Goa Sampling Employees' Association Vs.
General Superintendance Co. of India Pvt. Ltd. & Ors [1984] INSC 231 (11
December 1984)
DESAI, D.A.
DESAI, D.A.
SEN, AMARENDRA NATH (J)
CITATION: 1985 AIR 357 1985 SCR (2) 373 1985
SCC (1) 206 1984 SCALE (2)978
ACT:
Industrial Disputes Act 1947, Sections 2 (a)
(i) and 10 (1) (d).
Industrial dispute in a Union
Territory-Central Government whether 'appropriate Government' to refer dispute
to the Industrial Tribunal.
Constitution of India 1950, Article 239.
'Administration of Union
Territory'-Administrator- Central Government whether 'appropriate Government'
to refer industrial dispute in a Union Territory to the industrial Tribunal
under the Industrial Disputes Act 1947.
General Clauses Act 1897 Sections 3 (8), 3
(60), 3,(62A).
'Central Government'-'State Government'-Union
Territory'-'Administration of Union Territory'-'Distinction between.
Word & Phrases-Meaning of:
'appropriate Government'-Section 2 (a) (i)
Industrial Dispute Act 1947 in relation to the administration of Union`
Territory'- Section 3 (8) (b) (iii) and 3 (60) (c) General Clauses Act.
1897.
HEADNOTE:
The Central Government as an 'appropriate
Government' referred the Industrial dispute between the Appellant- employees' Association
and the first Respondent-employer in each of the Appeals under Sec. 10 (1) (d)
of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 to the Central Government Industrial
Tribunal.
A preliminary objection was raised that the
CENTRAL Government was not the 'appropriate Government' in relation to the said
industrial disputes and consequently the Central Government had no power under
Sec. 10 (l) (d) of the Act to make the five references and that the Tribunal
would have no jurisdiction to entertain the same- The Appellant- Association
repelled this objection by contending that the workmen were 'dock workers'
within the meaning of the expression in the Dock Workers (Regulation of
Employment) Act. 1948 and as they were working at Mormugao Port, a major port
in the Union Territory of Goa, Daman Diu, the Central Government would be the
'appropriate Government' in relation to the industrial dispute and consequently
the references were valid and competent.
374 The Tribunal held that the workmen
covered by the reference who were iron-Ore samplers were 'dock workers' as
defined in the Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) Act, 1948 and as they
were working in a major port, in a Union Territory, the Central Government
would be the 'appropriate Government' for referring the industrial dispute. The
Tribunal over-ruled the preliminary objection and set down the references for
final hearing.
The first respondent-employers filed
applications under Article 227 in the High Court which held that the workmen,
who were iron ore samplers, were neither comprehended in the expression 'dock
workers' as defined in the Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) Act, 1948.
nor involved in any work connected with or related to a major port. and were
not involved in an industrial dispute concerning a major port and therefore the
Central Government was not the appropriate Government' for referring the
industrial dispute. It further held that the Central Government is not the
State Government for the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu under Section 2
(a) (i) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 but it is the Administrator
appointed under Article 239 and therefore the Central Government was not the
'appropriate Government' and had no jurisdiction to make the references. The
rule was made absolute and the references quashed.
Allowing the Appeals to this Court,
HELD: 1. The Central,Government as the
'appropriate Government had made the references The High Court was clearly in
error in quashing the references. The judgment of the High Court is quashed and
set aside and the award of the Tribunal on the preliminary point about the
competence of the Central Government to make the reference under Section 10(1)
of Industrial Disputes, Act 1947 is confirmed. The tribunal will be at liberty
to examine the contention whether iron ore samples are involved in any work
connected with or related to a major part or are dock workers and come to its
own decision uninfluenced by the view taken by the High Court. As the dispute
is an old one, the Tribunal is to give top priority and dispose of the matter
within a period of six months. [386G; 387D-E, C] 2 (i) Indisputable the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 is a Central Act enacted after the commencement of the General
Clauses Act, 1897 and the relevant definitions having been recast to meet the
constitutional and statutory requirements the expressions 'Central Government,
'State Government’, and 'Union Territory' must receive the meaning assigned to
each in the General Clauses Act, 1897 unless there is anything repugnant in the
subject or context in which it is used. No. such repugnancy was brought to the
notice of the Court. [384B-C] (ii) On a conspectus of the relevant provisions
of the Constitution and the Union Territories Act 1963, it clearly transpires
that the concept of State Government is foreign to the administration of Union
Territory and Article 239 provides that every Union Territory is to be
administered by the President. The President may act through an Administrator
appointed by him. Administrator is thus the delegate of the President. His
position is wholly different from that 375 Of a Governor of a State.
