Narain Khamman Vs. Parduman Kumar Jain
[1984] INSC 196 (19 October 1984)
MADON, D.P.
MADON, D.P.
DESAI, D.A.
CITATION: 1985 AIR 4 1985 SCR (1)1025 1985
SCC (1) 1 1984 SCALE (2)650
CITATOR INFO :
R 1987 SC 222 (23)
ACT:
Delhi Rent Control Act 1958 Section 14A(1) Scope
of.
Landlord-Government servant-Required by
general order to vacate Government accommodation on ground of owning
residential accommodation recover possession of residential premises under
Section 14A(1) landlord to be in occupation of allotted accommodation on date
of filing eviction petition-If landlord owns other premises which are available
for residential accommodation petition under section 14A (1) not maintainable.
HEADNOTE:
The Appellant was a tenant of the Respondent.
The Respondent was in Central Government service and was allotted Government
residential accommodation. By a general order, the Government directed that all
Government servants who had their own dwelling houses at the place of posting
should vacate the Government accommodation allotted to them or in default to
pay market rent in respect thereof. The Respondent therefore vacated tho
Government accommodation allotted to him and resided in another premise
belonging to him which was adjoining the premises let out to the Appellant.
The Respondent later filed an application
under section 25B of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 on the ground specified
in section 14A(1) thereof for possession of the premises occupied by the
Appellant which was contested. The Rent Controller after considering the
accommodation in the respective occupation of the parties held that it could
not be said that the premises occupied by the Respondent constituted reasonably
suitable residential accommodation.
He further held, that section 14A(1) of the
Act did not contain a condition that the Government servant who made an
application under section 14A(1) should not be in possession of reasonably
suitable alternative accommodation as was the case under clause (e) of the
proviso to sub-section (1) of section 14, and that even if such a factor were
to be taken into consideration it could not be said that the Respondent was in
occupation of reasonably suitable alternative accommodation. The Rent
Controller therefore passed an order of eviction against the Appellant and
directed it not to be executed for a period of two months. This order was
confirmed by the High Court in the revision petition filed by the Appellant
under section 25B(8).
In the Appeal to this Court the
maintainability of the eviction petition was impugned on behalf of the
Appellant on two ground-: (1) the Respon- 1026 dent was not in occupation of
the government accommodation allotted to him on the date when be filed his
application, and (2) on the date when he filed his application, the Respondent
was already residing in premises belonging to him.
Allowing the Appeal,
HELD: A. (1) It is not necessary that a
person in occupation of residential premises allotted to him by the Central
Government or a local authority who is required by or in pursuance of a general
or special order made by that Government or authority to vacate such
accommodation or, in default, to incur certain obligations, such as payment of
market rent, on the ground that he owns in the Union Territory of Delhi a residential
accommodation either in his own name or in the name of his wife or dependent
child should be in occupation of the accommodation allotted to him on the date
when he files an eviction application under section 14A(1) of the Delhi Rent
Control Act, 1958 to recover possession of the residential premises which he so
owns and which has been let by him. [1038 G-H, 1039 A] (2) If such person has,
however, other premises which he owns either in his own name or in the name of
his wife or dependent child which are available to him for his residential
accommodation or into which he has already moved, he cannot maintain an
application under section 14A(1) of the Act. [1039 B] (3) Even if the other
premises owned by him their in his own name or in the name of his wife or
dependent child are reasonably suitable for his accommodation he cannot
maintain an application under section 14A(1) but must file an application on
the ground specified in clause (e) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section
14 of the Act. [1039 C] B. (1) Though the Statement of Objects and Reasons
accompanying a legislative Bill cannot be used to determine the true meaning
and effect of the substantive provisions of a statute, it is permissible to
refer to the Statement of Objects and Reasons accompanying a Bill for the
purpose of understanding the background, the antecedent state of affairs, the
surrounding circumstances in relation to the statute, and the evil which the
statute sought to remedy.
