Sanjit Roy Vs. State of. Rajasthan
[1983] INSC 6 (20 January 1983)
BHAGWATI, P.N.
BHAGWATI, P.N.
PATHAK, R.S.
CITATION: 1983 AIR 328 1983 SCR (2) 271 1983
SCC (1) 525 1983 SCALE (1)38
ACT:
Rajasthan Famine Relief Works Employees
(Exemption from Labour Laws) Act, 1964, Section 3, Constitutional validity
of-Constitution of India, Articles 14 and 23 and the Minimum Wages Act,
1968-"minimum wage" What is ? explained.
HEADNOTE:
The respondent State in the public Works
Department has engaged a large number of workers for the construction of
Madanganj Harmara Road, close to Tilonia village with a view to providing
relief to persons affected by drought and scarcity conditions. The workers
employed in this construction work are divided into gangs of 20 persons or
multiple thereof and for each gang one muster roll is maintained. The work done
by each gang is measured every fortnight and payment is made by the Public
Works Department to the Mate who is the leader of the gang according to the
work turned out by such gang during each fortnight. The Public Works Department
has fixed a certain norm of work to be turned out by each gang before the
workmen belonging to such gang can claim the minimum wage of Rs. 7 per day with
the result that if any particular gang turns out work according to the norm
fixed by the Public Works Department, the Mate would be paid such amount as
would be on distribution give a wage of Rs. 7 per day to the workmen
constituting such gang, but if less work is turned out by such gang, payment to
be made to the mate of such gang would be proportionately reduced and in that
event, the wage earned by each member of such gang would fall short of the
minimum wage of Rs. 7 per day. Further, this system of proportionate
distribution of the wages adopted without any visible principle or norm enabled
a workman who has put in less work to get more payment than the person who has
really put in more work. Hence the public interest writ petition filed by the
Director of the Social Work and Research Centre, complaining violation of the
provisions of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, Articles 14 and 23 of the
Constitution, and the vires of section 3 of the Rajasthan Famine Relief Works
Employees (Exemption from Labour Laws) Act, 1964.
Allowing the Petition, the Court
HELD: 1. Where a person provides labour or
service to another for remuneration which is less than the minimum wage, the
labour or service provided by him clearly falls within the meaning of the words
'forced labour' and attracts the condemnation of Article 23. Every person who
provides labour or service to another is entitled at the least to the minimum
wage and if anything less than the minimum wage is paid to him, he can complain
of violation of his 272 fundamental right under Article 23 and ask the court to
direct payment of the minimum wage to him so that the breach of Article 23 may
be abated. [280 D-F] 2: 1. The constitutional validity of the Exemption Act in
so far as it excludes the applicability of the Minimum Wages Act 1948 providing
that minimum wage may not be paid to a workman employed in any famine relief
work, cannot be sustained in the face of Article 23. Article 23 mandates that
no person shall be required or permitted to provide labour or service to
another on payment of anything less than the minimum wage. Whenever any labour
or service is taken by the State from any person, whether he be affected by
drought and scarcity conditions or not, the State must pay, at the least,
minimum wage to such person on pain of violation of Article 23.
[280 F-G, 282 B-C] 2: 2. When the State undertakes
famine relief work, it is no doubt true, that it does so in order to provide
relief to persons affected by drought and scarcity conditions but,
none-the-less it is work which enures for the benefit of the State representing
the society and if labour or service is provided by the affected persons for
carrying out such work, the State cannot pay anything less than the minimum
wages to the affected persons. It is not as if dole or bounty is given by the
State to the affected persons in order to provide relief to them against
drought and scarcity conditions nor is the work to be carried out by the
affected persons worthless or useless to the society so that under the guise of
providing work what the State in effect and substance seeks to do is to give dole
or bounty to the affected persons. The State cannot be permitted to take
advantage of the helpless condition of the affected persons and extract labour
or service from them on payment of less than the minimum wage. No work of
utility and value can be allowed to be constructed on the blood and sweat of
persons who are reduced to a state of helplessness on account of drought and
scarcity conditions. [281 B-E, H, 282 A] 2: 3. In the instant case, the
Notification issued under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 makes it clear that the
minimum wage of Rs. 7 is fixed per day and not with reference to any particular
quantity of work turned out by the workmen during the day. The Notification
does not empower the employer to fix any particular norm of work to be carried
out by the workman with reference to which the minimum wage shall be paid by
the employer. The minimum wage is not fixed on piece rate basis, so that a
particular minimum wage would be payable only if a certain amount of work is
turned out by the workman and if he turns out less work, then the minimum wage
payable would be proportionately reduced. Here the minimum wage is fixed at Rs.
