Hans Raj Vs. State of Punjab & Ors
[1984] INSC 199 (26 October 1984)
DESAI, D.A.
DESAI, D.A.
MADON, D.P.
CITATION: 1985 AIR 69 1985 SCR (1)1040 1985
SCC (1) 134 1984 SCALE (2)632
ACT:
Punjab Civil Service (Premature Retirement)
Rules 1975, Rule 3 (1) (a)-Premature retirement of government servant-
Qualifying service wrongly computed-Whether the order complies with the primary
pre-requisites of the rule.
(ii) Premature Retirement of government
servant- Impugned order did not mention that power was exercised in public
interest-Whether amounts to non application of mind and vitiates the order.
HEADNOTE:
The appellant joined service as a clerk in
the erstwhile Patiala and East Punjab States Union (PEPSU) on 2nd Sept. 1949
Being a temporary employee. he was discharged from service on 30th September
1953. On 22nd February, 1954, he was again recruited as a clerk and later on
promoted as senior clerk. The PEPSU government sanctioned condonation of break
from Oct. 1, 1953 to Feb. 21, 1954 in the service of the appellant under Note
to sub-para (iii) of para 3 Annexure B' of the Pepsu Civil Services (Temporary
Service) Rules, 1955 for the purpose of issuing quasi-permanent Certificate
only. On the reorganisation of Punjab State in 1966 the appellant came to be allocated
to Punjab State. On 20th August. 1975 the Deputy Commissioner of Bhatinda, in
exercise of the power conferred by Rule 3(1) (a) of the Punjab Civil Services
(Premature Retirement) Rules, 1975 passed an order prematurely retiring the
appellant from service on the Ground that he had completed more than 25 years
of service. The appellant challenged the said order before the High Court on
the ground (i) That he could not have been retired under Rule 3(1) as he had
not completed 2 S years of service; and (ii) that the impugned order of
premature retirement suffered from the vice of non- application of mind
inasmuch as it did not state that the power of prematurely retiring the
appellant was exercised in public interest. The respondent contended (i) that the
appellant had completed more than 25 years of service because the break in
service was condoned by the PEPSU Govt.
and (ii) that the power of prematurely
retiring the appellant was exercised in public interest. The High Court
dismissed the Writ Petition holding that once The break in service was
condoned, the appellant had completed 25 years of service and therefore the
pre-requisite for exercise of power under Rule 3(1) (a) was satisfied.
The appellant contended before this court (1)
that the order sanctioning the condonation of break in service of the appellant
was for 1041 the limited purpose of granting quasi-permanent status and issuing
quasi-permanent certificate only and that the condonation of break in service
did not qualify for pension as observed by the Accountant General of Punjab in
his memo addressed to the S.D.O. Bhatinda and therefore the High Court was in
error in holding that the appellant had put in 25 years of qualifying service
on the date of the impugned order; and (ii) the order suffers from the vice of
complete non-application of mind in as much as in the impugned order there is
not the slightest whisper that the power was exercised in public interest.
Allowing the appeal by the appellant,
HELD; (1) Rule 3(1) (a) of the Premature
Retirement Rules confers power on the appropriate authority to retire any
employee, if it is of the opinion that it is in the public interest to do so,
on the date on which he completes 25 years of qualifying service or attained 50
years of stage. Therefore, the appropriate authority must first male up its
mind that it is in public interest to retire the employee Once having reached
that satisfaction, it must further find out whether the concerned employee has
on the relevant date completed 25 years of qualifying service or whether he has
attained the age of 50 years. In the former case it is not 25 years of service
but it is 25 years of qualifying service which must have been completed on the
date of premature retirement. The power can be exercised on the date on which
one of the two alternative fact situation becomes available or on any date
thereafter. The expression 'qualifying service' has been defined in rule 2(3)
of the Premature Retirement Rules to mean 'service qualifying for pension'.