[1033 H; 1034 A] (2) The object underlying
section 14A introduced by the Delhi Rent Control (Amendment) Act 1976 is that a
person who is compelled to vacate residential accommodation allotted to him on
the ground that he owns other residential premises in the Union Territory of
Delhi either in his own name or in the name of his wife or dependent child
should not be left without a roof over his head or should not be made to incur
heavy financial obligation by continuing to reside in the accommodation
allotted to him by paying market rent in respect thereof to the Central
Government or the local authority, as the case may be. [1035 C-D] In the
instant case, the Rent Controller was in error in considering the respective
needs of the parties and the suitability of accommodation 1027 occupied by the
Respondent. The order of the High Court dismissing the revision petition is
reversed and the eviction suit filed by respondent in the Court of the Rent
Controller is dismissed. [1038 F; 1039 D]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal
No. 626 of 1982.
Appeal by Special leave from the Judgment and
Order dated the 24th November, 1981 of the Delhi High Court in Civil Revision
No. 854 of 1981.
A. Subba Rao for the Appellant.
R.K. Jain and P.K Jain for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
MADON, J. This Appeal by Special Leave granted by this Court is directed
against the judgment and order of the High Court of Delhi dismissing the
revision petition under section 25B (8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958
(Act No. 59 of 1958) (hereinafter for the sake of brevity referred to as 'the
Act'), filed by the Appellant against an order of eviction passed against him
by the Rent Controller, Delhi, on an application filed by the Respondent on the
ground specified in section 14A (1) of the Act. The Appellant was the tenant of
the Respondent in respect of premises situate at 3474, Gali` Kartar Singh,
Subzi Mandi, Delhi, consisting of one room and two tin shedsata rent of Rs.
10.50 per month excluding water, electricity and other charges Prior to January
1975, the Respondent was an employee in the Posts and Telegraphs. Audit and
Accounts Department of the Government of India, and in January 1975 he was sent
on deputation to the Union Public Service Commission. He retired on May 1, 1978
During the course of his service, in October, 1972, the Respondent was allotted
Government residential accommodation at Timarpur, Delhi, by the Directorate of
Estates, Government of India. The Respondent occupied the said accommodation
from November 1, 1972. By a general order issued by the Ministry of Works and
Housing in the form of an office memorandum, namely, O.M No, 12031 (1)/ 74-Pol.
II dated September 9, 1975, and subsequently clarified by another order,
namely, O.M. No. 12031 (1)/74- Pol. II dated December 12, 1975, the Government
of India directed that all Government servants who had their own dwelling
houses at the place of posting within the limits of any local or adjoining
muni- 1028 cipality should vacate the Government accommodation allotted to them
within three months from October 1, 1975, or in default to pay market rent in
respect thereof. Consequently the Respondent was required to vacate the
Government accommodation allotted to him by December 31, 1975, or to pay the
market rent in respect thereof with effect from January 1, 1976. The
Respondent, therefore, vacated the Government accommodation in his occupation
on December 27, 1975, and went to reside in other premises belonging to him
adjoining the premises let to the Appellant. Thereafter, on May 17, 1976, the Respondent
filed an application under section 25B of the Act on the ground specified in
section 14A (1) thereof, being Suit No. E-798 of 1976. During the pendency of
the said eviction application, by a special order dated December 24, 1975, but
signed on September 25, 1976, the Respondent was given notice that if he failed
to vacate the said Government accommodation in his occupation by December 31,
1975, he would be charged market rent with effect from January 1, 1976, at the
rate fixed by the Government from time to time. After the summons had been duly
served on him, the Appellant filed an affidavit stating the grounds on which he
sought to contest the said eviction application and obtained leave from the
Rent Controller, Delhi, to contest the said application. A number of defences
were taken by the Appellant, all of which were negatived by the Rent
Controller. The Rent Controller considered the accommodation in the respective
occupation of the parties and held that the Respondent's family consisted of himself,
his wife, his, married sons and their wives, eight grand children and two
married daughters with their children and that it could not be said that the
premises occupied by the Respondent constituted reasonably suitable residential
accommodation. The Rent Controller further held that section 14A (1) of the Act
did not contain a condition that the Government servant who made an application
under section 14A (1) should not be in possession of reasonably suitable
alternative accommodation as was the case under clause (e) of the proviso to
sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Act and that even if such a factor were to
be taken into consideration, it could not be said that the Respondent, was in
occupation of reasonably suitable alternative accommodation. Accordingly, on
August 1, 1981, the Rent Controller passed an order of eviction against the
Appellant and directed it not to be executed for a period of two months. The
Rent Controller directed the parties to bear their own costs of the said
eviction application.
