State of Punjab & Ors Vs. Raja Ram
& Ors [1981] INSC 19 (29 January 1981)
ISLAM, BAHARUL (J) ISLAM, BAHARUL (J) KOSHAL,
A.D.
CITATION: 1981 AIR 1694 1981 SCR (2) 712 1981
SCC (2) 66 1981 SCALE (1)218
ACT:
Land Acquisition Act, 1894, section 3(e) read
with section 4-Whether the Food Corporation, created by section 3 of the Food
Corporation Act, 1964, is a company within the meaning of section 3(e) of the
Land Acquisition Act.
HEADNOTE:
Dismissing the State appeal on certificate,
the Court
HELD: (1) The acquisition of land for the
Food Corporation of India is not in accordance with law for the reason that
compliance with the provisions of Chapter VII of the Land Acquisition Act had
not been made.
[717 A-B] (2) The Food Corporation of India
is a Company within the meaning of the term appearing in clause (e) of section
3 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Section 3 (e) mentions in unmistakable
terms that a company incorporated by an Indian law would be a
"Company" for the purposes of the Land Acquisition Act. The
Corporation was admittedly created by section 3 of the Food Corporation Act,
1964. Sub-section (2) of section 3 of the Food Corporation Act, 1964 is an
Indian Law and clothes the Corporation with the attributes of a company.
[715A-E] (3) A Government department has to be an organisation which is not
only completely controlled and financed by the Government but has also no
identity of its own. The money earned by such a department goes to the
exchequer of the Government and losses incurred by the department are losses of
the Government. The Corporation, on the other hand, is an autonomous body
capable of acquiring, holding and disposing of property and having the power to
contract. It may also sue or be sued by its own name and the Government does not
figure in any litigation to which it is a party. It is true that its original
share capital is provided by the Central Government and that 11 out of the 12
members of its Board of Directors are appointed by the Central Government but
then these factors may at the most lead to the conclusion that the Corporation
is an agency or instrumentality of the Central Government. [715E-H] Even the
conclusion, however, that the Corporation is an agency or instrumentality of
the Central Government does not lead to the further inference that the
Corporation is a Government department. The reason is that the Food Corporation
Act has given the Corporation an individuality apart from that of the
Government. In any case the Corporation cannot be divested of its character as
a "Company" within the meaning of the definition in clause (e) of
section 3 of the Land Acquisition Act, for it completely fulfils the
requirements of that clause. [716G-H, 717A-B] Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. The
International Authority of India and Ors., [1969] 3 SCR 1014, applied.
713
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal
No. 2063 of 1970.
From the Judgment and Order dated 26-2-1970
of Punjab and Haryana High Court in L.P.A. No. 283/69.
O. P. Sharma and M. S. Dhillon for the
Appellant.
S. K. Mehra, P. N. Puri, E. M. S. Anam and M.
K. Dua for Respondents Nos. 1-3.
K. J. John for Respondent No. 4.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
BAHARUL ISLAM, J.-This appeal by the State of Punjab and two others, namely,
the Collector, Rupar District and the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil-cum-Land
Acquisition Collector, Rupar, is on a certificate granted by a Division Bench
of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in respect of its judgment in a Letters
Patent Appeal holding the acquisition of the land in question to be bad in law
on the grounds that the Food Corporation of India for which the Land in
question was sought to be acquired was not a "Company" within the
meaning of section 3(e) of the Land Acquisition Act that the land had also not
been acquired for a public purpose and that the State could acquire the land
under that Act only for a public purpose or for the purpose of a Company.
2. The material facts of the case may be
stated thus:
Nine biswas of the disputed land situated
within the municipal area of Morinda in the District of Rupar was owned by
respondent No. 1, Raja Ram, Respondents No. 2 and 3 are Raja Ram's sons. The
State of Punjab issued a notification dated December 17, 1968 under section 4
read with section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 (hereinafter called
"the L.A. Act"). The notification related to 15 different plots of
land including the land of the present acquisition proceedings. The material
portion of the notification is as follows:
"Whereas it appears to the President of
India that the land is likely to be needed by Government, at public expense,
for a public purpose, namely, for the construction of godowns for storage of
food-grains at Morinda, it is hereby notified that the land in the locality
described below is likely to be required for the above
purpose..........................." "Further in exercise of the
powers conferred by the said Act, the President of India is pleased to direct
that the action under Section 17 shall be taken in this case on the 714 grounds
of urgency and provisions of Section 5 (A) shall not apply in regard to this
acquisition." On the same day another notification under Sections 6 and 7
read with Section 17(2)(c) of the L.A. Act was issued.