Administrator can differ with his Minister and he must then obtain the orders
of the President meaning thereby of the Central a Government. The Administrator
of Union Territory does not therefore qualify for the description of a State
Government. The Central Government is therefore the 'appropriate Government'
[384F- G] (iii) The High Court fell into an error in interpreting clause (c) of
Section 3 (60) of the General Clauses Act 1897 which upon its true construction
would show that in the Union Territory there is no concept of State Government
but wherever the expression 'State Government' is used in relation to the Union
Territory, the Central Government would be the State Government. The very
concept of State Government in relation to Union Territory is obliterated by
the definition. [383D-H] Satya Dev Bushahri v. Padam Dev & Ors., [1955] SCR
549 and the State of Madhya Pradesh v, Shri Moula Bux & Ors.
[1962] 2 SCR 794, held inapplicable.
3. (i) The definition of three expression
'Central Government' (Section 3 (8), 'State Government' (Section 3 (60)), and
Union Territory' (Section 3 (62A)) in the General Clauses Act, 1897 Would
unmistakably show that the framers of the Constitution as also the Parliament
in enacting these definitions have clearly retained the distinction between
State Government and Administration of Union Territory as provided by the
Constitution. It is especially made clear in the definition of expression
'Central Government' that in relation to the Administration of a Union
Territory the Administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority
given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution. would be comprehended in
the expression 'Central Government. When this inclusionary part is put in
juxtaposition with exclusionary part in the definition of the expression State
Government' which provides that as respects anything done or to be done after
the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956, it shall
mean, in a State, the Governors and in a Union Territory, the Central
Government, the difference conceptually speaking between the expression' State
Government' and the 'Administration of a Union Territory' clearly emerges There
is no room for doubt that the expression Administration of a Union Territory',
Administrator however having been described, would not be comprehended in the
expression State Government as used in any enactment These definitions have
been modified to bring them to their present form at by the Adaptation of Laws
(No.1) Order, 1956. [386E-G] (ii) The High Court clearly fell into an error when
it observed that the inclusive definition of the expression 'State Government,
does not necessarily enlarge the scope of the expression but may occasionally
point to the contrary;
[386C]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal
Nos. 4904- 4908 of 1984.
From the Judgment and Order dated 19.9.83 of
the Bombay 376 High Court in Special Civil Application Nos. 97B/80, 98B/80,
100B/80, 99B/80 and 67B/80.
VA Bobde, K.J. John and Ms. N. Srivastava for
the appellant.
F.S. Nariman, Miss A. Subhashini M.S. Usgaocar,
S.K. Mehta, P.N. Puri and M.K. Dua for the respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DESAI, J. Special leave granted.
Again the rigmarole of an utterly
unsustainable preliminary objection, and valuable time of a decade is wasted in
this bizarre exercise frustrating the search for socio-economic justice, making
it a distant dream, if not an optical illusion.
The Central Government as an appropriate
Government referred the Industrial dispute between the appellant-Goa Sampling
Employees' Association ('Association' for short) and the first respondent
('employer' for short) in each petition under Sec. 10 (1) (d) of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 ('Act' for short) to the Central Government Industrial
Tribunal No. 2, Bombay by different orders made in the year 1974 and 1975. Five
separate references were made because even though the Association representing
employees is common in all references, employer is different but each raising a
common question. When the references came up before the Tribunal for hearing,
it appears that the employer in each case raised a preliminary objection but
what was the earliest preliminary objection eluded us. The Tribunal overruled
the preliminary objection whereupon the employer filed some appeal to an authority
which is not made clear in the record. It appears the matters were remitted to
the Tribunal and thereafter all the five references stood transferred to the
Central Government Industrial Tribunal No. 1 ('Tribunal' for short).
