C.I.T. Central Bombay Vs. Jalan
Trading Co. (P) Ltd. [1985] INSC 172 (9 August 1985)
MISRA RANGNATH MISRA RANGNATH TULZAPURKAR,
V.D.
MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J)
CITATION: 1985 AIR 1656 1985 SCR Supl. (2)
517 1985 SCC (4) 59 1985 SCALE (2)225
ACT:
Indian Income Tax Act 1922 - Section
10(1)(xv) - Firm obtaining sole selling agency - Benefit of agreement assigned
to assessee, a newly incorporated company - 75% of annual profits to be paid to
firm - Sum paid - Whether deductible under section 10(1) (xv).
HEADNOTE:
A firm (JTC) obtained the sole selling agency
for the products of a manufacturer for two years with a right of renewal. A few
months later, under a deed of assignment, the firm assigned the benefits of the
agreement to the assessee company under which the assessee carried on the
business as sole selling agents for the products of the manufacturer.
Under the deed of assignment the assessee
company should take over not the whole of the business of the firm but only the
benefit of the contract with the manufacturers in consideration whereof the
assessee was to pay to the firm as and by way of royalty, an amount equal to
75% of their profits and commission, remuneration and other moneys received
from the manufacturers. The assessee had the option to renew the agreement.
In its income tax return the assessee claimed
under section 10 (1) (sv) of the Act deduction of a sum of Rs.
7.93 lacs, which under the deed of assignment
lt was required to pay to the firm, but the authorities below rejected the
claim. On appeal the Appellate Tribunal held that although no ascertained sum
was mentioned for acquiring the right or the enduring benefit, the amount was
spent by the assessee for acquiring an asset of enduring benefit, and
therefore, the expenditure was capital expenditure. On reference although the
High Court held that the asset acquired by the assessee was of an enduring
nature, purporting to follow the decision of this Court in Travancore Sugars
Chemicals Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Kerala 62 ITR 566 lt held that
the annual payment by the assessee of 75% of its profits was not in the nature
of capital expenditure.
It was contended on, behalf of the Revenue
that if the amount had been spent for obtaining a capital asset the assessee
would not be entitled to claim it as a deduction.
518 On behalf of the assessee it was
contended that once the assessee had paid 75% of its profits to the firm, the
amount was no more in its hands as income and since 8. 10(1) envisage the levy
of tax on real income in the assessee's hands this was / t income within the
meaning of S.10(1) and was not taxable.
Allowing the appeal, ^
HELD: On the finding of the High Court that
the expenditure related to acquisition of a capital asset, it was not
admissible as a deduction under section 10(2) (xv) of the Indian Income Tax Act
1922. [528 G].
It is well settled that if an expenditure is
made for acquiring or bringing into existence of an asset for the enduring
benefit of the business, it is properly attributable to capital and is of the
nature of capital expenditure. The aim and object of the expenditure would
determine, whether it is capital expenditure or revenue expenditure. The source
or the manner of the payment would be of no consequence. Where a company had
acquired an asset in consideration of recurring payment of certain sum per year
which was a right to carry on its business unfettered by any competition from
outsiders within the area it was held to be in the nature of a capital asset
and the payment was not deductible under section 10(2) (xv) of the Act. [524
A,C,G] Assam Bengal Cement Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax 27 ITR 34 =
[1955] S.C.B. 1972 applied.
In Travancore Sugars and Chemicals Ltd. which
the High Court purported to follow there was a substantial aud definite amount
of outright cash payment over and above which an indefinite annual payment had
been stipulated. The tests laid down in this case were not intended to be of
general application but were given to bring into bold relief the special
aspects of the case. The Court itself has pointed this out. Therefore, the High
Court erred in importing this reasoning as a test of general application to be
applied to the facts of the prevent case. [528 D,E] In the instant case, the
High Court has categorically found that a capital asset had been acquired under
the agreement. The assessee was a new company and had no other business. Under
the contract lt acquired the right to carry on the business on a long ter basis
subject to renewal of the agreement. Therefore, 519 the first of the broad
tests l it down in Assam Bengal cases that A the expenditure was made for
initial outlay applied and on the finding that a capital asset had been
acquired, the expenditure is not liable as a deduction. [528 F-G]
2. There is no merit in the assessee's
submission. If the amount had been spent for obtaining a capital asset, the
assessee would not be entitled to claim it as a deduction under section 10(1)
(xv). [531 C]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.
1733 of 1973.
