Smt. Kaushalya Devi Bogra & Ors Vs.
The Land Acquisition Officer, Aurangabad & ANR  INSC 30 (15 February
MISRA RANGNATH MISRA RANGNATH FAZALALI, SYED
MURTAZA VARADARAJAN, A. (J)
CITATION: 1984 AIR 892 1984 SCR (2) 900 1984
SCC (2) 324 1984 SCALE (1)304
CITATOR INFO :
R 1988 SC 943 (6) R 1992 SC 666 (4) RF 1992
Constitution of India 1950, Article 141.
Supreme Court in appeal setting aside
judgment of High Court-High Court directed to dispose of case afresh-High Court
whether entitled to resurrect the earlier Judgment.
Land Acquisition Act, 1894, Section 23-Large
tract of land acquired valuation of such land-Transactions in respect of small
properties do not offer proper guide-lines.
A large tract of land located within the
Municipal Limits was notified for acquisition under s.3 (1) of the Land
Acquisition Act prevailing in the State of Hyderabad, corresponding to section
4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for a public purpose. Appeals were filed by
two groups of people whose lands were acquired under a common notification, and
they were disposed of by the High Court by applying a common basis.
Dissatisfied with the compensation awarded,
the first group of claimants and the State preferred appeals. A Division Bench
of the High Court after dividing the land into zones for the purpose of
fixation of compensation determined the compensation. Being dissatisfied with
the results, the claimants preferred appeals to this Court.
In the appeals, it was urged on behalf of the
claimants that the decision of the Civil Judge in the second groups had not
become final and that an enhanced compensation was granted by the Civil Judge
in that matter, and sought to introduce additional evidence. This Court set
aside the judgments of the High Court, sent the cases back to the High Court
and directed the High Court to dispose them.
In the connected appeal (second group), the
claimant being dissatisfied with the compensation awarded both by the Land
Acquisition Collector and 901 the Civil Judge preferred an appeal to the High
Court, and a Division Bench which reassessed the evidence, held that as no
acceptable material was on record to justify any enhancement of compensation,
that award of the Land Acquisition Officer should be sustained, The appellant
challenged this order of the High Court, in his appeal to this Court.
When the appeals after remand (first group)
came before the same Division Bench, the High Court finding that no further
evidence was forthcoming either on behalf of the appellants or the State, held
that the earlier Judgment of the High Court should be treated as the
substantive judgment declared it to be placed on the record as the judgment of
the High Court after remand by the Supreme Court, and thereby confirmed the valuation
and compensation awarded by the earlier Division Bench.
Allowing the appeals by both the groups to
HELD : 1 (i) The High Court exceeded its
jurisdiction in dealing with the first appeals. This Court in exercise of its
appellate powers vested in it under Article 136 of the Constitution had set
aside the Bench decision of the High Court delivered in 1971 and that judgment
for all intents and purposes had become non-existent. The present Division
Bench of the High Court was not entitled, by any process known to law, to
resurrect that judgment into life. [909B-C] (ii) The direction of the appellate
court is binding on all courts subordinate thereto. The provisions of Article
141 of the Constitution, require all Courts in India to be bound to follow the
decisions of this Court. Judicial discipline requires and decorum known to law
warrants that appellate directions should be taken as binding and followed.
[909D-E] Broom v. Cassell & Co.,  1 All. E.R 801 ;
In the instant case, a judgment which has
already been set aside has been brought on record and has been described as the
judgment in the first appeals. That judgment is a nullity. The Division Bench
of the High Court allowed itself to be swayed away and landed up in a situation
which was wholly unwarranted. Some of its observations were uncalled for and
greater restraint was expected. It was open to the High Court to require the
parties to move this Court for modification of the direction. If necessary, a
reference could have been made to the Registry of this Court, so that this
Court could have even taken suo motu action. If additional evidence was not
forth coming, the Division Bench could have applied its mind afresh to the
materials already on record, and the appeals should have been disposed of by an
independent judgment and not by restoring to life a judgment which had, in
exercise of appellate powers of this Court, been rendered lifeless. [910G-H;
2. When large tracts of land are acquired,
the transaction in respect of small properties do not offer a proper guideline.
