Bhag Singh & Ors Vs. Union
Territory of Chandigarh, Through the Land Acquisition [1985] INSC 176 (14
August 1985)
BHAGWATI, P.N. (CJ) BHAGWATI, P.N. (CJ) SEN,
AMARENDRA NATH (J) MADON, D.P.
CITATION: 1985 AIR 1576 1985 SCR Supl. (2)
949 1985 SCC (3) 737 1985 SCALE (2)246
CITATOR INFO: RF 1987 SC 720 (7) RF 1987
SC1565 (9) RF 1988 SC 943 (11,12,14) RF 1988 SC1652 (9,23,24) O 1989 SC1933
(4,5,30,32,34,35) O 1990 SC 981 (9) D 1991 SC 730 (5)
ACT:
Land Acquisition Act 1894, Sections 23 and 28
& Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act 1984, Sections 15(b), 18(a) and 30(2).
Land acquisition - Solatium and compensation
- Enhanced rates of 'thirty per centum' and 'nine per centum' - Entitlement of
- When arises - Awards made after April 30, 1982 - Appeals arising from such
awards - Whether covered.
Compensation - Determination of by courts -
Market value of the land acquired - Courts restricting compensation to amount
of court-fee paid by claimants - Whether legal and valid.
HEADNOTE:
The Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 by
Section 15(b) amended section 23(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 to
provide that in sub-section (2) of section 23 for the words "fifteen per
centum", the words "thirty per centum" shall be substituted, and
by Section 18(a) provided that in Section 28 of the Principal Act for the words
'six per centum the words ' nine per centum' shall be substituted. Section
30(2) of the Amendment Act provided that the increased Solatium was to be
applicable "in relation to any award made by the collector or Court or to
any order passed by the High Court' or Supreme Court in appeal against any such
award under the provisions of the Principal Act after the 30th day of April,
1982 (the date of introduction of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill, 1982 in
the House of the People) and before the commencement of this Act.
The State Government issued a notification on
19th October 1974 under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for
acquisition of land for the purpose of establishment of a cantonment. The Land
Acquisition Collector thereafter issued a notice under section 9 and required
persons interested in the land to submit their claims for compensation. The
claims submitted by various claimants including the appellants, were considered
by the Land Acquisition Collector and an award made on 9th October 1975
dividing the land acquired into three belts and awarding compensation at
varying rates. The appellants and other 950 claimants being aggrieved by the
aforesaid award sought references under section 18 of the Act, and the
Additional District Judge, enhanced the rates of compensation. The appellants
who were still dissatisfied preferred appeals to the High Court.
A single Judge of the High Court enhanced the
amount of compensation, and directed that the claimants shall be entitled to
interest at the rate of 6% per annum and Solatium at the rate of 15% on the
enhanced amount of compensation. This order awarding enhanced compensation was,
however, made subject to the claims put forward in the memoranda of appeal
preferred by the claimants and the Court fee paid on such claims. As the
appellants had not paid the requisite court fee on the enhanced amount of
compensation they could not get the benefit of the said order.
The appellants preferred Letters Patent
Appeals. The Division Bench dismissed the appeals taking the view that the
appellants were entitled to the enhanced amount of compensation for acquisition
of their land, but restricting the benefits of the enhanced compensation only
to those claimants who had made payment of proper court fee.
In the Appeals to this Court it was contended
on behalf of the appellants: (1) that they should have been given an
opportunity of paying up the deficit court fee, so that like other claimants,
they could also get enhanced compensations and (2) that by virtue of Section
30(2) of the Amendment Act of 1984, the claimants are entitled to be paid
Solatium at the rate of 30 of the compensation ultimately awarded to them
instead of 15 awarded by the Division Bench as also interest at the rate of 9
instead of 6% per annum on the enhanced amount of compensation.