7 per day and that is the minimum wage which must be paid by the employer to
the workman so long as the workman works throughout the working hours of the
day for which he can lawfully be required to work. The employer may fix any
norm he thinks fit specifying the quantity of work which must be turned out by
the workman during the day, but if the workman does not turn out work in
conformity with such norm, the employer cannot pay him anything less than the
minimum wage. If the norm fixed by the employer is reasonable and the workman
does not turn out work according to such norm, disciplinary action may be taken
against the workman and in a given case he must even be liable to be thrown out
of employment, but he cannot be paid less than the minimum 273 wage, unless, of
course, the minimum wage fixed by the Notification under the Minimum Wages Act
1948 is correlated with the quantity of work to be turned out by the workman.
Otherwise, it would be the easiest thing for
the employer to fix an unreasonably high norm which a workman working
diligently and efficiently during the day cannot possibly reach and thereby
deprive the workman of the minimum wage payable to him. [283 B-G] Peoples Union
for Democratic Rights & Other v. Union of India &. Others [1983]1
S.C.R. 456 followed.
PER PATHAK, J.
1. The workers employed in the construction
of the Madanganj Harmara Road as a measure of relief is a famine stricken area
are entitled to a minimum wage of Rs. 7 per day, and that wage cannot be
reduced by reference to the Rajasthan Famine Relief Works Employees (Exemption
and Labour Laws) Act 1964, because in so far as the provisions of s. 3 of that
Act countenance a lesser wage they operate against Article 14 of the
Constitution and are, therefore, void.[286 D-E] 2:1. By prescribing the
criterion which it has, the Public Works Department has effected an invidious
discrimination bearing no reasonable nexus to the object behind the employment.
[286 C-D] 2:2 The circumstance that employment has been given to persons
affected by drought and scarcity conditions provides only the reason for
extending such employment. In other words, the granting of relief to persons in
distress by giving them employment constitutes merely the motive for giving
them work. It cannot affect their right to what is due to every worker in the
course of such employment. The rights of all the workers will be the same,
whether they are drawn from area affected by drought and scarcity conditions or
come from elsehwere. The mere circumstance that a worker belongs to an area
affected by drought and scarcity conditions can in no way influence the scope
and sum of those rights. In comparison with a worker belonging to some other
more fortunate area and doing the same kind of work, he is not less entitled
than the other to the totality of those rights nor liable to be distinguished
from the other by the badge of his misfortune. [285 E-G] 2: 3. When the State
employs workers for doing work needed on its development projects, it must find
funds for such projects. And the fund must be sufficient to ensure the
prescribed minimum wage to each worker and this is particularly so having
regard to the concept of a "minimum wage". Therefore, the argument
that the wages are drawn from a fund too limited to provide for payment of a
minimum wage to all is not justified. [286 B-C]
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition No. 6816
of 1981.
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of
India.) Kapil Sibal for the Petitioner.
