Begulla Bapi Raju Vs. State of Andhra
Pradesh [1983] INSC 103 (23 August 1983)
MISRA, R.B. (J) MISRA, R.B. (J) SEN, A.P. (J)
VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J)
CITATION: 1983 AIR 1073 1983 SCR (3) 701 1984
SCC (1) 66 1983 SCALE (2)141
CITATOR INFO :
F 1984 SC 515 (2)
ACT:
Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on
Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973, Section 3(f), definition of family
unit-Whether the term "minor sons" would include a "separated
minor son" long before the coming into force of the Act and whether the lands
transferred by such separated minor sons to third parties by separate sale
deeds would also form part of a holding for the purposes of Sections 3(f),
3(0), 4, 5(3), 5(4), 7, Explanations I and II to Sections 8 and 10-Whether to
answer in the affirmative and holding so would be in violation of Articles 14
and 21 of the Constitution-Whether a new plea not taken before the High Court
would be allowed to be taken for the first time in the Supreme Court and a
petitioner be given liberty to produce a document in future.
HEADNOTE:
The Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on
Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 was enacted on January 1, 1973. Soon after, its constitutional validity was challenged before the Andhra Pradesh High Court
on various grounds but a Full Bench of the said High Court negative the same on
11th of April 1973. Therefore, the Act was brought into force on January 1,
1975 by virtue of a notification issued by the State Government.
The three petitioners in SLP 6794/1978 filed
separate declarations in accordance with Section 8 of the Act on the footing
that the minor sons separated long before the enactment or enforcement of the
Act did not constitute a "family unit" and their holdings cannot be
tagged with the holding of the father and that land transferred to outsiders
long before the enactment either under agreement to sale or under gift deed
should not be included in the holding of the petitioners. The Land Reforms
Tribunal, Kovvur rejected the said pleas and on September 27, 1976 declared that
the 'family unit' was in possession of excess land over the ceiling limit. The
appeal preferred before the Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal was allowed in
part. The revision petition filed before the High Court was dismissed on the
7th of July 1978 and hence the Special Leave petitions to appeal.
During the pendency of the revision petition
in the High Court the Andhra Pradesh Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings
(Amendment) Act, 1977 was enacted with retrospective effect from 1st January,
1975 which introduced Section 4A among other provisions. The constitutional
validity of the Amendment) Act was challenged on the grounds, namely, the State
Act is void and inoperative by reason of enactment of the Urban Land (Ceiling
and Regulation) Act, 1976 (Central Act) and that the definition of 'family
unit' was violative 702 of Article 14 of the constitution. This Court upheld
the validity of the Act in Tumati Venkaish v. State of Andhra Pradesh etc.,
[1980] 3 SCR 1143.
In the Special Leave petitions under
consideration the following contentions were raised:
1. A separated minor son is not a member of
the 'family unit' and, therefore, his property cannot be tagged with that of
his father.
2. Some of the plots fall in drought-prone
area and, therefore, the petitioner should have got an advantage of twelve and
a half per cent.
3. The definition of family unit under S.
3(f) as interpreted by the High Court is also violative of Article 14 of the
Constitution.
4. Land transferred by the petitioners under
various transfer deeds to outsiders and who came in possession also could not
be included in the holding of the petitioners.
5. (a) Section 3(f) of the Andhra Pradesh Act
coupled with explanation thereto being destructive of Article 21 of the
Constitution is violative of the basic structure of the Constitution.
(b) Life and livelihood go together and,
therefore, deprivation of the minors of the land is hit by Article 21 of the
Constitution which contemplates not only a mere existence but living with
dignity.
