Maharaja Kumar Somendra Chand Nandy Vs.
The State of Uttar Pradesh [1985] INSC 152 (10 July 1985)
ERADI, V. BALAKRISHNA (J) ERADI, V.
BALAKRISHNA (J) MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J)
CITATION: 1985 AIR 1582 1985 SCR Supl. (2)
115 1985 SCC (4) 113 1985 SCALE (2)293
ACT:
Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land
Reforms Act 1950 ss. 4 & 6 - Jagirdari rights - Grant of - Whether fall
outside the purview of the Act - Worship of deity - Entrustment of right -
Whether provision for payment of compensation to be made.
HEADNOTE:
A Jagir of 41 villages was conferred on Dewan
Krishna Kant Nandy, the predecessor-in-interest of the appellant by the Raja of
Banaras. By a fresh Sanad issued on January 10, 1785 the Governor-General
assigned the said villages as 'Altamga Jagir', for the purposes of defraying
the expenses of worship etc. of the deity in a temple. Subsequently, in the
year 1793, the grantee created a trust of the income of this Jagir in favour of
the deity. In the revenue settlement of 1841 the grantee was entered as
Jagirdar of these villages entitled to realise the land revenue and the
zamindars were to pay the annual land revenue to the Jagirdar, and since then
the grantee and his descendants have been realising the land revenue. In
execution of the decrees in the suits which were filed against the defaulting
zamindars, the appellant's ancestors purchased the zamindari rights.
When the U.P. Zamindari and Land Reforms Act,
1950 came into force in 1952, the appellant claimed to have two distinct
rights, namely, Jagirdari rights under the Sanad and additional Zamindari
rights acquired by purchase in execution of the decrees. The appellant was,
however, paid compensation in the form of annuity in respect of those villages
over which he had acquired zamindari rights as the land was held in trust for
meeting the expenses of a religious institution. The State's claim that the
Jagirdari rights of the appellant became vested in the State under ss.
4 and 6 of the Act, was disputed by the
appellant contending that his Jagirdari rights fell outside the purview of the
Act and had not vested in the State.
The appellant filed a writ petition in the
High Court alleging that he had not been paid compensation in respect of
Jagirdari rights and sought direction to the Government to 116 recognize and
enforce the Jagirdari rights over the said villages. The petition was dismissed
and this order was confirmed by a Division Bench.
Dismissing the Appeal to this Court, ^
HELD: 1. The intention of the Legislature as
clearly disclosed by the Scheme of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and
Land Reforms Act, 1950 was to extinguish estates, all derivative rights in
estates and interest of intermediaries between the State and the tiller of the
soil.
All grants and confirmation of title in
respect of a right or privilege over land in an estate or its revenue, would
stand automatically determined under the provisions of the Act. [118 G-H] State
of Uttar Pradesh v. Kunwar Sri Trivikram Narain Singh, [1962] 3 S.C.R. 213
followed.
2. In the instant case, the appellant was
having Jagirdari rights over 41 villages under the Sanad issued in January
1785, and the interest of the appellant in the land constituted an estate under
Cl. (8) s. 3 of the Act read with Cl. (26) of that section. As a result of the
combined operation of ss. 4 and 6 of the Act, the Jagirdari rights on the date
of the coming into force of the Act automatically ceased and became vested in
the State free from encumbrances with effect from the specified date. [119 D-H,
120 A]
3. The Sanad expressly states that the
grantee shall take and use the produce of the original lands and increase
thereof without being liable to pay any Dewani contributions and government
demands. [119 C]
4. The appellant and his predecessors were
entitled to take possession and hold control over the lands. The application
for grant of the Sanad clearly shows that the request was for confirmation of
the grant of 41 mouzas of land and for the issue of a Sanad evidencing such
confirmation. [119 D] (Per Sabyasachi Mukharji J. concurring) In the instant
case, there is no provision for any compensation for vesting of the right of
entrustment of certain duties of worship which belonged to the donee. The Act
has not been challenged on the ground as being ultra vires and though it is not
necessary to provide for compensation in all cases after 117 the amendment of
the Constitution, this is a factor which normally should be taken into
consideration because taking away of a right without some provision for
compensation is normally not favoured unless one is compelled by the language
of the provision. No provision has been made for this obligation of worship
i.e. whether the worship, would no longer be continued or whether the State
would carry on the worship. In the social background this is a factor which
normally deters one from interpreting a document in a manner which has
abolished worship of the deity. [121 E-G]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal
No. 2239 (N) of 1970.
From the Judgment and Order dated 22.3.1966
of the Allahabad High Court in Special Appeal No. 647 of 1961.
D.N. Mukharjee and Ranjan Mukharjee for the
Appellant.