274 B.D. Sharma for the Respondent.
The following judgments were delivered
BHAGWATI, J. The petitioner is the Director of a social action group called
Social Work and Research Centre operating in and around Tilonia village in
Ajmer district of the State of Rajasthan. The Social Work and Research Centre is
duly registered society and since February 1972, it has been actively engaged
in the work of upliftment of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in different
areas and particularly in and around Tilonia village. It operates through
various groups and the present writ petition has been filed by the petitioner
for the purpose of remedying gross violations of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948
which have been discovered by one such group. These violations, according to
the petitioner, have been taking place in the following circumstances and they
need to be redressed through judicial intervention. The Public Works Department
of the State of Rajasthan is constructing Madanganj Harmara Road close to village
Tilonia and according to the State Government, it is a part of famine relief
work undertaken with a view to providing relief to persons affected by drought
and scarcity conditions. The State Government in the Public Works Department
has engaged a large number of workers for construction of this road and they
include women belonging to Scheduled Castes. It is common ground that the
minimum wage for a construction worker in Rajasthan is Rs. 7 per day and it was
asserted on behalf of the petitioner and not disputed on behalf of the State
Government that the Notification fixing the minimum wage of Rs. 7 per day does
not specify any particular quantity of work to be turned out by the worker in
order to be entitled to this minimum wage.
Now the practice followed by the Public Works
Department for engaging workers for the construction work is to issue an
identity card to every resident in the famine affected area who registers
himself with the Halka patwari and the identity card would show the number of members
in the family of the card-holder including males, females and children.
Every resident in the famine affected area
would be entitled to be employed in the famine relief work undertaken by the
State Government on production of the identity card. This way a large number of
workers including women belonging to Scheduled Castes are engaged in the
construction work of the Madanganj Harmara Road. The workers employed in this
construction work are divided into gangs of 20 persons or multiple 275 thereof
and there is a separate muster roll for each such gang and the work done by it
is measured every fortnight and payment is made by the Public Works Department
to the Mate who is the leader of the gang according to the work turned out by
such gang during each fortnight. The Public Work Department has fixed a certain
norm of work to be turned out by each gang before the workmen belonging to such
gang can claim the minimum wage of Rs. 7 per day with the result that if any
particular gang turns out work according to the norm fixed by the Public Works
Department the Mate would be paid such amount as would on distribution give a
wage of Rs. 7/- per day to the workmen constituting such gang, but if less work
is turned out by such gang, payment to be made to the mate of such gang would
be proportionately reduced and in that event, the wage earned by each member of
such gang would fall short of the minimum of Rs. 7 per day. The petitioner has
stated in the writ petition that as a consequence of this practice followed by the
Public Works Department workmen belonging to most of the gangs receive a wage
very much less than the minimum wage of Rs. 7 per day as illustrated by a few
instances set out in Annexure I to the writ petition. The petitioner has also
averred that even within the gang itself, deferential payments are made to the
workmen without any visible principle or norm and it is not uncommon that a
worker who has put in full day's work throughout the period of the fortnight,
may get less than the minimum wage of Rs.7/- per day, while a worker who has
put in much less work may get more than the proportionate wage due to him. This
system of payment adopted by the Public Works Department created considerable
discontent amongst the women workers belonging to Scheduled Castes who were
engaged in this construction work and on 21st August 1981 about 200 to 300 such
women workers approached the Social Work and Research Centre seeking advice as
to what course of action should be adopted by them for the purpose of
eliminating differential payments in wages and securing payment of minimum wage
of Rs. 7 per day for each worker.
