Partap Singh Vs. Union of India &
Ors [1985] INSC 194 (6 September 1985)
VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J) VENKATARAMIAH, E.S.
(J) MISRA, R.B. (J)
CITATION: 1985 AIR 1695 1985 SCR Supl. (2)
773 1985 SCC (4) 197 1985 SCALE (2)597
ACT:
Constitution of India, Articles 14 and 15 Hindu
Succession Act, 1956 s. 14 Compromise order Property allotted to widow in lieu
of her right to maintenance Whether becomes absolute estate on the coming into
force o the Act - Provision contained in s. 14(1) whether vague discriminatory
and ultra vires.
HEADNOTE:
Amar Singh was the owner of certain
agricultural lands.
He died leaving behind him two widows by name
Jagir Kaur and Har Kaur and the petitioner as his adopted son. Under an
arrangement each of the two widows had been given one Third share in the Lands
in Lieu of their right of maintenance.
Har Kaur surrendered her one third share in
favour of the petitioner and it was mutated in his favour. The petitioner filed
a suit against Jagir Kaur for obtaining a declaration that she had no right,
title or interet of any sort in the lands belonging to the deceased. A
compromise decree was passed on July 18, 1945 under which Jagir Kaur could
retain the one third hare in the Lands in question in lieu of her maintenance
and on her death the petitioner could get possession of the same. Later on
Jagir Kaur by a will dated January 25, 1971 bequeathed the said one third hare
in favour of Hardam Singh, respondent in the S.L.P. She died within a few days
thereafter.
The petitioner filed another suit claiming
that Jagir Kaur had acquired one-third share in the Lands of Amar Singh for the
first time under the compromise decree which conferred on her only a limited
estate and that on her death he should get possession of the same. The interest
of Jagir Kaur in the land allotted to her for maintenance under the compromise
decree did not become an absolute estate in her hand under s. 14(1) of the Hindu
Succession Act 1956. The Trial Court dismissing the suit held that since Jagir
Kaur had a pre-existing right to clam maintenance from the estate of Amar
Singh, her interest in the lands allotted to her had became enlarged into an
absolute estate 774 on the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act in
1956 and, therefore, the petitioner could not claim the lands in question after
her death on the basis of compromise decree.
Appeals to the District Judge as well as the
High Court also failed. The petitioner filed Special Leave Petition as well as
a Writ Petition under Article 32 questioning the constitutional validity of s.
14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act 1956 contending: (1) that the provision
contained in 8.
14(1) was vague and uncertain and in view of
the observations made by this Court in V. Tulasamma & Ors. v. V. Sesha
Reddi (dead) by L.Rs. 1977 (3) S.C.R. 266-27 the section could not be relied
upon any longer, and (2) that it was violative of Articles 14 ant 15(1) as it
had attempted to favour only one section of the community that was Hindu women
on the ground of sex to the prejudice of the male members of tat community.
Dismissing the Writ Petition as well as the
S.L.P., ^
HELD: 1. Section 14(1) of the Hindu
Succession Act 1956 is not vague and is capable of implementation. This Court
gave effect to that provision in Tulasamma's case.
The observations were mate only with a view
to bringing to the notice of Parliament that the provisions of s. 14 required
to be recast in order to avoid any possible litigation arising on account of
the clumsy language used therein. The Court, however, did not find any
difficulty in construing and applying 8. 14 and in declaring that the property
which had been allotted to the appellant No. 1 under the compromise in lieu or
satisfaction of right of maintenance became her absolute property on the coming
into force of the Act. The doubt, if any, about the meaning of that section was
set at rest by the said decision. In the instant case, the position of Jagir
Kaur was in no way different from the position of Appellant o. 1 in Tulasamma's
case. [778 B-E]
2. Section 14(1) of the Act was enacted to
remedy to some extent the plight of a Hindu woman who could no claim absolute
interest in the properties inherited by her from her husband but who could only
enjoy them with all the restrictions attached to a widow's estate under the
Hindu Law. There is ¯ justification for the males belonging to the Hindu
community to raise any objection to the beneficient provisions contained in
section 14(1) of the 775 Act on the grounds of hostile discrimination. The
provision is A further protected by the express provision contained in clause
(3) of Article 15. [778 G-H, 779 A]
CIVIL APPELLATE/ORIGINAL JURISDICTION:
Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 4934 of 1985.