S.C. Manchanda and Mrs. S.Dixit for the
Respondent.
The following Judgments were delivered :
BALAKRISHNA ERADI, J. This is an appeal by
special leave against a judgment of a Division Bench of the Allahabad High
Court dated March 22, 966 dismissing Special Appeal No. 647 of 1961 and
confirming the judgment of a learned Single Judge of the said High Court
rejecting Civil Misc. Writ No. 809 of 1958 filed by the appellant herein.
The appellant claims to be the descendant and
successor-in-interest of one Dewan Krishna Kant Nandy in whose favour a jagir
of 41 villages situated in the district of Ballia had been conferred by Raja
Mahip Narayan Singh of Banaras. This jagir grant was recognised by the East
India Company and in token thereof the Governor General, by a fresh Sanad dated
January 10, 1785 assigned the said 41 villages as `Altamga Jagir' in favour of
Dewan Krishna Kant Nandy. The Sanad mentioned that the grant was being made for
purposes of defraying the expenses of worship etc. of the deity in a temple.
Subsequently, by a document of the year 1793, Dewan Krishna Kant Nandy created
a trust of the income of this jagir in favour of the deity. In the revenue
settlement of 1841, Dewan Krishna Kant Nandy was entered as Jagirdar of these
villages entitled to realise the land revenue and the zamindars of the villages
were charged with the duty of 118 paying the annual land revenue aggregating to
Rs. 10,000 to the Jagirdar. It is the case of the appellant that since 1785,
Dewan Krishna Kant Nandy and his descendants have throughout been realising the
land revenue of the said villages. When some of the zamindars defaulted in
payment of the land revenue, suits for realisation of the outstanding arrears
were filed against them and in execution of the decrees obtained in those suits
the appellant's ancestors purchased the zamindari rights of the defaulting
zamindars in respect of some of the villages. Thus, at the time when the Uttar
Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land reforms Act, 1950 (U.P. Act No. 1 of 1951)
- herinafter called `the Act' - came into force in 1952, the appellant claims
to have held two distinct rights namely, jagirdari rights in respect of 41
villages covered by the Sanad and additional zamindari rights in respect of the
some of the villages acquired by purchase in execution of the decrees.
When the provisions of the Act were brought
into force, the appellant was paid compensation in the form of annuity in
respect of those villages over which he had acquired zamindari rights since the
lands were held in trust for meeting the expenses of a religious institution.
The State of Uttar Pradesh claimed that the Jagirdari rights of the appellant
became vested in the State under sections 4 and 6 of the Act. But this claim
was disputed by the appellant who contended that his Jagirdari rights fell
outside the purview of the Act and had not vested in the State. It was for
resolving the said dispute that the appellant approached the High Court with
the Writ Petition complaining that he had not been paid compensation in respect
of his Jagirdari rights over 41 villages and praying that a writ should be
issued compelling the Government to recognise and enforce the Jagirdari rights
of the appellant over the said villages. The Writ Petition was dismissed by the
learned Single Judge, whose judgment, as already noticed was confirmed by a
Division Bench of the High Court on appeal.
From the facts narrated above, It is clear
that the appellant was having Jagirdari rights over 41 villages under the Sanad
issued to him in January, 1785. As pointed out by this Court in State of Uttar
Pradesh v. Kunwar Sri Trivikram Narain Singh [1962] 3 S.C.R. 213, the intention
of the legislature as clearly disclosed by the Scheme of the Act was to
extinguish estates and all derivative rights in estates and to extinguish the
interest of intermediaries between the State and the tiller of the soil. All
grants and confirmation of title in respect of a right or privilege over land
in an estate or its revenue, will stand automatically determined under the
provisions of the Act.
119 The High Court has rightly negatived the
contention of the appellant that the right conferred on him by the Sanad was in
the nature of a right to pension amounting to a sum of Rs. 10,000. We have gone
through the terms of the Sanad, which is available at page 13 of the paper
book. It clearly shows that what was granted to the appellant and his predecessors
was a jagir right in respect of the lands comprised in 41 villages entitling
the grantee to collect and realise the land revenue due from the zamindars
aggregating to Rs. 10,000 with possible future increases and utilise the same
for `defraying the expense of the worship of the Thakoor'. The Sanad expressly
states that the grantee shall take and use the produce of the original lands
and increase thereof without being liable to pay any Dewani contributions and
Government demands. The appellant and his predecessors were entitled to take
possession and hold control over the lands. The application made by the
appellant, his predecessor, Dewan Krishna Kant Nandy for the grant of the Sanad
is at page 15 of the paper book. That clearly shows that the request was for
confirmation of the grant of 41 mouzas of land and for the issue of a Sanad
evidencing such confirmation. Under the grant, the appellant and his
predecessors acquired interest in the land and this interest in the hands of
the appellant clearly constitutes an Estate as defined in clause (8) of section
3 of the Act read along with clause (26) of the same section.