From the Judgment and Order dated 26.7.1971
of the Bombay High Court in Income Tax Reference No. 112 of 1963.
G.C. Sharma, K.C. Dua and Miss A. Subhashini
for the Appellant.
S.T. Desai, D.N. Misra and Mrs. A.K. Verma
for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
RANGANATH MISRA, J. This appeal by special leave at the instance of the Revenue
assails the decision of the Bombay High Court upon a reference under section 66
of the Income Tax Act, 1922 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). In respect
of the assessment year 1954-55, the respondent- assessee claimed deduction of a
sum of Rs. 7,93,837, under s. 10(1) or alternatively under 8. 10(2) (xv) of the
Act in determining its business profits which the Income Tax Officer and the
two appellate authorities in due course rejected. On the application of the
assessee the dispute regarding admissibility of the claim w referred to the
High Court. It agreed with the Tribunal that 'the assessee had acquired an
asset of an enduring nature in lieu of the payment of the amount in dispute;
yet, the High Court held that the payment represented business expenditure and
the claim of deduction was tenable under 8. 10(2) (xv) of the Act. On reaching
this conclusion the Court was of the view that consideration as to whether the
payment made by the assessee did not form part of its real income was
unnecessary and answered the reference in favour of the assessee. The
Commissioner of Income Tax, on obtaining special leave, is in appeal before
this Court.
The short facts relevant for appreciating the
question for consideration are these:
520 M/s. Bharat Barrel & Drum
Manufacturing Co. Ltd., ('Bharat Barrel' for short) gave its sole selling
agency to a firm - Jalan Trading Co. - by an agreement dated May 1, 1951, for
two years with a right of renewal. Assessee - respondent is a private company
incorporated on October 16, 1952. & der a deed of assignment dated December
30, 1952, the benefits of the agreement dated May 1, 1951, were assigned to the
assessee and from January 1, 1953, under the assignment the respondent carried
on the business as selling agents of Bharat Barrel. From May 1, 1953, on the
basis of the option for renewal exercised by the assessee an agreement was
entered into between Bharat Barrel and the assessee in respect of the sole
selling agency and with a renewal clause.
The deed of assignment incorporated the
following relevant terms:
"WHEREAS after the incorporation of the
said Company (assessee) lt was however agreed that the assignee company should
take over not the whole of the business of the Assignors but only the benefit
of the aforesaid contract dated the 1st May 1951 with the Said manufacturers on
the terms and conditions mutually agreed to and as hereinafter appearing:
1. In consideration of the premises and of
the covenant on the part of the assignees hereinafter contain ed the Assignors
as beneficial owners hereby assigns to the assignees:
(i) The said agreement of the 1st day of May
1951 and made between the said Bharat Barrel & Drum Manufacturing Co. Ltd.
Of the one part and the assignors of the other part and the full benefit
thereof as and from the 1st day of January 1953 and all commission and other
moneys payable or to be payable by the manufacturers;
(ii) the full benefit of all pending
contracts and orders entered into or given by the assignors in connection with
the said agreement
2. In consideration aforesaid the assignees
hereby covenant with the assignors to pay to the assignors as and by way of
Royalty an amount equivalent to 75% of their profits and commission
remuneration and other 521 moneys received from the manufacturers under the
said agreement or any further agreement that may be entered into by the
Manufacturers with the Assignees in pursuance of the option to renew the
agreement contained in cl. 5 of the said agreement dated 1st May 1951."
Assessee claimed to have paid Rs. 7,93,887 being 75% of its net profits in the
assessment year 1954-55 and claimed it as a business deduction but the same was
rejected by the Assessing Officer as also the appellate authorities. In dealing
with the question raised, the Tribunal held:
"The narrow question, therefore, that we
have to decide in this case is whether the payment of Rs.
7,93,837 is made by the assessee for
acquisition of an asset or benefit of an enduring character and, therefore, is
of a capital nature. In this the only relevant document to be considered, is
the deed of assignment dated 30.12.1952. Examining the said deed and
particularly clause 2 therein which is already stated above, we think there is
no doubt that the payment in question was made by the assessee to acquire the
right to carry on the sole selling agency of Bharat Ltd. Or in any case to
acquire a benefit of an enduring nature. It is true that in this case no
ascertained sum is mentioned for acquiring the right or the enduring benefit.
But in our opinion, this factor alone is not a decisive factor in every case.