Mrs. Aruna Roy, the Development Coordinator
of the Social Work and Research Centre thereupon contacted Shri Atul Gupta,
Asstt. Collector and both of them immediately proceeded to the site of the
construction work. On their arrival at the site, an impromptu meeting took
place where the women workers gave vent to their grievances which included
inter alia complaint in regard to the "wide difference in respect of
payments made by Mates to several gangs for the same category 276 of work
performed" and pointed out that "differentials in payments also
existed between the women workers working in the same gang and performing the
same category of work." Since these differential payments in wages were
made by the Public Works Department to the gangs allegedly on the basis of the
quantity of work turned out by each such gang and, according to the petitioner,
there were even within the gang itself, differentials in payment of wages to
the workers resulting in perpetuation of inequality, the petitioner in his
capacity as Director of the Social Work and Research Centre filed the present
writ petition challenging the system of payment of wages to the workers and
seeking a writ of mandamus directing the State Government to "comply with
the prescribed rates of minimum wages under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 as
applicable in the State of Rajasthan." When the writ petition reached
hearing before us, the State Government produced the Rajsthan Famine Relief
Works Employees (Exemption from Labour Laws) Act, 1964 (hereinafter referred to
as the Exemption Act) and relying upon this statute, the State Government
contended that since the construction work of Madangang Harmara Road was a
famine relief work, the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 was not applicable to employees
engaged on this construction work by reason of section 3 of this Act. The
Exemption Act is a Rajasthan statute enacted on 7th September 1964 and it is
deemed to have come into force with effect from 1st July 1963. Section 2 clause
(b) of this Act defines "famine relief works" to mean "works
already started or which may hereafter be started by the State Government to
provide relief to persons affected by drought and scarcity conditions" and
"Labour Law" is defined in section 2 clause (c) to mean "any of
the enactments as in force in Rajasthan relating to Labour and specified in the
Schedule".The Minimum Wages Act, 1948 is one of the enactments specified
in the Schedule to the Exemption Act. Then section 3 of the Exemption Act
proceeds to enact that "Notwithstanding.....any such law." Section 4
of the Exemption Act excludes the jurisdiction of courts and provides that
"no court shall take cognizance of any matter in respect of an employees
of famine relief works under any Labour Law", which includes the Minimum
Wages Act 1948. Now if the Exemption Act were a valid piece of legislation, it
is obvious that no workman employed in a famine relief work would be entitled
to complain that he is paid less than the minimum wage because the
applicability of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 would be 277 excluded by reason of
section 3 of the Exemption Act and the women workers engaged in the
construction work of Madanganj Harmara Road would have to be content with
whatever wage is paid to them even though it be less than the minimum wage of
Rs. 7 per day and their only complaint which would then survive would be that
there is discrimination by reason of differential payment of wages to workmen
doing the same quantity of work. The petitioner therefore sought leave to amend
the writ petition by including a challenge to the constitutional validity of
the Exemption Act and on such leave being granted, the petitioner filed an
amended writ petition in this Court. The principal grounds on which the
constitutionality of the Exemption Act was challenged were based on Articles 14
and 23 of the Constitution. I am, for reasons which I shall presently state, of
the view that the challenge under Article 23 is well founded and it is therefore
not necessary to investigate the facts relating to the violation of Article 14
and I accordingly propose to confine my judgment only to a consideration of the
attack based on Article 23. If the Exemption Act is unconstitutional on the
ground that it violates Article 23, it would be out of the way so far as the
claim of the workmen for the minimum wage of Rs. 7 per day is concerned and the
only question then would be whether the workmen are entitled to the minimum
wage of Rs. 7 per day in any event or any deduction can be made from such
minimum wage on the ground that the workmen have not turned out work according
to the norm set down by the Public Works Department.
This Court had occasion to consider the true
meaning and effect of Article 23 in a judgment given on 18th September 1982 in
writ petition No. 8143 of 1981-Peoples Union for Democratic Rights and Ors. v.
Union of India and Ors. (1) The Court pointed out that the constitution makers,
when they set out to frame the Constitution, found that the practice of 'forced
labour' constituted an ugly and shameful feature of our national life which
cried for urgent attention and with a view to obliterating and wiping out of
existence this revolting practice which was a relic of a feudal exploitative
society totally incompatible with new egalitarian socio-economic order which
"We the people of India" were determined to build, they enacted
Article 23 in the Chapter on Fundamental Rights. This Article, said the Court,
is intended to eradicate the pernicious 278 practice of 'forced labour' and to
wipe it out altogether from the national scene and it is therefore not limited
in its application against the State but it is also enforceable against any
other person indulging in such practice. It is designed to protect the
individual not only against the state but also against other private citizens.
