Indu Bhusan De & Ors Vs. The State
of West Bengal [1986] INSC 168 (12 August 1986)
MISRA RANGNATH MISRA RANGNATH VENKATARAMIAH,
E.S. (J)
CITATION: 1986 AIR 1783 1986 SCR (3) 547 1986
SCC (3) 682 JT 1986 129 1986 SCALE (2)211
ACT:
Calcutta City Civil Court Act (21 of 1953)
section 5(2) fixing local limits and pecuniary jurisdiction of City Civil
Courts-Whether the Act is ultra vires the Constitution for want of legislative
competence of the State Legislature- Entry 53 of List I, Entries 1 and 2 of
List II and Entry 15 of List III of the Government of India Act, 1935 (of Entry
I IA of List III of Schedule VII of the Constitution)-Binding nature of the
Supreme Court decision-Constitution of India, 1950 Article 141.
HEADNOTE:
The Calcutta City Civil Court Act empowered
the State Government to establish a civil court to be called the City Civil
Court and under section 5(2) thereof the local limits and the jurisdiction of
the City Civil Court was to be the city of Calcutta. Section 5(2) as it stands
now fixed the jurisdiction of the City Civil Court at Rupees one lakh and
excluded the High Court's jurisdiction up to that limit.
The appellant moved the Calcutta High Court
for a declaration that the Act was ultra vires the jurisdiction of the State
Legislature and contended that Parliament alone had the legislative competence
to make law affecting the jurisdiction of the High Court. The learned Single
Judge and also the Division Bench negatived the appellant's plea and held that
the Act was intra vires the Constitution. Hence the appeal by certificate.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court, ^
HELD: 1. Entries 1 and 2 of List II of the
Government of India Act, 1935 (now Entry llA of List III of the Seventh
Schedule of the Constitution) authorised law making on subject of
administration of justice, constitution and organisation of courts and
jurisdiction and powers thereof excepting in regard to the Supreme Court. The
Calcutta City Civil Court Act received the Presidential assent and was
therefore, competent to bring about a change in the prevailing position
obtaining 548 under the Letters Patent of the Calcutta High Court.[551E-G]
2. In Narotham Das's case, the Supreme Court
took the view namely, "administration of justice" authorised making
of law conferring on, or talking away from, courts, jurisdiction to entertain
cases. Inasmuch as the provisions of the Bombay City Civil Court Act, 1948
considered in Narotham Das's case and the provisions of the Calcutta Act, are
in pari materia, the High Court correctly held that the Act was intra vires the
Constitution. The decision of the Constitution Bench in Narotham Das's case is
clear and binding precedent under Article 141 of the Constitution, against the
appellant's stand. [551E-F;H] State of Bombay v. Narothamdas Jethabhai &
Anr., [1951] S.C.R. 51, followed.
Amarendra Nath Roy Chowdhury v. Bikash
Chandra Ghose & Anr., A.I.R. 1957 Calcutta 534, approved.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal
No. 2065 of 1971 From the Judgment and order dated 28.7.1970 of the Calcutta High
Court in original order No. 125 of 1970.
B.P. Maheshwari, S.N. Aggarwal and B.M.
Bagaria for the Appellants.
D.N. Mukarjee and G.S. Chatterjee for the
Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
RANGANATH MISRA, J. This appeal by certificate from the Calcutta High Court
assails the affirming judgment of the Division Bench upholding the dismissal of
a writ petition challenging the vires of the Calcutta City Civil Court Act (21
of 1953) and its later amendment on the ground of want of legislative
competence of the State Legislature. The City Civil Court Act ('Act' for
short), empowered the State Government to establish a civil court to be called
the City Civil Court and under section 5 thereof the local limits and the
jurisdiction of the City Civil Court was to be the city of Calcutta.
Sub-section (2) of s.5 provided:
"Subject to the provisions of
sub-sections (3) and (4), the 549 City Civil Court shall have jurisdiction and
the High Court shall not have jurisdiction to try suits and proceedings of a
civil nature not exceeding Rs. 10,000-in value." The value of Rs. 10,000
was later enhanced to Rs.50,000 and again to Rs. 1 lakh. The appellant moved
the Calcutta High Court for a declaration that the Act was ultra vires the
State legislature. It was contended that Parliament alone had the legislative
competence to make law affecting the jurisdiction of the High Court. The
learned single judge as also the Division Bench negatived the appellant's plea
and have held that the Act was intra vires the Constitution.