Condition No. 2 in para 4.23 of Chapter IV of the Punjab Civil Services Rules,
which deal with condonation of interruption or break in service while computing
qualifying service for pension, provides that interruption in service may be
condoned if amongst others, service preceding the interruption is not less than
five years. [1046D-F; 1047A] Sub para (iii) of para 3, Annexure of Pepsu Civil
Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1955 provides that before a certificate of
quasi-permanent capacity can be issued, the Government servant should have on
the crucial date rendered service for more than three years. Note appended to
the para provides that broken periods of temporary service will not count for
purposes of this instruction unless the breaks are condoned specifically by the
Government in consultation with the Finance Department and the service thus
rendered continues. It further provides that while condoning break in service
for the purpose of issuing quasi-permanent capacity certificate, it should be
made clear to the persons concerned that the condonation will not entitle them
to any benefits regarding the fixation of pay, seniority, pension, gratuity
etc. and that the periods condoned will be ignored and not counted as service
actually rendered. [1049D-E] (2) It thus becomes crystal clear that the
certificate issued by Rajpramukh under the PEPSU Civil Services (Temporary
Service) Rules, 1955 condoning break in service was for the limited purpose of
issuing quasi-permanent capacity certificate. Not only that the codonation was
for this 1042 limited purpose but the negative is clearly spell out when it is
specifically provided that the condonation will not enable a person in whose
favour the certificate is issued to claim any pension or gratuity etc. In other
words, the condonation will not render the earlier service if it is otherwise
not includible in the computation of qualifying service to so claim it. For the
purpose of computing qualifying service for pension the period for which there
was interruption will remain a break in service and as the earlier service as
provided by Para 4.23, condition No. 2, was for a period less than five years,
the same cannot be taken into account for computing qualifying service Thus the
conclusion is incapable that the qualifying service which the appellant is
shown to have rendered commenced from February 22. 1954. Inevitably, therefore
on August 20, 1975 he had not completed 25 years of qualifying service and
therefore, the primary prerequisite for exercises of power is not satisfied and
the appellant could not have been compulsory retired from service. The High
Court unfortunately overlooked the basic requirement for exercise of power
namely, completing 25 years of qualifying service and proceeded on the basis
that rendering 25 years of service will permit exercise of power. There is a
marked and not worthy distinction between service and qualifying service.
[1049F-G & ; 1050A-C] (3) The impugned order merely recites that as the
appellant has completed more than 25 years of service, he is retired from the
service from tho date of the order. Silence about recital of public interest is
both conspicuous and glaring probably as the power was exercised by an officer
of the rank of Deputy Commissioner who was blissfully unaware of it. The argument
of the respondent that the appropriate authority exercised the power to
compulsorily retire the appellant in public interest in view of an entry made
in the annual confidential report of the appellant for the year 1971-72 that
his conduct was unsatisfactory and his integrity was doubtful, is not
convincing for two reasons:
(i) that no record was placed before the
Court to show as to whether the adverse entry was ever communicated to the
appellant; and (ii) his record previous and subsequent to the year 1971-72 was
not placed before us. Therefore, the impugned order also suffers from the vice
of non-application of mind. Accordingly, the impugned order compulsorily
retiring the appellant from service is illegal and invalid and must be quashed
and set aside. [1050F, G, 1051A-D]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal
No. 1251 of 1978, Appeal by Special leave from the Judgment and Order dated the
1st November, 1976 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Civil Writ Petition
No. 6461 of 1976 N. D. Garg and R. K. Garg for the Appellant.
S. K. Bagga for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
1043 DESAI, J. Appellant joined service as a Clerk in the Civil Supplies
Department of the erstwhile Patiala and East Punjab States Union ('PEPSU' for
short) on September 2, 1949. He was a temporary employee and he was discharged
from service on September 30, 1953. On February 22, 1954, he was again
recruited as a clerk in the Consolidation department of PEPSU. In course of
time, he was promoted as senior clerk and came to be allocated to Punjab State
on the merger of PEPSU with erstwhile Punjab State. The Deputy Commissioner of
Bhatinda transferred the appellant and posted him as Assistant in his office
after obtaining concurrence of the Subordinate Service Selection Board, Punjab
with effect from January 1, 1962. On the reorganisation of Punjab State in
1966, the appellant came to be allocated to Punjab State.
After declaration of national emergency, the
Governor of Punjab in exercise of the power conferred by the proviso to Art.