When the references again came up before the
Tribunal for hearing, the history repeated. A preliminary objection was raised
that the Central Government was not the appropriate Government in relation to
the industrial dispute between the Association and the employer and therefore,
the Central Government had no power under Sec. 10 (1) (d) of the Act to make
the reference 377 and accordingly the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to
entertain A the same. The Association attempted to repell this contention by
urging that the workmen were dock workers within the meaning of the expression
in Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) Act, 1948 and as they are working in
a major port, the Central Government will be the appropriate Government in
relation to the industrial dispute between the Association and the workmen and
therefore, the reference is valid and the Tribunal should deal with the same on
merits according to law. As a second string to the bow, it was contended that
in relation to a union territory Central Government is the appropriate
Government.
It appears that evidence was led before the
Tribunal by both the sides. The Tribunal after exhaustively examining the
evidence held that the workmen covered by the reference would be comprehended
in the definition of expression 'Dock Workers' as defined in the Dock Workers
(Regulation of Employment) Act and as they were working at Mormugao Port which
is a major port, in respect of the industrial dispute raised by them the
Central Government would be the appropriate Government. The Tribunal then
proceeded to examine whether the reference would be competent on the assumption
that the employees are not covered by the expression 'Dock Workers' and held
that the work performed by the employees is in a major port and the dispute
arise out of the duty performed and work rendered in the major port and
therefore, the Central Government would be the appropriate Government to make
the necessary reference. The Tribunal then proceeded to consider the
alternative submission whether the reference would be competent even if the
State Government is the appropriate Government in view of the fact that Goa,
Damen and Diu constitute Union Territory as set out in the First Schedule to
the Constitution and its administration is carried on by the Administrator
appointed by the President under Art. 239 of the Constitution. Therefore, also
the Central Government is the appropriate Government. After discussing the
rival contentions the Tribunal did not record a finding on this contention. The
Tribunal overruled the preliminary objection and set down the reference for
final hearing by its order dated July 14, 1980.
The employer in each reference filed special
civil application under Art. 227 of the Constitution in the High Court of
Judica- 378 ture at Bombay. All the five special civil applications came up
before the Panaji Bench of the Bombay High Court for final hearing and they
were disposed of by a common judgment The High Court held that the iron ore
samplers, the workmen represented by the appellant association are not involved
in any work connected with or related to a major port. The High Court further
held that the industrial dispute in which iron ore samplers are involved is not
an industrial dispute concerning the major port within the meaning of Sec- 2
(a) (i) of the Industrial Disputes Act. 1947 nor are the workmen comprehended
in the expression 'Dock Workers' as defined in the Dock Workers (Regulation of
Employment) Act, 1948 and therefore the Central Government is not the
appropriate Government for referring the industrial dispute to the Tribunal.
Dealing with the second limb of the submission that the Central Government
itself can be said to be the State Government for the Union Territory of Goa,
Daman and Diu, the High Court held that the Central Government is not the State
Government for the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu under Sec 2 (a) (ii)
of the Act but it is the administrator appointed under Art, 239 of the
Constitution of India who is the State Government for the Union Territory of
Goa Daman and Diu and he is the appropriate Government within the meaning of
Sec. 2 (a) of the Act. The High Court felt that if the Central Government is
also held to be the State Government for this purpose there would be two State
Governments for the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu and this would lead
to utter confusion: The High Court accordingly concluded that the Administrator
is the appropriate Government for the purpose of Sec 2(a) of the Act and
therefore the Central Government was not the appropriate Government and had no
jurisdiction to make the impugned references. In accordance with this finding,
the High Court made the rule absolute quashing the references.
