Chandra Bansi Singh & Ors Vs.
State of Bihar & Ors [1984] INSC 150 (22 August 1984)
FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA
VARADARAJAN, A. (J) MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J)
CITATION: 1984 AIR 1767 1985 SCR (1) 579 1984
SCC (4) 316 1984 SCALE (2)235
CITATOR INFO :
RF 1990 SC 334 (32)
ACT:
Constitution of India, 1950-Article
14-Proceedings under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 taken. On
19.8.74 seeking to acquire land for Housing Board but on 24.5.80 a small
portion of land of a particular influential family was exempted from the
acquisition-Whether the release of the said land is in violation of Article 14
of the Constitution and whether the entire acquisition Proceedings would be
vitiated by the said Act of release-Compensation payable should based, whether
at the prevailing market value on the data of Section 4 Notification or on the
date of actual takeover of possession-Supreme Court being a Court of equity as
well, it can award compensation for the delay in actual turnover.
HEADNOTE:
Respondent State issued a Notification under
Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 seeking to acquire 1034.94 acres of
land in Village Digha for the purpose of construction of houses by the Bihar
State Housing Board and the price or compensation for the acquired land was to
be paid by the Housing Board and not by the State from its own funds. In July
1977, the State Ministry of Revenue and Industry, after issuing Notifications
under Sections 6, 7 and 9 and after considering the claims and objections confirmed
the acquisition. On 24.5.1980 a portion of the land comprising 4.03 acres
belonging to some influential persons (Pandey families) was released without
there being any legal or constitutional justification for the same. This
release was challenged by way of Writ Petitions in the Bihar High Court, out of
which the Present Civil Appeals and Special Leave Petitions have arisen and by
filling fresh Writ Petitions in the Court.
Allowing the appeals and the petitions in
part, the Court
HELD : 1. The order of release passed by the
Government under Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was non est, as
being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.
The release of land in favour of Pandey
families was a pure and simple act of favouritism without there being any legal
or constitutional justification for the same. [583G-H, 584G]
2. The entire Notification issued under
Section 4 on 19th August, 1974 would be deemed to be valid and the land
released to the Pandey 580 families would form part of the acquisition as it
did on 19.8.74. The release being separate and subsequent act of the Collector
could not invalidate the entire Notification but would only invalidate the
portion released. Lila Ram etc. v. Union of India and Ors.[1976] 1 SCR 941
distinguished. [585C-D, E-F] 3: 1 The contention that compensation should be
paid according to the value of land prevailing on the date of actual takeover
of possession, since the price of land had appreciated substantially, is not
correct under the law for two reasons, namely; (i) that it is not the fault of
the Collector for causing the delay in taking over the possession because the
matter was pursued both in the Courts and before the Government and the
proceedings had to be stayed, as a result of which Collector was prevented from
taking possession or giving his award, although all proceedings had taken
place; and (ii) The landowners being in continuous possession of the land had
enjoyed the usufruct of the same, particularly the lands happened to be mostly
mango orchards and they must have derived large benefits by selling them in the
market. [586G-H, 587A-B] 3: 2 However, the appellants have undoubtedly a case
for payment of some additional compensation in equity which relief cannot be
denied by the Supreme court which is not only a Court of law but a Court of
equity as well. Apart from the compensation which may be awarded by the
Collector or enhanced by the Judge or a High Court the appellants should get an
equitable compensation in the form of interest calculated at the rate of seven
and a half percent per annum for two years on the value of land owned by each
land owner.
Thus equitable compensation has been awarded
in the special facts of the case appeal, if any, under the Act on the amount of
compensation payable. [587C-E]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal
Nos. 9973 to 9977 of 1983 Appeals by Special leave from the Judgment and Order
dated the 31st January, 1983 of the Patna High Court in C.W J.C. Nos. 2170,
3435, 3879, 3436 and 3561 of 1982.
WITH
Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 3098 of 1983 From the Judgment and Order
dated the 31st January, 1983 of the Patna High Court in C.W.J.C. No. 3556 of
1982.
AND Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 4428
of 1983 From the Judgment and Order dated the 31st January, 1983 of the Patna
High Court in C.W.J.C. No. 2104 of 1982.
