V.S. Talwar Vs. Prem Chandra Sharma
[1984] INSC 49 (1 March 1984)
MISRA RANGNATH MISRA RANGNATH FAZALALI, SYED
MURTAZA VARADARAJAN, A. (J)
CITATION: 1984 AIR 664 1984 SCR (3) 51 1984
SCC (2) 420 1984 SCALE (1)367
ACT:
Construction of documents, Principle of-True
meaning of clause 12 of the lease deed dated 5.1.1968-Meaning of
"office"-Whether "personal Office" in clause 12 would mean
that the premises were let out for composite purposes and not for residential
purposes and therefore eviction under section 14(1) (e) of the Delhi Rent
Control Act cannot lie ?
HEADNOTE:
Prem Chand Sharma was admitted into tenancy
of the suit premises under a lease deed dated 5th January, 1968, clause 12,
thereof provided.
"That the lessee shall use the premises
for the purpose of Residential Personal office only and not for commercial
purposes." The landlord, appellant, applied to the Rent Controller on
March 4, 1972, for eviction of the Respondent under section 14(1) (e) of the
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. The respondent tenant obtained leave to contest
and pleaded inter alia that the premises were let out both for residential as
also for office and the composite purpose of the tenancy took the premises out
of the purview of residential accommodation. The Controller did not accept the
defence and passed an order for eviction. In revision, however, the High Court
rejected the land lord's submission holding that the use of the word
"personal" before "office" was intended to convey the idea
that the tenancy was not for the purpose of accommodating a place of business
and reversed the decision of eviction. Hence the appeal by the landlord, after
obtaining special leave of the Court.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: (1) The word "office" is used
in different senses and in each case that meaning must be assigned to it which
conforms with the language used. Therefore, in the instant case, the High Court
was not right in picking one of the meanings given in the chamber's dictionary
and proceeding to the conclusion that "office" is certainly "not
residence" and a letting purpose which includes office must be understood
to include a purpose other than residence only.
[54-A, 55A-B] Macmillan v. Guest (1942) A.C.
561; Smt. Kanta Kathuria v. Manak Chand Surana, (1970) 2 S.C.C. 232, referred
to.
52 2:1. Law is fairly settled that in
construing a document the ordinary rule is to give effect to the normal and
natural meaning of the words employed in the document itself. [55 D-E] Krishna
Biharilal v. Gulab Chand and Others, [1971] Supp. S.C.R. 27; D.D.A. v. D.C.
Kaushish, (1974) 1 S.C.R.
535; Monypenny v. Monypenny, [1861] 9 H.L.C.
114; In re:
Meredith, ex-parte Chick, [1879] 11 Ch. D.
731, referred to.
2:2. In the instant case it is clear that the
parties to the document were anxious enough and took proper care in order to
keep the user of the premises confined to residential purpose; that is why it
was expressly stipulated in the lease to prohibit commercial user. Even while
permitting an office to be located, equal care was taken to put the word
'personal' before 'Office' to convey the idea that the tenant would not be
entitled to transact official business connected with his avocation. Although
ordinarily an office would mean the place where official business is
transacted, a personal office in contradistinction to an office simpliciter or
a commercial office would be a place where an outsider would not normally be
admitted; commercial transactions would not take place; there would be no
fixity of the location and the tenant would be entitled to use any portion of
the premises as his personal office and the like.
Such a place is referred to as personal
office would essentially be residential and obviously while entering into the
present lease deed, the parties were not trying to create a lease of premises
for any other purposes. In para 2 of the document, there was no description of
any existing office room and available for such use to the tenant, nor was
space earmarked for any personal office out of this accommodation. It was in
the discretion of the lessee to use any part as a personal office. Every
lessee, or for the matter of that every person maintaining an acceptable
standard of living does set apart a portion of the accommodation available to
him which can answer the description of a personal office. Even the clause
relating to payment of tax by the lessor do not support the stand of the
lessee. As contemplated under the Transfer of Property Act a document of lease
normally provides the rights and obligations of both the lessor and the lessee.
In stipulating the rent payable for the use and occupation of the premises the
lessor had undertaken the liability of payment of taxes as described therein as
long as the premises were used for residence only. This clause necessarily means
that what had been stipulated was only residential user. In fact, the lessor
had been paying the taxes and the lessee had not been called upon to share the
burden. This clause is an added provision to clinch the point in dispute
against the tenant. Therefore the High Court, went wrong in reversing the
decision of the Rent Controller by merely relying upon clause 12 of the lease
deed. [55C, 56F-G, 57A-B, D-E, GH, 58 A-B]
3. Though the fact that the tenant has been
in occupation for more than 14 years after the litigation began will disentitle
him to any further time to vacate, taking judicial notice of the fact that
these days an alternative premises would be very difficult to find, the Court
considered it appropriate to grant time to the Respondent to vacate the
premises upto 31st December, 1984 subject to furnishing usual undertaking
within four weeks or to face eviction after four weeks.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal
No. 2999 of 1980.
