Anwar Vs. First Additional District
Judge, Bbulandshahr & Ors [1986] INSC 166 (11 August 1986)
VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J) VENKATARAMIAH, E.S.
(J) MISRA RANGNATH
CITATION: 1986 AIR 1785 1986 SCR (3) 540 1986
SCC (4) 21 JT 1986 111 1986 SCALE (2)249
ACT:
Motor Vehicles Act, 1939:S.68-D(-)Civil suit
for injunction restraining proceedings before Hearing Authority- Whether
maintainable.
HEADNOTE:
Section 68-C, occurring in Chapter IVA of the
Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 provides for publication of the scheme where any State
Transport Undertaking is of opinion that it is necessary in the public interest
that road transport services in relation to any area or route be run and
operated by such undertaking. Section 68-D(l) provides for filing of objections
to the scheme before the State Government, s. 68-D(2) for approval or
modification of the scheme by the State Government after giving a hearing to
objectors, while s.68-D(3) states that the approved or modified scheme when
published shall become final.
Before the Hearing Authority could give its
approval, the petitioner in the Special Leave Petition, a stage carriage permit
holder, who had earlier filed objections to the scheme published under s. 68-C,
filed a civil suit for declaration that the said scheme was illegal, void and
ultra vires and for an injunction. It was contended by the
defendants-respondents that the suit was not maintainable since the
jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in such matters was impliedly barred. During
the pendency of that suit the petitioner filed an application before the Civil
Court for staying the hearing of the suit till the disposal of a special leave
petition before the Supreme Court in which question relating to the
maintainability of suits of similar nature was involved. The Court declined to
grant the request and fixed the suit for arguments. The revision to the
District Judge and the writ petition to the High Court preferred by the
petitioner were dismissed.
In the special leave petition to the Court on
the question: Whether a suit is maintainable in a Civil Court for an injunction
restraining the Hearing Authority under s.
68-D of the Motor Vehicles Act from proceeding
with the hearing and approving the scheme.
Dismissing the special leave petition, ^
HELD: The Civil Judge was right in declining
to stay further proceedings in the suit. This is a suit which should have been
rejected at the threshold under order 7 rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure
on the ground that it did not disclose a cause of action. [546F-G] The
Jurisdiction conferred on the hearing authority under s.68D of the Motor
Vehicles Act is exclusive in character and it is not open to a civil court to
issue an order of injunction restraining the said authority from proceeding
with the hearing of the case and exercising its statutory functions. [545H;
546A] Whenever a statute uses the expression that a decision of an authority
shall be final, the jurisdiction of a civil court to go into the correctness or
otherwise of the decision is taken away. The civil courts then have
jurisdiction only to examine whether the provisions of the statute have not
been complied with or the tribunal had or had not acted in conformity with the
fundamental principles of judicial procedure. Their jurisdiction is barred
insofar as merits of the case is concerned. [546B;D-E] In the instant case the
scheme had been duly published under s 68-C by an authority which had the power
to publish it and the authority which was hearing the case under s.68-D had the
power to do so. All the contentions urged in the plaint related to the merits
of the scheme and the desirability of bringing the scheme into force and these
can be raised by an aggrieved person before the Hearing Authority under s. 68-D
of the Act. It is for the Hearing Authority to consider the objections and to
pass appropriate orders thereon. [546B-D] Parliament has created a special
machinery by the provisions contained in Chapter IVA of the Act for bringing
into force an approved or modified scheme which would have the effect of
excluding completely or partially other persons from operating motor service
vehicles on any route or in any area. The very object of enacting that Chapter
can be frustrated by interested parties by resorting to a civil court with the
sole purpose of delaying the implementation of a scheme if suits as in the
instant case are allowed to be entertained. [545C-D: 546E-F] H.C. Narayanappa
and Ors. v. The State of Mysore & Ors., [19601 3 S.C.R. 742 referred to.
542
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Special Leave
Petition (Civil) No. 8001 of 1986 From the Judgment and order dated 8.7.1986 of
the Allahabad High Court in W.P. No. 9664 of 1986.
U.R. Lalit and T. Sridharan for the
Petitioner.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
MISRA, J. The short question which arises for consideration in this case is
whether a suit is maintainable in a civil court for an injunction restraining
the Hearing Authority appointed under section 68-D of the Motor Vehicles Act,
1939 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') from proceedings with the hearing
of matters under that provision and from approving a scheme published under
section 68-C of the Act either with or without any modification.