Section 4 of the Act provides that as from a
date to be specified, all estates situate in Uttar Pradesh shall vest in the
State free from all encumbrances. Section 6 lays down the consequences of the
vesting of an estate in the State.
Under clause (a) thereof, all rights, title
and interest of all the intermediaries in every estate automatically cease and
become vested in the State of Uttar Pradesh free from all encumbrances. Clause
(b) of the said section, which deals with grants and confirmations of title is
in the following terms :- "All grants and confirmation of title of or to
land in any estate so acquired, or of or to any right or privilege in respect
of such land or its land revenue shall, whether liable to resumption or not,
determine".
There cannot be any doubt that as a result of
the combined operation of sections 4 and 6 of the Act, the Jagirdari rights,
which the appellant originally possessed over the 41 villages as on the date of
the coming into force of the Act automatically cease and 120 became vested in
the State of Uttar Pradesh free from all encumbrances with effect from the
specified date. Such being the position, the High Court was perfectly right in
holding that the appellant was not entitled to any of the reliefs in the Writ
Petition.
This appeal accordingly fails and is
dismissed but in the circumstances without any order as to costs.
SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J. The facts of this
case and the position in law have been discussed by my learned brother.
The only doubt that I have entertained about
this matter is whether the Sanad or the grant dated 10th of January, 1785
created any in interest in the donee, Dewan Krishna Kanta Nandy, the
predecessor in interest of the present appellant as contemplated under Section
3 and Section 6 of the U.P.
Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act,
1950 (U.P. Act No. 1 of 1951). The document is at page 13 of the Paper Book in
this Court and the material portion of which is as follows:- "To the
present and future Mutsuddies of the affairs of Government and Zamindars and
Chowdharies and Kanongoes and Mokudduns and Tenants and Cultivators of
pergunnah Gazipore purchased by Government situate in Dooha Allahabad be it
known that Jageer Mouzas to the amount of Ten thousand Rupees are at present
settled upon Dewan Krishna Kant Nandy by way of an Altumga Donation to enable
him to defray the expense of the worship of the Thakoor from the commencement
of the Autumn season in Aodiyal 1189 one thousand one hundred and eighty nine
Fasly according to the Zamin so that he may take possession thereof and hold
control over same and he and his descendents apply the produce thereof and
defray the necessary expenses of the worship of the Thakoor. It behoveth that
you consider that aforesaid Original Mouzas and increase thereof to be free and
exempt from being liable to charge and alteration as well as from all the
Dewanny contributions and Government demands and not deviate from his advise
for the welfare of the tenants and inhabitants and the cultivation of the land
nor require a new Sanad every year the conduct that the above named is to
observe is this that he shall take and use the produce of the original lands
and increase thereof he and his descendants without participation or parter 121
and pray for the welfare of Government and continue the tenants and inhabitants
pleased and thankful by adopting salutary measures and exert himself
strenuously for the increase of cultivation and augmentation of duties and
exercise no apprehension or injustice towards the inhabitants of that place by
any means and take care of the public roads that passengers may pass and repass
in full confidence and suffer no body to commit any prohibited act or
drunkenness and refrain from levying any of the Branches of Revenue that have
been discontinued." Is it entrustment of certain duties of worship of
Thakoor and for this purpose providing for some expenses which will be met from
the land indicated in the document or is it a grant of the interest in the land
coupled with the obligation to perform the duty of worship to the Deity? Having
regard to the expressions used in the document to which my learned brother has
referred and having regard to the fact that incidental powers of managing etc.
as contained in the said document as set out hereinbefore, the view taken by my
learned brother seems to be appropriate though two facts have caused me certain
anxiety namely that there is no provision for any compensation for vesting of
this right of property which belonged to the donee. I say this for this reason
that though the Act has not been challenged on this ground as being ultra vires
and though it is not necessary to provide for compensation in all cases after
the amendment of the Constitution, this is, in my opinion, a factor which
normally should be taken into consideration because taking away of right
without some provision for compensation is normally not favoured unless one is
so compelled by the language of the provision. The other factor which has
caused me some hesitation is that for this obligation of worship, no provision
has been made i.e.
whether the worship would no longer be
continued or whether the State would carry on the worship. In our social
background, this is also a factor which normally deters one from interpreting a
document in a manner which has abolished worship of deity. But in spite of
these doubts, in view of the language used in the document itself, I respectfully,
though with certain amount of hesitation, agree with the view taken by my
learned brother.
A.P.J. Appeal dismissed.
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