Smt. Anand Kaur Vs. Pritam Lal [1982]
INSC 4 (14 January 1982)
KOSHAL, A.D.
KOSHAL, A.D.
ERADI, V. BALAKRISHNA (J) MISRA, R.B. (J)
CITATION: 1982 AIR 777 1982 SCR (3) 43 1982
SCC (1) 502 1982 SCALE (1)2
ACT:
Delhi Rent Control Act-Section 14(1), proviso
(a) read with proviso to section 14(2)-scope of.
HEADNOTE:
When a tenant has neither paid nor tendered
the whole of the arrears of rent legally recoverable from him within two months
of the date on which the notice of demand for the arrears of rent has been
served on him by the landlord proviso (a) to section 14(1) empowers the
Controller to make an order for the recovery of possession of the premises. The
proviso to section 14(2) states that no tenant shall be entitled to the benefit
under the sub-section if having obtained such benefit once in respect of any
premises he again makes a default in the payment of rent of those premises for
three consecutive months.
On 14th December, 1973, the
land-lady-appellant issued a notice to the tenant stating that he had not paid
the damages after May 1973 and called upon him to pay the arrears within two
months from the date of notice. The tenant remitted the rent to the land-lady
by money-order towards the end of February 1974 but she refused to accept the
same.
On the land-lady's application the
Controller, and the Tribunal in appeal, held that the notice was valid and that
the expression "damages for the use and occupation" meant nothing
more nor less than rent. But the High Court on appeal held that the term "rent"
and "damages for use and occupation" could not be taken to be
synonymous terms and that the notice issued by the land-lady did not satisfy
the requirements of clause (a) of the proviso to section 14(1) of the Act in
that it did not demand rent from the tenant.
Allowing the appeal and remitting the case to
the Court below
HELD: The notice issued by the land-lady
satisfies the requirements of clause (a) of the proviso to section 14(1).
[46 D] The High Court has taken an
unnecessarily hyper-technical view of the contents of the notice which
specifically stated that on account of the termination of the tenancy by an
earlier notice the tenant had become a statutory tenant and it was in this
context that a claim was made for damages for use and occupation at a rate
equivalent to the agreed rent. The demand so made could not be construed as
anything but a demand for rent. [46 B-C] 44
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal
No. 966 of 1976.
(Appeal by special leave from the judgment
and order dated the 6th February, 1976 of the Delhi High Court in S.A.O. No.
148 of 1975) Vinoo Bhagat for the Appellant.
G. D. Gupta for the Respondent (Not Present)
The Order of the Court was delivered by KOSHAL, J. The short point arising for
determination in this appeal concerns the validity of a notice served by the
landlady appellant on the tenant-respondent and purporting to be one issued in
accordance with the provisions contained in clause (a) of sub-section (1) of
section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act (hereinafter called the Act), and we
may at the very outset reproduce the relevant provisions of that section:
"14(1) Notwithstanding anything to the
contrary contained in any other law or contract, no order or decree for the
recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any court or Controller
in favour of the landlord against a tenant:
Provided that the Controller may, on an
application made to him in the prescribed manner, make an order for the
recovery of possession of the premises on one or more of the following grounds
only, namely:
(a) that the tenant has neither paid nor
tendered the whole of the arrears of the rent legally recoverable from him
within two months of the date on which a notice of demand for the arrears of
rent has been served on him by the landlord in the manner provided in section
106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882;
14(2) No order for the recovery of possession
of any premises shall be made on the ground specified in clause 45 (a) of the
proviso to sub-section (1), if the tenant makes payment or deposit as required
by section 15:
Provided that no tenant shall be entitled to
the benefit under this sub-section, if having obtained such benefit once in
respect of any premises, he again makes a default in the payment of rent of
those premises for three consecutive months."
2. The tenant respondent has remained absent
and unrepresented at the hearing and we have had the advantage of being
addressed by Mr. Vinoo Bhagat, learned counsel for the appellant only.
3. It was not disputed before the High Court
that in an earlier proceeding the tenant had taken advantage of the provisions
contained in sub-section (2) of section 14 of the Act, that he committed
another default in the payment of rent which covered the period from 1.6.1973
to 30.11.1973 and that it was then that a notice dated 14.12.1973 was served on
him. The notice stated:
"Your contractual tenancy in respect of
House No. A-54 (double-storey) Kalkaji, New Delhi-19 had already been
terminated where after you are a statutory tenant liable to pay damages for use
and occupation at the rate of Rs. 15/- (Rupees fifteen per month) to me. That
you have not paid the said damages after May, 1973. In case you do not clear
the arrears upto date within two months from the date of this notice, I shall
be compelled to issue instructions to my legal adviser to file an application
for your eviction .........." No attempt to pay the rent was made inspite
of the notice till the end of February, 1974. Although thereafter rent was
remitted to the landlady through money orders but she refused to accept the
same and made an application to the Controller for eviction of the tenant on
the sole ground of a second default in the payment of rent. Both the Controller
and the Tribunal in the appeal held that the notice was a valid one and that
the expression "damages for use and occupation" contained therein
meant nothing more or less than rent. In a second appeal, a learned Single
Judge differed from the Courts below and was of the opinion that the word
'rent' and they said expression could not be taken to be 46 synonymous and that
there was no demand of rent in the notice in question which did not, therefore,
satisfy the requirements of the provisions contained in clause (a) above
extracted. It is the judgment of the learned Single Judge which is assailed in
the present appeal.
4. After hearing Mr. Vinoo Bhagat, learned
counsel for the appellant, we are of the opinion that the learned Single Judge
has taken an unnecessarily hyper-technical view of the contents of the notice.
It is significant that the notice specifically stated that on account of the
termination of the tenancy by an earlier notice the tenant had become what is
popularly known as a statutory tenant and it was in this context that a claim
was made for damages for use and occupation at a rate equivalent to the agreed
rent. We are of the opinion that in the circumstances of the case the demand so
made could not be construed as anything but a demand for rent. Consequently the
notice must be held to satisfy the requirements of clause (a) of sub-section
(1) of Section 14 of the Act.
5. For the reasons stated above, we accept
the appeal, set aside the impugned judgment and restore the orders of the
Controller and the Tribunal. The case is remitted for further proceedings to
the Controller who shall dispose of it within three months from the receipt of
records from this Court. No costs.
P.B.R. Appeal allowed.
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