The petitioner is the holder of a permit
issued under Chapter IV of the Act to ply a stage carriage on
Bulandshahr-Siana-Garh-Bugrasi-Brijghat-Bhasians-Shambhaoli-
Babugarh-Jadol-Jahangirabad route in the State of Uttar Pradesh. The State
Transport Undertaking of the State of Uttar Pradesh published a scheme dated
March 7, 1975 in the U.P. Gazette dated April 5, 1975 under section 68-C of the
Act pro posing to operate its stage carriages to the exclusion of all private
operators on the route referred to above. The petitioner filed his objections
to the said scheme along with several others. After a number of adjournments
the Hearing Authority empowered under section 68 of the Act was able to
conclude the proceedings by April 26, 1979 and it is alleged that the Authority
in the course of the hearing ob served that it would finalise and approve the
scheme by 21.5.1979. Before the Hearing Authority could give its approval to
the scheme under section 68-D of Act, the petitioner filed original Suit No.
145 of 1979 on the file of the Civil Judge, Bulandshahr for a declaration that
the above scheme published under section 68-C of the Act was illegal, void and
ultra vires and for an injunction restraining the defendants in the suit from
finalising and approving the scheme and acting upon it after it was published.
The State Transport Undertaking, i.e., the Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport
Corporation, the State of Uttar Pradesh and the Regional Transport Authority,
Meerut were impleaded as the defendents in the suit. The defendants contested
the suit. L one of the pleas raised in their written statement was that the
suit was 543 not maintainable in a civil court for the reliefs prayed for by
the petitioner. During the pendency of the suit the petitioner filed an
application before the Civil Court for staying the hearing of the suit till the
disposal of a special leave petition before this Court since the question
relating to the maintainability of suits of similar nature was involved in the
said special leave petition. The learned Civil Judge declined to grant the
request of the petitioner and fixed the suit for arguments on November 8, 1985.
Aggrieved by the order of the Civil Judge,
the petitioner filed a revision petition before the Additional District Judge,
Bulandshahr. That revision petition was dismissed.
Against the order of Additional District
Judge, the petitioner filed a writ petition. On the file of the High Court of
Allahabad. That petition was also dismissed. This special leave petition is
filed against the order of the High Court of Allahabad.
We have heard the learned counsel for the
petitioner in this case on the question of maintainability of the suit out of
which this petition arises.
The question for consideration in this case
is, as mentioned above, whether a suit is maintainable in a civil court for an
injunction restraining the Hearing Authority under section 68-L) of the Act
from proceeding with the hearing and approving the scheme either with or
without modification. The contention of the respondents before the trial court
was that the suit was not maintainable for the reliefs prayed for by the
petitioner since the jurisdiction of the civil courts in such matters was
impliedly barred.
Chapter IVA of the Act was introduced into
the Act by Act 100 of 1956. Section 68-D of the Act provides that the
provisions of the Chapter IVA and the rules and orders made thereunder shall
have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in
Chapter IV of the Act or any other law for the time being in force or in any
instrument having effect by virtue of any such law. Chapter IVA contains
certain special provisions relating to the State Transport Undertakings. A
'State Transport Undertaking' is defined by section 68-A(b) of the Act as any
Undertaking providing road transport J service where such undertaking is carried
on by (i) the Central Government or a State Government; (ii) any Road Transport
Corporation, established under section 3 of the Road Transport Corporations
Act, 1950; and (iii) any municipality or any corporation or company owned or
controlled by the Central Government or one or more State 544 Governments, or
by the Central Government and one or more State Governments. Chapter IVA of the
Act provides for the preparation and approval of a scheme enabling the State
Transport Undertaking to operate road transport services to the exclusion
complete or partial of other persons. The procedure laid down for the preparation
of the scheme is contained in sections 68-C and 68-D of the Act. Section 68-C
of the Act provides that where any State Transport Undertaking is of opinion
that for the purpose of providing an efficient, adequate, economical and
properly co-ordinated road transport service, it is necessary in the public
interest that road transport services in general or any particular class of
such service in relation to any area or route or portion thereof should be run
and operated by the State Transport Undertaking, whether to the exclusion,
complete or partial, of other persons or other vise, the State Transport
Undertaking may prepare a scheme giving particulars of the nature of the
service proposed to be rendered, the area or route proposed to be covered and
such other particulars respecting thereto as may be prescribed, and shall cause
every such scheme to be published in the official Gazettee and also in such
manner as the State Government may direct. Section 68-D of the Act provides
that on the publication of any scheme in the official Gazette any person
already providing transport facilities by any means along or near the area or
route proposed to be covered by the scheme, any association representing
persons interested in the provision of road transport facilities recognised in
this behalf by the State Government and any local authority or police authority
within whose jurisdiction any part of the area or route proposed to be covered
by the scheme lies, may within thirty days from the date of its publication in
the official Gazette file objections to it before the State Government. The
State Government may, after considering the objections and after giving an
opportunity to the objector or his representatives and the representatives of
the State Transport Undertaking to be heard in the matter if they so desire,
approve or modify the scheme. The scheme as approved or modified as stated
above shall then be published in the official Gazette by the State Government
and the same shall thereupon become final and shall be called the approved
scheme and the area or route to which it relates shall be called the notified
area or notified route. Under section 68-I of the Act the State Government is
authorised to make rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions
of this Chapter. The rules which are promulgated provide for the details
relating to the manner in which objections or representations can be filed
under section 68-D(i) and the procedure to be followed at the hearing of
persons who have filed such objections 545 and/or representations and the
representatives of the State Transport Undertaking. The rules also provide for
the particulars to be incorporated in the scheme published under section 68-C
of the Act. From the above provisions it is clear that on the publication of
the scheme under section 68-C of the Act any person who is aggrieved by the
proposed introduction of the scheme is entitled to file his representations and
objections and to appear before the Hearing Authority under section 68-D of the
Act and make his submissions in support of his objections or representations.