From the judgment and order dated the 22nd
April, 1980 of the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in C.R. Petition No.
336 of 1979.
G.L. Sanghi, Mr. A.K. Verma and S. Kashwa for
the appellant.
D.D. Thakur, P.H. Parekh, P.K. Menon and R.K.
Sharma for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
RANGANATH MISRA, J.-The landlord whose application for eviction of the tenant,
respondent before us, was rejected by the High Court by reversing the order of
the eviction passed by the Additional Rent Controller has come before this
Court on obtaining special leave and the short point arising for consideration
is as to the true meaning of a clause in the rent deed.
The respondent was admitted into tenancy of
the premises in question under a lease deed dated 5th January, 1968. Clause 12
thereof provided:
"That the lessee shall use the premises
for the purpose of Residential/Personal office only and Not for commercial
purposes". (underlining’s are our own) The landlord, appellant before us,
applied to the Controller on March 14, 1972, for eviction of the respondent
under Section 14 (1) (e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 ('the Act' for
short). The tenant obtained leave to contest and pleaded, inter alia, that the
premises were let out both for residential as also office and the composite
purpose of the tenancy took the premises out of the purview of residential
accommodation. The Controller did not accept the defence and passed an order
for eviction. Thereupon, the tenant carried a revision to the Delhi High Court
and reiterated his defence that the tenancy was not for residential purpose.
The High Court found that there was no
infirmity in the finding about the bona fide requirement but adverting to the
conclusion on the letting purpose held:
"It is well known that premises may be
let out for residence only, for use as an office, for use as a shop and for
other commercial purpose. Once any of the latter purposes is combined with the
purpose of use as residence, the premises let out for a composite purpose and
for residence only.
The meaning of the word 'office', not defined
in the Act, in the Chamber's dictionary is a place where business is carried
oh. Office is certainly not residence and a letting purpose which includes
office must be understood to include a purpose other than residence only".
And ultimately concluded by saying:
"Clause (e) of Section 14(1) is
available as a ground to seek eviction of tenants only, among other
requirements, if the premises were let out for residence only and once the
letting purpose is shown to be composite, an eviction petition under Section
14(1) (e), without more, must fail." The High Court rejected the
landlord's submission that the use of the word 'personal' before 'office' was
intended to convey the idea that the tenancy was not for the purpose of accommodating
a place of business.
Counsel for the appellant took us to the
terms of clause 12 of the lease agreement and emphasised on the feature that
commercial purposes were clearly kept out and the lease was for residence and
authorised the location of a personal office. He also relied upon the
description of the premises as residential in the application made by the
tenant to the controller for fixation of fair rent in respect of the very
premises.
The word 'office' is used in different senses
and in each case that meaning must be assigned to it which conforms with the
language used. In Volume 67, Corpus Juris Secundum at page 96, the following
statement appears: "The term 'office' is one which is employed to convey
various meanings, and no one definition thereof can be relied on for all
purposes and occasions". This Court has approved the observation of Lord
Wright in Macmillan v. Guest, 1 where it was stated:
"The word 'office' is of indefinite
content. Its various meanings 55 cover four columns of the New English
Dictionary.. " See Smt. Kanta Kathuria v. Manak Chand Surana(1). In this
view of the position the High Court was not right in picking one of the
meanings given to the word in the Chamber's dictionary and proceeding to the
conclusion that 'office' is certainly not residence and a letting purpose which
includes office must be understood to include a purpose other than residence
only.
Section 2(i) of the Act defines 'premises' to
mean "any building or part of a building which is, or is intended to be,
let separately for use as a residence or for commercial use or for any other
purpose ......." Respondent's counsel has argued that tenancy under the
Act can be for three purpose;-(1) residential, (2) commercial and (3) for any
other purposes depending upon the use for which the premises are let out.
Conceding that the definition is capable of such an argument being built up, a
reference to the pleadings in this case shows that the permission in the rent
deed of locating a personal office had been stated to be a commercial purpose.
Great care seems to have been taken by the landlord while inducting the tenant
under the rent deed to put a total prohibition to commercial user of the
premises. That is why in clause 12 it has been specifically stated that it is
"not for commercial purposes". In the back-drop of such a provision
in the lease agreement, the true meaning of the words 'personal office' has to
be found out. Law is fairly settled that in construing a document the ordinary
rule is to give effect to the normal and natural meaning of the words employed
in the document itself. See Krishna Biharilal v. Gulabchand and Ors. (2) This
Court in D.D.A. v. D.C. Kaushish(3) observed:
"There (at pages 28-29) 'Construction of
Deeds and Statutes' by Odger's (5th ed. 1967) the First General Rule of
Interpretation formulated is: 'the meaning of the document or of a particular
part of it is therefore to be sought for in the document itself'. That is,
undoubtedly, the primary rule of construction to which Sections 90 to 94 of the
Indian Evidence Act give statutory recognition and effect.. Of course, 'the
document' means 'the document' read as a whole and not piecemeal.