Hence these appeals by special leave.
The question that must engage our attention
is whether in relation to the industrial dispute between the employees
represented by the Association and the employer which is the appropriate
Government which can exercise power under Sec. 10 of the Act. Sec. 10 provides
that 'where the appropriate Government is of opinion that any industrial
dispute exists or is 379 apprehended, it may at any time by order in writing
refer the dispute etc. to a Tribunal for adjudication.' There are two A
provisos to the section. which are not material for the present purpose. Thus
the power is conferred on the appropriate Government to make the reference for adjudication
of an industrial dispute which either exists or is apprehended.
'Appropriate Government' is defined in Sec. 2
(a) of the Act to mean C(i) in relation to any industrial dispute concerning
any industry carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government
(omitting the words not relevant for the present purpose), a major port. The (
central Government, and (ii) in relation to any other industrial dispute, the
State Government.' The employer contended that the employees represented by the
Association in each case are iron ore samplers and they are not connected with
the work of a major port or their duties are not ancillary or incidental to the
working of a major port and therefore, Sec. 2 (a) (i) would not be attracted.
As a corollary, it was submitted that the case would fall in the residuary
clause (ii) and therefore, the State Government would be the appropriate
Government. The employees repelled the contention by saying that they are
employees working in a major port and the industrial dispute directly touches
the functioning and administration of a major port and therefore, the Central
Government is the appropriate Government. Alternatively it was contended on
behalf of the Association/appellant herein that any rate in relation to a Union
Territory, there is no State Government and the Central Government, if it at
all can be said to be one, is the only Government and in the absence of a State
Government the Central Government will also have all the powers of the State
Government and therefore, the Central Government would be the appropriate
Government for the purpose of making the reference. It is the second limb which
we propose to examine in these appeals because in our opinion it goes to the
root of the matter and the appeals can be finally disposed of by answering this
contention.
Before we deal with the contention on merits,
it is necessary to focus attention on constitutional and statutory provisions
relevant to the contention.
380 Art. 239 (1) provides that 'save as
otherwise provided by Parliament by law, every Union Territory shall be
administered by the President acting, to such extent as he thinks fit through
an Administrator to be appointed by him with such designation as he may
specify.' Art. 239A which was inserted by the Constitution (Fourteenth
Amendment) Act.
1962 confers power Parliament by law to
create local legislatures or Council of Ministers or both for certain Union
Territories including Goa, Damen and Diu. The law by which the local
legislature and/or Council of Ministers are created will also specify their
constitution, powers and functions in each case. By sub-art.(2) it was ensured
that such law when enacted shall not be deemed to be an amendment of the
Constitution for the purpose of Art. 368. Art. 240 confers power on the
President to make regulations for the peace, progress and good government of
the Union Territories specified therein. Art. 246 (4) provides that 'Parliament
has power to make laws with respect to any matter for any part of the territory
of India not included in a State notwithstanding that such matter is a matter
enumerated in the State List.' The expression 'Central Government' has been
defined in Sec. 3 (8) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (omitting the words not
relevant for the present purpose) as under:
"(8) "Central Government"
shall- (a) .- ...... - .. ; ...
....................................
(b) in relation to anything done or to be
done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President, and shall
include, (i) (ii) (iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory,
the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him
under Article 239 of the Constitution." The expression 'State Government'
is defined in Sec. 3 (60) (omitting the words not necessary for the present
purpose,) as under:
"(60) "State Government", 381
(a) ............................. ... ....
(b) .......................................
(c) as respects anything done or to be done
after the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956, shall
mean, in a State, the Governor, and in a Union Territory, the Central
Government ;" The expression 'Union Territory' is defined in Sec. 3 (62A)
to mean "Union Territory specified in the First Schedule to the Constitution
and shall include any other territory comprised within the territory of India
but not specified in that Schedule." Parliament enacted the Government of
Union Territories Act, 1963 ('1963 Act' for short). Its long title reveals the
object underlying the enactment, namely to provide for Legislative Assemblies
and Council of Ministers for certain Union Territories and for certain other
matters. Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu is governed by the 1963 Act (See
Sec. 2 h). The expression 'Administrator' has been defined in Sec. 2 (a) of the
1963 Act to mean 'the Administrator of a Union Territory appointed by the
President under Art. 239.' Sec. 18 specifies the extent of legislative power of
the Legislative Assembly of a Union Territory to encompass any of the matters
enumerated in the State List or the Concurrent List in the Seventh Schedule.