Sub-section (ii) of section 68-D of the Act
authorises the Hearing Authority to approve the scheme either with or without
modification. By necessary implication it can also reject a scheme if it feels
that it is not necessary to introduce the scheme. When the scheme is approved
or modified under section 68-D of the Act, such approved or modified scheme is
required to be published in the official Gazette and on such publication it becomes
final. It is thus seen that Parliament has created a special machinery by the
provisions contained in Chapter IVA of the Act for bringing jnto force an
approved or modified scheme which would have the effect of excluding completely
or partially other persons from operating motor service vehicles on any route
or in any area. After the scheme become final, as provided in sub-section (iii)
of section 68-D of Act, the transport authorities concerned can issue permits
only in accordance with the scheme and the other provisions contained in
Chapter IVA of the Act . This Court in H. C. Narayanappa and Ors. v. The State
of Mysore and Ors., [1960] 3 S.C.R. 742 at page 753 has observed that the
scheme approved or modified and published under section 68-D of the Act may
properly be regarded as 'law', within the meaning of Article 19(6) of the
Constitution, made by the State excluding private operators from notified
routes or notified areas, and immune from the attack that it infringes the
fundamental right guaranteed by Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.
Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908 provides that the courts (subject to the provisions contained therein)
have jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature excepting suits of which
their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. It is no doubt true
that there is no express provision in the Act taking away the jurisdiction of
the civil courts to try a suit in which the validity of the proceedings under
Chapter IVA of the Act is called in question. But we are of opinion that the
jurisdiction of the civil courts is impliedly barred from entertaining suits of
the present nature. The jurisdiction of the State Government (the Hearing
Authority under section 68-D of the Act) is exclusive in character and it is
not open to a civil court to issue an order of injunction restraining the
Hearing Authority from proceeding 546 with the hearing of the case and
exercising its statutory functions. Whenever statute uses the expression that a
decision of an authority shall be final, the jurisdiction of a civil court to
go into the correctness or otherwise of the decision is taken away. We have
gone through the plaint presented in this case. It is not disputed that the
scheme had been duly published under section 68-C of the Act by an authority
which had the power to publish it and that the authority which was hearing the
case under section 68-D of the Act had the power to do so. All the contentions
urged in the plaint relate to the merits of the scheme and the desirability of
bringing the scheme into force. All such objections relating to the merits of a
scheme or the desirability of bringing such scheme can be raised by an
aggrieved person before the Hearing Authority under section 68-D of the Act and
it is for the Hearing Authority to consider such objections and representations
and to pass appropriate orders thereon. Where the Statute gives finality to the
orders of a special tribunal the civil courts jurisdiction must be held to be
excluded insofar as the merits to the case is concerned. If jurisdiction is so
excluded, the civil courts have jurisdiction only to examine whether the
provisions of the Statute have not been complied with or the tribunal had or
had not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial
procedure. In cases of the present nature where invariably reliance is placed
by the private operators on Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, a writ
petition lies before the High Court. In such cases a suit is hardly the remedy
which can be availed by them. If suits of this nature are allowed to be
entertained, the very object of the several provisions of Chapter IVA of the
Act can be frustrated by interested parties by resorting to a civil court with
the sole object of delaying the implementation of a scheme. Such attempts
should be curbed at the earliest opportunity. The learned Civil Judge was right
in declining to stay the further proceedings in the suit. This is a suit which
should have been rejected at the threshold under order 7 rule 11 of the Code of
Civil Procedure on the ground that it did not disclose a cause of action. We,
therefore, do not find any ground to interfere with the orders of the High
Court, the District Judge and the Civil Judge. The Civil Judge is directed to
dispose of the suit in the light of the observations made in this order. The
petition fails and is dismissed.
P.S.S Petition dismissed.
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