Amending Act') on any amendment made or any
provision inserted in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred
to as 'the Code') by a State Legislature or a High Court prior to the
commencement of the Amending Act, i.e., prior to February 1, 1977 in the
different local areas in India where the Code is in force if they be
inconsistent with the provisions of the Code as amended by the Amending Act.
18 Section 97(1) of the Amending Act reads
thus:- "any amendment made, or any provision inserted in the principal Act
by a State Legislature or a High Court before the commencement of this Act
shall, except in so far as such amendment or provision is consistent with the
provisions of the principal Act as amended by this Act, stand repealed."
The above provision is however subject to sub-section (2) of section 97 of the
Amending Act which provides that notwithstanding that the provisions of the
Amending Act have come into force or the repeal under sub-section (1) of
section 97 of the Amending Act has taken effect, and without prejudice to the
generality of the provisions of section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, the
provisions in clauses (a) to (zb) of that sub-section would prevail.
Sub-section (3) of section 97 of the Amending Act provides that save as
otherwise provided in sub-section (2), the provisions of the principal Act, as
amended by the Amending Act, shall apply to every suit proceeding, appeal or
application pending at the commencement of the Amending Act or instituted or
filed after such commencement, notwithstanding the fact that the right, or
cause of action, in pursuance of which such suit, proceeding, appeal or
application is instituted or filed, had been acquired or had accrued before
such commencement.
The principal Act referred to in section 97
is the Code. By the Amending Act several amendments were carried out to the
Code on the basis of the recommendations of the Indian Law Commission which had
considered extensively the provisions of the Code before it submitted its 54th
Report in 1973. By the time the Law Commission took up for consideration the
revision of the Code, there were in force in different parts of India several
amendments to the Code which had been effected by the State Legislatures or by
the High Courts. The subject of civil procedure being in Entry 13 of List III
of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, it is open to a State Legislature
to amend the Code insofar as its State is concerned in the same way in which it
can make a law which is in the Concurrent List. Section 122 of the Code
empowers the High Courts to make rules regulating the procedure of civil courts
subject to their superintendence as well as rules regulating their own
procedure. These rules no doubt must not be inconsistent with the body of the
code. But they can amend or add to rules in the First Schedule to the Code.
Section 129 of 19 the Code which is overlapping on section 122 of the Code to
some extent confers power on the Chartered High Courts to make rules as to
their original civil procedure. As mentioned earlier, before the Amending Act
came into force on February 1, 1977 many of the provisions of the Code and the
First Schedule had been amended by the State Legislatures or the High Courts as
the case may be and such amended provisions had been brought into force in the
areas over which they had jurisdiction. When the Amending Act was enacted
making several changes in the Code Parliament also enacted section 97 providing
for repeals and savings and the effect of the changes on pending proceedings.
There are three sub-sections in section 97 of
the Amending Act. A reading of section 97 of the Amending Act shows that it
deals with the effect of the Amending Act on the entire Code both the main part
of the Code consisting of sections and the First Schedule to the Code which
contains Orders and Rules. Section 97(1) of the Amending Act takes note of the
several local amendments made by a State Legislature and by a High Court before
the commencement of the Amending Act and states that any such amendment shall
except insofar as such amendment or provision is consistent with the provisions
of the Code as amended by the Amending Act stands repealed. It means that any
local amendment of the Code which is inconsistent with the Code as amended by
the Amending Act would cease to be operative on the commencement of the
Amending Act, i.e., on February 1, 1977.
The repealing provision in section 97(1) is
not confined in its operation to provisions of the Code including the Orders
and Rules in the First Schedule which are actually amended by the Amending Act.
The object of section 97 of the Amending Act appears to be that on and after
February 1, 1977 throughout India wherever the Code was in force there should
be same procedural law in operation in all the civil courts subject of course
to any future local amendment that may be made either by the State Legislature
or by the High Court, as the case may be in accordance with law. Until such
amendment is made the Code as amended by the Amending Act alone should govern
the procedure in civil courts which are governed by the Code. We are
emphasising this in view of the decision of the Allahabad High Court which is
now under appeal before us.
This appeal by special leave is filed against
the judgment dated April 9, 1985 in Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 2754
of 1981 on the file of the High Court of Allahabad.
20 Jamuna Chaubey, respondent No. 3 herein
obtained a decree for recovery of money of July 29, 1977 against the appellant Ganpat
Giri in Original Suit No. 359 of 1973 on the file of the Munsiff East, Balia.