Therefore, the valuation in transactions in regard to smaller property is not
taken as a real basis for determining the compensation for larger tracts of
property. For determining the market value of a large property on the basis of
a sale transaction for smaller property a deduction should be given. A
reduction of 25% was indicated in one case 902 while certain other cases
indicated that the reduction should be to the extent of 1/3. [912F-H; 913A]
Prithvi Raj Taneja v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Others,  2 S.C.R 633;
Padma Uppal Etc. v. State of Punjab and Others,  1 S.C.R. 329; Special
Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore v. T. Adinarayan Setty,  Suppl. 1
S.C.R. 404; referred to.
In the instant case, the lands have been
acquired in a town, which was in a developed part of the State, and was a
constituted municipality. Not far away from it are places of tourist
importance. A fort and a place of historical importance are in the vicinity of
the town. There is evidence that the lands acquired are located close to these
spots, and that these areas were developed and semi- developed portion of the
town. The town had become the regional head-quarters of a Zone of the State and
had been industrially developing. The lands in question had potential value
which had to be kept in view in the matter of fixing the compensation under the
Land Acquisition Act. Taking an overall picture of the matter, compensation is
fixed at the rate of Rs. 1.50 per square yard or Rs. 7260/- per acre for all
the lands acquired by the notification in question. Over and above this amount,
the appellants shall be entitled to statutory solatium of 15% as also interest
at the rate of 6% per annum on additional compensation from the date of
dispossession till payment thereof. The Collector to work out the compensation
within two months. If the amount of compensation determined is not paid within
three months thereafter interest at 12% per annum on the additional compensation
shall be payable till payment is made. [912C-D; 913D-E]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal
Nos. 2458- 2461 of 1981.
Appeals by Special leave from the Judgment
and Order dated the 16th October, 1979 of the Bombay High Courts in Ist. Appeal
Nos. 773/67, and 537/68, F.A. No. 774/67 and Cross Appeal No. 702/68.
WITH Civil Appeal No. 2462 of 1981.
Appeal by Special leave from the Judgment and
Order dated the 15th October, 1979 of the Bombay High Court in Civil Appeal No.
628 of 1972.
Shanti Bhushan, C.S. Vaidyanath, P.
Chowdhary, M. Mudgal, 903 Ms. Gurdip Kaur and Prasant Bhushan for the
O.P. Rana and M.N. Shroff for the
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
RANGANATH MISRA, J. All these appeals are by special leave and seek to
challenge two separate judgments of the Bombay High Court. A large tract of
land located within the municipal limits of Aurangabad within the State of
Maharashtra was notified for acquisition under section 3 (1) of the Land
Acquisition Act prevailing in the State of Hyderabad (corresponding to s. 4 of
the Land Acquisition Act, Act I of 1894), by notification dated November 28,
1957, for the purpose of locating a Medical College and an attached hospital.
These lands can be conveniently referred to as Navkhanda and Ahmadibag
properties. Four of these appeals are by one group being Kausalya Devi Bogra
and others and the other is by Syed Yusufuddin Syed Ziauddin.
Since their lands were acquired under a
common notification and as would be indicated later, the appeals were disposed
of by the High Court by applying a common basis and these appeals at the
request of the counsel have been heard together, they are being disposed of by
a common judgment.
The total acquisition was of about 150 acres
of land. Out of it, the first group owned about 74 acres while the claim of
Yusufuddin related to about 15 acres of land.
In so far as the lands of Kausalya Devi's
group are concerned, the Land Acquisition Officer determined compensation at 4
paise per square yard for the Navkhanda land in the two blocks besides
statutory solatium of 15%. At the instance of the claimants reference was made
to the Civil Judge who raised the compensation to 15 paise per square yard as
against the claim laid at the rate of Rs.