Allowing the Appeals, ^
HELD: 1. (i) The order passed by the Division
Bench in so far as it refused to grant enhanced compensation to the appellants
on account of non-payment of deficit court fee is set aside. It is directed
that the appellants shall be paid enhanced compensation at the rate determined
by the Division Bench. They shall also receive Solatium calculated at the rate
of 30% on the amount of enhanced compensation under the amended Section 23
sub-section (2) as also interest at the rate of 9% per annum on the enhanced
amount of compensation from the date on which 951 possession was taken up to
the date of payment cf such enhanced compensation. The appellants will pay up
the deficit amount of court fee within two months. [963 A-C] (ii) The Division
Bench and the single judge should not have adopted a technical approach and
denied the benefit of enhanced compensation to the appellants merely because
they had not initially paid the proper amount of court fee. They should have
allowed the appellants to pay up the deficit court fee and awarded to them
compensation at the higher rate or rates determined by them. [956 B] (iii) In
the instant case, a claim was made by the appellants against the State
Government for compensation for acquisition of their land and under the law,
the State was bound to pay to the appellants compensation on the basis of the
market value of the land acquired and if according to the judgments of the
single Judge and the Division Beach, the market value of the land acquired was
higher than that awarded by the Land Acquisition Collector or the Additional
District Judge there is no reason why the appellants should have been denied
the benefit of payment of the market value so determined. To deny this benefit
to the appellants would be tantamount to permitting the State Government to
acquire the land of the appellants on payment of less than the true market
value. Under agrarian reform legislation, the holder of land may legitimately,
as a matter of social justice, be deprived of land which is not being
personally cultivated by him or which is in excess of the ceiling area with
payment of little compensation or no compensation at all, but where land is
acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, it would not be fair and just to
deprive the holder of land without payment of the true market value when the
law declares that he shall be paid such market value. [955 E-H]
2. (i) Under Section 30 sub-section (2) the
provisions of the amended Section 23 sub-section (2) and Section 28 are made
applicable to all proceedings relating to compensation pending on 30th April
1982 or filed subsequent to that date, whether before the Collector or before
the Court or the High Court or the Supreme Court, even if they have finally
terminated before the enactment of the Amending Act. [961 H] (ii) The Amendment
Act came into force with effect from 24th September 1984 but the Bill which
ultimately became the Amending Act was introduced in Parliament on 30th April
1982.
952 Parliament desired that the amended
provisions of Section 23 sub-section (2) and Section 28 should be given effect
from the date of introduction of the Bill in Parliament and therefore enacted
Section 30 sub-section (2) making the provisions of the amended Section 23
sub-section (2) and Section 28 applicable to and in relation to "any award
made by the Collector or Court or to any order passed by the High Court or
Supreme Court in appeal against any such award and before the commencement of
this Act", that is, the Amending Act after the 30th day of April 1982.
[959 F, 962 D-G] (iii) The intendment of Parliament in enacting Section 30
sub-section (2), is brought out in no uncertain terms by the express language
of Section 30 sub-section (2). The adverbial phrase "after the 30th day of
April 1982 and before the commencement of this Act" governs not only the
words "any award made by the Collector or Court" but also the words
"any order passed by the High Court or Supreme Court in appeal against any
such award". The amended provisions of section 23 sub-section (2) and
Section 28 are applicable not only in relation to an award made by the
Collector or court after 30th April 1982 and before the commencement of the
Amending Act but also in relation to an order passed by the High Court or
Supreme Court in appeal between 30th April 1982 and the commencement of the
Amending Act. [960 E-F] (iv) Parliament deliberately and advisedly introduced
the adverbial phrase "after the 30th day of April, 1982 and before the
commencement of this Act", so as to qualify both "any award made by
the Collector or Court" as also "any order passed by the High Court
or Supreme Court in appeal against any such award. The word "such award"
in the context in which they occur mean only the award made by the Collector or
court and do not import the time element which finds place only at the end of
the sentence and not immediately following the words "any award made by
the Collector or Court". [961 F-G] In the instant case, the award of the
Collector was made on 9th October 1975 and the award of the court was made on
31st July 1979. The award of the Court as well as the award of the Collector
were thus made prior to 30th April 1982. So also was the order passed by the
single Judge of the High Court in appeal against the award of the court made on
10th November 1981, that is, before 30th April, 1982. But on 30th April, 1982
the Letters Patent Appeal preferred by the appellants was pending before the
Division Bench of the High Court and that was disposed of on 8th December 1982
and this was followed by the present appeal before 953 this Court. The present
appeal was pending at the date of commencement of the Amending Act and
therefore, this Court 18 bound to given effect to the provisions of the amended
Section 23 sub-section (2) and Section 28 in determining the amount of
compensation. [962 D-G] State of Punjab v. Mohinder Singh & another
approved Kamalajamannivaru v. Special Land Acquisition Officer 1985 (1) SCC 582
disapproved.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.
