Bhaskar Textile Mills Ltd; Vs.
Jharsuguda Municipality & Ors  INSC 10 (11 January 1984)
MISRA, R.B. (J) MISRA, R.B. (J)
VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J)
CITATION: 1984 AIR 583 1984 SCR (2) 401 1984
SCC (2) 25 1984 SCALE (1)72
Octroi duty, imposition of-Validity of the
imposition of Octroi duty under section 131(1)(kk) of the Orissa Municipal Act,
1950 to a village constituted as a Grama earlier under Section 3 of the Orissa
Gram Panchayat Act, 1964 but later included in an area of cl Municipality under
Section 4 of the 1950 Act-Constitution of India, 1950, Article 19(1)g.
The appellant Textile Mills is a company duly
incorporated under the Indian Companies Act 1956 having its mills located at
Village Ektaji under the Jharsuguda police station in district Sambalpur,
Orissa. The company mainly carries on spinning of Cotton which in the
manufacturing process is transformed from loose fibres into finished yarn The
area under the Ektaji village in which the appellant's factory was located was
earlier constituted as a Grama by a declaration made under Section 3 of the
Orissa Grama Panchayat Act 1964. On or about March 25, 1970 Jharsuguda
Municipality passed a resolution for the inclusion of the Ektaji and other
villages within its jurisdiction. After considering the objections and
representations against the inclusion of Ektaji village in the Municipal Limit
and after following once again the other statutory requirement of further notice
etc., the State Government published in the Orissa Gazette dated 12.8.1975 a
notification approving the inclusion. Soon thereafter on September 1, 1975 the
said Jharsuguda Municipality sent a letter to the appellant directing it to pay
octroi duty at the rate of I percent ad valorem on cotton as soon as it entered
the Municipal check post for the purpose of its being spun into yarn. The levy
of octroi was challenged by filing a petition under Arts.
226 and 227 of the Constitution on various
grounds, but the writ Petition was dismissed. Petition seeking permission for
issuance of a certificate under Article 133(1) of the Constitution was also
dismissed. Hence the appeal after obtaining Special Leave of the Court.
Dismissing the appeal the Court.
HELD: 1. Considering the case from any aspect
the imposition of Octroi duty under section 5 of the Orissa Municipal Act, 1950
does not suffer from any infirmity [413 H]
2. The levy, being neither an unreasonable
one nor also excessive, cannot . be challenged on the ground that there is
violation of Article 19(1)(e) of the Constitution. [413 a] 402
3. It is true that when a duly constituted
Grama under sub-section (I) of section 3 of the Grama. Panchayat Act is to go
out of existence an order of the Magistrate cancelling the Notification in
terms of sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the said Act is a pre-requisite. But
in the instant case the Gram Panchayat never challenged the Notification of
inclusion of the Village Ektaji in Jharsuguda' Municipality.
Rather on the other hand the Gram panchayat
was consulted before the impugned notification dated 12th August 1975 was
issued. [406 H; 407 A]
4. The proviso to sub-section 1 of Section 4
of the Orissa Municipal. Act, 1950 has no application to the present case and
that cannot be taken to be a ground for challenging the Notification for
inclusion of Village Ektaji hl the Jharsuguda Municipality. A bare perusal of
the proviso clearly indicates that the requirement is that two- thirds of the
adult, male population of the town to which it refers should be engaged in
non-agricultural pursuits The proviso applies not to all the clauses of
sub-section (I) of section 4 but it. applies only to clause (a) of sub-section
(1) of Section 4, because it is clause (a) of section 4 (1) which talks of
town. [408 E-F]
5. The contention that the objection raised
by the appellant against the inclusion of the village in question into
Municipality has not been considered by the State has no force. The objection
is required to be made through the Magistrate of the District. Naturally the
District Magistrate. while forwarding the objection to the State Government
made his comment. The Revenue Divisional officer who intervenes in the channel
of communication between the District Magistrate and the State Government had
an occasion to process the matter. The State Government while dealing with the
matter consulted the Panchayat Raj Department and ultimately notified in terms
of the notification dated August 12, 1975. [408H; 409A-B]
6. Section 131(1) of the Municipal Act
empower the Municipal Council to impose various kinds of taxes which includes
octroi as provided in Clause (kk) with the sanction of the Government since the
goods are brought into the municipal limits at least for the purpose of
use"-one of the three conditions laid down in clause (kk -the imposition
of Octroi is valid.