2.50 per square yard. So far as Ahmadibag
lands are concerned, the Land Acquisition Officer awarded compensation at the
rate of 3 paise per square yard and on a reference to the Court, the learned
Civil Judge raised the compensation to 12 paise per square yard besides the
statutory solatium of 15% while the claimants had asked for compensation at the
rate of Rs. 1.50 per square yard. In both the cases the claimants as also the
State preferred appeals-the State challenging the enhancement and the claimants
asking for more. A Division 904 Bench of the Bombay High Court by judgment
dated April 27, 1971, divided the Ahmadibag lands into three zones for the
purpose of fixation of compensation; the first portion was on the east, the
portion which abutted the road near the main gate up to an indicated depth was
treated as the second block and the patch of land which was to the north of the
second portion was treated as the third block. The High Court fixed
compensation at 12 paise per square yard for the middle portion and at 9 paise
per square yard for the rest of the land. So far as Navkhanda lands were
concerned, the same was also divided into three zones and depending upon the
location of these three blocks, compensation was fixed at 16 paise per square
yard of the land in the zone abutting the road; 10 paise per square yard for
the second zone and at 8 paise per square yard for the remaining lands forming
the third zone. Being dissatisfied with the results obtained in the first
appeals before the High Court, the claimants came before this Court by
certificate under Article 133 of the Constitution on the basis of valuation
involved. Attempt was made to introduce additional evidence which mainly
consisted of material to show that higher compensation had been given for
similarly situated properties. By Judgment dated March 23, 1979, in Civil
Appeal Nos. 1035 & 1038 of 1972, this Court directed :
"We, therefore, allow the appeals, set
aside the judgment of the High Court and send the cases back to the High Court
to be restored and direct the High Court to take the appeals on its file and
dispose them of according to law in the light of the directions given
above." One of the consideration for remand was reference to two judgments
of the Civil Judge where, in respect of lands covered by the same Notification,
compensation had been worked out at Rs. 4.50 per square yard. One of these
judgments was the case of Yusufuddin. As the judgment of this Court would show,
it had been represented by the claimants before this Court that the decision of
the Civil Judge in Yusufuddin's case had not been challenged in appeal and had
become final. That was, however, not a fact and First Appeal No. 628/72 had
been taken to the High Court by the State.
In Yusufuddin's case, as already indicated,
the property acquired was around 15 acres. These lands were covered by two
sector; 10 acres and 16 gunthas appertained to Sej Nos. 3, 4 and 905 5 while 5
acres 32 gunthas related to Saj No. 167, and all these lands were situated
close to the road leading from Aurangabad City to Panchakki. The Land
Acquisition Officer had given an award of Rs. 5454.71 inclusive of solatium of
15% for the first sector and a sum of Rs. 4614.11 inclusive of the solatium in
respect of 5 acres 32 gunthas in Sej 167.
The appellant was aggrieved by the Award and
laid claim of Rs. 40,360 in respect of first block and Rs. 2,26,512 in respect
of the other. On the basis of the evidence placed on record, the learned Civil
Judge came to hold that market value of the property on the date of the
preliminary notification was Rs. 4.50 per square yard but as the claimants had
claimed a lesser amount, he confined the compensation to the amount claimed and
fixed the compensation accordingly. The decision of the Civil Judge was challenged
in appeal as already indicated. The High Court re-assessed the evidence and
came to hold that no acceptable material was on record to justify any
enhancement of compensation and the Award of the Land Acquisition Officer
should be sustained. Accordingly, the decision of the Civil Judge was vacated
and if out of the enhanced compensation any amount had been paid, refund
thereof was directed.
This first appeal of the State against
Yusufuddin was disposed of by a Division Bench consisting of Deshmukh, C.J. and
Deshpande, J. on October 15, 1979. Before the same Division Bench the other
batch of first appeals remanded pursuant to the direction of this Court came up
for hearing on the next day, viz., October 16, 1976. The High Court referred to
these first appeals as once upon disposed of by a Division Bench of the Court
and stated :
"Being dissatisfied with this common
judgment disposing of the four appeals, the claimants carried the matter to the
Supreme Court on leave from this Court. According to the provisions of the law
then existing, the leave granted was as a matter of course as the claim
involved in each of the appeals was much more than Rs. 20,000 at all stages of
After obtaining a certificate of fitness for
leave to appeal to the Supreme Court on 17th December 1971 from this Court, the
petition of appeal was filed in the Supreme Court on 15th February 1972.
Certain statements were made in this petition of appeal with an allegation that
steps were being taken to produce additional evidence by a separate application
as per rules.
Accordingly, a separate application for
production of additional evidence was made on 27th February 1972.
Presumably a copy of the appeal memo, as also
a copy of this application was served upon the State Government of Maharashtra,
who were the respondents, and we further presume that those copies were made
available to the learned counsel who were engaged by the State to defend the
said appeals. We are told that before the matter comes up for hearing, there is
an intervening stage when a statement of case is required to be filed before
the final hearing. The learned counsel is not aware whether in these appeals
any such statement of case was filed by the parties. After a lapse of about
seven years these appeals were called out for hearing before the Supreme Court
on 23rd March, 1979. By a speaking order, the Supreme Court set aside the
Judgment of this Court and remanded the original four appeals for being further
heard and disposed of on merits. It is only in this manner that we are hearing
today the said four appeals over again.