1519-23 of 1985.
From the Judgment and Order dated 22.9.1982
of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in R.F.A. Nos. 2317, 2318, 2319, 2320 of
1980 and 331 of 1981.
A.K. Goel, for the Appellants.
Atul Jain and Raj Birbal, for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
BHAGWATI, CJ. This appeal by special leave raises a short but interesting
question of law relating to the interpretation of Section 30 sub-section (2) of
the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 (hereinafter referred to as the
Amending Act). There are divergent views expressed by different Benches of this
Court in regard to the interpretation, of this provision and hence it is
necessary to examine this question afresh in order to arrive at a proper
interpretation, particularly since the interpretation placed by us will affect
the determination of compensation in a large number of cases.
The facts giving rise to this appeal are few
and may be briefly stated as follows. On 9th October 1974 a notification was
issued by the State of Punjab under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
(hereinafter referred to as the Act) stating that a large chunk of land
admeasuring 10768 Bighas 18 Biswas was likely to be needed for the purpose of
establishment of a cantonment within the revenue estate of Bhatinda. This
notification was followed by another notification issued by the State of PunJab
under- section 6 of the Act declaring that the entire area admeasuring 10768
Bighas 18 Biswas was needed for the establishment of a cantonment. The Land
Acquisition Collector thereafter 954 issued a notice under-section 9 of the Act
and required persons interested in the land forming the subject matter of the
declaration to submit their claims for compensation for acquisition of their
interest in the land. The claims submitted by various claimants including the
appellants in the present appeal were considered by the Land Acquisition
Collector and he made an award on 11th June 1975 dividing the land acquired
into three belts and awarding compensation at varying rates according to the
belt in which a particular piece of land was situated. The appellants and other
claimants being aggrieved by the award made by the Land Acquisition Collector,
sought references under-section 18 of the Act and the Additional District
Judge, Bhatinda, hearing the references, amalgamated belts 2 and 3 and enhanced
the rates of compensation for the two belts. The appellants and the other
claimants were still dissatisfied with the award made by the Additional
District Judge and they thereupon preferred appeals to the High Court. On
appeal, the learned single Judge of the High Court enhanced the amount of
compensation by awarding the rate of Rs. 72,600 per acre for the first belt and
Rs. 25000 per acre for the second belt and in addition, directed that the
claimants shall be entitled to interest at the rate of 6% per annum and
solatium at the rate of 15% on the enhanced amount of compensation. This order
awarding enhanced compensation was, however, made subject to the claims put
forward in the memoranda of appeal preferred by the claimants and the court fee
paid on such claims. It seems that the appellants had not paid the requisite
court fee on the enhanced amount of compensation and they, therefore, could not
get the benefit of the order of the learned single Judge. They according
preferred a letters patent appeal to a division Bench of the High Court and the
other claimants also being dissatisfied with the order made by the learned
single Judge preferred letters patent appeals to the Division Bench. The
Division Bench of the High Court, by an order dated 8th December 1982, affirmed
the judgment of the learned single Judge in regard to the rate of compensation
tor the land situate in first belt but so far as the land situate in the second
belt was concerned, it enhanced the rate of compensation to Rs. 38,720 per
acre. The Division Bench, however, restricted the benefit of the enhanced
compensation only to those claimants who had made payment of proper court fee.
The result was that the letters patent appeal of the appellants was dismissed,
though according to the view taken by the Division Bench the appellants were
entitled to the enhanced amount of compensation tor acquisition of their land.
The appellants thereupon preferred the present appeal with special leave
obtained from this Court.