In execution of the said decree the immovable property belonging to the
appellant was brought to sale by court on August 4, 1978 and at that court sale
respondent No.3 was declared as the successful bidder. Before the sale was
confirmed, on August 12, 1978 the appellant filed an application for setting
aside the sale under Rule 90 of Order 21 of the Code on several grounds. Later
on he made an application stating that the sale was liable to set aside as
respondent No. 3 who was the decree holder had not obtained the permission of
the executing court under Rule 72(1) of Order 21 of the Code. The delay in
filing that application was condoned. The executing court upheld the plea of
the judgment debtor, the appellant herein, relying upon sub-rule (3) of Rule 72
of Order 21 of the Code and set aside the sale by its order dated February 20,
1979, since admittedly no such permission had been obtained by the decree
holder. The application under Rule 90 of Order 21 of the Code was dismissed as
not pressed. Another prayer made under Rule 89 of Order 21 of the Code was
rejected on the ground that it had become infructuous. Aggrieved by the
decision of the executing court respondent No. 3 filed a revision petition
before the District Judge, Balia under the provisions of section 115 of the
Code (as amended by section 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Uttar Pradesh
Amendment) Act 1978 with effect from August 1, 1972). The District Judge dismissed
the revision petition on October 13, 1980. Against the decision of the District
Judge respondent No. 3 filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution
before the High Court of Allahabad. The petition was allowed by the High Court
holding that the case was governed by Rule 72 of Order 21 of the Code as it was
in force in the State of Uttar Pradesh before the Amending Act came into force.
It may be stated here that both the executing court and the District Judge had
upheld the contention of the judgment debtor that on the commencement of the
Amending Act by virtue of section 97(1) thereof the local amendment made to
Rule 72 of Order of the Code prior to that date ceased to operate and the Code
as amended by the Amending Act applied to the case. The High Court however took
the view that since the Amending Act had not made amendment of any kind in so
far as Rule 72 of Order 21 was concerned, the amendment made by the High Court
of Allahabad to Rule 72 of Order 21 of the Code prior to the commencement of
the Amending Act remained intact.
21 The High Court did not say anything on the
question of condonation of delay in making the application under Rule 72(3) of
Order 21 of the Code. It however stated that the application under Rule 89 of
Order 21 of the Code could still be considered by the executing court. In this
appeal by special leave the order of the High Court is questioned.
For purposes of ready reference Rule 72 of
Order 21 as it is in the Code and as it was in the State of Uttar Pradesh prior
to the commencement of the Amending Act are set out below:
"Order 21 Rule 72 as it is in the Code.
72. Decree-holder not to bid for or buy
property without permission. - (1) No holder of a decree in execution of which
property is sold shall, without the express permission of the Court, bid for or
purchase the property.
Where decree-holder purchases, amount of
decree may be taken as payment. - (2) Where a decree holder purchases with such
permission, the purchase money and the amount due on the decree may, subject to
the provisions of Section 73, be set off against one another, and the Court
executing the decree shall enter up satisfaction of the decree in whole or in
part accordingly.
(3) Where a decree-holder purchases, by
himself or through another person, without such permission, the Court may, if
it thinks fit, on the application of the judgment-debtor or any other person
whose interests are affected by the sale, by order set aside the sale; and the
costs of such application and order, and any deficiency of price which may
happen on the re-sale and all expense attending it, shall be paid by the
decree-holder." "Order 21 Rule 72 as it was in force in the State of
Uttar Pradesh prior to the commencement of the Amending Act.
Where a decree-holder purchases the property
sold, the purchase money and the amount due on the decree may, subject to the
provisions of section 73 be set off against one another, and the Court
executing the decree shall enter up satisfaction of the decree in whole or in
part accordingly." 22 The difference between the Code and the rule as it
was in force in State of Uttar Pradesh prior to the commencement of the
Amending Act was that in the State of Uttar Pradesh sub- rules (1) and (3) of
Rule 72 of Order 21 had been completely deleted and sub-rule (2) had been
renumbered as Rule 72 with the modification that for the words "with such
permission" the words "the property sold" had been substituted.
The result was that in the case of a decree-holder the need for obtaining the
express permission of the executing court before offering the bid for or
purchasing the property put up for sale under sub-rule (1) was not there and
the power of the Court to set aside the sale under sub-rule (3) of Rule 72 in
the absence of such permission had also been taken away.