From the Judgment and Order dated 6.1.1984 of
the Punjab & Haryana High Court in R.S.A. No. 1254 of 1975.
WITH Writ Petition No. 3947 of 1985. C (Under
Article 32 of the Constitution of India).
P.C. Khunger and A.M. Tripathi for the
appellant Petitioner.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
VENKATARAMIAH, J. The above petition for special leave is filed by the
petitioner under Article 136 of the Constitution requesting the Court to grant
leave to him to prefer an appeal against the judgment and order of the High
Court of Punjab Haryana in R.S.A. No. 1254 of 1975. He has also filed a writ
petition under Article 32 of the Constitution questioning the constitutionality
of section 4(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as
'the Act'). Since the two petitions are connected, they are disposed of by this
common judgment.
One Amar Singh was the owner of certain
agricultural lands measuring in all 33 Bighas 5 Biswas in the village Fatuhi
Khera, Tehsil Muktsar in the State of Punjab. He died in or about the year 1932
leaving behind him two widows by name Jagir Kaur and ar Kaur. The petitioner
was his adopted son. Under an arrangement each of the two widows had been given
one-third share in the lands belonging to their husband in lieu of their right
of maintenance. In November, 1942 ar Kaur surrendered her one-third share in
the lands in favour of the petitioner and it was mutated in his name on March
23, 1943. In 1945 the petitioner filed a suit against Jagir Kaur, the other
widow of Amar Singh, for obtaining a declaration that she had no right, title
or interest of any sort in the lands belonging to Amar Singh. During the
pendency of the said suit a compromise was effected on July 18, 1945 under
which the parties agreed that Jagir Kaur could retain 776 the one-third share
in the lands in question in lieu of her maintenance and on her death the
petitioner should get the possession of the same. Accordingly a decree was
passed.
Later on Jagir Kaur, who was in possession of
the said one- third share of the lands, bequeathed the said share in favour of
Hardam Singh, the respondent in the Special Leave Petition, under a ill on
January 25, 1971 and died within a few days thereafter. Thereafter on April 2,
1971 the petitioner filed the present suit, out of which this appeal arises,
claiming that Jagir Kaur had acquired one-third share in the lands of Amar
Singh for the first time under the compromise decree which conferred on her
only a limited estate and that on her death he should get possession of the
same. He urged that in the circumstances, the interest of Jagir Kaur in the
lands allotted to her for maintenance under the compromise decree did not
become an absolute estate in her hands under section 14(1) of the Act. Since it
could not be disputed that Jagir Kaur had a pre-existing right to claim
maintenance from the estate of Amar Singh, the Trial Court held that the
interest of Jagir Kaur in the lands allotted to her had become enlarged into an
absolute estate on the coming into force of the Act and, therefore, the
petitioner could not claim the lands in question after her death on the basis
of the compromise decree. Accordingly, the suit was dismissed.
Against the said judgment and decree of the
Trial Court the petitioner filed an appeal before the Additional District
Judge, Faridkot. In the course of the said appeal the petitioner conceded that
the Will was a genuine and valid one, but it was contended that section 14(1)
of the Act was not applicable to the case but it was governed by section 14(2)
of the Act. The appeal was, however, dismissed. The Second Appeal filed by the
petitioner before the High Court of Punjab & Haryana against the judgment
and decree of the District Judge was also dismissed. The Special Leave
Petition, referred to above, is filed against the Judgment and decree passed by
the High Court. Realising that it is not possible for him to succeed in his
suit in the presence of section 141) of the act, the petitioner has filed the
above Writ Petition questioning its constitutional validity.