Burmah Shell Oil Storage & Distribution
Co. v. The Belgam Borough Municipality '  Supp 2 SCR 216 referred to and
held inapplicable. [409 D-E] 7:1. There is a statutory presumption under
section 392 of the Orissa Municipal Act, 1950 that the publication of the rules
or regulations or bye laws in the Gazette shall be evidence that the rule pr
regulation or bye law has, been mad as required by the section Therefore the
court will assume that the bye law has been made in accordance with law in the
absence of anything more from the site of the appellant. 1410 F-G] 7 :2; The
argument that even assuming that the bye laws when initially enforced might be
presumed to be in accordance with law in the absence of similar steps being
taken at the time of extension of bye laws to the newly added area, the bye
laws are not enforceable in the new areas is not correct as it has, proceed in
utter oblivion of the provisions of section 5 of the Municipal Act. [410H; 411
A] Vishakhapatanam Municipality v. Kandregula Nukarajau & Ors.  1
S.C.R. 5.44; Atlas Cycle Industries Ltd. v. State of Haryana and Anr.  1
S.C.R. 127; Bagalkot City Municipality v Bagalkot Cement  2 Supp S.C.R.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal
No. 487 of 1977.
Appeal by Special leave from the Judgment and
order dated the 5th January, 1977 of the orissa High Court in O.J.C. No. 810 of
V S Desai, Parveen Kumar and Ashok Mathur for
C.V. Murty, K. PrabhaKar Rao and C.M. Murty
for the Respondents.
R.K. Mehta for Respondent No. 3.
B.D. Sharma for Respondent No. 2.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
MISRA J.: The present appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment
of the High Court of Orissa dated 5th January ]977 dismissing a petition under
226 and 227 of the Constitution ' for
quashing imposition of octroi under s. 131(1)(kk) of the Orissa Municipal Act,
1950 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') and for . '. a declaration. that
the notifications dated 31st July 1973 and 12th August, 1975 issued by the
State Government in exercise of powers . . vested under s.4 of the Act are
illegal and unenforceable and for a further declaration that the octroi
Bye-laws of the Jharsuguda Municipal Council are also void and inoperative.
Jharsuguda Municipality, respondent No. 1, is
a municipality incorporated under the Act. In March 1962 the State Government
'accorded sanction for the imposition of octroi in terms of s.]3](]) of the
Act. ' A set of octroi bye-laws were framed by the Municipal Council in terms
of s.388 of the Act and the same were also approved by the State Government in
exercise of powers under s.390 of the Act on 19th March, 1968. octroi was
levied for the first time after 31st March 1962 when the State Government
accorded sanction under s.131 (i)(kk) of the Act.
The appellant is a company duly incorporated
under the Indian Companies Act, 1956 having its mills located at village Ektali
under the Jharsuguda police station in District Sambalpur, Orissa. The said
area of the village was included within the Ektali Panchayat. The company
mainly carries on spinning of cotton which in the manu- .
404 facturing' process is transformed from
loose fibres into finished yarn.
The area under the Ektali village in which
the appellants' factory was located was constituted, along with other villages
as a Gram by a declaration made under s.3 of the, Orissa' Grama Panchayat Act,
1964. On or about 25th March, 1970 Jharsuguda Municipality passed a resolution
for the inclusion of Ektali and other villages in the Jharsuguda Municipality
and thus extending the area of the said Municipality. Against the proposed
extension the appellant made a representation to the State Government inter
alia on the ground that he said, village Ektali could not under the relevant
rules be included in the Municipality under s.4(1)(c) of the Orissa Municipal
Act, 1950 in view of the proviso to s.4(1) which contemplates that a
declaration shall not be made under this sub-section unless the State
Government are satisfied that two-thirds of the adult male population of the
town to which it refers are chiefly employed in pursuits other than agriculture
and that such a town contains not less than 10,000 inhabitants and an average
number of not less than 1000 inhabitants to a square mile of the area of such a
town. The appellant alleged that the male population of the said village Ektali
was 2640 as per 1971 census report, out of which only 1586 were chiefly
employed in pursuits other than agriculture and thus two- thirds of such male
population were not employed in non- agricultural pursuits.