Dismissing the petitions, the Court
HELD: 1. There is no infirmity in any of the
provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Land reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural
Holdings) Act, 1973. All the contentions raised are no longer res integra,
since they are covered by earlier decisions of this Court. [718 F] 2:1. From a
reading of sections 3(f), 3(0), 4, 5(3), 5(4), 8 and 10, it will be clear that
the ceiling area in case of an individual who is not a member of the family
unit is equivalent to one standard holding and so also in the case of a family
unit with not more than five members the ceiling area is the same. But if the
family unit consisted of more than five members the ceiling area would stand
increased by one-fifth of one standard holding for every additional member of
the family unit, subject, however, to the maximum limit of two standard
holdings. In view of the explanation added to S. 4 the land held by all the
members of the family unit shall be aggregated for the purpose of computing the
holding of the family unit. Obviously, therefore, where a family 703 unit
consisted of father, mother, and minor sons or daughters the land held by all
these persons would have to be clubbed together and then ceiling area limit
applied to the aggregate holding. No distinction has been made in the
definition of family unit between a divided minor son and an undivided minor
son. Both stand on the same footing and a divided minor son is as much a member
of the family unit as an undivided minor son. Family unit is not to be confused
with joint family. [710 A-D] 2:2. The definition of family unit alongwith the
explanation does not leave the slightest doubt that a separated minor son is as
much a member of the family unit as a joint son with his father. [713 B] Kanuru
Venkatakrishna Rao v. The Authorised Officer, Land Reforms, Bandar & Ors,
[1978] Andhra Law Journal Vol.
II, p. 114, approved.
State of Maharashtra v. Vyasendra, C.A. No.
4264/83 decided by S.C. on 3-5-1983, followed.
3:1. In order to attract the provisions of
clause (iv) of section 5 of the Act, the petitioners have to establish that the
Government by notification has declared a particular area to be a drought prone
area. Here, the petitioners should have raised a contention to that effect
before the High Court and should have produced the necessary notification but
they did not do so. Even before this Court they have not been able to produce
the specific notification issued by the Government. Under the circumstances
they cannot be allowed to urge this new point for want of necessary foundation.
[713 F-H] 3:2. This Court cannot give a blank cheque to the petitioners to
produce the required notification as and when they like according to their
sweet will. [714 G]
4. The definition of family unit under
section 3(f) of the Act, as interpreted by the High Court is not violative of
Article 14 of the Constitution. Further it is saved by the protective umbrella
under Article 31A and 31B of the Constitution. [714B-C] Seth Nand Lal &
Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors., [1980] 3 SCR 1181, followed.
5. After taking into consideration the
various relevant provisions of the Act, the Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v.
Mohd. Ashrafuddin AIR 1982 S.C. 913 correctly came to the conclusion that the
same land can be the land of the transferor as well as the transferee in view
of the definition of the term 'holding' in section 3(1) of the Andhra Pradesh
Act and the said view does not require reconsideration. [717 A-B]
6. The contention that life includes
livelihood within the meaning of Article 21 of the Constitution was repelled in
In re: Sant Ram, [1960] 3 SCR 499 and A.V. Nachane v. Union of India, [1982] 1
SCC. 206 and since Maneka 704 Gandhi v. Union of India did not take into
consideration Sant Ram's case, these cases therefore, still hold the field.
Besides, the petitioners have been deprived of their holding in the form of
surplus land but it was only for the purpose of giving relief to the
downtrodden and the poor agricultural labourers. The surplus land would vest in
the State and the State in its turn would give it to the poor and the
downtrodden and thus such a deprivation will be protected under Article 39 of
the Directive Principles. [718 C-E] Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978] 2
SCR 621, distinguished.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Special Leave
Petition (Civil) Nos. 1671, 2631, 3322-23, 3904, 4418, 9796, 9127 of 1979,
6639-40, 6794, 5121-22 of 1978, 10403 of 1979, 3797 of 1980.
From the Judgments and Orders dated the
6-7-77, 19.12.77, 20.12.77, 20-4-78, 28-2-78, 4-7-79, 8-6-78, 7-7- 78, 12-7-78,
9-8-79, 18-1-78 and 13-10-77 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Civil Revision
Petition Nos. 1991/76 & 403/77, 1612/77, 1268 & 1275/77, 4436/77,
2571/77, 7175/78, 7174/78, 70 & 1907/78, 564/78, 1036 & 1126/78,
1686/79, 1387/77 and 2677 of 1977 WITH Writ Petition No. 4789 of 1982 AND Writ
Petition No. 4703 of 1978 (Under article 32 of the Constitution of India) FOR
THE APPEARING PARTIES M.N. Phadke, G.V. Sastry and P. Rama Reddy.