955 We are of the view that when the learned
single Judge and the Division Bench took the view that the claimants whose land
was acquired by the State of Punjab under the notifications issued under
Sections 4 and 6 of the Act, were entitled to enhanced compensation and the
case of the appellants stood on the same footing, the appellant should have
been given an opportunity of paying up the deficit court fee so that, like
other claimants, they could also get enhanced compensation at the same rate as
the others. The learned single Judge and the Division Bench should not have, in
our opinion, adopted a technical approach and denied the benefit of enhanced
compensation to the appellants merely because they had not initially paid the
proper amount of court fee. It must be remembered that this was not a dispute
between two private citizens where it would be quite just and legitimate to
confine the claimant to the claim made by him and not to award him any higher
amount than that claimed though even in such a case there may be situations
where an amount higher than that claimed can be awarded to the claimant as for
instance where an amount is claimed as due at the foot of an account. Here was
a claim made by the appellants against the State Government for compensation
for acquisition of their land and under the law, the State was bound to pay to
the appellants compensation on the basis of the market value of the land
acquired and if according to the judgments of the learned single Judgement and
the division Bench, the market value of the land acquired was higher than that
awarded by the Land Acquisition Collector or the Additional District Judge,
there is no reason why the appellants should have been denied the benefit of
payment of the market value so determined. To deny this benefit to the
appellants would tantamount to permitting the State Government to acquire the
land of the appellants on payment of less than the true market value. There may
be cases where, as for instance, under-agrarian reform legislation, the holder
of land may, legitimately, as a matter of social justice with a view to
eliminating concentration of land in the hands of a few and bringing about its
equitable distribution, be deprived of land which is not being personally
cultivated by him or which is in excess of the ceiling area with payment of
little compensation or no compensation at all, but where land is acquired under
the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, it would not be fair and just to deprive the
holder of his land without payment of the true market value when the law, in so
many terms, declares that he shall be paid such market value. The State
Government must do what is fair and just to the citizen and should not, as far
as possible, except in cases where tax or revenue is received or recovered
without protest or where the state Government would 956 otherwise be
irretrievably be prejudiced, take up a technical plea to defeat the legitimate
and just claim of the citizen. We are, therefore, of the view that, in the
present case, the Division Bench as well as the learned single Judge should
have allowed the appellants to pay up the deficit court fee and awarded to them
compensation at the higher rate or rates determined by them.
But this view taken by us does not an end to
the present appeal because another more important question has been raised
before us arising out of Section 30 sub-section (2) of the Amending Act. The
appellants on the basis of this provision, have contended that they are
entitled to be paid solatium at the rate of 30% of the compensation ultimately
awarded to them instead of 15% awarded by the Division Bench as also interest
at the rate of 9% instead of 6% per annum on the enhanced amount of
compensation. It is necessary, in order to adjudicate upon the validity of this
contention to refer to a few relevant provisions of the Act as it stood prior
to its amendment by the Amending Act. Section 23 sub- section (2) of the
unamended Act provided inter alia as follows:- "23 (2) In addition to the
market value of the land as above provided, the Court shall in every case award
a sum of fifteen per centum on such market value, in consideration of the compulsory
nature of the acquisition.
Section 28 of the unamended Act provided for
payment of interest on excess compensation in the following terms:
If the sum which, in the opinion of the
Court, the Collector ought to have, awarded as compensation is in excess of the
sum which the Collector did awarded as compensation, the award of the Court may
direct that the Collector shall pay interest on such excess at the rate of six
per centum per annum from then date on which he took possession of the land to
the date of payment of such excess into Court." The Act was amended by the
Amending Act h effect from 24th September 1984. Section 15 clause (b) of the
Amending Act reads as follows :
957 15. In section 23 of the Principal Act :
(a) .......................... ..........
(b) in sub-section (2), for the words
"fifteen per centum", the words "thirty per centum" , shall
be substituted." Section 18 clause (a) of the Amending Act provides that
"in Section 28 of the principal Act for the words 'six per centum' the words
'nine per centum' shall be substituted.