The State Government, however, by a
notification dated 31st July 1973 declared their intention under s.4(1)(c) of
the Municipal Act, 1950 to include within the Jharsuguda Municipality the local
area of a number of villages including the village Ektali. By the said
notification published in Orissa Gazette Extraordinary dated 22nd August, 1973
the Government invited objections within six weeks from the date of
publication. The appellant did file objection to the said notification.
Objection was also filed by Grama Panchayat of Ektali to the effect that the
Ektali Grama was duly constituted , by the State Government in Community
Development and Panchayat Raj Department in exercise of powers under s.3(1) of
the Orissa Grama Panchayat Act and in the absence or any notification under
s.3(1) and s.149 of the Grama Panchayat Act, village Ektali still continues to
be a Grama.
The objections were examined by the District
Magistrate, Sambalpur and the Revenue Division Commissioner Northern Division,
. Sambalpur and the same were rejected.
On 12th August, 1975, notification under
s.4(33(b) declaring the inclusion of the said villagsa 405 including the
village Ektali, into Jharsuguda Municipality was issued. Soon thereafter on Ist
September, 1975 the said Jharsuguda Municipality sent a letter to the appellant
directing it to pay octroi as per provisions of s.5 of the Orissa Municipal
Act. The said octroi was payable at the rate of 1 per cent ad valorem on cotton
as soon as it entered the municipal check-post for the purpose of its being
spun into yarn.
The levy or octroi duty was challenged by
filing a petition under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution on various
grounds viz.,(a) the inclusion of village Ektali in the area of Jharsuguda
Municipality was illegal and ultra vires the provisions of the Orissa Municipal
Act, and (b) the levy of octroi duty at the rate of I percent ad valorem was
arbitrary, coercive and violative of Art. 301 of the Constitution and,
therefore, the appellant prayed for quashing the notifications referred to
The writ petition was, however, dismissed by
a Division Bench of the Orissa High Court by its order dated 5th January. 1977
The appellant filed an application under Art.
133(1) of the Constitution for the grant of a
certificate for leave to appeal to 'this Court, which was dismissed by the High
Court by its order dated 19th January, 1977. The appellant has now filed the
present appeal after-obtaining special leave from this Court.
The learned counsel for the appellant raised
the following contentions: .
1. In the absence of a notification
cancelling the declaration constituting Ektali village as part of Grama, it was
not legally permissible for the- State Government acting ' under the Orissa
Municipal Act 1 950 to include within the area of the municipality the area of
the said Grama.
2. The mandatory requirements of proviso to
sub-s.(l) of s.4 of the Orissa Municipal Act, 1950 have not beer satisfied.
3. The objection filed by the appellant under
sub- s.(2) of s.4 has not been considered by the State Government.
4. (a) The liability to octroi arises when
any of the three alternatives mentioned in s.]31(1)(kk) of the Municipal Act is
satisfied viz., when the goods are brought 406 within the municipal limits for
(i) consumption, (ii) use or (iii) sale.
(b) The tax already imposed within the limits
of the Municipality of Jharsuguda could not be automatically made applicable to
the extended limits of the municipality without obtaining the sanction of the
State Government under s.131(1) (kh) of the Act.
(c) The rate levied is per se unreasonable
and arbitrary. We take up these grounds seriatim.
Admittedly village Ektali where the factory
of the appellant is located was a part of the duly constituted Ektali Grama
Panchayat prior to 1973, within the meaning of s.3 of the Orissa Grama
Panchayat Act. Sub-section (1) of s.3 authorises the State Government to
constitute any village or group of contiguous villages as a Grama by a
declaration notified in the Gazette and assign to such Grama a name which shall
be of one of the villages comprised within the Grama. Subsection (2) of 5.3
provided that whenever the State Government deems it fit so to do, they may
cancel any notification in respect of a Grama under sub- s (1) on may alter the
area comprised in a Grama by reducing or adding to the number of villages
comprised within such Grama by a declaration 'notified in the Gazette
constituting such altered area or areas as a Grama or Gramas, as the case may
The precise contention raised on behalf of
the appellant is that- there was a declaration by notification for them.
constitution of the Grama within the meaning of sub-s.(l), but there has been
no notification as required by sub-s,(2) of s.3 for taking village Ektali out
of Grama Panchayat and, therefore, village Ektali continues to be a Grama and
the inclusion of village Ektali in Jharsuguda Municipality by notifications
dated 31st July, 1973 and 12th August, 1975 will have no effect.