A. Subba Rao, B. Partha Sarathi, T.V.S.N.
Chari, B. Kanta Rao, K.R. Chowdhari, A.V.V. Nair, Mrs. V.D. Khanna and V.M.
Phadke.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
MISRA J. This batch of special leave petitions and writ petitions arising out
of proceedings under the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural
Holdings) Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Andhra Pradesh Act') is
directed against the judgments of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh and raise
common questions of 705 law. They are, therefore, being disposed of by a common
judgment. It will suffice to refer to the facts of Special Leave Petition No.
6794 of 1978, Chinnam Nagabhushnam and others v. State of Andhra Pradesh to
bring out the points of controversy in these cases.
Chinnam Jaganmohanrao and Chinnam
Sivaramprasad, petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 are the sons of the first petitioner,
Chinnam Nagabhushnam. Petitioner No. 2 is still a minor but petitioner No. 3
has become major recently. The first petitioner and the third petitioner
partitioned their property by metes and bounds by virtue of a registered
partition deed dated 12th of April 1960 and since then they are in separate
possession of the land falling in their respective shares. By a second
partition deed dated 11th of April, 1969 the first petitioner and the second
petitioner further partitioned the properties that fell to the share of the
first petitioner in the first partition between themselves. On 10th January
1970 the third petitioner sold an area of 12.00 acres of Pangidigudem village
to P.
Pattabhi. On 10th of April 1970 he sold an
area of 10.22 acres and 10.00 acres of village Pangidigudem under sale
agreement Ext. A-9, for Rs. 80,000 to G. Veeraju and the vendee was put in
possession. On 12th of June 1970 the first petitioner sold an area of 22.63
acres of Pangidigudem village to one B. Appa Rao under sale agreement Ext.
A-12.
Again on 16th of June 1970 the third
petitioner sold an area of 8.00 acres of Pangidigudem village to B. Balaram
Singh under sale agreement Ext. A-10.
The Andhra Pradesh Act came into force on 1st
of January 1975 by virtue of a notification issued by the State Government. By
April 1, 1975 all the three petitioners filed separate declarations in
accordance with s. 8 of the Act on the footing that separated minor sons did
not constitute a 'family unit' and their holdings cannot be tagged with the
holding of the father and that land transferred to outsiders either under
agreement of sale or under gift deed should not be included in the holding of
the petitioners. The Land Reforms Tribunal, Kovvur, however, treated the
holding in question as the holding of the 'family unit' on the finding that
divided minor sons also constituted a 'family unit', and the part of holding
transferred to various persons either under agreements of sale or under gift
deed formed a part and parcel of the holding of the 'family unit'.
Accordingly, on 27th of September, 1976 the
Tribunal declared that the 'family unit' was in possession of excess land over
the ceiling limit. The petitioners filed an appeal before the Land Reforms
Appellate 706 Tribunal. The Appellate Tribunal, in its turn, allowed the appeal
in part. The petitioners still feeling aggrieved filed a revision to the High
Court of Andhra Pradesh. The High Court dismissed the same on 7th of July,
1978. The petitioners have now filed the special leave petition to challenge
the order of the High Court.
Shri M.N. Phadke appearing for the
petitioners has raised the following contentions:
1. A separated minor son is not a member of
the 'family unit' and, therefore, his property cannot be tagged with that of
his father.
2. Some of the plots fall in drought-prone
area and, therefore, the petitioner should have got an advantage of twelve and
a half per cent.
3. The definition of family unit under s. 3
(f) as interpreted by the High Court is also violative of Article 14 of the
Constitution.
4. Land transferred by the petitioners under
various transfer deeds to outsiders and who came in possession also could not
be included in the holding of the petitioners.
5.(a)Section 3 (f) of the Andhra Pradesh Act
coupled with explanation thereto being destructive of Article 21 of the
Constitution is violative of the basic structure of the Constitution.