Section 30 sub-section (2) is the material
provision which falls to be construed and since the entire controversy between
the parties turns upon the true interpretation of this provision, we may
reproduce it in extenso. It runs as follows :
"30(2). The provisions of sub-section
(2) of section 23 and Section 28 of the principal Act, as amended by clause (b)
of section 15 and section 18 of this Act respectively, shall apply, and shall
be deemed to have applied, also to, and in relation to, any award made by the
Collector or Court or to any order passed by the High Court or Supreme Court in
appeal against any such award under the provisions of the principal Act after
30th day of April, 1982 (the date of introduction of the Land Acquisition
(Amendment) Bill, 1982, in the House of People) and before the commencement of
this Act.' The question is as to what is the extent to which retrospective
effect is given by the provision enacted in Section 3() sub-section (2). Does
it make the amended provisions in Section 23 sub-section (2) and Section 28
applicable only to cases where an award is made by the Collector or Court after
30th April 1982 or does it make these amended provisions applicable also to
cases where an award may have been made by the Collector or Court prior to 30th
April 1982 but the proceedings by way of appeal were pending in the High Court
or the Supreme Court on 30th April 1982 and were disposed of subsequent to that
date. The former view has prevailed with Chinnappa Reddy, J. and Sabyasachi
Mukharji, J. in Kamalajammanniavaru v. Special Land Acquisition Officer [1985]
S.C.C. 582 while the latter view has found acceptance with S. Murtaza Fazal
Ali, J., Varadarajan, J. and Ranganath Misra, J. in Civil Appeal No.
3267 of 1979, State of Punjab v. Mohinder
Singh & Anr..
decided on 1st May 1985. Since the latter
decision is one 958 given by a Bench of three Judges, we would have ordinarily
regarded it as over-ruling the earlier decision in Kamalajammanniavaru case
which was a decision of only two Judges, but it seems Chat the earlier decision
was not cited before the Bench of three Judges in Mohinder Singh's case and
moreover there is no discussion of the provision enacted in Section 30
sub-section (2) and hence we have to consider for ourselves which decision, on
a true interpretation of the language of Section 30 sub-section (2) represents
the correct view.
We may first consider what would be the
position if Section 30 sub-section (2) were not enacted and the amendments in
Section 23 sub-section (2) and Section 28 were effective only from the date on
which they were made, namely 24th September 1984 when the Amending Act received
the assent of the President and was brought into force. If at the date of the
commencement of the Amending Act, any proceedings for determination of
compensation were pending before the Collector under Section 11 of the Act or
before the Court on a reference under Section 18 of the Act, the amended
Section 23 sub-section (2) and Section 28 would admittedly be applicable to
such proceedings. This much indeed was conceded by the learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the respondents and even in Kamalajammanniavaru case
(supra) it was accepted to be the correct position.
Chinnappa Reddy, J. speaking on behalf of the
Court in Kamalajammanniavaru case (supra) observed : "The new Section 23
(2), of course, necessarily applies to award made by the Collector or court
after the commencement" of the Amending Act. But if an award were made by
the Court on a reference under Section 18 prior to the commencement of the
Amending Act and an appeal against such award were pending before the High
Court under Section 54 at the date of the commencement of the Amending Act,
which provisions would the High Court have to apply in deciding the appeal and
determining the amount of compensation : the amended provisions in section 23
sub-section (2) and Section 28 or the unamended provisions. The answer can only
be that the High Court would have to apply the provisions in the amended
Section 23 sub- section (2) and Section 28. The appeal against the award would
be a continuation of the proceeding initiated before the Court by way of
reference under Section 18 and when the High Court hears the appeal, it would
be in effect and substance be hearing the reference and while determining the
amount of compensation, it would have to give effect to Sections 23 and 28 as
it finds them at the date of decision of the appeal. then Section 23 sub-
section (1) provides that in determining the amount of 959 compensation the
court shall take into consideration matters specified in the various
sub-clauses of that sub-section and sub-section (2) of Section 23 directs that
in addition to the market value of the land the court shall in every case award
a sum of 15 per centum of such market value in consideration of the compulsory
nature of the acquisition, the mandate of these two sub-section must apply
equally whether the court is hearing a reference or the High Court is hearing
an appeal against an award has been decided by the Court amended provisions in
Section 23 sub-section (2) and Section 28 would therefore have to be applied by
the High Court in determining the amount of condensation. The same position
would obtain where an appeal against an award has been decided by the High
Court prior to the commencement of the Amending Act and an appeal against the
order of the High Court is pending before the Supreme Court at the date of
commencement of the Amending Act or is filed after such date. me Supreme Court
also while deciding the appeal and determining the amount of compensation would
have to take into account the amended provisions in Section 23 sub- section (2)
and Section 28, because when the Supreme Court decides the appeal and determines
the amount of compensation, it would have to comply with the mandate contained
in Section 23 sub-section (2) and Section 28 and that mandate would be as found
in the amended provisions of Section 23 Sub-Section (2) and Section 28. Thus
the amended provisions of Section 23 sub-section (2) and Section 28 would apply
in determination of the amount of compensation where proceedings are either
pending at the date of commencement of the amending Act or are filed subsequent
to the date, whether before the Collector or before the Court or before the
High Court or the Supreme Court.