AND 581 Writ Petition (Civil) Nos. 13306-21,
13346 of 1983 and 13229 of 1984 and 1324-42 of 1984.
Under article 32 of the Constitution of
India.
ADVOCATES FOR THE APPELLANTS:
R.P. Bhatt and A. K. Srivastava in CA.
9973/83.
A.K. Sen and M. P. Jha in CA No. 9974/83.
D.P. Singh and B.B. Singh in CA. No. 9975/83.
Y.S. Cihitale, L.R. Singh and Gopal Singh for
the Appellants.
Singh and Ranjit Kumar in CA. 9973/83.
L. N. Singh, K. P. Verma, Advocate General
and Jaya Narayan R. P. Singh (In WP. Nos. 13306-21 and 13346) K.P. Verma,
Advocate General and R.P. Singh in SLP. No. 4288 of 1983.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
FAZAL ALI, J. Sometimes while taking a pragmatic and progressive action under a
statute in the general public interest, which is doubtless a step in the right
direction, the Government succumbs to internal or external pressures by a
citizen or group of citizens so as to show special favour to them which destroys
the laudable object of the nature of the action. Such a course is adopted to
help a few chosen friends at the cost of the people in general and furstrates
the very object of the meaningful State action. Furthermore, the State action
brings it into direct collision with Art.
14 of the Constitution of India.
582 The present case seems to us to be a
concrete illustration of the State action taken under the land Acquisition Act,
1894 (for short, to be referred to as the 'Act'). What happened here is that
while the Government of Bihar acquired a vast tract of land for construction of
houses and allotment to the people belonging to the low and middle income
groups but chose to exempt certain persons from the statutory action on purely
unreasonable and illusory grounds. Fortunately, the chosen class comprised a
very small number of persons whose lands consisted of a small proportion of the
total acquired land.
This now brings us to the consideration of
the important facts of the case. A notification under s. 4 of the Act was
issued by the Government of Bihar on 19.8.4 seeking to acquire 1034.94 acres of
land in village Digha for the purpose of construction of houses by the Bihar
State Housing Board wherein it was mentioned that the price or compensation for
the acquired land was to be paid by the Housing Board and not by the State from
its own funds. By virtue of the said notification objections were called and on
12.2.76 all the objections were disposed of. A declaration under s. 6 of the
Act was issued which was published on 20.2.76. On 25.3.76 the publication was
received by the Department and notices were issued under s. 7 of the Act for
filing claims. On 14.4.76 notification under s. 9 of the Act was issued. On
19.5.76 as many as 500 objections were filed. So far so good. Unfortunately,
thereafter on 8.11.76 a representation was made by Mr. Ram Avtar Shastri,
Member of Parliament, for withdrawing the acquisition proceedings, which was
disposed of and dismissed in December, 1976.
After this, rate report was prepared which
was accepted by the Collector who gave his final estimate and sent the same to
the Government in January, 1977. According to the estimate, a sum of Rs. 8.30
crores was to be disbursed to the various owners whose lands were sought to be
acquired.
While the matter was nearing completion
preparations for the 1977 general elections were made as a result of which the
entire matter was deferred and put into cold storage. On 24.5.80, which is a
crucial date as it appears to be the subject matter of the present appeals and
writ petitions, a portion of land comprising 4.03 acres belonging to some
influential persons, viz., Badri Sahu, R.S. Pandey and his relations
(hereinafter referred to as `Pandey families') was released. It is not clear
what were the. considerations which led the Government to single out Pandey 583
families for favourable treatment. Sometime in July, 1977 the State Ministry of
Revenue and Industry confirmed the acquisition. Ultimately, on 12.12.77 in
order to smoothen the way for the acquisition of the lands in question, the
Central Government exempted purely agricultural lands from acquisition under
the Urban Land Ceiling Act.
In the year 1978, a representation was made
by Mr. Thakur Prasad who took over as the new Minister of Industries after the
general elections, about the acquisition to the Chief Minister who stayed
further proceedings in the matter. In the mean-time, a writ petition was filed
in the High Court which was ultimately withdrawn by the petitioners and the
stay was vacated by the Government sometime in early 1980. In May, 1981 another
writ petition was filed in the High Court mainly challenging the release of
lands on 24.5.80 in favour of Pandey families on the ground that the said
release was violative of Art. 14 and therefore the entire notification was bad
and without jurisdiction.