5.(b)Life and livelihood go together and,
therefore, deprivation of the minors of the land is hit by Article 21 of the
Constitution which contemplates not only a mere existence but living with
dignity.
The argument by the counsel for the parties
was over on 23rd of March, 1983 when the judgment was reserved. Two weeks were,
however, allowed to Shri Phadke to file written submissions and three weeks
time to file the notification with respect to drought-prone areas in the above
matter.
Time for filing written submissions was
extended up to 14th April, 1983. The petitioners, however, were 707 not able to
get the exact notification in respect of the drought-prone area. They have,
therefore, in their written arguments sought permission to withdraw the said
contention for the present with liberty to raise the same before the
appropriate authority whenever the said notification is available.
Before dealing with the points raised by the
learned counsel for the petitioners it may be pointed out that the Andhra
Pradesh Act was enacted by the Andhra Pradesh Legislature on 1st of January,
1973. Soon after, its constitutional validity was challenged before the Andhra
Pradesh High Court on various grounds but a Full Bench of the High Court
negatived the challenge and held the Act to be constitutionally valid on 11th
of April, 1973. Effective steps for implementation of the Act could not,
however, be taken till the 1st of January, 1975.
The Andhra Pradesh Ceiling on Agricultural
Holdings (Amendment) Act, 1977 was enacted with retrospective effect from 1st
January, 1975 which introduced s. 4 A among other provisions. As soon as the
amending Act was passed another round of litigation was started by the land
holders by filing writ petitions in this Court challenging again the
constitutional validity of the Andhra Pradesh Act. One of the grounds taken was
that by reason of enactment of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act,
1976 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Central Act') the Andhra Pradesh Act had
become void and inoperative. The other ground taken in those cases was that the
definition of 'family unit' was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.
The ground of discrimination under Article 14 was, however, negatived by the
Court. Certain other questions involving the interpretation of the provisions
of the Andhra Pradesh Act were also raised in some of the writ petitions. But
this Court in Tumati Venkaish etc. v. State of Andhra Pradesh(1) observed that
the other questions could be agitated by the land holders in the appeals filed
by them against the orders determining surplus land. This Court did not invalidate
the whole of the Andhra Pradesh Act but only in respect of the provisions which
were found repugnant to the provisions of the Central Act.
This is the third attempt on the part of the
land holders to challenge the constitutional validity of some of the provisions
of the Andhra Pradesh Act.
708 All the points raised by Shri Phadke are
covered by some decision or the other of the Supreme Court. Shri Phadke,
however, tried to distinguish those cases on the ground that the specific pleas
sought to be raised by him in the present petition were not actually considered
in those decisions, and, therefore, he cannot be precluded from raising the
contentions which were conspicuous by their absence in those decisions. We take
up the first ground first.
In Tumati Venkaish's case (supra) this Court
made it clear, as stated earlier, that it would examine only the constitutional
validity of the Andhra Pradesh Act and other questions could be agitated the
land holders in the petitions filed by them against the orders determining the
surplus land. In spite of the aforesaid observation the Court did consider the
question whether a separated minor son will or will not be construed as a
member of the family unit, as will be evident from the following observations
made by the Court:
"The next contention urged on behalf of
the land- holders was that on a proper construction of the relevant provisions
of the Andhra Pradesh Act, a divided minor son was not liable to be included in
"family unit" as defined in section 3 (f) of that Act., and
eventually the Court held:
"We do not therefore see how a divided
minor son can be excluded from the family unit. That would be flying in the
face of sections 3 (f) and 4 of the Andhra Pradesh Act." It will be
relevant at this stage to refer to certain material provisions of the Act in
order to appreciate the arguments:
"3. In this Act, unless the context
otherwise requires-(f) 'family unit' means- (i) in the case of an individual
who has a spouse or spouses, such individual, the spouse or spouses and their
minor sons and their unmarried minor daughters, if any;
(ii) in the case of an individual who has no
spouse such individual and his or her minor sons and unmarried minor daughters;
709 (iii)in the case of an individual who is
a divorced husband and who has not remarried, such individual and his minor
sons and unmarried minor daughters, whether in his custody or not; and (iv)
where an individual and his or her spouse are both dead, their minor sons and
unmarried minor daughters.