The facts and the circumstances of every case have to be looked into and if on
the whole it appears that what was acquired was an asset or an enduring benefit
by expending a certain sum, the expenditure can well be held to be a capital
expenditure and not a revenue expenditure. In certain cases, it may well be
that in conjunction with other facts, the fact that there is no ascertained sum
mentioned in order to acquire the asset or the enduring benefit, would lead to
the inference that the expenditure is not a capital expenditure. But in this
case, we have no doubt that the amount in question was spent for acquiring an
asset of enduring benefit and, therefore, we have to hold that the expenditure
in question was a capital expenditure..... " 522 The High Court also
negatived the assessee's stand that no enduring asset was acquired and held:
We cannot accept the assessee's submission
that the asset acquired by it when lt obtained assignment of the sole selling
agency agreement, is not of an enduring nature. Counsel for the assessee says
that the assessee only acquired the right to use the rights under the sole
selling agency agreement and that is not an asset of a capital nature. There is
no warrant for the submission, because clause 1 of the deed of assignment
provides in terms that the firm as a beneficial owner assigned to the assessee
'the said agreement of the 1st day of May 1951.......... and the full benefit
thereof as and from the 1st day of January 1953 and all commission and other
moneys payable or to be payable....... by the manufacturers. Secondly, the
right which the assessee acquired under the deed of assignment was a right to
act as the sole selling agents till the 1st day of May 1953 in the first
instance, coupled with the right to have the sole selling agency agreement
renewed for an indefinite period, though for two years at a stretch. mere was
some faint argument before us as to the true meaning and scope of the option of
renewal, but we see no doubt that under the agreement of the 1st day of May
1951, the firm had the option to stipulate for a renewal on the same terms and
conditions as were contained in that agreement, which must include the term
regarding the option for a further renewal for an indefinite period. m us, the
assessee obtained an assignment of the agreement between the Company and the
firm.
That agreement contained the right to have
the sole selling agency agreement renewed for an indefinite period. It must
follow that the assessee acquired an asset of an enduring nature.
Ordinarily, out of this finding the
conclusion would have followed that the claim of deduction was not admissible
as the expenditure was for acquisition of a capital asset.
The High Court, however, referred to this
Court's decision in Travancore Sugars & Chemicals Ltd. v. Commissioner of
Income Tax, Kerala, 62 I.T.R. 566 = [1967] 1 S.C.R. 423 and adopting the
reasonings relied upon in that case to which we shall presently refer, came to
hold:
523 In view of these circumstances, the
Supreme Court held that the payment of the annual sum was not in the nature of
capital expenditure but was in the nature of revenue expenditure. Each one of
the three features adverted to by the Supreme Court is present in the instant
case.
and proceeded to conclude the matter by
saying:
We take the view that the case before us is
in material respects similar to the Travancore Sugar case." The High Court
did not examine the aspect relating to whether the payment made by the assessee
did not form part of its real income by saying: 'It is enough for our purpose
that the payment is deductible under s. 10(2) of the Act.
A four Judge Bench of this Court in Assam
Bengal Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal, 27 I.T.R.
34=[1955] 1 S.C.R. 972, indicated that the
line of demarcation between capital expenditure and revenue expenditure is very
thin. Several English decisions were referred to and the Court approved the
opinion of the Full Bench of the Lahore High Court in Benarsidas Jagannath, In
re. 15 I.T.R. 185, where Mahajan, J. (as he then was), speaking for the Court,
had successfully attempted a synthesis. This Court observed:
The synthesis attempted by the Full Bench of
the Lahore High Court truly enunciates the principles which emerge from the
authorities. In cases where the expenditure is made for the initial outlay or
for extension of a business or a substantial replacement of the equipment,
there is no doubt that it is capital expenditure. A capital asset of the
business is either acquired or extended or substantially replaced and that
outlay whatever be its source whether it is drawn from the capital or the income
of the concern is certainly in the nature of capital expenditure. The question
however arises for consideration where expenditure is incurred while the
business is going on and is not incurred either for extension of the business
or for the substantial replacement of its equipment. Such expenditure can be
looked at either from the point of view what is acquired or from the point of
view of what is the 524 source from which the expenditure is incurred. If the
expenditure is made for acquiring or bringing into existence an asset or
advantage for the enduring benefit of the business it is properly attributable
to capital and is of the nature of capital expenditure. If on the other hand it
is made not for the purpose of bringing into existence any such asset or
advantage but for running the business or working it with a view to produce the
profits it is a revenue expenditure.