For reasons which we will detail hereafter,
we have not heard the parties on merits at all. It is true that the Supreme
Court has set aside the judgment of this Court and remanded the appeals for
further hearing and disposal according to law. That is what precisely we are
doing but for reasons which we will record hereunder why we have not heard the
parties on merits.
On considering in detail the long and able
judgment delivered by the two judges of this Court and after reading the
Supreme Court order and noting the factual position, there is not much force in
hearing the appeal afresh and further there is no necessity for the application
of mind by another two judges of this Court to the same evidence which is on
record. The factual position that has come to our notice reveals a state of
affairs which cannot be described as very commendable so far as the handling of
the Government litigation is concerned......... What surprises us is that when
copies of original appeal, petition as well as civil application for additional
evidence are served upon the Government no attempt is made to file a reply that
these judgments need not be admitted as additional evidence as the High Court
is 907 already seized of the judgments in appeals which are admitted and they
have not become final as alleged by the appellants in their memo of appeal to
the Supreme Court. Even after seven years when the matter was called out for
final hearing before the Supreme Court, we are surprised to find from the
Supreme Court's order that the Government representative before the Supreme
Court was on the defensive all the while and merely wanted to state that he
should be heard further in the matter of additional evidence. We do not know
whether any attempt was made to seek instructions from the State Government or
in spite of query being made the information was wanting from this end.
Whatever the reason may be for the Government's failure to provide instructions
to the counsel appearing for the State in the Supreme Court or whatever may be
the reason for the failure of the Government counsel in Delhi to seek
information either of them is not a very commendable state of affairs. The
Supreme Court should have been told at once that those judgments were subjected
to appeals and the appeals are pending and almost ready for hearing. We are
sure the Supreme Court would have adjourned the hearing until the decision by
the High Court in First Appeal Nos. 628 of 1972 and 179 and 180 of 1972. That
undoubtedly would have been the proper course for the Government to adopt and
we have no doubt that the Supreme Court would have valued that
suggestion." Then followed a long paragraph censuring the conduct of
counsel for the claimants which closed with the following observation:
"The Supreme Court took cognizance of
all this and thinking that Court cannot go into such questions in detail as it
may involve taking of evidence, the Supreme Court passed the order and that is
how this group of appeals has come back to us for further hearing." A set
of first appeals one of which related to Yusufuddin's matter being of the year
1972 first came up for hearing before the High Court. In course of hearing
thereof, when the judgment of the Division Bench of 1971 in the case of
Kausalya Devi's group was produced, it was pointed out that this Court had
already vacated the judgment of the Division Bench and the matter had 908 been
remanded. The Division Bench hearing the appeals after remand, therefore, directed
as stated in its order:
"We, therefore, said that the office may
find out as to which are the group of appeals which were remanded and issue
notice fixing 8th October, 1979 as the date of hearing along with those group
That is how they came to be shown on our
Board from that day onwards continuously until they reached the final hearing.
However, the very next day after 18th
September 1979, Mr. Savant came to tell us that he would not be in a position
to apply for additional evidence, as the very judgments of the Civil Judge in
respect of which certain representations were made before the Supreme Court are
those which are the subject-matters of First Appeals Nos. 179 and 180 of 1972
as also first appeal no. 628 of 1972. Since we had already adjourned the
matter, we decided to hear these appeals first and take up these remanded
appeals." The Division Bench continued to State:
"The first factual position which we
note here is that neither the appellant has pressed for additional evidence nor
the State could lend additional evidence, though the wording of the Supreme
Court order says that both the parties will be at liberty to apply for
additional evidence. None of the parties has any additional evidence to offer.
In fact, in our humble view, remand seems to be a direct result of a rash
statement, not being denied even at final hearing stage. If this is the
position in so far as the appeal in the matter was concerned where two other
judges of this Court who were seized of the matter had given full hearing to
the parties at an earlier stage we told Mr.