Now, as we have already pointed out above,
the Amending Act came into force with effect from 24th September 1984 but the
Bill which ultimately became the Amending Act was introduced in Parliament on
30th April 1982. Parliament obviously desired that the amended provisions of
Section 23 sub-section (2) and Section 28 should be given effect from the date
of introduction of the Bill in Parliament and therefore enacted Section 30 sub-section
(2) making the provisions of the amended Section 23 sub-section (2) and Section
28 applicable to and in relation to "any award made by the Collector or
court or to any order passed by the High Court or Supreme Court in appeal
against any such award...... after the 30th day of April 1982...... and before
the commencement of this Act", that is, the Amending Act. The object of
Parliament clearly was that the amended provisions of Section 23 sub-section
(2) and Section 28 should be applicable in determination of 960 compensation
where proceedings before the collector or the court or the high Court or the
Supreme Court were pending on 30th April 1982 or were commenced after that
date, even if such proceedings and finally terminated before the enactment of the
Amending Act and no proceedings were pending before the Collector or the court
or the High Court or the Supreme Court at the date of enactment on the
Amending. If the proceedings had not finally concluded before the enactment of
the Amending Act and were pending on that date or were started subsequently,
whether before the Collector or the Court or the High Court or the Supreme
Court, the amended pervasions of Section 23 subsection (2) and section 28 would
apply on their own terms in determining compensation. But by virtue of Section
30 sub-section (2), the amended provisions of Section 23 sub-section (2) and
Section 28 were made applicable also where the proceedings were pending 30th
April 1982 or were commenced after that date even though they might have
finally come to an end before the enactment of the amending Act. Of course, if
the proceedings had finally terminated on or before 30th April 1982, the
amended provisions of Section 23 sub-section (2) and Section 28 could not
possibly be intended to apply to the determination made in such proceedings.
This was clearly the intendment of Parliament in enacting Section 30
sub-section (2).
This intendment is brought out in no
uncertain terms by the express language of Section 30 sub-section (2). It says
that the t provisions of the amended Section 23 sub-section (2) and Section 28
shall apply and shall be deemed to have applied to and in relation to any award
made by the Collector or court or to any order passed by the High Court or the
Supreme court in appeal against any such award after 30th April 1982 and before
the commencement of the Amending Act. It is significant that the adverbial
phrase "after the 30th day of April 1982 and before the commencement of
this Act" governs not only the words 'any award made by the Collector or
court but also the words "any order passed by the High Court or Supreme
Court in appeal against any such award" The amended provisions Of Section
23 sub-section (2) and Section 28 are applicable not only in relation to an award
made by the Collector or court after 30th April 1982 and before the
commencement of the amending Act but also in relation to an order passed by the
High Court or Supreme Court in appeal between 30th April 1982 and the
commencement of the Amending Act. The appeal in which the order is passed by
the High Court or Supreme Court may be against an award made by the Collector
or court prior to 30th April 1982 or subsequent to that date. The only
requirement is that the order must have been 961 passed by the High Court or
Supreme Court in appeal against such award, after 30th April 1982 but before
the commencement of the amending Act. If it was the intention of Parliament to
confine the applicability of the provisions Of the amended section 23
sub-section (2) and section 28 only to an award made by the collector or Court
after 30th April 1982 and before the commencement of the Amending Act and to an
order made by the High Court or the Supreme Court in appeal only against such
an award, Parliament would have inserted the adverbial phrase after the 30th
day of April 1982...... and before the commencement of this Act immediately
after the words "any award made by the Collector or court , so as to
indicate clearly and beyond doubt that the adverbial phrase was intended to
govern only award made by the Collector or court and in that event the words
"such award" would have carried only one meaning, namely, award made
by the Collector or court after 30th April 1982 and before the commencement of
the Amending Act. The words "any order passed by the High Court or Supreme
Court in appeal against any such award" would then have had a limited
meaning, namely, order passed by the High Court or Supreme Court in an appeal
preferred against an award made by the Collector or court after 30th April 1982
and before the commencement of the Amending Act. The words "any order
passed by the High Court or Supreme Court in appeal against any such award