If any such asset or advantage for the
enduring benefit of the business is thus acquired or brought into existence it
would be immaterial whether the source of the payment was the capital or the
income of the concern or whether the payment was made once and for all or was
made periodically. The aim and object of the expenditure would determine the
character of the expenditure whether it is a capital expenditure or a revenue
expenditure. The source or the manner of the payment would then be of no
consequence. It is only in those cases where this test is of no avail that one
may go to the test of fixed or circulating capital and consider whether of the
business or part of its circulating capital. If it was part of the fixed
capital of the business it would be of the nature of capital expenditure and if
it was part of its circulating capital it would be the nature of revenue
expenditure. These tests are thus mutually exclusive and have to be applied to
the facts of each particular case in the manner above indicated. It has been
rightly observed that in the great diversity of human affairs and the
complicated nature of business operations it is difficult to lay down a test
which would apply to all situations. One has therefore got to apply these
criteria one after the other from the business point of view and come to the
conclusion whether on a fair appreciation of the whole situation the expenditure
incurred in a particular case is of the nature of capital expenditure or
revenue expenditure in which latter event only it would be a deductible
allowance under section 10(2) (xv) of the Income-tax Act. The question has all
along been considered to be a question of fact to be determined by the
Income-tax authorities on an application of the broad principles laid down
above and the Courts of law would not ordinarily interfere with such finding of
fact if they have been arrived at on a proper application of these principles.
(emphasis ours) 525 In that case before this Court, a lease was obtained with
certain stipulations including the payment of a sum of Rs. 5,000 per year. The
Court found that it was an enduring benefit for the benefit of the whole business
of the company. The fact that it was a recurring payment was immaterial because
one had got to look to the nature of the payment which in its turn was
determined by the nature of the asset which the company had acquired. The asset
which the Company had acquired in consideration of this recurring payment the
right to carry on its business unfettered by any competition from outsiders
within the area was in the nature of a capital asset and, therefore, the
payment was not deductible under s. 10(2) (xv) of the Act. The broad tests laid
down by this Court in Assam Bengal Cement Co. Ltd.'s case have been accepted in
several subsequent decisions of this Court as also by the High Courts in India.
The facts in Travancore Sugars &
Chemical's case were peculiar. The assessee in that case purchased Travancore
Sugar Ltd., a Government distillery at Negercoil and the business assets of a
Government Tincture Factory at Trivandrum under an agreement dated June 18,
1937, entered into between the Government of Travancore and the promoters of
the assessee company. Under the agreement, cash consideration of Rs. 3,25,000
was to be paid for buying the assets of Travancore Sugars Ltd. In regard to the
distillery, the sale price had to be arrived at on the basis of joint valuation
by the Engineers to be appointed by the parties. As regards the Tincture
Factory, the book valuation was to be adopted for fixing the consideration. The
existing distillery licence was agreed to stand recognised in the hands of the
assessee for a period of five years after its termination. Government also
undertook to purchase pharmaceutical products manufactured by the assessee at
the Tincture Factory. Government reserved the right to nominate a director on
the Board of Directors of the assessee company without voting powers. The
agreement further stipulated payment to Government of 20% of the net profits
earned by the company every year subject to a limit of Rs. 40,000 per annum and
certain other payments were also undertaken. The 20% stipulation was reduced to
10% by a subsequent agreement. The question that fell for consideration was
whether payment of Rs. 42,480 by the assessee company to the Travancore
Government in terms of the agreement referred to above as modified, was
allowable expenditure under s. 10 of the Act in the year under consideration.
This Court stated:
It is often difficult, in any particular
case, to decide and determine whether a particular expenditure 526 is in the
nature of capital expenditure or in the nature of revenue expenditure. It is
not easy to distinguish whether an agreement is for the payment of price
stipulated in instalments or for making annual payments in the nature of
income.
The Court has to look not only into the
documents but also at the surrounding circumstances so as to arrive at a
decision as to what was the real nature of the transaction from the commercial
point of view. No single test of universal application can be discovered for a
solution of the question. The name which the parties may give to the transaction
which is the source of the receipt and the characterization of the receipt by
them are of little consequence. The Court has to ascertain the true nature and
character of the transaction from the convenants of the agreement tested on the
light of surrounding circumstances.