It is appropriate to refer to the relevant
legislative entries in the three lists-Union, State and Concurrent-as they
stood in 1953 when the Act was enacted. In the Union List entries 77, 78 and 95
are relevant. They provide:
"77. Constitution, organisation,
jurisdiction and powers of the Supreme Court (including contempt of such
Court), and the fees taken therein; persons entitled to practise be fore the
Supreme Court.
78. Constitution and organisation (including
vacations) of the High Courts except provisions as to officers and servants of
High Court; persons entitled to practise before the High Court.
95. Jurisdiction and powers of all courts,
except the Supreme Court, with respect to any of the matters in this list;
admiralty jurisdiction." Entry 3, List II at the relevant time provided:
"3. Administration of justice,
constitution and organisation of all courts except the Supreme Court and the
High Courts; officers and servants of the High Court; procedure in rent and
revenue courts; fees taken in all courts except the Supreme Court." Entry
65, List II provides:
"65. Jurisdiction and powers of all
courts, except the 550 Supreme Court, with respect to any of the matters in
this list." Entry 46, List III provides:
"46. Jurisdiction and power of all
courts, except the Supreme Court, with respect to any of the matters in this
list." A Constitution Bench of this Court in State of Bombay v.
Narothamdas Jethabhai & Anr., [1951] S.C.R. 51, examined the validity of
the Bombay City Civil Court Act of 1948. the provisions of that Act and the
impugned Act are almost similar. The challenge to the vires of the Bombay Act
had to be examined keeping the provisions of Government of India Act, 1935, in
view inasmuch as that was a pre Constitution legislation. Each of the learned
Judges wrote a separate judgment but all of them were agreed that the Bombay
Act was a law with respect to a matter enumerated in List II and was not ultra
vires. Entry 53 of List I was to the following effect:
"53. Jurisdiction and powers of all
courts, except the Federal Court, with respect to any of the matters in this
list .. " Entries 1 and 2 of List II were as under:
"1....The administration of justice,
constitution and organisation of all courts, except the Federal Court, and fees
taken therein; ......
2. Jurisdiction and powers of all courts,
except the Federal Court, with respect to any of the matters in this list;
procedure in Rent and Revenue Courts." Entry 15 of List III was to the
following effect:
"15. Jurisdiction and powers of all
courts, except the Federal Court, with respect to any of the matters in this
List." The two relevant entries in List II of the Seventh Schedule of the
Constitution authorised law making on subject of administration of justice, constitution
and organisation of courts and jurisdiction and pow- 551 ers thereof excepting
in regard to the Supreme Court. These were the two expressions with reference
to which Fazal Ali, J. in Narotham Das's case observed thus:
"...the expressions "administration
of justice" and "constitution and organisation of courts", which
have been used therein without any qualification or limitation, are wide enough
to include the power and jurisdiction of courts, for how can justice be
administered if courts have no power and jurisdiction to administer it, and how
can courts function without any power of jurisdiction. Once this fact is
clearly grasped, it follows that, by virtue of the words used in Entry I of
List II, the Provincial Legislature can invest the courts constituted by it
with power and jurisdiction to try every cause or matter that can be dealt with
by a court of civil or criminal jurisdiction and that the expression
''administration of justice" must necessarily include the power to try
suits and proceedings of a civil as well as criminal nature irrespective of who
the parties to the suit or proceeding or what its subject-matter may be. This
power must necessarily include the power of defining, enlarging, altering,
amending and diminishing the jurisdiction of the courts and defining their
jurisdiction territorially and pecuniarily.' The other learned Judges
constituting the Bench took the same view namely, "administration of
justice" authorised making of law conferring on, or taking away from,
courts, jurisdiction to entertain cases. This decision of the Constitution
Bench clearly negatives the claim of the appellant that the impugned Act was
ultra vires the jurisdiction of the West Bengal Legislature. Admittedly the Act
received Presidential assent and was, therefore, competent to bring about a
change in the prevailing position obtaining under the Letters Patent of the
Calcutta High Court.
A similar challenge as in the present dispute
had also been raised before the Calcutta High Court in the case of Amarendra Nath
Roy Chowdhury v. Bikash Chandra Ghose & Anr., AIR 1957 Calcutta 534 and a
learned single Judge relying on the decision of the Constitution Bench referred
to above had held that the Act was intra vires the State legislature. We are of
the view that the decision of the Constitution Bench is a clear and binding
precedent against the appellant's stand.
552 The appeal has no merit and is,
therefore. dismissed.
There will be no order as cost in this Court.
S.R. Appeal dismissed.
Back