would then have had a limited meaning, namely, order passed by the High Court
or Supreme Court, in an appeal preferred against an award made by the Collector
or Court after 30th April, 1982 and before the commencement of the Amending
Act. These words would not in that event have comprehended order passed by the
High Court or Supreme Court in appeal against an award made by the Collector or
court on or before 30th April 1982. But Parliament deliberately and advisedly
introduced the adverbial phrase F after the 30th day of April 1982....... and
before the commencement of this Act" at the end of the sentence, so as to
quality both "any award made by the Collector or court as also any order
passed by the High Court or Supreme Court in appeal against any such
award". The words 'such award' in the context in which they occur mean
only the award made by the Collector or court and do not import the time
element which finds place only at the end of the sentence and not immediately
following the words 'any award made by the Collector or court". It is
therefore clear that under Section 30 sub-section (2) the provisions of the
amended Section 23 sub-section (2) and Section 28 are made applicable to all
proceedings relating to compensation pending on 30th April 1982 or filed
subsequent to that date, whether before the Collector or before the court or
the High Court or the Supreme Court, 962 even if they have finally terminated
before the enactment of the Amending Act. It would not be a correct
interpretation of Section 30 sub-section (2) to say that the provisions of the
amended section 2 sub-section (2) and Section 28 would be applicable in
relation to an order passed by the High Court or Supreme Court only if the
order is passed in appeal against an award made by the Collector or Court
between 30th April 1982 and the commencement of the Amending Act. Even if an
award is made by the Collector or court on or before 30th April 1982 and an
appeal against such award is pending before the High Court or the Supreme Court
on 30th April 1982 or is filed subsequent to that date, the provisions of the
amended Section 23 sub-section (2) and Section 23 would be applicable in
relation to an order passed in such appeal by the High Court or the Supreme
Court, we accordingly affirm the view taken by the Bench of three Judges in
Mohinder Singh's case (supra) and express our respectful disagreement with the
view taken by the Bench of two Judges in Kamalammanniavaru`s case (supra). The
latter decision cannot be rewarded as laying down the correct law in regard to
the interpretation of Section 30 sub-section (2).
Here in the present case the award of the
Collector was made on 11th June 1975 and the award of the court was made on
31st July, 1979. The award of the court as well as the award of the Collector
were thus made prior to 30th April 1982. So also was c the order passed by the
learned single Judge of the High Court in appeal against the award of the Court
made on 10th November 1981, that is, before 30th April 1982. But on 30th April
1982, the Letters patent appeal preferred by the appellants was pending before
the Division bench of the High Court and that was disposed of on 8th December
1982 and this was followed by the present appeal before this court. The order
in the letters patent appeal was thus passed by the Division Bench after 30th
April 1982 and before the commencement of the amending Act and the provisions
of the amended Section 23 sub-section (2) and Section 28 were therefore
applicable in relation to this order passed by the Division Bench, on the
interpretation placed by us on Section 30 sub-section (2). Moreover, the
present appeal was pending at the date of commencement of the Amending Act and
therefore, in any view of the matter, this court is bound to given effect to
the provisions of the amended Section 23 sub-section (2) and Section 28 in
determining the amount of compensation.
We must therefore allow the present appeal
and set aside the order passed by the Division Bench in so far as it refused to
grant enhanced compensation to the appellants on account of 963 non-payment of
deficit court fee and direct that the appellants A shall be paid enhanced
compensation at the rate determined by the Division Bench, according as the
land belonging to them fell within one or the other belt, and they shall also
receive solatium calculated at the rate of 30% on the amount to enhanced compensation
under the amended Section 23 sub-section (2) as also interest at the rate of 9%
per annum on the enhanced amount of compensation from the date on which
possession of their land was taken up to the expiration of a period of one year
and thereafter at the rate of 15% per annum. The appellant will pay up the
deficit amount of court fee within two months from today and a final order in
the above terms will be drawn up in favour of the appellants only after payment
of the deficit court fee is made within the time stipulated by us. We think
that the fair order of costs in the present case would be that each party shall
bear and pay its own costs throughout.
N.V.K. Appeals allowed.
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