Syed Asadullah Kazmi Vs. The Addl.
District Judge, Allahabad & Ors  INSC 122 (23 July 1981)
CITATION: 1981 AIR 1724 1982 SCR (1) 77 1981
SCC (3) 483 1981 SCALE (3)1092
CITATOR INFO :
D 1988 SC 30 (5)
Landlord and tenant-Prescribed authority
allowing the landlord to recover his building tenanted, but the appellate
authority modifying the order of part recovery only and the said order becomes
final due to successive failures in appeal by the tenant including in the
Supreme Court-Any application to re-open the issue due to the subsequent event
i.e. the death of the landlord is not maintainable.
In February 1965, Bungalow No. 16-D, Beli
Road (now 26 B.K. Banerjee Road), Allahabad was allotted to the appellant. On
an application made in April 1975 the prescribed authority allowed, on 24th
May, 1976, the application directing the release of the bungalow to the
landlord. On appeal the appellate authority by its order dated 25th March, 1977
modified the order by releasing only a portion of the building and by
permitting the appellant to continue in the remaining portion with a direction
to the prescribed authority to divide the bungalow accordingly. The said order
dated 25th March, 1977 became final, since the writ petition challenging the
said order was dismissed. On the death of the landlord the appellant filed a
fresh application before the prescribed authority not to proceed with the
partition scheme. Since the prescribed authority refused to take note of this
subsequent event, the issue has come up before this Court by way of special
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. The order dated 25th March, 1977 of
the appellate authority releasing a portion of the premises in favour of the third
respondent and leaving the remaining portion in the tenancy of the appellant
acquired finality when the proceedings taken against it by the appellant
failed. The prescribed authority was bound to give effect to that final order
and was not acting outside its jurisdiction or contrary to law. [79 C-D]
2. It is true that subsequent events must be
taken into account by a statutory authority or court when considering
proceeding arising out of a landlord's petition for ejectment of a tenant on
the ground of the landlord's personal need. But in the present case the order
for release of a portion of the accommodation acquired finality before the
death of the landlord and the controversy concluded by it could not be reopened
now. [79 E-F]
3. The present appeal being limited to the
question which arose before the prescribed authority on the application of the
appellant after the proceedings for release had acquired finality, it is not
open even to the Supreme Court, to reopen the proceeding for release. [79 G- H]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal
No. 1440 of 1979.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order dated the 15th November, 1978 of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Misc.
Writ No. 8736 of 1978.
R.K. Garg, Manoj Swarup and Miss Lalita Kohli
for the Appellant.
Yogeshwar Prasad, and Mrs Rani Chhabra, for
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
PATHAK, J. The appeal by special leave is directed against a judgment of the
Allahabad High Court dismissing a tenant's writ petition arising out of
proceedings consequential upon an order of ejectment.
The bungalow, 16-D, Beli Road, Allahabad, was
owned by Raj Kumar Sinha, father of the third respondent, Kailash Shanker
Sinha. In February 1965, the bungalow was allotted to the appellant, Syed
Asadullah Kazmi, and he was accordingly treated as the tenant of the premises.
At the time, Raj Kumar Sinha, with his family, including the third respondent,
occupied another house at 14-D, Beli Road, Allahabad. In October 1973, the third
respondent applied for the release of the bungalow 16-D, Beli Road, Allahabad,
now described as 26, B.K. Banerjee Road, Allahabad. The attempt failed. A fresh
application was made in April, 1975. It was allowed by the Prescribed Authority
on 24th May, 1976 after overruling an objection filed by the appellant. The
appellant appealed and the appellate authority by its order dated 25th March,
1977 modified the order of the Prescribed Authority inasmuch as a portion only
of the building was released in favour of the third respondent and the
appellant was permitted to continue in the remaining portion, and the
Prescribed Authority was directed to divide the bungalow accordingly. The
appellant filed a writ petition in the High Court against the order of the Appellate
Authority, but the writ petition was dismissed. Against its dismissal he
applied in this Court for special leave to appeal and on 3rd January, 1978,
that petition was also dismissed.
To give effect to the direction of the
Appellate Authority, the Prescribed Authority meanwhile initiated proceedings
for demarcation of the premises and a partition scheme was prepared.
During the preparation of the partition
scheme, Raj Kumar Sinha, the third respondent's father, died. On 22nd
September, 1978, the appellant filed an application before the Prescribed
Authority bringing the fact of this death to its notice and praying that the
partition scheme should not be prepared. The Prescribed Authority rejected the
application. Appeal by the appellant was dismissed by the Appellate Authority
on the ground that the order dated 25th March, 1977 directing a division of the
premises had become final and the controversy could not be re-opened. The
appellant then filed a writ petition before the High Court, and the High Court
has maintained the view taken by the Appellate Authority and dismissed the writ
petition by its judgment dated 25th November, 1978.
We are of opinion that the High Court is
Plainly, the order dated 25th March, 1977 of
the Appellate Authority releasing a portion of the premises in favour of the
third respondent and leaving the remaining portion in the tenancy of the
appellant acquired finality when the proceeding taken against it by the
appellant failed. The order having become final, the Prescribed Authority was
bound to give effect to it. In doing so, the Prescribed Authority was not
acting outside its jurisdiction or contrary to law. The application moved by
the appellant before the Prescribed Authority requesting it to take into
account the death of Raj Kumar Sinha was misconceived, because it did not lie
with the Prescribed Authority to reopen proceedings which had been taken to the
highest Court and had become final. It is true that subsequent events must be
taken into account by a statutory authority or court when considering
proceedings arising out of landlord's petition for ejectment of a tenant on the
ground of the landlord's personal need. But in the present case, the order for
release of a portion of the accommodation required finality before the death of
Raj Kumar Sinha and the controversy concluded by it could not be reopened, The
appellant has vehemently urged that being the highest court of the land it is
open to us to reopen the proceeding for release initiated by the third respondent.
We do not think we can. The present appeal is limited to the question which
arose before the Prescribed Authority on the application of the appellant after
the proceedings for release had acquired finality and we must be confined to
the consideration of that question alone. We cannot reopen that which has
become final after this court dismissed the special leave petition of the
appellant. We may point out that we have been referred to s. 24 of the U.P.
Urban 80 Building Act, 1972 in support of the contention that the Prescribed
Authority retains control over ejectment proceedings, but we are not impressed
by that contention.
The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
S. R. Appeal dismissed.