The Court observed that the expression "other similar forms of forced
labour" in Article 23 is of the widest amplitude and on its, true
interpretation it covers every possible form of forced labour begar or
otherwise and it makes no difference whether the person forced to give his
labour or service to another is remunerated or not. Even if remuneration is
paid, labour supplied by a person would be hit by this Article if it is forced
labour, that is, labour supplied not willingly but as a result of force or
compulsion and the same would be the position even if forced labour supplied by
a person has its origin in a contract of service. The Court then considered
whether there would be any breach of Article 23 when a person provides labour
or service to the State or to any other person and is paid less than the
minimum wage for it and observed:
"It is obvious that ordinarily no one
would willingly supply labour or service to another for less than the minimum
wage, when he knows that under the law he is entitled to get minimum for the
labour or service provided by him. It may therefore be legitimately presumed
that when a person provides labour or service to another against receipt of
remuneration which is less than the minimum wage, he is acting under the force
of some compulsion which drives him to work though he is paid less than what he
is entitled under the law to receive. What Article 23 prohibits is 'forced
labour' that is labour or service which a person is forced to provide and
'force' which would make such labour or service 'forced labour' may arise in
several ways. It may be physical force which may compel a person to provide
labour or service to another or it may be forced exerted through a legal
provision such as a provision for imprisonment or fine in case the employee
fails to provide labour or service or it may even be compulsion arising from
hunger and poverty, want and destitution. Any factor which deprives a person of
a choice of alternatives and compels him to adopt one particular course of
action may properly be regarded as 'force'and if labour or service is compelled
as a result of such 279 'force',it would be 'forced labour'. Where a person is
suffering from hunger or starvation, when he has no resources at all to fight
disease or to feed his wife and children or even to hide their nakedness where
utter grinding poverty has broken his back and reduced him to a state of
helplessness and despair and where no other employment is available to
alleviate the rigour of his poverty, he would have no choice but to accept any
work that comes his way, even if the remuneration offered to him is less than
the minimum wage. He would be in no position to bargain with the employer; he
would have to accept what is offered to him. And in doing so he would be acting
not as a free agent with a choice between alternatives but under the compulsion
of economic circumstances and the labour or service provided by him would be
clearly 'forced labour'. There is no reason why the word 'forced' should be
read in a narrow and restricted manner so as to be confined only to physical or
legal 'force' particularly when the national charter, its fundamental document
has promised to build a new socialist republic where there will be
socioeconomic justice for all and everyone shall have the right to work, to
education and to adequate means of livelihood. The constitution makers have
given us one of the most remarkable documents in history for ushering in a new
socio-economic order and the Constitution which they have forged for us has a
social purpose and an economic mission and therefore every word or phrase in
the constitution must be interpreted in a manner which would advance the
socio-economic objective of the Constitution. It is not unoften that in a
capitalist society economic circumstances exert much greater pressure on an
individual in driving him to a particular course of action than physical
compulsion or force of legislative provision. The word 'force' must therefore
be construed to include not only physical or legal force but also force arising
from the compulsion of economic circumstances which leaves no choice of
alternatives to a person in want and compels him to provide labour or service even
though the remuneration received for it is less than the minimum wage. Of
course, if a person provides labour or service to another against receipt of
the minimum wage, it would not be possible to say that the labour or service
provided by him is 'forced 280 labour' because he gets what he is entitled
under law to receive. No inference can reasonably be drawn in such a case that
he is forced to provide labour or service for the simple reason that he would
be providing labour or service against receipt of what is lawfully payable to
him just like any other person who is not under the force of any compulsion. We
are therefore of the view that where a person provides labour or service to
another for remuneration which is less than the minimum wage, the labour or
service provided by him clearly falls within the scope and ambit of the words
'forced labour' under Article 23, Such a person would be entitled to come to
the court for enforcement of his fundamental right under Article 23 by asking
the court to direct payment of the minimum wage to him so that the labour or
service provided by him ceases to be 'forced labour' and the breach of Article
23 is remedied." I must, therefore hold consistently with this decision
that where a person provides labour or service to another for remuneration
which is less than the minimum wage,the labour or service provided by him
clearly falls within the meaning of the words 'forced labour' and attracts the
condemnation of Article 23. Every person who provides labour or service to another
is entitled at the least to the minimum wage and if anything less than the
minimum wage is paid to him he can complain of violation of his fundamental
right under Article 23 and ask the court to direct payment of the minimum wage
to him so that the breach of Article 23 may be abated.