309 of the Constitution and all other powers enabling thereto and with the
previous approval of the Central Government under sub-section (7) of sec. 115
of the State Reorganisation Act, 1956 and sub-sec. (6) of the Sec. 82 of the Punjab
Reorganisation Act 1966 framed Punjab Civil Services (Premature Retirement)
Rules, 1975 (Premature Retirement Rules 'for short). Rule 3 conferred power on
the appropriate authority to order premature retirement of the Government
servant governed by the rules. It reads is under:
"3 (1) (a): The appropriate authority
shall, if it is of the opinion that it is in public interest to do so, have the
absolute right, by giving any employee prior notice in writing, to retire that
employee on the date on which he completes twenty five years of qualifying
service or attains fifty years of age or on any date thereafter to be specified
in notice.
(b) The period of such notice shall not be
less than three months:
Provided that where at least three months'
notice is not given or notice for a period less than three months is given, the
employee shall be entitled to claim a sum equivalent to the amount of his pay
and allowances at the same rates at which he was drawing them immediately
before the date of retirement for a period of three months or, as the case may
be, for the period by which such notice falls short of three months 1044 (2)
Any Government employee may, after giving at least three months' previous
notice in writing to the appropriate authority retire from service on the date
on which he completes twenty five years of qualifying service or attains fifty
years of age or on any date thereafter to be specified in the notice;
Provided that no employee under suspension
shall retire from service except with the specific approval of the appropriate
authority." In exercise of the power conferred by rule 3(1) (a), Deputy
Commissioner, Bhatinda passed an order of the premature retirement of the
appellant dated August 20. 1975.
It reads as under:
"No. 173 Dated 20.8. 1975 Under Rule
3(1) (a) of the Punjab Civil Services (Premature Retirement) Rules, 1975, Shri
Hans Raj, Sub- Divisional Assistant, S D.O. (Civil) office, Bhatinda who has
completed more than 25 years service is hereby retired from service from the
date of order.
2. He shall be entitled to three months pay
in lieu of notice as is admissible under proviso below rule 3 (1) (b) of the
Rules ibid.
3. He shall further be entitled to the
benefits of retiring pension and death cum retirement gratuity, admissible
under the rules.
Sd/- Deputy Commissioner, Bhatinda." The
appellant was accordingly prematurely retired by the appropriate authority on
the ground that he has completed more than 25 years of service and that even
though he was prematurely retired, he was entitled to the benefits of retiring
pension and death cum retirement gratuity, admissible under the rules. The
appellant questioned the validity, legality and correctness of the order of
premature retirement in C.W.P. No. 6461 of 1976 in the High Court of Punjab and
Haryana at Chandigarh. It was inter alia contended before a Division Bench of
the High Court that on the 1045 relevant date, the appellant had not completed
25 years of qualifying service and therefore, he could not have been retired
under Rule 3(1). It was also contended that the impugned order of premature
retirement suffered from the vice of non-application of mind in as much as it
does not state that the power of prematurely retiring the appellant was
exercised in public interest. It was urged that the power to prematurely retire
a Government servant conferred by Rule 3 postulates two pre-requisites (i) that
it is in public interest to prematurely retire the Government servant and (ii)
that either he has completed 25 years of qualifying service or he has attained
50 years of age. It was accordingly Contended that if the pre-requisites for
exercise of power, are not satisfied, the order would be initio void and would
not have the effect of bringing about the termination of service There were
other contentions raised on behalf of the appellant before the High Could with
which we are not concerned in this appeal.
A return was filed on behalf of the
respondents by the third respondent-Deputy Commissioner, Bhatinda who has
passed the Impugned order. It was stated that the conduct of the applicant in
the year 1971-72 was found unsatisfactory.
His integrity was found doubtful. It was
specifically contended that the appellant was prematurely retired from service
on his completion of more than 25 years of service and the computation that he
had completed 25 years of service was correct because the break in service from
October 1, 1953 to February 21, 1954 was condoned by the PEPSU Government vide
Revenue Department Letter No. RD-13 (25) SS-/ 56-7101 dated June 28, 1956 and
that once the break in service was condoned, the appellant on the date of
premature retirement had completed 25 years of qualifying service. A bald
statement was made that the power was exercised in public interest but the
impugned order is wholly silent on this material point.