Two contentions are urged by the learned
counsel for the petitioner in support of his plea that section 14(1) of the Act
is unconstitutional; (1) that the provision contained in section 14(1) of the
Act is vague and uncertain; and (2) that it is violative of Article 14 and
15(1) of the Constitution as it has attempted to favour only one section of the
community, i.e., Hindu omen on the ground of sex to the prejudice of the male
777 members of that community. In support of his first limb of attack he relied
on the following observations made by this Court in V. A Tulasamma & Ors.
v. V. Sesha Reddi (dead) by L.Rs. [1977] (3) S.C.R., at page 266-27 :
"It is indeed unfortunate that though it
became evident as far back as 1967 that sub Sections (1) and (2) of section 14
were presenting serious difficulties of construction in cases were property was
received by a Hindu female in lieu of maintenance and the instrument granting
such property prescribed a restricted estate for her in the property and
divergence of Judicial opinion was creating a situation which might well be
described as chaotic, robbing the law of that modicum of certainty which it
must always possess in order to guide the affairs of men, the legislature for
all these years, did not care to step in to remove the constructional dilemma
facing the courts and adopted an attitude of indifference and inaction,
untroubled and unmoved by the large number of cases on this point encumbering
the files of different courts in the country, when by the simple expedient of
an amendment, it could have silenced judicial conflict and put an end to needless
litigation.
This is a classic instance of a statutory
provision which, by reason of its inapt draftsmanship, has created endless
confusion for litigants and proved a paradise for lawyers. It illustrates
forcibly the need of an authority or body to be set up by the Government or the
Legislature which would constantly keep in touch with the adjudicatory
authorities in the country as also with the legal profession and immediately
respond by making recommendations for 6uitable amendments whenever it is found
that a particular statutory provision is, by reason of inapt language or
unhappy draftsmanship, creating difficulty of construction or is otherwise
inadequate or defective or is not well conceived and is consequently counter
productive of the result it was intended to achieve. If there is a close inter
action between the adjudicatory wing of the State and a dynamic and ever alert
authority or body which responds swiftly to the draw backs and deficiencies in
the law in action, much of the time and money which is at present expanded in
fruitless litigation, would H 778 he saved and law would achieve a certain
amount of clarity, certainty and simplicity which alone can make it easily
intelligible to the people." It is contended by the learned counsel for
the petitioner quite ingeniously that since Parliament had not amended section
14 after the above judgment of this Court as indicated by the Court, the said
section could not relied upon any loner.
We do not find any substance in the
contention that section 14(1) of the Act is vague and is not capable of
implementation because this Court gave effect of that sub- section in the very
judgment on which the petitioner relies notwithstanding the observations
extracted above. Those observations were made by this Court only with a view to
bringing to the notice of Parliament that the provisions of section 14 required
to be recast in order to avoid any possible litigation arising on account of
the clumsy language used in section 14 of the Act. The Court, how ever, did not
find any difficulty in construing and applying section 14(1) of the Act to the
case of the appellant No. 1 in that case and in declaring that the property
which had been allotted to her under compromise in lieu or satisfaction of
right of maintenance became her absolute property on the coming into force of
the Act. The doubt, if any, about the meaning of that section was set at rest
by the above decision. In the instant case the position of Jagir Kaur was in no
way different from the position of the appellant No. 1 in Tulasamma's case
(supra). The first ground, therefore should fail.
There is very little substance in the second
contention raised by the petitioner also. The submission made on behalf of the
petitioner in this case over-looks the benign constitutional provision in
clause (3) of Article 15 of the Constitution which provides that nothing in
Article 15 shall prevent the State from making any special provision for women
and children. The said provision over-rides clause (1) of Article 15 of the
Constitution which provides that the State shall not discriminate against any
citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of
them. Section 14(1) of the Act was enacted to remedy to some extent the plight
of a Hindu woman who could not claim absolute interest in the properties
inherited by her from her husband but who could only enjoy then. with all the
restrictions attached to a widow's estate under the Hindu law. There is now
hardly any justification for the males belonging to the Hindu community to
raise any objection to the beneficent 779 provisions contained in section 14(1)
of the Act on the ground of hostile discrimination. The above provision is
further protected by the express provision contained in clause (3) of Article
15, since it is a special provision enacted for the benefit of Hindu women. We
do not find any merit in the Writ Petition. The Writ Petition is dismissed.
Consequently, the Special Leave Petition also
has to be dismissed. It is accordingly dismissed.
A.P.J. Petitions dismissed.
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