If this be the correct position in law, it is
difficult to see how the constitutional validity of the Exemption Act in so far
as it excludes the applicability of the Minimum wages Act 1948 to the workmen
employed in famine relief works can be sustained. Article 23, as pointed out
above, mandates that no person shall be required or permitted to provide labour
or service to another on payment of anything less than the minimum wage and if
the Exemption Act, by excluding the applicability of the Minimum Wages Act 1948,
provides that minimum wage may not be paid to a workman employed in any famine
relief work, it would be clearly violative of Article 23. The respondent
however contended that when the State undertakes famine relief work with 281 a
view to providing help to the persons affected by drought and scarcity
conditions, it would be difficult for the State to comply with the labour laws,
because if the State were required to observe the laws, the potential of the
State to provide employment to the affected persons would be crippled and the
State would not be able to render help to the maximum number of affected
persons and it was for this reason that the applicability of the Minimum Wages
Act 1948 was excluded in relation to workmen employed in famine relief work.
This contention, plausible though it may seem is in, my opinion, unsustainable
and cannot be accepted.
When the State undertakes famine relies work
it is no doubt true that it does so in order to provide relief to persons
affected by drought and scarcity conditions but none the less it is work which
enures for the benefit of the State representing the society and if labour or
service is provided by the affected persons for carrying out such work, there
is no reason why the State should pay anything less than the minimum wage to
the affected persons. It is not as if a dole or bounty is given by the State to
the affected persons in order to provide relief to them against drought and
scarcity conditions nor is the work to be carried out by the affected persons
worthless or useless to the society so that under the guise of providing work
what the State in effect and substance seeks to do is to give dole or bounty to
the affected persons. The court cannot proceed on the basis that the State
would undertake by way of famine relief, work which is worthless and without
utility for the society and indeed no democratic State which is administered by
a sane and sensible Government would do so because it would be sheer waste of
human labour and resource which can usefully be diverted into fruitful and
productive channels leading to the welfare of the community and creation of
national asset or wear. It is difficult to appreciate why the State should
require the affected persons to provide labour or service on work which is of
no use to the society, instead of simply distributing dole or bounty amongst
the affected persons. There is no reason which the State should resort to such
a camouflage. The presumption therefore must be that the work undertaken by the
State by way of famine relief is useful to the society and productive in terms
of creation of some asset or wealth and when the State exacts labour or service
from the affected persons for carring out such work, for example, a bridge or a
road, which has utilised for the society and which is going to augment the
wealth of the State, there can be no justification for the State not to pay
minimum wage to the affected persons. The State cannot be permitted to take
advantage of the 282 helpless condition of the affected persons and extract
labour or service from them on payment of less than the minimum wage. No work
of utility and value can be allowed to be constructed on the blood and sweat of
persons who are reduced to a state of helplessness on account of drought and
scarcity conditions. The State cannot under the guise of helping these affected
persons extract work of utility and value from them without paying them the
minimum wage.
Whenever any labour or service is taken by
the State from any person, whether he be affected by drought and scarcity
conditions or not, the State must pay, at the least, minimum wage to such
person on pain of violation of Article 23 and the Exemption Act in so far as it
excludes the applicability of the Minimum Wages Act 1948 to workmen employed on
famine relief work and permits payment of less than the minimum wage to such
workmen, must be held to be invalid as offending the provisions of Article 23.
The Exemption Act cannot in the circumstances be relied upon by the respondent
as exempting it from the liability to pay minimum wage to the workmen engaged
in the construction work of Madanganj Harmara Road.