56 The rule stated above follows logically
from the Literal Rule of Construction which, unless its application produces
absurd results must be resorted to first. This is clear from the following
passages cited in Odgers' short book under the First Rule of Interpretation set
out above :
Lord Wensleydale in Monypenny v. Monypenny 1
said:
"the question is not what the parties to
a deed may have intended to do by entering into that deed, but what is the
meaning of the words used in that deed; a most important distinction in all
cases of construction and the disregards of which often leads to erroneous
conclusions".
Brett, L.J. in Re Meredith, ex-parte Chick 2
observed :
"I am disposed to follow the rule of
construction which was laid down by Lord Denman and Baron Parke..
They said that in construing instruments you
must have regard not to the presumed intention of the parties, but to the
meaning of the words which they have used." Since we agree with this
exposition of the law reference to the oral evidence or even to the tenant's
documents would be wholly out of place. The terms of the document if they make any
good meaning must be given effect to.
All the provisions of the lease deed have to
be read and in fact with the assistance of counsel we have read the same more
than once during the hearing. The parties to the document were anxious enough
and took proper care in order to keep the user of the premises confined to
residential purpose; that is why it was expressly stipulated in the lease to
prohibit commercial user. Even while permitting an office to be located, equal
care was taken to put the word 'personal' before 'office' to convey the idea
that the tenant would not be entitled to transact official business connected
with his avocation. Although ordinarily an office would mean the place where
official business is transacted a personal office in contradistinction to an
office simpliciter or a commercial office would be a place where an outsider
would not normally 57 be admitted; commercial transactions would not take
place; there would be no fixity of the location and the tenant would be
entitled to use any portion of the premises as his personal office and the
like. Such a place if referred to as personal office would essentially be
residential and obviously while entering into the present lease deed, the
parties were not trying to create a lease of premises for any other purposes as
now contended by Mr. Thakur for the respondent. The High Court, therefore, went
wrong in reversing the decision of the Rent Controller by merely relying upon
clause 12 of the lease deed.
It is relevant to note the description of the
premises as given in the lease deed itself. Paragraph 2 of the document
described the premises thus :
"The lessor hereby leases to the lessee
the following described premises of the entire house built on plot No. 125.
Greater Kailash-I, New Delhi comprising of three bed rooms with two bath rooms,
drawing-cum-dining room, one kitchen one front and central veranda, front and
back lawn, garage, servant quarter, above garage, a servant W.C. and
terrace." There was no description of any existing office room and
available for such use to the tenant. nor was space earmarked for any personal
office out of this accommodation.
As indicated above it was in the discretion
of the lessee to use any part as a personal office. Every lessee, or for the
matter of that every person maintaining an acceptable standard of living does
set apart a portion of the accommodation available to him which can answer the
description of a personal office.
Mr. Thakur placed reliance on another clause
of the lease deed which reads as follows:
"That the lessor shall pay all the taxes
of any kind whatsoever including house tax, ground rent as are of may
hereinafter be assessed on the demised premises by the municipality or any
other authority whatsoever provided the premises are used for residence
only." We do not think the terms of this clause support the stand of the
lessee. As contemplated under the Transfer or Property Act a document of lease
normally provides the rights and obligations of both the 58 lessor and the
lesses. In stipulating the rent payable for the use and occupation of the
premises the lessor had undertaken the liability of payment of taxes as
described therein as long as the premises were used for residence only. This
clause necessarily means that what had been stipulated was only residential
user. It is appropriate to take note of the admission of Mr. Thakur that the
lessor had been paying the taxes and the lessee has not been called upon to
share the burden. This clause is an added provision to clinch the point in
dispute against the tenant.
We are, therefore, of the view that the High
Court clearly erred in law in reversing the decision of the Controller allowing
the eviction. The appeal is allowed and the order of the High Court is set
aside and the order of the Additional Rent Controller is restored. Parties are
directed to bear their respective cost throughout.
This is a litigation which began in 1970. The
tenant has been in occupation and continuing for about 14 years now after the
application for eviction had been filed.
Ordinarily we would not have allowed any time
to the tenant keeping this aspect in view. But Mr. Thakur has urged upon us to
take judicial notice of the fact that these days an alternative premises would
be very difficult to find. We allow time to the tenant until 30th December,
1984 to vacate the premises subject to furnishing usual undertaking within four
weeks from today. In the absence of the undertaking the tenant becomes liable
to eviction after four weeks.
S.R. Appeal allowed.
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