Sec. 44 provides that there shall be a
Council of Ministers in each Union territory with the Chief Minister at the
head to aid and advise the Administrator in exercise of his functions in
relation to matters with respect to which the Legislative Assembly of the Union
Territory has power to make laws except in so far as he is required by or under
the Act to act in his discretion or by or under any law to exercise any
judicial or quasi-judicial functions. There is a proviso to Sec 44 (1) which
sheds light on the position of the Administrator and powers of the Council of
Ministers.
According to the proviso in the event of a
difference of opinion between the Administrator and the Ministers of any
matter, the Administrator shall refer it to the President for decision given
therein by the President etc. Thus the executive power of the Administrator
extends to all subjects covered by the legislative power. But in the event of a
difference of opinion the President 382 decides the point. When President
decides the point, it is the Central Government that decides the point. And
that is binding on the Administrator and also the Ministers. Section 45
provides that 'the Chief Minister of a Union Territory shall be appointed by
the President.' Section 46 confers power on the President to make rules for the
conduct of business. Section 55 provides that 'all contracts in connection with
the administration of a Union Territory are contracts made in the exercise of
the executive power of the Union and all suits and proceedings in connection
with the administration of a Union Territory shall be instituted by or against
the Government of India.' In exercise of the power conferred by Article 240,
the President has infer alia enacted the Goa, Daman and Diu (Laws) Regulation,
1962. By clause (3) of the regulation, the Acts enumerated in the Schedule
appended to the Act were extended to the Goa, Daman and Diu subject to the
modifications, if any, specified in the Schedule. The Schedule includes Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 as a whole without any modification.
Section 10 (l) of the Act confers power on
the appropriate Government to refer an industrial dispute for adjudication to
one or the other of the various authorities enumerated in the section. Thus the
power is the power of the appropriate Government to make the reference. The
cotention which found favour with the High Court is that in relations to the
industrial dispute raised by the workmen represented by the Association by
broadly described as iron ore samplers. the appropriate Government is the State
Government and not the Central Government and that as the reference in this
case is made by the Central Government, the same being without jurisdiction,
the Industrial Tribunal did not acquire any jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the
same.
Would it be constitutionally correct to
describe Administration of a Union Territory as State Government ? Article 1
provides that 'India, that is Bharat, shall be a Union of States'. Sub-article
(2) provides that 'the States and the territories thereof shall be as specified
in the First Schedule'- Sub-article (3) introduced a dichotomy between the
State as understood in the Constitution and the Union Territory when it
provides that 'the territory of India shall comprise-(a) the territories of the
States, and (b) the Union Territories specified in the First Schedule.