The Appellant thereupon filed in the High
Court of Delhi a 1029 revision petition under section 25B (8) of the Act The
said revision petition was dismissed on November 24, 1981. It is against this
judgment and order of the Delhi High Court that the present Appeal by Special
Leave has been filed by the Appellant.
The first contention raised on behalf of the
Appellant at the hearing of this Appeal was that the Respondent was not
entitled to rely upon the said special order dated December 25, 1975, inasmuch
as it was signed on September 25, 1976, and the fact that it was signed nine
months later than the date it bears clearly showed that the Respondent had
manoeuvred to obtain this order. In our opinion, the said special order dated
December 24, 1975, is irrelevant inasmuch as the foundation of the Respondent's
said eviction application was not the said special order but the said general
order dated September 9, 1975, as clarified by the said order dated December
12, 1975. We may also mention here that the Government policy as embodied in
the said general order and its clarification has been modified from time to
time. We are, however, not concerned in this Appeal with any of the subsequent
modifications of the said policy.
The next point which was urged before us and
which requires our serious consideration is that the Respondent's said eviction
application was not maintainable. The maintainability of the said eviction
application was impugned on two grounds: (1) the Respondent was not in
occupation of the Government accommodation allotted to him on the date when he
filed his application, and (2) on the date when he filed his application, the
Respondent was already residing in premises belonging to him.
In order to test the correctness of these
contentions, it is necessary to refer to the relevant provisions of the Act. As
the long title of the Act shows that it is "An Act to provide for the
control of rents and evictions and of rates of hotels and lodging houses, and
for the lease of vacant premises to Government, in certain areas in the Union
Territory of Delhi. ' Under section 14 (1) of the Act a landlord is disentitled
from obtaining possession of any premises let out by him except on one of the
grounds set out in the proviso to that sub-section. The relevant provisions of
the said section 14 (1) are as follows:
" 14. Protection of tenant against
eviction.
(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary
contained in any other law or contract, no order or decree for the recovery of
possession of any premises shall be made by any court or Controller in favour
of the landlord against a tenant:
Provided that the Controller may, on an
application made to him in the prescribed manner, make an order for the
recovery of possession of the premises on one or more of the following grounds
only, namely:- x x x x x (e) that the premises let for residential purposes are
required bona fide by the landlord for occupation as a residence for himself or
for any member of his family dependent on him, if he is the owner thereof, or
for any person for whose benefit the premises are held and that the land lord
or such person has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation;
x x x x x (6) Where a landlord has acquired
any premises by transfer, no application for the recovery of possession of such
premises shall lie under sub-section (l) on the ground specified in clause (e)
of the proviso thereto, unless a period of five years has elapsed from the date
of the acquisition.
x x x x x (7) Where an order for the recovery
of possession of any premises is made on the ground specified in clause (e) of
the proviso to sub-section (1), the landlord shall not be entitled to obtain
possession thereof before the expiration of a period of six months from the
date of the order.
The right of a landlord to recover possession
on the ground specified in clause (e) of the proviso to section 14 (1) of the
Act is thus circumscribed by three restrictions:
(1) the landlord of the person for whose
benefit the premises are held should not have other reasonably suitable
residential accommodation; (2) if the premises of which the landlord desires to
recover possession have been acquired by him by transfer, no application for
the recovery 1031 of such premises can be filed unless a period of five years
has elapsed from the date of the acquisition of such premises; and (3) if the
landlord obtains an order for the recovery of possession of the premises, he is
not entitled to obtain possession of such premises before the expiration of a
period of six months from the date of the order or, in other words, the tenant
is statutorily given a period of six months to vacate the premises.