So far as these observations formulating the
tests are concerned, they are not different from those laid down by this Court
in Assam Bengal Cement Co.'s case. The Court then proceeded to apply these
tests to the facts of the case and observed:
Examining the transaction from this point of
view, it is clear in the present case that the consideration for the sale of
the three undertakings in favour of the appellant was: (1) the cash
consideration mentioned in the principal agreement, viz., clauses 3, 4(a) and
5(a); and (2) the consideration that Government shall be entitled to twenty per
cent of the net profits earned by the appellant in every year subject to a
maximum of Rs. 40,000 per annum. With regard to the second part of the consideration
there are three important points to be noticed. In the first place, the payment
of commission of twenty per cent on the net profits by the appellant in favour
of the Government is for an indefinite period and has no limitation of time
attached to it. In the second place, the payment of the commission is related
to the annual profits which flow from the trading activities of the
appellant-company and the payment has no relation to the capital value of the
assets. In the third place, the annual payment of 20 per cent commission every
year is not related to or tied up, in any way, to any fixed sum agreed between
the undertakings. There is not 527 reference to any capital sum in this part of
the agreement. On the contrary, the very nature of the payments excludes the
idea that any connection with the capital sum was intended by the parties.
It is true that the purchaser may buy a
running concern and fix a certain price and the price may be payable in a lump
sum or may be payable by instalments. The mere fact that the capital sum is
payable by instalments spread over a certain length of time will not convert
the nature of that payment from the capital expenditure into a revenue
expenditure, but the payment of installments in such a case would always have
some relationship to the actual price fixed for the sale of the particular
undertaking. As we have already mentioned, there is no specific sum fixed in
the present case as an additional amount of price payable in addition to the
cash consideration and payable by instalments or by any particular method. In
view of these facts we are of opinion that the payment of the annual sum of Rs.
42,480 in the present is not in the nature of capital expenditure but is in the
nature of revenue expenditure and the judgment of the High Court of Kerala on
this point must be overruled.
As we have already observed, the facts in
this case were peculiar. There was a substantial amount of outright cash
payment over and above which the indefinite annual payment had been stipulated.
It is interesting to note that this Court by
its judgment in Travancore Sugars & Chemicals Ltd. had sent down the matter
to the High Court for a re-disposal and the very matter again came before this
Court, this time at the instance of the Revenue and the judgment is reported in
Commissioner of Income Tax, Kerala v. Travancore Sugars & Chemicals Ltd. 88
I.T.R. 1 = [1977] 2 S.C.R. 738. At page 10 of the Reports, this Court observed:
"In considering the nature of the
expenditure incurred in the discharge of an obligation under a contract or a
statute or a decree or some similar binding covenant, one must avoid being
caught in the maze of judicial decisions rendered on different facts anc which
always present distinguishing features for a comparison with the facts and
circumstances of the case in hand. Nor would it be conducive for clarity or 528
for reaching a logical result if we were to concentrate on the facts of the
decided cases with a view to match the colour of the case with that of the case
which requires determination. The surer way of arriving at a just conclusion
would be to first ascertain by reference to the expenditure is created and
thereafter to apply the principle emblamed in the decisions of those facts.
Judicial statements on the facts of a particular case can never assist courts
in the construction of an agreement or a statute which was not considered in
those Judgments or to ascertain what the intention of the legislature was. What
we must look at is the contract or the statute or the decree, in relation to
its terms, the obligation imposed and the purpose for which the transaction was
entered into.
We agree with these observations. The tests
indicated by this Court in Travancore Sugars & Chemicals were not intended
to be of general application but were given to bring into bold relief the
special aspects of the case as the learned Judges themselves stated. The High
Court committed a mistake In importing these reasonings as tests of general
application to be applied to the facts of the present case though the facts
were indeed quite different.
As already pointed out, there was a definite
sum of cash consideration in Travancore Sugars Chemicals' case and the special
features were taken into account. In the dispute before us the High Court was
categorically found that a capital asset had been acquired under the
arrangement.
Admittedly, the assessee was a new company
and it had no other business. It acquired under the contract stipulating to pay
75% of its annual net profits, the right to carry on the business on a long
term basis subject to the renewal of the agreement. The first of the broad
tests laid down in Assam Bengal Cement Co.'s case that the expenditure was made
for the initial outlay squarely applies and on the finding that a capital asset
had been acquired (a finding which has not been disputed before us) we must
hold that the expenditure related to acquisition of a capital asset and was not
admissible as a deduction under s. 10(2) (xv) of the Act.