The provisions of Part 383 VI of the
Constitution do not apply to the Union Territories. Part VI of the Constitution
which deals with States clearly indicates that A the Union Territory is not a
State. Therefore, the Union Territory constitutionally speaking is something
other than a State. As far as the States are concerned, there has to be a
Governor for each State though it would be permissible to appoint the same
person as Governor of two or more States. Part VIII provides for administration
of Union Territories. Article 239 conferred power on the president for
administration of Union Territories unless otherwise provided by an act of
Parliament. Therefore, apart from the definitions of the expressions 'Central
Government', 'State Government' and 'Union Territory' as enacted in the General
Clauses Act, 1897, the Constitution itself makes a distinction between State
and its Government called the State Government and Union Territory and the
Administration of the Union Territory. Unless otherwise clearly enacted, the
expression 'State will not comprehend Union Territory' and the 'State
Government' would not comprehend Administration of Union Territory. Now if we
recall the definition of three expressions 'Central Government' (Section 3 (8),
'State Government' (Section 3 (60)) and Union Territory' ( Section 3 (62A)) in
the General Clauses Act, it would unmistakably show that the framers of the
Constitution as also the Parliament in enacting these definitions have clearly
retained the distinction between State Government and Administration of Union
Territory as provided by the Constitution. It is especially made clear in the
definition of expression 'Central Government' that in relation to the
Administration of a Union Territory, the Administrator thereof acting within
the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution,
would be comprehended in the expression 'Central Government'. When this
inclusionary part is put in juxta-position with exclusionary part in the
definition of the expression 'State Government' which provides that as respects
anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh
Amendment) Act, 1956, it shall mean, in a State, the Governor, and in a Union
Territory, the Central Government, the difference conceptually speaking between
the expression 'State Government' and the 'Administration of a Union Territory'
clearly emerges. Therefore, there is no room for doubt that the expression
'Administration of a Union Territory', Administrator howsoever having been
described, would not be comprehended in the expression state Government' as
used in any enactment. These definitions have been modified to being them to
their present format by 384 adaptation of laws (No. 1) Order 1956. Section 3 of
the General Clauses Act, 1897 provides that in all General Acts and Regulations
made after the commencement of the Act unless there is anything repugnant in
the subject or context, the words defined therein will have the meaning
assigned therein. lndisputably the lndustrial Disputes Act, 1947 is' a Central
Act enacted after the commencement of the General Clauses Act and the relevant
definitions having been recast to meet the constitutional and statutory
requirements, the expressions 'Central Government, 'Stale Government' and
'Union Territory' must receive the meaning assigned to each in the General
Clauses Act unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context in
which it is used. No such repugnancy was brought to our notice.
Therefore, these expressions must receive the
meaning assigned to them.
The High Court after referring to the
definitions of the aforementioned three expressions as set out and discussed
herein first observed that on a careful reading of the definition, it appears
'that in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator
thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239
of the Constitution is the Central Government.' So far there is no dispute. The
High Court then observed that it must follow that the Administrator is the State
Government in so far as the Union Territory is concerned, and it is so provided
in the definition of the State Government in Section 3(60) of the General
Clauses Act.'
The High Court fell into an error in interpreting clause (c) of Section 3 (60)
which upon its true construction would show that in the Union Territory, there
is no concept of State Government but wherever the expression 'State
Government' is used in relation to the Union Territory, the Central Government
would be the State Government. The very concept of State Government in relation
to Union Territory is obliterated by the definition. Our attention was, however,
drawn to the two decisions of this Court in Satya Dev Bushahri v. Padam Dev
& Ors.(') and the decision of this Court in The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Shri
Moula Bux & Ors.(2) in which with reference to Part States, some
observations have been made that the authority conferred under Article 239, as
it then stood, to administer Part States has (1) [1955] S.C.R. 549.
(2) [1962] 2 S.C.R. 794.
385 not effect of converting those States
into the Central Government, and that under Article 239 the President occupies
in regard to Part States, a position analogous to that of a Governor in Part A
States and of a Rajpramukh in Part in States.' It was also observed that
'though the Part States are centrally administered under the provisions of
Article 239, they do not cease to be States and become merged with the Central
Government.' It was then urged that by the amendment to Articles 239 and 240 by
the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956 and introduction of Article 239
A and 239 by the Constitution (Fourteenth Amendment) Act, 1962, only the
nomenclature of the Part States has undergone a change, now being described as
Union Territory, but the position the Union Territory is the same as it was as
Part States and therefore, the view taken in the aforementioned decisions that
the administration of Part States could appropriately be described as State
Government would mutatis mutandis apply to the administration of Union
Territories. In other words, it was said that they can be appropriately
described as State Governments for various purposes. Both the decisions were
rendered prior to the amendment of Part VIII of the Constitution in 1956 and
the insertion of the Articles 239 A and 239 in 1962 and more specifically after
the enactment of the 1963 Act. The concept of Union Territory with or without a
Legislative Assembly and with or without a Council of Ministers with specified
legislative and executive powers have been set out in the 1963 Act. Coupled
with this, modifications were made in the definitions of aforementioned three
expressions.