Section 35 of the Act provides for
appointment of Controllers and Additional Controllers. Section 37 of the Act
prescribes the procedure to be followed by the Controller which expression,
under clause (b) of section 2, includes an Additional Controller. Under section
37 no order which prejudicially affects any person is to be made by the
Controller without giving him a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against
the order proposed to be made and until his objections, if any, and any
evidence he may produce in support of the same have been considered by the
Controller. The Controller is to follow as far as may be the practice and
procedure of a Court of Small Causes, including the recording of evidence,
while holding an inquiry in any proceeding before him. Under section 38 an
appeal lies to the Rent Control Tribunal from every order made by the
Controller under the Act, and a second appeal from an order made by the
Tribunal lies to the High Court if the appeal involves a substantial question
of law.
On December 1, 1975, the President of India
promulgated the Delhi Rent Control (Amendment) Ordinance, 1975 (Ord. No. 24 of
1975). The said Ordinance was repealed and replaced by the Delhi Rent Control
(Amendment) Act, 1976 (Act No. 18 of 1976). The said Amendment Act came into
force with retrospective effect from December 1, 1975, being the date of the
said Ordinance. By the said Ordinance and the said Amendment Act which replaced
it, the definition of 'tenant' in clause (1) of section 2 was substituted and a
new section, namely, section 14A, and a new Chapter IIIA, were inserted in the
Act. Section 14A(1) provides as follows:- 14"A(1) Right to recover
immediate possession of premises to accrue to certain persons.
(1) Where a landlord who, being a person in
occupation of any residential premises allotted to him by the Central
Government or any local authority is required, by, or in pursuance of, any
general or special order made by that Government or authority, to vacate such
residential 1032 accommodation, or in default, to incur certain obligations, on
the ground that he owns, in the Union Territory of Delhi, a residential
accommodation either in his own name or in the name of his wife or dependent
child, there shall accrue, on and from the date of such order, to such land
lord, notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in this Act or in any other
law for the time being in force or in any contract (whether express or
implied), custom or usage to the contrary, a right to recover immediately
possession of any premises let out by him:
Provided that nothing in this section shall
be construed as conferring a right on a landlord owning, in the Union territory
of Delhi, two or more dwelling houses, whether in his own name or in the name
of his wife or dependent child, to recover the possession of more than one
dwelling house and it shall be lawful for such landlord to indicate the
dwelling house, possession of which he intends to recover." Chapter IIIA
is entitled 'Summary Trial of Certain Applications'. It consists of three
sections, namely sections 25A, 25B and 25C. Section 25A provides that the
provisions of Chapter IIlA or any rule made there under shall have effect
notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained elsewhere in the Act
or in any other law for the time being in force. Section 25B prescribes, as its
marginal heading shows, a special procedure for the disposal of applications
for eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement'. Under section 25B every
application by a landlord for the recovery of possession of and premises on the
ground specified in clause (e) of the proviso to section 14(1), or under section
14A, is to be dealt with in accordance with the special procedure prescribed by
that section. The special procedure which has been prescribed for these cases
is that on an application being filed on either of these two grounds, the
Controller is to issue a summons in the form specified in the Third Schedule to
the Act. This summons is to call upon the tenant to appear before the
Controller within fifteen days of the service of the summons and to obtain
leave of the Controller to contest the application for eviction, and it
intimates to him that in default of his doing so the applicant would be
entitled after expiry of the said period of fifteen days to obtain an order for
his eviction. Leave to appear and to contest the application is to be obtained
by the tenant on an application made to the Controller 1033 supported by an
affidavit. This affidavit is to disclose such facts A as would disentitle the
landlord from obtaining an order for the recovery of possession of the premises
on the ground specified in clause (e) of the proviso to section 14(1) or under
section 14A. When leave is granted, to the tenant to contest the application,
the Controller is to commence the hearing of the application as early as
practicable. In holding such an inquiry, the Controller is to follow the
practice and procedure of a Court of Small Causes, including the recording of
evidence. No appeal or second appeal is to lie against an order for the
recovery of possession of any premises made by the Controller in accordance
with this special procedure. The High Court is, however, given the right to
call for the records of the case for the purpose of satisfying itself that an
order made by the Controller under this section is according to law and to pass
such order in respect thereto as it thinks fit.