Explanation:- Where a minor son is married,
his wife and their off-spring, if any, shall also be deemed to be members of
the family unit of which the minor son is a member." Section 3 (o) defines
'person' as including inter alia an individual and a family unit. Section 10 is
a key section which imposes ceiling on the holding of land by providing that if
the extent of the holding of a person is in excess of the ceiling area, the
person shall be liable to surrender the land held in excess. If, therefore, an
individual or family unit holds land in excess of the ceiling area, the excess
land would have to be surrendered to the State Government. The extent of the
ceiling area has been provided by s. 4 (1) of the Andhra Pradesh Act, which
reads:
"4(1) The ceiling area in the case of a
family unit consisting of not more than five members shall be an extent of land
equal to one standard holding.
(2) the ceiling area in the case of a family
unit consisting of more than five members shall be an extent of land equal to
one standard holding plus an additional extent of one-fifth of one standard
holding for every such member in excess of five, so however, that the ceiling
area shall not exceed two standard holdings.
(3) The ceiling area in the case of every
individual who is not a member of a family unit, and in the case of any other
person shall be an extent of land equal to one standard holding.
Explanation:- In the case of a family unit,
the ceiling area shall be applied to the aggregate of the lands held by all the
members of the family unit." 710 It will thus be clear that the ceiling
area in case of an individual who is not a member of the family unit is
equivalent to one standard holding and so also in the case of a family unit
with not more than five members the ceiling area is the same. But if the family
unit consisted of more than five members the ceiling area would stand increased
by one-fifth of one standard holding for every additional member of the family
unit, subject, however, to the maximum limit of two standard holdings. In view
of the explanation added to s. 4 the land held by all the members of the family
unit shall be aggregated for the purpose of computing the holding of the family
unit. Obviously, therefore, where a family unit consisted of father, mother,
and minor sons or daughters the land held by all these persons would have to be
clubbed together and then ceiling area limit applied to the aggregate holding.
No distinction has been made in the definition of a family unit between a
divided minor son an undivided minor son. Both stand on the same footing and a
divided minor son is as much a member of the family unit as an undivided minor
son. Family unit is not to be confused with joint family.
The contention of Shri Phadke is that the
definition of various terms as given in s. 3 of the Andhra Pradesh Act opens
with the words. "In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires."
According to the learned counsel the context 'otherwise requires' that the word
'minor' in s. 3 (f) cannot include a divided minor son. Section 4 (2), argued
the learned counsel, deals with the ceiling area of a family unit and s. 4 (3)
deals with the ceiling area of an individual who is not a member of a family
unit. A divided minor son, submits the counsel, is an individual and is no
longer a member of the family unit in as much as a partition has not only the
effect of division of the property but a complete severance from membership of
the joint family. Thus a minor who is separated under a partition deed cannot
be a member of the family unit but becomes an individual.
The counsel supported his argument by
reference to cls. (3) and (4) of s. 5 of the Andhra Pradesh Act. Clause (3)
deals with the holding of an individual who is not a member of a family unit
but is a member of joint family, and reads:
"(3) In computing the holding of an
individual who is not a member of a family unit, but is a member of a 711 joint
family, the share of such an individual in the lands held by the joint family
shall be taken into account and aggregated with the lands, if any, held by him
separately and for this purpose, such share shall be deemed to be the extent of
land which would be allotted to such individual had there been a partition of
the lands held by the joint family.' Clause (4) deals with the member of a
family unit who is also a member of a joint family, and reads:
"(4) In computing the holding of the
member of a family unit who is also a member of a joint family, the share of
such member in the lands held by the joint family shall be taken into account
and aggregated with the lands, if any, held by him separately and for this
purpose, such share shall be deemed to be the extent of land which would be
allotted to such member, had there been a partition of the land held by the
joint family." On the strength of these clauses it is sought to be argued
for the petitioners that joint family is recognised as a legal entity in the
computation of holding. Reference was also made to s. 3 (f), cl. (iv) which
provides that where an individual and his or her spouse are both dead, their
minor sons and unmarried daughters will be a constituent of 'family unit'. The
contention of Shri Phadke is that in view of cl. (iv) of s. 3 (f) an orphan
constitutes a family unit and is a member thereof, and in the light of these
provisions if one looks at s. 8, Explanation [ regarding declaration of holding
it will be clear that it speaks of "where the land is held or is deemed to
be held by a minor not being a member of a family unit, the declaration shall
be furnished by his guardian". Explanation II deals with the land held by
the family unit and the declaration on behalf of the family unit is to be made
by a person in the management of the property of such family unit. Such a minor
not being a member of the family unit, says the counsel, can only be a
separated member of the joint family.