This contention has considerable force:
When-a duly constituted Grama is to go out of existence an order of the
Magistrate cancelling the notification in terms of sub-s.(2) of s.3 of the
Grama Panchayat Act is necessary. But there are circumstances which take away
the force of the argument.
The Grama Panchayat never' challenged the
notification of inclusion of the village Ektali in Jhar- 407 suguda
Municipality. From un-controverted averment made in para 6 of the
counter-affidavit of the State filed before the High Court it appears that the
Grama Panchayat was consulted before the impugned notification. Therefore, we
do not feel persuaded to accept the contention at the instance of the
appellant. This leads us to the second ground.
In order to. appreciate the second ground it
is appropriate at this stage to refer to the provisions of s.1 in so far as it
is relevant for the purposes of the case:
"4.(1) The State Government may, by
notification declare their intention (a) to constitute any town, together with,
or exclusive of, any railway station, village, land or building in the vicinity
of any such town, a municipality under this Act: or (b)
(c) to include within a municipality any
local area contiguous to the same and defined in the notification; or (d)
(e) .............. .
Provided that a declaration shall not be made
under this sub-section unless the State Government are satisfied that
two-thirds of the adult male population of the town to which it refers, are
chiefly employed in pursuits other than agricultural, and that such town
contains not less than ten thousand inhabitants and an average number of not
less than one thousand inhabitants to the square mile of the area of such town,
408 (2) Any inhabitant of the town or local area, or any, rate-payer of the
municipality, in respect of, which any . . such notification has been published
under sub-section (l) may, if he objects to anything contained in the
notification, submit his objection in writing to the State Government. through
the Magistrate of the district within six weeks from the date of the
publication of the notification and the' State .
Government shall take his objections into
(3) ......." The emphasis of the appellant
is that two-third of the adult male population of the Grama should be chiefly
employed in pursuits other than agricultural. The appellant has referred to
1971 census figures. On the basis of these- census figures it is argued that
out of the total male population of 2640 of Grama Ektali only 1586 adults were
engaged in non-agricultural pursuits hut the requirement of law was that
two-third of the male population should have been employed in the
non-agricultural pursuits which comes to 1760.
The argument proceeds on the assumption that
the proviso to s.4(1) applies. But a bare persual of the proviso clearly
indicates that the requirement is that two-thirds of the adult male population
of the town to which it refers should be engaged in non-agricultural '
pursuits. The provision, to our mind, applies not to all the classes of
sub-s.(l) of s.4 but it applies only to cl.(a) of sub-s.(l) of s.4, because it
is cl.(a) of s.4(1) which talks of town.
Therefore, the proviso, in . . Our opinion,
has no application to the present case and that cannot be taken to be a ground
for challenging the notification for inclusion of village Ektali in the
Jharsuguda Municipality. This takes us to the third ground.
The appellant had filed an objection under
sub-s.(2) of s.4. The said objection was examined by the District Magistrate,
Sambalpur and the Revenue Divisional Commissioner (Northern Division),
Sambalpur: They overruled the objection treating it to be of general nature.
Thereafter, the Community Development and the
Panchati Raj (Grama Panchayat) Department were consulted to agree with this
proposal, to which they agreed, and it was thereafter.
that the Urban Development Department issued
a final notification dated 12th August, 1975 to include the above village into
the municipal limits of Jharsuguda Municipality. The contention of the
appellant that the objection had not been considered by the State Government
409 cannot be accepted in as much as the objection is required to be made
through the Magistrate of the district.
Naturally, the District Magistrate while
forwarding the objection to the State Government made his comment. The Revenue
Divisional Commissioner intervenes in the channel of communication between the
District Magistrate and the State Government and he, therefore, had an occasion
to. process the matter. The-State Government while dealing with the matter
consulted the. Panchayati Raj Department and ultimately notified in terms of
notification dated 12th August, 1975. In the circumstances it cannot be accepted
that the objection filed by the appellant had not been considered by the State
It was next contended that the liability for
octroi arises when ally of the three alternatives mentioned in s.131(1)(kk) of
the Municipal Act are satisfied, namely, when the goods are brought within the
municipal limits fol (i) consumption, (ii) use, or (iii) sale. Section 131(1)
of the Municipal Act empowers the Municipal Council to impose various kids of
taxes within the limits of the Municipality with the sanction of the State
Government. One of the taxes contemplated by s.313 (l) is octroi, as provided
in cl. (kk). According to the appellant the goods are brought into the
municipal area not for the purpose of sale or for consumption but for the
purpose of manufacture of yarn. The appellant took support from Burmah Shell
Oil Storage & Distribution Co. India Ltd. v. The Belgam Borough
Municipality in which this Court had an occasion to consider the word
'Consumption'. This Court took the view that the word 'consumption' in is
primary sense means the act of con summing and in ordinary parlance means the
use of an article in a way which destroys, wastes or uses up that article, but
in some legal contexts, the word 'Consumption has a wider meaning and that it is
. not necessary that by the act of consumption the commodity must be '
destroyed or used up. On the strength of this authority it is con tended that
the goods were brought into the municipal limits neither . For consumption, nor
for sale. Assuming the contention to be correct there is no escape from the
conclusion that the goods are brought into the municipal limits at. least for
the purpose of use. In this view of the legal position the imposition of octroi
by the Municipality cannot be challenged on this ground.