Section 25C provides as follows:- "25C.
Act to have effect in a modified form in relation to certain persons:- (1)
Nothing contained in sub-section (6) of section 14 shall apply to a landlord
who, being a person in occupation of any residential premises allotted to him
by the Central Government or any local authority is required by, or in
pursuance of, an order made by that Government or authority to vacate such
residential accommodation, or, in default, to incur certain obligations, on the
ground that he owns a residential accommodation either in his own name or in
the name of his wife or dependent child in the Union Territory of Delhi.
(2) In the case of a landlord who, being a
person of the category specified in sub-section (1), has obtained, on the
ground specified in clause (e) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 14,
or under section 14A, an order for the eviction of a tenant from any premises,
the provisions of sub-section (7) of section 14 shall have affect as if for the
words "six months," occurring therein, the words "two
months" were substituted." It is now well settled that though the
Statement of Objects and Reasons accompanying a legislative Bill cannot be used
to determine the true meaning and effect of the substantive provisions of 1034
a statute, it is permissible to refer to the Statement of Objects and Reasons
accompanying a Bill for the purpose of understanding the background, the
antecedent state of affairs, the surrounding circumstances in relation to the
statute, and the evil which the statute sought to remedy. It will, therefore,
be convenient to reproduce at this stage the Statement of Objects and reasons
accompanying Bill No. XII of 1976 which when enacted became the Delhi Rent
Control (Amendment) Act, 1976. The said Statement of Objects and Reasons is as
follows:- "There has been a persistent demand for amendments to the Delhi
Rent Control Act, 1958 with a view to confer ring a right of tenancy on certain
heirs/successors of a deceased statutory tenant so that they may be protected
from eviction by landlords and also for simplifying the procedure for eviction
of tenants in case the landlord requires the premises bonafide for his personal
occupation. Further, Government decided on the 9th September, 1975 that a
person who owns his own house in his place of work should vacate the Government
accommodation allotted to him before the 31st December, 1975. Government
considered that in the circumstances, the Act required to be amended urgently.
2. As the Parliament was not in session, the
Delhi Rent Control (Amendment) Ordinance, 1975 was promulgated on the 1st
December, 1975. The Bill seeks to replace the said Ordinance." The
aforesaid general order of the Government was issued on September 9, 1975. The
said Ordinance was promulgated on December 1, 1975. This proximity of dates and
the provisions of section 14A(1) make it clear that a new ground of eviction
was provided by section 14A(1) in order to enable a person who has to vacate
the Government accommodation allotted to him by December 31, 1975, to recover
possession of premises let by him. The fact that section 14A was inserted in
view of the said Government order dated September 9, 1975, has also been
expressly stated in the Statement of Objects and Reasons accompanying the said
Bill No. XII of 1976. This object is further brought out by the provisions 1035
of section 25B which was inserted in the Act by the said Ordinance and
re-enacted by the said Amendment Act. As mentioned earlier, by section 25B a
special procedure has been prescribed for applications made on the ground
specified in clause (e) of the proviso to section 14(1) or under section 14A.
By the special procedure provided in section 25B the delay normally involved in
following the procedure under section 37 of the Act, is sought co be cut down
and the tenant is made to apply and obtain leave to contest the eviction
application. Further, the tenant's right of appeal and second appeal have been
taken away and the only remedy left to him against an order of eviction passed
by the Controller under section 25B is to approach the High Court in revision.
Thus, the object underlying section 14A is that a person who is compelled to
vacate residential accommodation allotted to him on the ground that he owns
other residential premises in the Union Territory of Delhi either in his own
name or in the name of wife or dependent child should not be left without a
roof over his or should not be made to incur heavy financial obligation by
continuing to reside in the accommodation allotted to him by paying market rent
in respect thereof to tho Central Government or the local authority, as the
case may be.