A division Bench of the High Court rejected
the writ petition observing that once the break in service from September, 1953
to February 20, 1954 was condoned, the appellant had completed 25 years of
service and after recording the statement of the learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the respondents that the Memo No. Xll IN XI/ Misc. file/75-76/1618-19
dated January 1, 1976 issued by the Accounts Officer attached to the Office of
the Accountant General, Punjab and addressed to the Sub-Divisional Officer (c),
Bhatinda stating therein that the services of the appellant for the period from
October l, 1953 to February 21, 1954 does not qualify for pension as service
prior to the break was for a period less than 1046 five years, would not be
given effect to and thereupon concluded that the pre-requisite for exercise of
power under rule 3(1) (a) was satisfied. Hence this appeal by special leave.
Mr. N. D. Garg, learned counsel for the
appellant convassed two contentions before us: (1) that the order dated August
28, 1956 issued in the name of the Raj Pramukh of PEPSU sanctioning the
condonation of break in service of the appellant for the period October 1, 1953
to February 20, 1954 was for the limited purpose of' granting quasi- permanent
status and issuing quasi-permanent certificate only and for no other purpose
and therefore the Accountant General rightly held that the condonation in break
of service did not qualify for pension and therefore the High Court was in
error in holding that the appellant had put in 28 years of qualifying service
on the date of the impugned order; and (2) the order suffers from the vice of
complete non-application of mind inasmuch as in the impugned order there is not
the slightest whisper that the power was exercised in public interest.
Rule 3(1) (a) of the Premature Retirement
Rules confers power on the appropriate authority to retire any employee, if it
is of the opinion that it is in the public interest to do so, on the date on
which he completes 25 years of qualifying service or attained 50 years of age.
This power of premature retirement can be exercised firstly in public interest
and secondly, if one of the two conditions is satisfied namely that either the
employee who is to be retired has completed 25 years of qualifying service on
the date on which he is to be retired or he has attained the age of 50 on that
date. The power can be exercise on the date on which one of the two alternative
fact situation becomes available or on any date thereafter. Therefore, the
appropriate authority must first make up its mind that it is in public interest
to retire the employee. Once having reached that satisfaction, it must further
find out whether the concerned employee has on the relevant date completed 25
years of qualifying service or whether he has attained the age of 50 years. The
respondents in this case assert that the appropriate authority has retired the
appellant as it was of the opinion that it was in public interest to do so and
on the relevant date the appellant had completed 25 years of qualifying
service.
Taking the second contention first, it is
incumbent upon the respondents to show that on the date of the impugned order,
the appellant had completed 25 years of qualifying service. Let there be no
confusion that is it not 25 years of service but it is 25 1047 years of
qualifying service which must have been completed before the power can be exercised.
The expression 'qualifying service' has been defined in Rule 2(3) of the
Premature Retirement Rules to mean 'service qualifying for pension The
expression 'service qualifying as understood in the rules governing pension in
the Punjab Civil Services has been given various shades of meaning. Punjab
Civil Services Rules Vol. II, Chapter III para 3.12 provides that 'the service
of a Government employee does not qualify for pension unless it conforms to the
three conditions therein mentioned:
First - The service must be under Government.
Second- The employment must be substantive
and permanent.
Third - The service must be paid by
Government.
The rules permit condonation of interruption
or break in service. If there is a break, how the service prior to the break
has to be dealt with for the purpose of computing qualifying service has been
dealt with in Chapter IV para 4.23 under the heading D-Condonation of
Interruptions and Deficiencies. It provides that 'interruption in service
(either between two spells of permanent or temporary service or between a spell
of temporary service and permanent service or vice versa), in the case of an
officer retiring on or after the 5th January, 1961, may be condoned, subject to
the following conditions, therein mentioned. The relevant condition reads as
under:
"(2) Service proceeding the interruption
should not be less than five years' duration. In cases where there are two or
more interruptions, the total service, pensionary benefits in respect of which
shall be lost if the interruptions are not condoned should not be less than
five years." The question is whether the service rendered by the appellant
despite the fact that it was temporary for the period September 30, 1953 to
February 22, 1954 when he was reinducted in service can be included in
reckoning qualifying service on the date of the` impugned order it is conceded
that if the service prior to the break is ignored, the appellant had not
completed 25 years of qualifying service on the date of the impugned order. To
recall a few facts, the appellant joined service on September 2, 1949. He was
discharged on September 30, 1953. Therefore, the service prior to 1048 the
break was of roughly four years and 28 days duration. At any rate it was less
than five years in duration. Therefore, Condition No. 2 in para 4.23 of the
Premature Retirement Rules would be attracted because it provides that
interruption in service may be condoned if amongst others, service preceding
the interruption is not less than five years. As the service prior to the break
was less than five years even if the interruption or break in service is
condoned unconditionally, the earlier service would not qualify for being
reckoned as qualifying service for the purpose of pension. This is exactly what
the Accountant General in his order dated January 1, 1976 has opined when he
said that in the case of the appellant service prior to the break being less
than five years duration, such service does not qualify for pension. He
accordingly computed qualifying service from Feb. 22, 1954 till August 20, 1975
when the impugned order was passed. An arithmetical computation would show that
the appellant had not completed 25 years of qualifying service on August 20,
1975.