With this conclusion of ours and no more, the
appeal deserved to be allowed. Mr. S.T. Desai for the assessee respondent
thereupon sought to raise the contention that once the assessee had paid 75% of
its profits of the year, the 529 amount claimed as a deduction was no more in
its hands as income and on the principle of real income in the hands of the
assessee, we should hold the same was not income within the meaning of s.10(1)
of the Act. Initially, objection was raised to this move of Mr. Desai by
learned counsel for the Revenue on the ground that such a plea had not been
canvassed in the earlier stages of the matter. The question referred to the
High Court did raise the issue and the High Court in the penultimate paragraph
of its judgment had declined to go into this question by saying that it was
sufficient for the disposal of the reference once it took the view that the
payment was deductible under s. 10(2) (xv) of the Act. Mr. Desai wanted this
aspect of the matter to be sent back to the High Court, but we were not
inclined to do so in consideration of the fact that the assessment is for the
year 1954-55 - a period three decades away. Thereupon, counsel for both sides
agreed to advance their arguments in regard to this aspect to enable this Court
to finally deal with this question avoiding remand. Section 10(1) of the Act
provides:
The tax shall be payable by an assessee under
the head 'Profits & gains of business, profession or vocation' in respect
of the profits and gains of any business, profession or vocation carried on by
him.
Tax, therefore, under the provision is
payable on income and if income is not earned by the assessee no tax is
payable.
It follows that tax is leviable on the real
income in the hands of the assessee. Mr. Desai for the assessee has maintained
that when 75% of the net profits have been paid to the partnership firm, the
real income in the hands of the assessee was reduced to 25% of the net profits
and that amount alone was assessable to tax. F M/s. Jalan Trading Co., the
partnership had initially been appointed as the sole selling agent. On October,
16, 1952, the assessee company came to be incorporated and soon after
incorporation by agreement the rights of the firm were assigned to the assessee
company. Neither the Income Tax Officer nor the two appellate authorities and
nor even the High Court went into the question as to whether the assessee was
in fact separate from, and independent, of the partnership firm. It is true
that the tenability of the claim of deductibility as a business expenditure of
the amount was examined by taking it for granted that the payment had been made
by the assessee to the firm. But the exact position having not been
investigated no finding has been recorded at any stage. The fact that the
partnership and the 530 assessee company bear the same name and soon after
incorporation the agreement assigning the firm's rights in favour of the
company had been entered, had obviously led the Income Tax Officer to doubt the
bona fides. That is why in his order of assessment the Income Tax Officer had
observed:
"The payment is also not allowable as it
is only an apportionment of profits as pointed out above, as it is nothing but
75% of the net profits of the assessee company and although it has been written
to the profit and loss account actually it is nothing but an apportionment of
profits and as such the amount is not allowable.
The Appellate Assistant Commissioner took
note of the position that the assessment of Jalan Trading Co., the firm, was
not before him and observed:
"The amount claimed cannot also be
regarded as deduction in the trading account itself because the royalty is
ascertained ultimately on the profits and does not go to add to the cost of the
drums that are purchased from the manufacturers.
Therefore, there can be no question of giving
any deduction under s. 10(1) of the Act. The concept of 'real income'
apparently based on the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of 31
I.T.R.
735 has also no relevance because there is no
question. Of any deviation of profits of the appellant company by any
overriding title.
The Appellate Tribunal in answer to the
reiteration of the point raised, said:
"Shri Mistry next submitted that the
amount in question is also deductible under s. 10(1) as a trading item and in
any event what is to be determined is the assessee's real income and that can
only be determined after deducting from the assessee's total income the amount
paid to M/s.
Jalan Trading Co. It was also stated that in
the hands of the recipient the said amount of Rs.
7,93,000 and odd was assessed as revenue
receipts and assessing the same in the hands of the assessee would amount to
double taxation. In our opinion, this later submission of Shri Mistry can
easily be disposed of because even though the real 531 income of the assessee
is to be taxed, it is not that each and every outgoing is to be taken into
consideration in arriving at the real income of the assessee and if the
outgoing is in fact of a capital nature, the same can never be considered as an
allowable deduction under the Act.
We are impressed by the argument advanced on
behalf of the Revenue that if the amount had been spent for obtaining a capital
asset, the assessee would not be entitled to claim it as a deduction under
s.10(1) of the Act and on the principle of taxation that income tax is to be
levied on the real income, the amount paid for obtaining capital asset would
not be deductible. In such circumstances, we are inclined to agree with the
appellant's submission that there is no merit in this aspect of the matter and
no relief is admissible to the assessee on that score.
We allow the appeal and vacate the Judgment
of the High Court and direct that the Tribunal's decision shall be given effect
to. Parties are directed to bear their own costs both before the High Court as
also this Court.
P.B.R. Appeal allowed.
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