Turning now to the merits of the present
Appeal, it is not disputed that the premises let to the Appellant and the
premises belonging to the Respondent which the Respondent occupied after giving
up the Government 'accommodation allotted to him are separate premises and that
each constitutes a dwelling house under the proviso to section 14A(1). It is
also not disputed that the Central Government issued the said general order
dated September 9, 1975, and subsequently clarified it by another order dated
December 12, 1975. It is equally not in dispute that on the date when the
respondent filed his said eviction application he was residing in premises
belonging to him. It is in the light of these admitted facts and the statutory
provisions referred to above that we must now consider the question of
maintainability of the eviction application filed by the Respondent.
The first ground of challenge to the
maintainability of the said eviction application is that a landlord who is not
in occupation of the residential accommodation allotted to him either by the
Central Government or a local authority on the date when he files an application
under section 14A (1) is not entitled to maintain it. It was submitted on
behalf of the Appellant that though such a 1036 condition was not expressly
provided in section 14A, it should be read into that section as being implicit
in it. We find no merit in this submission. Admittedly, the section does not
contain any such condition. The object of section 14A (1) is to provide an
additional ground of eviction to a landlord who had been allotted residential
accommodation by the Central Government or a local authority and who is
required by a general or special order of that Government or authority to
vacate that accommodation or in default, to incur certain obligations, for
example, payment of market rent, on the ground that he owns in the Union
Territory of Delhi a residential accommodation either in his own name or in the
name of his wife or dependent child. Being asked to vacate on the ground that
he owns his own residential accommodation, he must be in a position to move
into such accommodation It is for this reason that the section expressly states
that ' There shall accrue, on and from the date of such order, to such
landlord-a right to recover immediately possession of any premises let out by
him". To accept the contention of the Appellant would be to postpone the
accrual of the right given by section 14A to the date of the filing of the
application. In order to recover possession of residential accommodation let
out by him, a landlord to whom residential accommodation had been allotted by
the Central Government or any local authority cannot be obliged to continue to
reside in such accommodation by paying market rent in respect thereof. On the
passing of a general or special order of the nature specified in section 14A
(1) the landlord may vacate the accommodation allotted to him and find
accommodation for himself elsewhere, either by renting premises or in a hostel,
hotel, lodging house, boarding house or with a relative. He is not thereby
debarred from filing an application under section 14A(1).
Does the same position, however, prevail when
on the passing of such general or special order the landlord vacates the
accommodation allotted to him and moves into other premises owned by him either
in his own name or in the name of his wife or dependent child ? The
consideration of this question brings us to the second ground of challenge to
the maintainability of the Respondent's said eviction application. This is a
more formidable challenge and in our opinion, it must succeed. It was urged by
Mr. R.K. Jain on behalf of the Respondent that there was no such restriction
provided in section 14A (1). We are unable to accept this submission. The
object underlying the Act and the subsequent enactment of section 14A would be
defeated, if this contention were to be accepted. The Act, like other Rent
Acts, has been passed to secure tenants 1037 in their accommodation at a
reasonable rent. This is apparent from the long title and the provisions of the
Act.
Various States had enacted Rent Acts in order
to prevent landlords from profiteering from the situation brought about as a
result of increase in population and shortage of accommodation. By these Rent
Acts, the right which a landlord has under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882,
to recover possession of the property let by him to a tenant on the expiry of
the lease or on determination of the tenancy has been taken away and the
landlord can recover possession of such premises only on one of the grounds
provided by the particular Rent Act. To permit an allottee of residential
accommodation belonging to the Central Government or a local authority who owns
a residential accommodation either in his own name or in the name of his wife
or dependent child to file an application to evict a tenant from other premises
belonging to him which he has let out would be to permit him to move into one
of the premises owned by him and to let out the other premises and thus to
profiteer from the general or special order mentioned in section l4A(1). That
he cannot do so is clear from the proviso to section 14A (1). Under the said
proviso, if an allottee of such accommodation owns in the Union Territory of
Delhi two or more dwelling houses, either in his own name or in the name of his
wife or dependent child, which he has let out, he cannot recover possession of
more than one of these dwelling houses but he has to select one of them and
file an application under section 14A (1) in respect thereof only. If such a
landlord cannot file an application under section 14A (1) when he owns two
dwelling houses which have been let out by him, to recover possession of both
these dwelling houses but can do so only in respect of one of them, he equally
cannot file an application under section 14A(1) when he has let out one of such
dwelling houses and the other dwelling house is available to him for his
residence or when he has already moved into the other dwelling house.