We must then proceed to consider whether on
the facts the labour provided by the workers employed in the construction work
of Madanganj Harmara Road could be said to be 'forced labour on the ground that
they received wage less than Rs.7 per day. Now it was not disputed on behalf of
the respondent that the wage paid to a gang of workmen depended upon the work
turned out by a particular gang and if it was less than the norm fixed by the
Public Works Department, the wage earned by each member of the gang would fall
short of the minimum wage of Rs. 7 per day. But the argument was that this did
not involve any breach of Article 23 because if any particular gang turned out
work according to the norm fixed by the Public Works Department, the amount
paid to the Mate of the gang was enough to give to each workman, on
distribution, the minimum wage of Rs. 7 per day, and it was only if less work
was turned out by the gang that the workmen would receive less than the minimum
wage of Rs. 7 per day and this result would ensue not on account of any default
on the part of the respondent but entirely because of the lethargy of the
workmen constituting the gang. The workmen, said the respondent, could always
earn the minimum wage of Rs. 7 per day by turning out work according to the
norm fixed by the Public Works Department but if they did not do so and in
consequence received less than the minimum 283 wage of Rs. 7 per day the
respondent could not be held responsible for breach of the fundamental right
conferred under article 23. This argument does, at first blush, appear to be
attractive, but a closer scrutiny will reveal that it is unfounded. If we look
at the Notification issued under the Minimum Wages Act 1948 fixing the minimum
wage of Rs. 7 per day for workmen employed in the construction work, it will be
obvious that the minimum wage is fixed per day and not with reference to any
particular quantity of work turned out by the workman during the day. Nor does
the Notification empower the employer to fix any particular norm of work to be
carried out by the workman with reference to which the minimum wage shall be
paid by the employer. The minimum wage is not fixed on piece rate basis, so
that a particular minimum wage would be payable only if a certain amount of
work is turned out by the workman and if he turns out less work, then the
minimum wage payable would be proportionately reduced. Here the minimum wage is
fixed at Rs. 7 per day and that is the minimum wage which must be paid by the
employer to the workman so long as the workman works throughout the working
hours of the day for which he can lawfully be required to work. The employer
may fix any norm he thinks fit specifying the quantity of work which must he
turned out by the workman during the day, but if the workman does not turn out
work in conformity with such norm, the employer cannot pay him anything less
than the minimum wage. If the norm fixed by the employer is reasonable and the
workman does not turn out work according to such norm, disciplinary action may
be taken against the workman and in a given case he may ever be liable to be thrown
out of employment, but he cannot be paid less than the minimum wage, unless, of
course, the minimum wage fixed by the Notification under the Minimum Wages Act
1948 is co-related with the quantity of work to be turned out by the workman.
Otherwise, it would be the easiest thing for the employer to fix an
unreasonably high norm which a workman working diligently and efficiently
during the day cannot possibly reach and thereby deprive the workman of the
minimum wage payable to him. There can therefore be no doubt that in the
present case the respondent was not entitled to pay less than the minimum wage
to the workman belonging to a gang on the ground that such gang turned out work
less than the norm fixed by the Public Works Department.
I must therefore hold that each workman
employed in the construction work of Madanganj Harmara Road was entitled to 284
receive the minimum wage of Rs. 7 per day from the respondent and the
respondent was not entitled to reduce the wage payable to the workman below the
minimum of Rs. 7 per day on the ground that the gang of which the workman was a
member had turned out work less than the norm fixed by the Public Works
Department. I would accordingly direct the respondent to pay to each workman
employed in the construction work of Madanganj Harmara Road the difference
between the minimum wage of Rs. 7 per day and the actual wage paid during the
period that the workman provided labour on this construction work. I do not
think it should be difficult for the State to carry out this direction since
the workman employed on this construction work are all residents of the
surrounding area and the muster roll maintained by the Public Works Department
would give the particulars of such workmen. I would direct that the arrears of
difference between the minimum wage of Rs. 7 per day and the actual wage
disbursed shall be paid by the respondent to the workmen within two months from
today and a report to that effect shall be submitted by the respondent to this
Court on or before 30th April, 1983 setting out particulars of the payments
made and the names of the workmen to whom such payments are made. I would also
direct that the State shall hereafter pay to each workman employed in any
famine relief work including the construction work of Madanganj Harmara Road,
minimum wage for the labour provided in such construction work and no deduction
in the minimum wage shall be made on the ground that the work turned out by
such workman is less than the norm fixed by the Public Works Department, unless
and until a notification is issued under the Minimum Wages Act 1948 co-relating
the minimum wage with a particular quantity of work to be turned out by the
workman.