The next ground of attack is based on s.372
of the Orissa Municipal Act. Section 392 pertinently reads: - H 410 "392.
The State Government before making any rules under sub-section (2) of section
81 and section 387, and a municipal council, before making any regulation or
by-laws under section 388, shall publish, in such manner as the State
Government deem sufficient for giving information to persons interested, the
proposed rules or regulations or by-laws - together with a notice specifying a date
on or after which the same will be taken into consideration; and shall before
making such rules or regulations or by-laws, receive and consider any objection
or suggestion which may be made - by any person with respect to the same before
the date so specified.
Every such rule or regulation or by-law shall
be published in the Gazette in English and in Oriya and such publication shall
be evidence that the rule or regulation or by-law has been made as required by
this section." It is contended that the mandatory requirements having not
been complied with the imposition of octroi is vitiated on this account.
The appellant in para 3 of the Writ petition
had alleged that the bye-laws 'were not published in the State Gazette either
in Oriya or in English. This allegation has, however, been controverted by the
State Government in para ]8 of the counter-affidavit. It was specifically
averred that the bye-laws were approved and confirmed by the Government in
Urban Development Department vide. Order No.
1903/Legis-43-67/UD dated nil published in
Orissa Gazette for information of the general public on 23rd May, 1969 at pages
691 to 697. There is a statutory presumption under s.3 of the Act that the
publication of the rules or regulations or by-laws in the Gazette shall be
evidence that the rule or regulation or bye-law has been made as required by
this section. In view of this statutory presumption the Court will assume that
the bye-law has been made in accordance with law in the absence of anything
more from the side of the appellant.
As a second limb to this argument it was
contended by the appellant that even assuming that the bye-laws when initially
enforced might be presumed to be in accordance with law, in the absence of
similar steps being taken at the time of extension of bye-Jaws to the newly
added area, the bye-laws are not enforceable in the new area.
411 This argument has proceeded in utter
oblivion of the provisions of s.5 of the Municipal Act. It reads:
"5. When any local area is included in a
municipality, by a notification under clause (b) or (c) of sub-section (3) of
section 4, all the provisions of this Act and of any rules, by-laws,
notifications, or orders made there under, which immediately before such
inclusion were in force throughout such municipality, shall be deemed to apply
to such area, unless the State Government, in and by the notification,
otherwise direct." The learned counsel for the appellant, however, has
placed strong reliance upon Visakhapatnam Municipality v. Kandrequla Nukaraju
& Ors. In that case the question that fell for consideration was whether
the property tax which could lawfully be levied under the District
Municipalities Act 1929 can be levied after the repeal of that Act, on property
situated in the areas included within the municipal limits after the
constitution of the municipality. Section 391(1) of the Andhra Pradesh
Municipalities Act 1965 expressly repealed the. District Municipalities Act,
1920 from which it must follow that ordinarily no action can be taken under the
Act of 1920 after April 1, 1966 when the repeal became effective on the coming
into force of the Act.
It was, however, contended in that case that
cl. la of Schedule 9 of the Act keeps the repealed enactment alive for tax
purposes and, therefore, the municipality had the authority to impose the
property tax under the Act of 1920 notwithstanding its repeal by the new Act.
This Court, however, took the view that the provisions contained in the
Schedule are of a transitional nature. They were intended to apply during the
period of transition following upon the repeal of old municipal laws and the
introduction of the li new law. The object of clause 12 of Schedule 9 was to
authorise the levy of taxes which, on the commencement of the Act, Were levied
under the repealed laws. This Court further added that the municipality might
have been levying property tax since long on properties situated within its
limits, but until April 1, 1966 the villages of Ramakrishnapuram and
Sriharipuram were outside those limits.