Can such a person, however, file an
application under section 14A (1) on the ground that a dwelling house owned by
him either in his own name or in the name of his wife or dependent child and
available for his residence is not reasonably suitable for his residential
accommodation? The answer to this question must also be in the negative.
Section 14A does not contain a condition that
a person who has or had to vacate the accommodation allotted to him by the
Central Government or any local authority by reason of a general or special
order mentioned in section 14A (1) has "no other reasonably suitable
residential accommodation" as clause 1038 (e) of the proviso to section 14
(1) does. Under section 14A (1) such allottee should have no other dwelling
house which he owns either in his own name or in the name of his wife or dependent
child for him to move into. If such dwelling house is not adequate or suitable
for his residence, he must proceed under clause (e) of the proviso to section
14 (1).
That this is the only remedy open to him is
clear from the provisions of section 25C. As we have seen, a landlord who
desires to recover possession of premises on the ground specified in the said
clause (e), which premises have been acquired by him by transfer, he cannot
under clause (6) of section 14 file an application under the said clause (e)
for a period of five years from the date of the acquisition of those premises
by him. Further, such an applicant if he succeeds in getting an order of
eviction is not entitled to obtain possession of the premises for a period of
six months from the date of the eviction order. In the case of a landlord
referred to in section 14A (1) these two conditions have been relaxed by
section 25C. Under section 25C(1) even though the premises which have been let
out by such landlord have been acquired by him by transfer, clause (6) of
section 14 does not apply to him and he does not have to wait for a period of
five years or for any length of time before filing an application for the
recovery of possession of such premises Further, the period of six months during
which the order of eviction cannot be executed under sub-section (7) of section
14 is reduced by section 25C (2) in the case of such a landlord to two months.
These provisions clearly show that if a landlord referred to in section 14A(1)
has other residential accommodation of his own either in his own name or in the
name of his wife or dependent child which accommodation is not reasonably
suitable for his residence cannot proceed under section 14A (1) but must file
an application on the ground specified in clause (e) of the proviso to section
14 (1). The Rent Controller was, therefore, in error in considering the
respective needs of the parties and the suitability of accommodation occupied
by the Respondent.
To summarize our conclusions:
(1) It is not necessary that a person in
occupation of residential premises allotted to him by the Central Government or
a local authority who is required by or in pursuance of a general or special
order made by that by that Government or authority to vacate such accommodation
or, in default, to incur certain obligations, such as payment of market rent,
on the ground that he owns in the 1039 Union Territory of Delhi a residential
accommodation either in his own name or in the name of his wife or dependent
child should be in occupation of the accommodation allotted to him on the date
when he files an eviction application under section 14A (1) of the Delhi Rent
Control Act, 1958, to recover possession of the residential premises which he
so own and which has been let by him.
(2) If such person has, however, other
premises which he owns either in his own name or in the name of his wife or
dependent child which are available to him for his residential accommodation or
into which he has already moved, he cannot maintain an application under
section 14A (1) of the Act.
(3) Even if the other premises owned by him
either in his own name or in the name of his wife or dependent child are not
reasonably suitable for his accommodation, he cannot maintain an application
under section 14A (1) but must file an application on the ground specified in
clause (e) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Act.
In the result, this Appeal must succeed. We
accordingly allow this Appeal and reverse the order of the Delhi High Court
dismissing Civil Revision Petition No. 854 of 1981 filed by the Appellant and
allow the said revision petition and dismiss the Eviction Suit No. 798 of 1976
filed by the Respondent in the Court of the Rent Controller, Delhi.
The Respondent will pay to the Appellant the
costs if this Appeal which we quantify at Rs. 800.
N.V.K. Appeal allowed.
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