It was however, contended on behalf of the
respondents that as the break in service from Sept. 30, 1953 to February 21,
1954 was condoned, the appellant can be said to be continuously in service from
September 2, 1949 and therefore on August 20, 1975 he had completed more than
25 years of qualifying service. Undoubtedly, the Raj Pramukh of PEPSU had
sanctioned condonation of break in service from October 1, 1953 to February 21,
1954 in the service of the appellant, Whether this condonation would make the
service continuous for the purpose of treating earlier service as includible in
computing qualifying service, it is necessary to examine the purpose, the
content and the benefit granted by this order.
The order of the Raj Pramukh reads as under:
"His Highness the Rajpramukh has been
pleased to sanction the condonation of break from 1.10.1953 to 21.2.1954 in the
service of Shri Hans Raj, under note to sub-para (iii) of para 3, Annexure 'B'
of the Pepsu Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1955 for the purpose of
issuing quasi-permanent Certificate only, provided that his service was not
discontinued as a result of resignation or his employment elsewhere and further
provided that the incumbent has not been confirmed already." This order
has been made in exercise of the powers conferred 1049 by sub-para (iii) or
para 3 of Annexure 'B' to the PEPSU Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules,
1955. Sub Rule 2 (b) of the aforementioned rules defines 'quasi-permanent
service' to mean 'temporary service commencing from the date on which a
declaration issued under rule 3 takes effects and consisting of periods of duty
and leave (other than extra- ordinary leave) after that date. Rule 3 provides
that Government servant shall be deemed to be in quasi- permanent service; (i)
if he has been in continuous Government service for more than 3 years, and (ii)
if the appointing authority, being satisfied as to his character for employment
in a quasi-permanent capacity, has issued a declaration to that effect, in
accordance with such instruction as the Rajpramukh may issue from time to time.
Annexure 'B' sets out instructions regulating the issue of declaration of
quasi-permanent eligibility to temporary employees under the PEPSU Civil
Services (Temporary service) Rules, 1955. Para (HI) of sub-para (3) provides
that before a certificate of quasi-permanent capacity can be issued, the
Government servant should have on the crucial date rendered service for more
than three years. Note appended to the para provides that 'broken periods of
temporary service will not count for purposes of this instruction unless the
breaks are condoned specifically by the Government in consultation with the
Finance Department and the service thus rendered continues.' It further
provides that while condoning break in service for the purpose of issuing quasi-permanent
capacity certificate, 'it should be made clear to the persons concerned that
the condonation will not entitle them to any benefits regarding the fixation of
pay, seniority, pension, gratuity etc. and that the periods condoned will be
ignored and not counted as service actually rendered.' It thus becomes crystal
clear that the certificate issued by Rajpramukh under the PEPSU Civil Services
(Temporary Service) Rules, 1955 condoning break in service was for the limited
purpose of issuing quasi-permanent capacity certificate. Not only that the
condonation was for this limited purpose but the negative is clearly spell out
when it is specifically provided that the condonation will not enable a person
in whose favour the certificate is issued to claim any pension or gratuity etc.