Shri Ram Reddy, learned counsel for the
respondent State relied on Kanuru Venkatakrishna Rao v. The Authorised Officer,
Land Reforms, Bandar & Ors.(1) in support of his contention that a sepa-
712 rated minor son is as much a member of the family unit as a non-separated
minor son. The precise argument of the learned counsel in that case was that
since no provision is made in the Act to indicate the holding of a 'family
unit', the other provisions of the Act cannot have any application with regard
to a family unit. The High Court held:
"According to the definition of the term
'person' a family unit is also a person. All the provisions of the Act are
intended by the Legislature to apply to the family unit like the other
categories of the term 'person' as per its definition. Therefore, the
legislature intended the family unit also to have a holding for the purpose of
applying provisions of the Act relating to determination of the ceiling limit
and excess land, if any, over it. It is true the provision is not specific that
such and such land constitutes the holding of a family unit. But from what was
said in the explanation to section 4, it is clear what is meant by the
Legislature to be the holding of a family unit. The implication is very clear
that the holding of a family unit is the aggregate of all the lands held by all
the members of the family unit ....By means of the Explanation itself the
Legislature intended to make that provision." A similar question arose in
a recent case before this Court in Civil Appeal No. 4264 of 1983: State of
Maharashtra v. Vyasendra decided on 3rd May, 1983 by a Division Bench on
Section 4 of the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961
dealt with 'family unit' and the land held by it. Dealing with the question
Hon'ble the Chief Justice speaking for the Court observed:
"The circumstance that the land held by
a constituent member of the family unit is separate property or stridhan property
is a matter of no consequence whatsoever for the purpose of determining the
ceiling area which the family unit can retain. The respondent, his wife and
their minor sons and minor unmarried daughters, if any, are all constituent
members of the family unit and all the lands held by them have to be pooled
together for the purpose of determining the ceiling area which is permissible
to the family unit. The nature or character of their interest in 713 the land
held by them is irrelevant for computing the ceiling area which the family unit
may retain.
In our opinion, therefore, the definition of
family unit along with the explanation does not leave the slightest doubt that
a separated minor son is as much a member of the family unit as a joint son
with his father.
This leads us to the second group relating to
drought- prone area. It may be pointed out at the very outset that no such plea
had been taken before the High Court. The petitioners seek to get an advantage
of 12 1/2 per cent on account of the land lying in drought-prone area in view
of s. 5 (iv) of the Andhra Pradesh Act. Section 5 (iv) provides:
"5 (iv) In the case of any dry land
situated in any area declared by the Government by notification to be a drought
prone area, the extent of standard holding shall be increased,- (a) by twelve
and a half per centum, in the case of any dry land falling under Class G or
Class H of the Table below;
(b) by twenty per centum, in the case of any
dry land falling under Class I, Class J or Class K of the said Table." In
order to attract the provisions of cl. (iv) of s. 5 the petitioners have to
establish that the Government by notification has declared a particular area to
be a drought prone-area. The petitioners were given an opportunity to produce
the notification which they have failed to do and now the petitioners seek that
they should be given an opportunity to produce the specific notification as and
when they are able to procure the same. We are not inclined to give such a
blank-cheque to the petitioners to produce the required notification as and
when they like. Indeed they should have raised a contention to that effect
before the High Court and should have produced the necessary notification but
that they did not do. Even before this Court they have not been able to produce
the specific notification issued by the Government. Under the circumstances
they cannot be allowed to urge this point for want to necessary foundation for
the 714 argument. We also decline to accede to their request that they may be allowed
to produce the required Government notification according to their sweet will
and as and when they are able to produce the same.