Andhyarujina, Advocate, that there was no
necessity for any further hearing in the matter and that we are not inclined to
do so. Since there is no change in the record and no additional evidence is
offered and the High Court judgment was pronounced on the evidence already
recorded, we see no reason to differ in any way with the well considered
earlier judgment of this Court. We, therefore, declare that a copy of that
judgment, which will be our substantive judgment, be placed 909 on record as
the judgment of this Court after remand by the Supreme Court. We thus not only
confirm the valuation and compensation awarded by the earlier Bench of this
Court but also confirm their order as to costs." Having read the judgment
of the High Court and considering the manner in which the first appeals have
been disposed of, we have no doubts in our mind that the High Court exceeded
its jurisdiction in dealing with the first appeals. This Court in exercise of appellate
powers vested it under Article 136 of the Constitution had set aside the Bench
decision of the High Court delivered in 1971 and that judgment for all intents
and purposes had become non- existent. The present Division Bench of the High
Court was not entitled, by any process known to law, to resurrect that judgment
The direction of the appellate court is
certainly binding on the courts subordinate thereto. That apart, in view of the
provisions of Article 41 of the Constitution, all courts in India are bound to
follow the decisions of this Court. Judicial discipline requires and decorum
known to law warrants that appellate directions should be taken as binding and
followed. It is appropriate to usefully recall certain observations of the House
of Lords in Broom v. Cassell & Co.(1) Therein Lord Hailsham, L. C.
"The fact is, and I hope it will never
be necessary to say so again, that in the hierarchical system of courts which
exist in this country, it is necessary for each lower tier, including the Court
of Appeal, to accept loyally the decisions of the higher tier." Lord Reid
"It seems to me obvious that the Court
of Appeal failed to understand Lord Delvin's speech but whether they did or
not, I would have accepted them to know that they had no power to give any such
direction and to realise the impossible position in which they were seeking to
put those judges in advising or directing them to disregard a decision of this
House." 910 Lord Diplock observed at p. 874 of the Reports:
"It is inevitable in a hierarchical
system of courts that there are decisions of the Supreme appellate tribunal
which do not attract the unanimous approval of all members of the judiciary.
When I sat in the Court of Appeal, I sometimes thought the House of Lords was
wrong in over ruling me. Even since that time there have been occasions, of
which the instant appeal is one, when alone or in company. I have dissented
from a decision of the majority of this House. But the judicial system only
works if someone is allowed to have the last word and if that last word, once
spoken, is loyally accepted." We refuse to accept the submission of Mr.
Shanti Bhushan for the appellants that the High Court intended to disobey the
direction given in the appellate order of remand. Nevertheless, the Division
Bench of the High Court allowed itself to be swayed away and landed up in a
situation which was wholly unwarranted. Some of the observations which we have
extracted were uncalled for and greater restraint was expected. It was open to
the High Court to require the parties to move this Court for modification of
the direction. If necessary, a reference could have been made to the Registry
of this Court so that this Court could have even taken suo motu action.
Finally, if additional evidence was not forth coming, the Division Bench could
have applied its mind afresh to the materials already on record and the appeals
should have been disposed of by an independent judgment and not by restoring to
life judgment which had, in exercise of appellate powers of this Court, been
rendered lifeless. We hope and believe that such an unfortunate situation will
never recur and, therefore, we propose to say no more on this aspect of the
As already indicated, the order of remand has
not been operative on account of the High not giving effect to it. On the other
hand, a judgment which already been set aside has been brought on record and
has been described as the judgment in the first appeals. In our opinion, that
judgment is a nullity. The two options available before the Court, therefore,
are, a further remand to the High Court asking for a fresh disposal of the
appeals or to dispose of the appeals in exercise of appellate powers by
recording findings. Acquisition in this case is of the year 1957.
Twenty-seven 911 years have already passed. A
remand at this stage would indeed be not in the interest of the parties nor in
public interest. We have, therefore, decided to look into the materials
ourselves and dispose of these appeals finally.
Aurangabad was in a developed part of the
Nizam's State of Hyderabad and was a constituted municipality. Hyderabad had
become a part of India by 1948. By the State Re- organisation Act of 1956,
Aurangabad and certain other tracts of Hyderabad became parts of the then State
of Bombay. Aurangabad was of historical importance. Not far away from it are
the famous caves of Ajanta and Ellora.
Aurangabad, therefore, had been of tourist
importance from before. A fort and a palace of historical importance are in the
vicinity of this town. There is evidence that the lands acquired in the instant
appeals are located close to these spots. There is also evidence that these
areas were developed and semi-developed portions of the town.
The learned Civil Judge did take into account
certain documents for fixing up the valuation of the property on the date of
the notification. In Yusufuddin's case a sale deed of October 18, 1957, was
relied upon where the valuation was about Rs. 4.50 per square yard. This sale
deed was of the year of the notification though the transaction happened to be
a few months after the date. The learned Civil Judge had found that the
property was located not away from the acquired land. Exhibit 36 was also the
certified copy of a sale deed of 1957 but since it had a construction on the
property and the separate valuation thereof could not be known in the absence
of any substantive, no reliance had actually been placed on this transaction.