The question whether Rule 72 of Order 21 of
the Code required any modification was considered by the Law Commission before
it made its recommendation in its 54th Report. Its observations at pp 182-183
of the Report are as follows:
"Order 21, rule 72 21.36. With reference
to Order 21, rule 72, a point was considered in the earlier Report. A
recommendation had been made in the Fourteenth Report to the effect, that a
decree-holder should be allowed to purchase property unless the court has prohibited
him from doing so. The object of the recommendation was to avoid the delay that
is frequently caused when the warrant of sale is returned unexecuted in the
absence of bidders. An amendment carrying out this recommendation was proposed
in the draft Report on the Code which had been circulated. Comments received
thereon, however, emphasised the need for the court being aware of any proposal
by the decree holder to bid.
The earlier Commission thought that there was
force in this approach and a decision was taken not to disturb the existing
rule.
We have considered this matter further, and
have come to the conclusion that the approach in the earlier Report on the Code
was correct. Hence no change is recommended.
Order 21, rule 72 23
21. 36-A. We have considered the more
fundamental question if rule 72 should be retained at all. The object behind
this provision is to ensure fairness in the auction. The decree holder, if
interested in purchasing the property himself, can conceivably, keep back or discourage
(or even mislead) prospective purchasers. Ordinarily, the fetching of a higher
purchase price would be in his interest (as likely to satisfy his claim without
further execution). But it should not be forgotten that when he is the
purchaser this consideration takes leave, and he like every purchaser would
like the price to be low. To a certain extent, he has a hand in initiating, the
sale, though not so in theory. It is he who obtains the proclamation of sale;
and, though the rules in Order 21 do not so require, it is he who is expected
to assist, and even to guide, the process serving staff in various matters
concerning execution e.g., affixation of the proclamation etc. He also
estimates the price. For these reasons, it is better to keep the existing
safeguard." Having observed this, it proceeded to recommend that a new
rule 72-A may be added to Order 21 in which there was reference to sub-rules
(2) and (3) of Rule 72 in sub-rule (3) of Rule 72-A.
It is thus seen that even though Rule 72 was
not amended by the Amending Act its retention in the form in which it was in
Code had been recommended by the Law Commission for the reasons given by it.
Now reverting to section 97(1) of the
Amending Act, the High Court was in error in holding that because no amendment
had been made to Rule 72 by the Amending Act, section 97(1) had no effect on
the Rule as it was in force in the State of Uttar Pradesh before the
commencement of the Amending Act.
As observed earlier, the effect of section
97(1) is that all local amendments made to any of the provisions of the Code
either by a State Legislature or by a High Court which were inconsistent with
the Code as amended by the Amending Act stood repealed irrespective of the fact
whether the corresponding provision in the Code had been amended or modified by
the Amending Act and that was subject only to what was found in sub-section (2)
of section 97. Sub-section (3) of section 97 provides that save as otherwise
provided in sub-section 24 (2) the provisions of the Code as amended by the
Amending Act shall apply to every suit, proceeding, appeal or application
pending at the commencement of the Amending Act or instituted or filed after
such commencement notwithstanding the fact that the right or cause of action in
pursuance of which such suit, proceeding, appeal or application is instituted
or filed had been acquired or had accrued before such commencement. Sub-section
(3) of section 97 sets at rest doubts, if any, by making the Code as amended by
the Amending Act applicable to all proceedings referred to therein subject to
sub-section (2) of section 97.
The High Court was therefore in error in
holding that the amended Rule 72 of Order 21 which was in force in the State of
Uttar Pradesh prior to February 1, 1977 continued to be in force after that
date and that the court sale held in which the decree holder had purchased the
property without the express permission of the executing court was unassailable
under sub-rule (3) of Rule 72.
We do not in the circumstances of the case find
any merit in the contention of the respondent No. 3 that the prayer made under
Order 21, Rule 72(3) of the Code was barred by time particularly because of the
doubts about its applicability in the State of Uttar Pradesh being there. At
this stage we find it unjust to consider the plea of limitation when the High
Court and the Subordinate Courts below have not found it proper to reject the
application on that ground.
The order passed by the High Court is,
therefore, set aside and the order passed by the District Judge affirming the
order of the executing court is restored.
The appeal is accordingly allowed. No costs.
We thank Shri S.N. Kacker, Senior Advocate,
who assisted us in this case at our request as amicus curiae.
M.L.A. Appeal allowed.
Back