We now take up the third ground that the
definition of family unit under s. 3 (f), as interpreted by the High Court is
violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution. This point is also covered by a
decision of this Court in Seth Nand Lal & Anr. v. State of Haryana &
Ors.(1) and the Court repelled the argument firstly on the ground that it was
saved by the protective umbrella under Art. 31A and Art. 31B of the
Constitution and also on other considerations as will be evident from the
following observation:
"It has been pointed out that adopting
'family' as a unit as against 'an individual' was considered necessary as that
would reduce the scope for evasion of law by effecting mala fide partitions and
transfers since such transactions are usually made in favour of family members
that normally in rural agricultural set up in our country the family is the
operative unit and all the lands of a family constitute a single operational
holding and that therefore ceiling should be related to the capacity of a
family to cultivate the lands personally. It has been pointed out that keeping
all these aspects in view the concept of family was artificially defined and
double standard for fixing ceiling, one for the primary unit and other for the
adult son living with the family was adopted In fact, a provision like s. 4(3)
which makes for the augmentation of the permissible area for a family when the
adult sons do not own or hold lands of their own but are living with the family
has one virtue, that it ensures such augmentation in the case of every family
irrespective of by what personal law it is governed and no discrimination is
made between major sons governed by different systems of personal laws. So far
as an adult son living separately from the family is concerned, he is rightly
regarded as a separate unit who will have to file a separate declaration in
respect of his holding under s. 9 of the Act and since he is living separately
and would not be contributing his capacity to the family to cultivate the
family lands 715 personally, there is no justification for increasing the
permissible area of the primary unit of the family.
The case of an unmarried daughter or
daughters living with the family, counsel pointed out, was probably considered
to be a rare case and it was presumed that daughters would in normal course get
married and would become members of their husbands' units and that is why no separate
provision was made for giving additional land for every unmarried major
daughter living with the family. On the materials placed and the initial
presumption of constitutionality, we find considerable force in this
submission. It is, therefore, not possible to strike down an enactment
particularly the enactment dealing with agrarian reform which has been put on
the Statutes Book with the avowed purpose of bringing about equality or rather
reducing the inequality between the haves and the have-nots, as being violative
of Art. 14 of the Constitution simply because it has failed to make a provision
for what was regarded as an exceptional case or a rare contingency.
In our view, the material furnished on behalf
of the State Government by way of justification for adopting an artificial
definition of family and a double standard for fixing ceiling is sufficient to
rebel the attack on these provisions under Art. 14." We fully concur with
the view of the Court.
We now take up the fourth ground. The learned
counsel for the petitioners contends that the land transferred by the
petitioners in favour of outsiders under various deeds could not be included in
their holdings, especially when those transfers were not hit by s. 7 of the
Andhra Pradesh Act in as much as the transfers were made much before 24th of
January, 1971. This point is again covered by a decision of this Court in State
of Andhra Pradesh v. Mohd.. Ashrafuddin(1, to which one of us was a party. In
that case the Court had to construe the expression 'held' as defined in s.3 (i)
of the Andhra Pradesh Act. It reads:
"3(i) 'holding' means the entire land
held by a person,- (i) as an owner;
716 (ii) as a limited owner;
(iii)as a usufructuary mortgage;
(iv) as a tenant;
(v) who is in possession by virtue of a
mortgage by conditional sale or through part performance of a contract for the
sale of land or otherwise, or in one or more of such capacities;
and the expression 'to hold land' shall be
construed accordingly.