In January, 1982, the amount of compensation
was deposited by the State Housing Board with the Treasury which was followed
by an Award given in respect of the acquired lands on 1.2.83. The totality of
the facts and the dates stated above clearly show that the delay in finalising
the compensation by the Collector was due to unforeseen circumstances and the
appellants, therefore, cannot be heard to complain of the same because, as
already indicated, this was due to stay orders passed by the Government and the
courts on several representations.
It is rather unfortunate that while the
acquisition of land for a sound purpose was taken and necessary steps complied
with, the acquisition fell into a rough weather raising serious controversies
between the parties in dispute, putting forward various claims and objections,
as a result of which the said housing scheme was delayed by more than 5-6
years. Indeed, if the Government would have been wiser and more alert by the
time possession was taken. the object of building houses by the Housing Board
of the State could have been accomplished long before.
The sheet anchor of the arguments of the
appellants in civil appeal No 9973 of 1983, which is by special leave, was that
the entire acquisition proceedings and the orders passed by the Collector
acquiring the land became non est as they were violative of Art. 14 of the
Constitution. It was contended that there was no justification for the 584
Government to have released a portion of the land, viz., 4.03 acres. However
small fraction of the main land, it was merely to favour a particular set of
individuals, viz., Pandey families, who are alleged to have exercised very
great influence on the Government of the time and that was done only to help
one single body of persons without any reasonable classification or nexus to
the object of the Notification. The release of land belonging to Pandey
families was supported by the Government on the ground that as they had put up
large buildings with boundary walls in the entire area covered by 4.03 acres,
it would have been rather difficult for the Government to demolish the said
constructions thereon. In order to repel this argument, unimpeachable materials
were produce before us to show that the plea of huge buildings or houses
situated on the land of Pandey families was a complete hoax or a false pretext
in order to enable the Collector to withdraw the acquisition of this particular
land. On examining the materials, which have not been denied by the Pandey
families, we find that the contentions of the appellants are sound and must
prevail. We have been shown photographs of the lands of Pandey families, which
appear at page 120 of the Paper-book, which shows that there are no huge
buildings or houses but only small hutments, perhaps used for keeping a
tube-well to water the fields. The plot in question is No. 3114 which belongs
to Pandey families. On page 121 there is another photograph which shows small
hut in the plot owned by the Pandey families. On the other hand, amongst the
lands acquired and not withdrawn from acquisition is a plot owned by one Deo
Narain Singh, on which stands a two-storeyed structure which also is meant for
the purpose of keeping cattle or watchman to look after the field. Even so, if
the plea of Pandey families was to be accepted then there was a much superior
claim of Deo Narain Singh for release of his land also.
Neither the photographs referred to above nor
the fact that no structure except the one shown in the photograph which had
been built by the Pandey families, has been disputed before us. It was,
therefore, rightly argued by counsel for the appellants in Civil Appeal No.
9973/83 that the release of land in favour of the Pandey families was a pure
and simple act of favouritism without there being any legal or constitutional
justification for the same. The State also was not in a position either to
rebut or support the release of the lands in question. We might also mention
that although notice had been issued and served on the Pandey families yet they
did not appear in this Court to support their claim. Hence, there does not
appear to be any serious dispute between the parties that the order of release
585 passed by the Government under s. 48 of the Act was non est as being
violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution The matter does not rest here but the
counsel for the appellants further submitted before this Court to declare the
entire acquisition of lands as unconstitutional even though a very small
fraction of it was hit by the mischief of Art. 14. It was submitted that the
entire tract of lands was acquired by one notification and once it is found
that even an infinitesimal part of it was unconstitutional, the entire
notification would have to be struck down. In case at the time of acquisition
the lands belonging to the Pandey families were left out on some special
grounds in public interest, then doubtless the appellants' argument would be
unanswerable. This, however, does not appear to have happened in this case, as
indicated above. Where-as section 4 notification was issued on 19.8.74, the
release came on 24.5.80, that is to say about six years after. Hence, all that
would happen is that the release is here by declared to be bad and non est. as
a result of which the entire notification issued under s. 4 on 19.8.74 would be
deemed to be valid and the land released to the Pandey families would form part
of the acquisition as it did on 19.8.74.