In other words, the condonation will not render the earlier service if it is
otherwise not includible in the computation of qualifying service to so claim
it. Therefore, there is no substance in the submission made on behalf of the
respondents and which unfortunately found favour with the High Court that
because the Rajpramukh of PEPSU had condoned break in service, the appellant
was in continuous uninterrupted service from September 2, 1949. For the purpose
of computing qualifying 1050 service for pension the period for which there was
interruption will remain a break in service and as the earlier service as
provided by para 4.23, condition No. 2, was for a period less than five years,
the same cannot be taken into account for computing qualifying service. Thus
the conclusion is inescapable that the qualifying service which the appellant
is shown to have rendered commenced from February 22, 1954. Inevitably,
therefore on August 20, 1975 he had not completed 25 years of qualifying
service and therefore, the primary pre-requisite for exercise of power is not
satisfied and the appellant could not have been compulsory retired from
service. The High Court unfortunately overlooked the basic requirement for
exercise of power namely completing 25 years of qualifying service and
proceeded on the basis that rendering 25 years of service will permit exercise
of power. There is a marked and noteworthy distinction between service and
qualifying service.
Incidentally, it may be pointed out that the
concession made by the respondents before the High Court that the memo issued
by the Accountant General shall not be given effect to is hardly of any legal
consequence. It is the duty of the Accountant General to compute the qualifying
service for pension. He was satisfied that under the relevant rules the
appellant had not completed 25 years of qualifying service on the date of the
impugned order. He dearly pointed out that condonation in break in service is
of no legal consequence as far as computation of qualifying service is
concerned. Therefore, that concession has to be ignored as of no consequence.
Mr. Garg next urged that the impugned order
made by the competent authority suffers from the vice of non-application of
mind inasmuch as it has not been stated in the impugned order that the power
was exercised in public interest. There is substance in this contention. The
impugned order merely recites that as the appellant has completed more than 25
years of service, he is retired from the service from the date of the order.
Silence about recital of public interest is both conspicuous and glaring
probably as the power was a exercised by an officer of the rank of Deputy
Commissioner who was blissfully unaware of it. The return is also filed by the
same officer. In the return filed in this court, the only contention worth
noting is that as the High Court Judgment is clear, convincing and unassailable
this Court should not interfere in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction
because no case of injustice is made out. In para 5 (c) of the return filed in
the High Court, it has been stated 1051 that the impugned order is legal and
the appellant was retired on completion of his 25 years of service. In para (d)
it is stated that the order retiring the petitioner prematurely was passed in
public interest. The attempt seems to be to merely reproduce the language of
the rule without any attempt at bringing the case within the parameters of the
relevant rule. If the power was exercised in public interest, one would have
expected some whisper about it in the impugned order, However when a specific
contention was taken that the power was not exercised in public interest, a
routine averment was made that it was exercised in public interest. When this
contention was canvassed before this Court, the respondents tried to repel it
by saying that in the annual confidential report for the year 1971-72, an entry
has been made that the conduct of the appellant was unsatisfactory and his
integrity was found doubtful. This is the only entry relied upon to
substantiate the charge that as the appellant had rendered himself undesirable
for further continuance in service and therefore power to compulsorily retire
him was exercised in public interest, We remain unconvinced for two reasons:
(1) that no record was placed before us to show as to whether the adverse entry
was ever communicated to the appellant and (2) his record previous and
subsequent to the year 1971-72 was not placed before us. Thus there remains a
stray entry only. The material for making the entry 3 years prior to the date
of the impugned order has not been placed before us. And the more disturbing
part is that the entries in the subsequent years have not been shown to us. It
therefore, appears that reference to public interest in the return was an
attempt at paying lip sympathy to the provision of the relevant rule rather
than a serious application of mind while dealing with the career and the
consequent starvation heaped upon the appellant by the impugned order. We are
therefore, satisfied that the order also suffers from the vice of
non-application of mind.
However, we propose to rest this judgment on
the finding that the pre-requisite for the exercise of power was not satisfied
inasmuch as the appellant was not shown to have completed 25 years of
qualifying service on the date of the impugned order. Therefore, the impugned
order compulsorily retiring the appellant from service is illegal and invalid
and must be quashed and set aside. In this view of the matter, we find it
difficult to agree with the view taken by the High Court.
1052 Accordingly, this appeal succeeds and is
allowed and the judgment of the High Court is quashed and set aside and it is
hereby declared that the impugned order dated August 20, 1975 compulsorily
retiring the appellant from service of the Punjab Government is illegal and
invalid and is hereby quashed. A necessary declaration must follow that the
appellant continues in service uninterruptedly and is entitled to all the
benefits to which he would have been entitled, had he continued in service. The
respondents shall pay the costs of the appellant.
M.L.A. Appeal allowed.
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