Exhibit 37 was a transaction of 1953 and the rate adopted there was about Rs. 5
per square yard. A party to the transaction was examined as a witness. As
noticed by the learned Civil Judge, the property was located at a distance of
about their furlongs from the acquired land. The learned Civil Judge stationed
at Aurangabad was certainly in a better position to take judicial notice of the
location of important landmarks within Aurangabad than the learned Judges of
the Bombay High Court or even the Judges of this Court sitting at a long
distance from the place where the lands are situated.
Exhibit 42 is a saledeed of 1960 and keeping
in view the extent of lands sold and the consideration per square yard, the
rate worked out at Rs. 2.25. The purchaser had been examined as a witness and
the land has been found to be about 912 half a furlong away from the acquired
land. The learned Civil Judge also relied upon a letter of the Collector of
Aurangabad addressed to the Deputy Director of Excise Department wherein it was
indicated that the price of land in the area was about Rs. 5 per square yard
and that was stated with reference to some land near the Railway Station.
The acquired land is admittedly not far away
from the Railway Station.
The learned Civil Judge did in fact state in
his order that the lands of Yusufuddin were situated by the side of the road
leading from Panchakki to Bhadkal gate. The historical monument of Panchakki
has been stated to be located by the side of the acquired land. A State Hotel
has come up not far away from the land. The Court took judicial notice of the
fact that Aurangabad city had developed rapidly following police action which
brought about accession of the Nizam's State to India. Aurangabad had become
the regional headquarters of a zone of the State. The city had been
industrially developing. Therefore, the lands in question had potential value
which had to be kept in view in the matter of fixing the compensation under the
Land Acquisition Act.
Admittedly, the lands of Yusufuddin and the
lands belonging to Kausalya Devi group are in one adjacent tract.
Therefore, it would not be improper to
assume, particularly in the absence of any contrary evidence from the side of
the State that there was no great disparity in the quality of lands and that
all these lands were substantially of similar type.
Two principles relating to the matter of
fixation of compensation relevant for the present purpose may be kept in view.
When large tracts are acquired, the transaction in respect of small properties
do not offer a proper guideline.
Therefore, the valuation in transactions in
regard to smaller property is not taken as a real basis for determining the
compensation for larger tracts of property (see Prithvi Raj Taneja v. State of
Madhya Pradesh and Ors(1).; Padma Uppal etc. v. State of Punjab & Ors(2).
In certain other cases this Court indicated that for determining the market
value of a large property on the basis of a sale transaction for smaller
property a deduction should be given. In Special Land Acquisition Officer,
Bangalore v. T. Adinarayan Setty, (3) a reduction of 25% 913 was indicated
while there are certain other cases where the view is that the reduction should
be to the extent of 1/3.
Again, in the very scheme for fixation of
compensation provided by the Land Acquisition Act there is bound to be some
amount of arbitrariness. The acquisition is deemed to be a statutory purchase
and on the basis of evidence the law requires an assumed consideration to be
determined. Keeping in view the fact that acquisition is of compulsory nature,
a solatium of 15% on the valuation is provided. Bearing these considerations in
view and taking into account the fact that the lands in question were located
in a developed part of Aurangabad and had considerable potential value, we
proceed to fix the market value of the property. One acre of land is equal to
4840 square yards. The learned Civil Judge had maintained a distinction between
the two classes of lands.
We take note of that fact also in the matter
of determining the compensation. We, however, do not propose to indicate
separate valuations for the two classes of lands. Taking an overall picture of
the matter, we direct compensation to be fixed at the rate of Rs. 1.50 per
square yard or Rs. 7260 per acre for all the lands of the present appellants
acquired by the notification in question. Over and above this amount, the
appellants shall be entitled to statutory solatium of 15% as also interest at
the rate of 6% per annum on the additional compensation from the date of
dispossession till payment thereof. We direct the Collector to work out the
compensation on the basis indicated above within two months from today. If the
amount so determined is not paid within three months thereafter, the interest
on the additional compensation shall be at the rate of 12% per annum till
payment is made.
Ordinarily, the appellants should have been
entitled to costs. Keeping in view the history of the litigation and manner in
which the Kausalya Devi group of appellants had conducted themselves on the
earlier occasion before this Court, we do not award costs to them. In Civil
Appeal No. 2462/81 appellant Syed Yusufuddin Syed Ziauddin will be entitled to
his costs in this Court and hearing fee of Rs. 1,000.
N.V.K. Appeals allowed.