Perhaps, the appellants wanted to persuade
this Court to strike down the entire notification so that when a fresh
notification is issued they may be able to get a higher compensation in view of
the sudden spurt and rise in the price of land and other commodities in between
the period when the acquisition was made and when the actual possession was
taken. For the reasons that we have given above we are unable to uphold this
process of reasoning. The release being a separate and subsequent act of the
Collector, could not invalidate the entire notification but would only
invalidate the portion released, with the result that the original notification
would be restored to its position as it stood on 19.8.74.
Reliance was placed by the counsel for the
State on a decision of this Court in the case of Lila Ram etc. v. Union of
India & ors.,(1) etc. This case is clearly distinguishable from the present
one because the argument in that case proceeded on the footing that as huge
areas of land had been freezed there was no public purpose in acquiring the
land and hence the acquisition was bad. While rejecting the contention Khanna,
J, speaking for the Court observed thus:- 586 "It is significant that the
land covered by the notification is not a small plot but a huge area covering
thousands of acres. In such cases it is difficult to insist upon greater
precision for specifying the public purpose because it is quite possible that
various plots covered by the notification may have to be utilised for different
purposes set out in the interim General Plan. No objection was also taken by
the appellant before the authorities concerned that the public purpose
mentioned in the notification was not specific enough and as such he was not
able to file effective objections against the proposed acquisition." The
case cited above has no application to the facts of the present case because it
was never argued before the High Court that the acquisition was without any
public purpose.
It is, however, contended by both the parties
that if at the time when the section 4 notification was issued an invidious
distinction without any reasonable classification would have been made between
the land acquired and the land of Pandey families so as to form an integral
part of the entire acquisition, the entire notification would have been struck
down. Here, we find that the release of land in favour of Pandey families came
after three years of the initial notification and therefore it cannot
invalidate the section 4 notification in its entirety. All that would happen is
that the released portion would be deemed to be non est. and in the eye of law
the section 4 notification would be deemed to be a notification for the entire
lands acquired, including the lands of Pandey families.
In view of our decision on the aforesaid
points, it is not necessary for us to dilate further on this question.
The other question raised by the counsel for
the appellants was that there was sufficient delay between the date of the
section 4 notification and taking over possession of the lands during which
period the price of land had appreciated substantially and, therefore, the
compensation should be paid according to the value of the land prevailing on
the date of actual taking over of possession. This argument also is without
substance for the following reasons:- (1): that it is not the fault of the
Collector for causing the delay in taking over the possession because the
matter was pursued both in the courts and before the Government and the
proceedings had to be stayed, as a result 587 of which Collector was prevented
from taking possession or giving his award, although all other proceedings had
taken place.
(2): The landowners being in continuous
possession of the land had enjoyed the usufruct of the same, particularly the
lands happened to be mostly mango orchards and they must have derived large
benefits by selling them in the market.
On an analysis of the various steps taken by
the parties and others in the taking of possession, there is undoubtedly a
delay of about 1/1/2 years and for the purpose of calculation and convenience
when rounded off, the delay may be taken to be of two years. So far as this
delay is concerned, the appellants have undoubtedly a case for payment of some
additional compensation in equity though not under law and as this Court is not
Only a court of law but a court of equity as well, it will be impossible for us
to deny this relief to the appellants. After taking into consideration the
various shades and aspects of the case we are clearly of the opinion that apart
from the compensation which may be awarded by the Collector or enhanced by the
Judge or a higher Court, the appellants should get an equitable compensation in
the form of interest calculated at the rate of 7/1/2 per cent per annum for two
years on the value of land owned by each landowner. This equitable compensation
has been awarded in the special facts of this case and will not be the subject
matter of appeal, if any, under the Act on the amount of compensation.
As the points involved in these appeals and
writ petitions are the same we decided to dispose them of by one common
judgment.
For the reasons given above, the appeals the
special leave and the writ petitions are disposed of accordingly but without
any order as to costs.
S.R. Appeals and Petitions partly allowed.
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