Since the petitioners have succeeded in the
writ petition, the respondent will pay the costs of the writ petition to the
petitioners.
PATHAK J. I agree with the order proposed by
my learned brother. But while he has found substance in the contention that the
case is one of "forced labour" within the meaning of Art. 23 of the
Constitution, I prefer to rest my decision on the ground that there is a breach
of Art. 14 of the Constitution.
It appears that in order to provide relief to
persons affected by drought and scarcity conditions in the area, employment has
been offered in the construction of the Madanganj Harmara Road 285 Payment of
wages for the day is determined by the Public Works Department on the basis of
a standard norm of work, the wage for completing the daily standard norm being
fixed at Rs. 7. It may be noted that the minimum wage prescribed under the Minimum
Wages Act, 1948 in respect of such work is also Rs. 7 per day. The Public Works
Department has declared that if the quantum of work turned out during the day
is less than the fixed standard norm the workers will be paid a mere
proportionate amount of the wage of Rs. 7 per day, that is to say they will be
entitled to a reduced wage only.
Sanction for not adhering to the prescribed
minimum wage of Rs. 7 per day and making payment of a lesser wage has been
drawn from s. 3 of the Rajasthan Famine Relief Works Employees (Exemption from
Labour Laws) Act, 1964, which in provides, inter alia, that the Minimum Wages
Act, 1948 will not apply to famine relief works or the employees thereof.
The Minimum Wages Act being thus out of the
way, it is open to the Public Works Department to prescribe whatever wages
norms it considers appropriate for payment to persons, employed by way of
relief, who are affected by drought and scarcity conditions. It is apparent
that in the matter of wages such persons have been treated as a class different
from that to which workers from other areas belong. While the latter are
entitled under the Minimum Wages Act to the prescribed minimum wage, the former
must be content with a lesser wage if the work turned out is less than the
norm. To my mind, there is no justification for such discrimination.
The circumstance that employment has been
given to persons affected by drought and scarcity conditions provides only the
reason for extending such employment. In other words, the granting of relief to
persons in distress by giving them employment constitutes merely the motive for
giving them work. It cannot affect their right to what is due to every worker
in the course of such employment. The rights of all the workers will be the
same, whether they are drawn from an area affected by drought and scarcity
conditions or come from elsewhere. The mere circumstance that a worker belongs
to an area effected by drought and scarcity conditions can in no way influence
the scope and sum of those rights. In comparison with a worker belonging to
some other more fortunate area and doing the same kind of work, is he less
entitled than the other to the totality of those rights? Because he belongs to
a distressed area, is he liable in the computation of his wages, to be
distinguished from the other by the badge of his misfortune? The prescription
of equality in Art, 286 14 of the Constitution gives one answer only, and that
is a categorical negative. It is urged for the respondents that employment is
provided to all able-bodies inhabitants of the area as a measure of relief in
their distress and it has been considered desirable to provide employment to
all, even though at a wage below the prescribed minimum wage, than to provide
employment to some only at the prescribed minimum wage. The argument evidently
proceeds on the assumption that the wages are drawn from a fund too limited to
provide for payment of a minimum wage to all. I see no justification for
proceeding on that assumption. When the State employs workers for doing work
needed on its development projects, it must find funds for such projects. And
the fund must be sufficient to ensure the prescribed minimum wage to each
worker, and this is particularly so having regard to the concept of a
"minimum wage." It seems to me that by prescribing the criterion
which it has, the Public Works Department has effected an invidious
discrimination bearing no reasonable nexus to the object behind the employment.
In my judgment, the workers employed in the
construction of the Madanganj Harmara Road as a measure of relief in a famine
stricken area are entitled to a minimum wage of Rs. 7 per day, and that wage
cannot be reduced by reference to the Rajasthan Famine Relief Works Employees
(Exception from Labour Laws) Act, 1964 because in so far as the provisions of
s. 3 OF that Act countenance a lesser wage they operate against Art 14 of the
Constitution and are, therefore, void.
S.R. Petition allowed.
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