Qua the areas newly included within the
municipal limits, the tax was being imposed for the first time and therefore it
was incumbent on the municipality to follow the procedure prescribed by the
first proviso to section 81(2). Residents and tax payers of those areas never
had 412 an opportunity to object to the imposition of the tax and that valuable
opportunity cannot be denied to them. It is obligatory upon the municipality
not only to invite objections to the proposed tax but also to consider the objections
received by it within the specified period.
For the State, however, reliance was placed
in that case on s.3(4) of the Act to contend that the inclusion of the two
villages within the municipal area attracts of its own force every provision of
the Act with effect from the dale on which the final notification is published.
by the Government under s.3(3). In support of this contention it cited the
decision of this Court in Atlas Cycle Industrial Ltd. v. State of Haryana &
Anr. This argument on behalf of the State was, however, repelled and the Court
"Far from supporting the argument, we
consider that the decision shows how a provision like the one contained in
Section 3(4) cannot have the effect contended for by the appellant. In the
Atlas Cycle case, section 5(4) of the Punjab Municipality Act, 1911 provided
that when any local area was included in the municipality, "this Act
and...all . rules, bye-laws, orders, directions and powers made, issued or
conferred under this Act and- in force throughout the whole municipality at the
time, shall apply to such areas."." But this Court took the view that
since section 5(4) of the Punjab Act did not, significantly, refer to
notifications and since section 62(1) of the Punjab Act spoke of "notification"
for the imposition of taxes, it was not competent to the municipality to levy
and collect octroi from the company on the strength merely of the provision
contained in s. 5(4) of the Punjab Act. That case, however, is distinguishable
and cannot be of much assistance for solving the problem before us. Section 5
of the orissa Municipal Act makes all the provisions of the Act and of any
rules, by-laws, notifications, or orders made thereunder, which immediately
before such inclusion were in force throughout such municipality, applicable to
such area, unless the State Government, in and by the notification, otherwise
direct. . This section, therefore, includes not only the provisions of the Act,
rules and bye-laws but also includes notifications. This distinguishes the. .
present case from the Visakhapatnam Municipality's case (supra).
413 For the appellant, next reliance was
placed upon Bagalkot City Municipality v. Bagalkot Cement.(1) In that case also
at the time of the imposition of the octroi duty the respondent's factory was
situated outside the municipal district and was not subject to the octroi duty.
Subsequently, the Government extended the
municipal district so that the factory came to be included within that
district. The appellant in that case contended that upon such extension its
octroi limits also stood extended to include the factory and the respondent
became liable to pay octroi duty in respect of goods brought into the factory.
The majority view was that the expression
"municipal district" in the bye-law referred to the municipal
district as existing when the bye-law was framed. The context prevented the
definition of "municipal . district" in the Act, namely, the
municipal district as from time to time existing from being applied under s.20 of
the Bombay General Clauses Act to interpret the bye-law The bye-law had been
made without being published to the respondent, and if it was so read referring
to the municipal district from time to time existing it would be invalid for
non-compliance with the provisions of s.48 of the Act. This case again is
distinguishable in view of the wording of s.5 of the orissa Municipal Act: .
Lastly it is urged that the octroi duty
levied in this case by the Municipality is unreasonable and excessive. The
Municipality is required to provide certain amenities not only for the
permanent residents within the municipality, but also even for casual visitors
who may on occasions enter the limits of the municipality. The entry of large
quantities of goods within the municipality almost daily from outside
necessarily creates innumerable problems such as provisions of water supply,
lighting facilities, facilities for conservancy, sanitation, maintenance of
good roads and markets etc. which the Jharsuguda Municipality has done and
there is no allegation to the contrary by the appellant. From the material
placed before us we are of the view that the levy is not an unreasonable one.
It is not also excessive. . The imposition of octroi cannot, therefore, be
challenged on the ground that there is violation of Art. 19(1)(g) of the
Considering the case from any aspect the
imposition of octroi duty, in our opinion, does not suffer from any infirmity.
414 For the foregoing discussion the appeal
It is accordingly dismissed. In the
circumstances of the case, however, we allow the parties to bear their own
S.R. Appeal dismissed.