Therefore, the two decisions are of no
assistance in resolutation of the present controversy.
It was then pointed out that the definition
of the expression 'appropriate Government' in Section 2(a)(i) of the Act unless
it is shown in relation to any industrial dispute concerning any industry
carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government or the
enumerated industries or a banking or an insurance company, a mine, an
oilfield, a Cantonment Board, or a major port, the appropriate Government will
be the Central Government and in any other case a State Government- It was
therefore, submitted that unless it is shown that in relation to the industrial
dispute raised by the Association, the appropriate Government would be the
Central Government, the case would fall under the residuary provision, namely,
that in relation to any other industrial dispute, the appro- 386 priate
Government would be the State Government. The submission does not commend to us
because before one can say that the appropriate Government is the State
Government in relation to an industrial dispute, there has to be some State
Government in which power must be located for making the reference. If there is
no State Government but there is some other Government called the
Administration of Union Territory, the question would arise whether in such a
situation the Administration of Union Territory should be described as State
Government for the purpose of Section 2(a)(i) read with Section 10(1) ? The High
Court clearly fell into an error when it observed that the inclusive definition
of the expression 'State Government' does not necessarily enlarge the scope of
the expression, but may occasionally point to the contrary.
Let as assume it to be so without deciding
it. But where the High Court fell into the error was when it held that the
President representing the Central Government and the Administrator, and
appointee of the President and subject to all orders of the President
constitute two different governments for a Union Territory. The position, the
power, the duties and functions of the Administrator in relation to the
President have been overlooked. On a conspectus of the relevant provisions of
the Constitution and the 1963 Act, it clearly transpires that the concept of
State Government is foreign to the Administration of Union Territory and
Article 239 provides that every Union Territory is to be administered by the
President. The President may act through an administrator appointed by him.
Administrator is thus the delegate of the President. His position is wholly
different from that of a Governor of a State. Administrator can differ with his
Minister and he must then obtain the orders of the President meaning thereby of
the Central Government.
Therefore, at any rate the administrator of
Union Territory does not qualify for the description of a State Government,
Therefore, the Central Government is the 'appropriate Government'.
If the Central Government as the appropriate
Government has made the reference, the High Court was clearly in error in
quashing the reference.
Learned counsel for the appellant-Association
made an alter native submission that the workmen involved in the dispute are
workmen working in a major port and are dock workers and there 387 fore, also
the Central Government will be the appropriate Government for the purpose of
making reference under Sec. 10(1). This contention found favour with the
Tribunal. The High Court reached a contrary conclusion observing that the iron
ore samplers are not involved in any work connected with or related to a major
port nor are they dock workers. We do not propose to examine this alternative
submission because if the reference is held to be competent, it is not
necessary to undertake elaborate examination of the second contention to
sustain the reference. It is, however, urged that this aspect is likely to
figure again before the Tribunal while examining the industrial dispute
referred to it for adjudication on merits. In this situation the proper thing
is to keep the contention between the parties open. The Tribunal will be at
liberty to examine this contention whether iron ore samplers are involved in
any work connected with or related to a major port or are dock workers. The
Tribunal may come to its own decision uninfluenced by the view taken by the
High Court and if the question does require examination the same will have to
be examined over again.
Accordingly, all these five appeals are
allowed and the judgment of the High Court is quashed and set aside and the
award of the Tribunal on the preliminary point especially about the competence
of the Central Government to make the reference under Section 10(1) of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947, for the reasons herein mentioned is confirmed. The
respondents shall pay the costs of the appellant in each case quantified at Rs.
1,000 in all Rs. 5,000 shall be paid by the respondents to the appellant as
costs.
As the dispute is an old one, hanging
resolution for years, the Tribunal is directed to give top priority to it and
dispose it off on merits within a period of six months from today, N.V.K.
Appeals allowed.
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