Explanation:-Where the same land is held by
one person in one capacity and by another person in any other capacity, such
land shall be included in the holding of both such persons." Dealing with
the expressions 'held' the Court observed:
"The word 'held' is not defined in the
Act. We have, therefore, to go by the dictionary meaning of the term. According
to Oxford Dictionary 'held' means: to possess to be the owner or holder or
tenant of; keep possession of; occupy. Thus, 'held' connotes both ownership as
well as possession. And in the context of the definition it is not possible to
interpret the term 'held' only in the sense of possession. For example, if a
land is held by an owner and also by a tenant or by a person in possession
pursuant to a contract for sale, the holding will be taken to be the holding of
all such persons. It obviously means that an owner who is not an actual
possession will also be taken to be a holder of the land. If there was any
doubt in this behalf, the same has been dispelled by the explanation attached
to the definition of the term 'holding'. The explanation clearly contemplates
that the same land can be the holding of two different persons holding the land
in two different capacities. The respondent in view of the definition certainly
is holding as an owner, although he is not in possession." Shri Phadke,
however, contends that s. 3(i) of the Andhra Pradesh Act being unreasonable is
ultra vires because the same land 717 cannot be the land of the transferor as
well as of the transferee and that Mohd. Ashrafuddin's case (supra) requires
reconsideration. That case has taken into consideration the various relevant
provisions of the Act and the Court came to the conclusion the same land can be
the land of the transferor as well as the transferee in view of the definition of
the term 'holding' in s. 3(i) of the Andhra Pradesh Act and in our opinion the
view taken in that case is fully warranted by the provisions of the Act. We are
not persuaded to accept the contention that the case requires re-consideration.
This leads us to the last point but not the
least in importance, in that the petitioners have been deprived of a
substantial portion of their holding in the form of surplus land and thereby
they have been deprived of their livelihood affecting their right to live, which
is violative of Art. 21 of the Constitution. In support of this contention
strong reliance was placed on the case of Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India(1)
which has given a new dimension to Art. 21 of the Constitution. It was held in
that case that right to live is not merely confined to physical existence, but
it includes within its ambit the right to live with basic human dignity and the
State cannot deprive anyone of this valuable right.
It was further submitted that s. 3(f) of the
Andhra Pradesh Act with the explanation added to it is destructive of Art. 21
and, therefore, violative of the basic structure of the Constitution. This
point is also covered by two decisions of this Court. In re Sant Ram(2) dealing
with Art. 21 of the Constitution a Bench of Five Judges of this Court held:
"The argument that the word
"life" in Art. 21 of the Constitution includes "livelihood"
has only to be stated to be rejected." "The same view was reiterated
by a Bench of three Judges in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India(3). In that case
the validity of the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 (I of
1981) and the Life Insurance Corporation of India Class III and Class IV
Employees (Bonus and Dearness Allowance) Rules, 1981, were challenged on
several grounds including Art. 21 of the Constitution and the Court dealing
with this aspect of the matter quoted with approval the case of Sant Ram
(supra) in the following words:
718 "As regards Article 21, the first
premise of the argument that the word 'life' in that Article includes
livelihood was considered and rejected in In re Sant Ram." Shri Phadke,
however, brushed these cases aside on the simple ground that they are not
relevant for the decision of the question whether the right to live includes
the right to live with human dignity, and the decision on Maneka Gandhi's case
(supra) must be deemed to be the correct exposition of the law on the subject.
The contention that life includes livelihood within the meaning of Art. 21 of
the Constitution was repelled in these two cases and Maneka Gandhi's case did
not take into consideration the case of Sant Ram (supra).
These cases, therefore, still hold the field.
Besides, the petitioners have been deprived
of their holding in the form of surplus land but it was only for the purpose of
giving relief to the downtrodden and the poor agricultural labourers. The
surplus land would vest in the State and the State in its turn would give it to
the poor and the downtrodden and thus such a deprivation will be protected
under Art. 39 of Directive Principles. The case of Maneka Gandhi (supra), in
our opinion, is not relevant for the decision of the point under consideration.
The counsel for the petitioners in other
cases adopted the same argument of Shri Phadke.
Having given our best consideration to the
questions involved in the cases we find no infirmity in any of the provisions
of the Andhra Pradesh Act.
For the foregoing discussion all the special
leave petitions and the writ petitions must fail. They are accordingly
dismissed.
S.R. Petitions dismissed.
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