The material portion of this notification
runs thus:
"Whereas the President of India is
satisfied that the land specified below is needed by Government at the public
expense for a public purpose, namely, for the construction of godowns for
storage of food grains at Morinda, it is hereby declared that the land
described in the specification below is required for the aforesaid purpose.
This declaration is made under the provisions of Section 6 of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894................"
3. Against the aforesaid notification a writ
petition was filed by respondents No. 1 to 3. The writ petition was heard by a
single Judge of the High Court and was dismissed.
The learned Single Judge, inter alia, found
that the provisions of Part VII of the L.A. Act relating to the acquisition of
land for Companies were not applicable to the present case as the Food
Corporation of India (hereinafter called the Corporation) was a department of
Government and not a Company within the meaning of Section 3(e) of the L.A.
Act although, undoubtedly, according to the
learned Judge, there was no manner of doubt about the fact that the land in
dispute was in fact being acquired for the Corporation and that the purpose for
which the land had been acquired was a public purpose.
Against the aforesaid Order of the learned
Single Judge a Letters Patent Appeal, being L.P.A. No. 1283 of 1969, was filed
by respondents No. 1 to 3 before the Division Bench, that allowed the appeal
and quashed the land acquisition proceedings as stated earlier.
4. With respect we find it difficult to agree
with the learned division bench when it held that the Corporation was not a
"Company" within the meaning of section 3(e) of the L.A. Act which
runs thus:
"3. In this Act, unless there is
something repugnant in the subject or context- (e) the expression "Company"
means a Company registered under the Indian Companies Act, 1882 or under the
(English) Companies Act, 1862 to 1890 or incorporated by an Act of Parliament
of the United Kingdom or by an Indian law or by Royal Charter or Letters Patent
and includes a 715 society registered under the societies Registration Act,
1860, and a registered society within the meaning of the Co-operative Societies
Act, 1912 or any other law relating to co-operative societies for the time
being in force in any State." The section mentions in unmistakable terms
that a company incorporated by an Indian law would be a 'Company' for the
purposes of the L.A. Act. Now the corporation was admittedly created by section
3 of the Food Corporation Act, 1964 (hereinafter called the F.C. Act). That
section states :
"3. (1) With effect from such date as
the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify in
this behalf, the Central Government shall establish for the purposes of this
Act a Corporation known as the Food Corporation of India.
(2) The Corporation shall be a body corporate
with the name, aforesaid, having perpetual succession and a common seal with
power, subject to the provisions of this Act, to acquire, hold and dispose of
property and to contract, and may, by that name, sue and be sued."
Sub-section (2) which we need hardly say, is an Indian law, clothes the
Corporation with the attributes of a company. It cannot, therefore, be contended
with any plausibility that the Corporation is not a 'Company' within the
meaning of the definition of that term appearing in clause (e) of section 3 of
the L.A. Act.
5. Learned counsel for the appellant then
urged that the Corporation is a Government department. We are unable to accept
this submission also. A Government department has to be an organisation which
is not only completely controlled and financed by the Government but has also
no identity of its own. The money earned by such a department goes to the
exchequer of the Government and losses incurred by the department are losses of
the Government. The Corporation, on the other hand, is an autonomous body
capable of acquiring, holding and disposing of property and having the power to
contract. It may also sue or be sued by its own name and the Government does
not figure in any litigation to which it is a party. It is true that its
original share capital is provided by the Central Government (section 5 of the
F.C.
Act) and that 11 out of the 12 members of its
Board of Directors are appointed by that Government (section 7 of the F.C. Act)
but then these factors may at the most lead to the conclusion (about which we
express no final opinion) that the Corporation is an agency or instrumentality
of the Central Government. In this connection we may cite 716 with advantage
the following observations of this Court in Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. The
International Authority of India and Ors.
"A Corporation may be created in one of
two ways.
It may be either established by statute or
incorporated under a law such as the Companies Act, 1956 or the Societies
Registration Act, 1860. Where a corporation is wholly controlled by government
not only in its policy making but also in carrying out the functions entrusted
to it by the law establishing it or by the Charter of its incorporation, there
can be no doubt that it would be an instrumentality or agency of Government.
But ordinarily where a corporation is established by statute, it is autonomous
in its working subject only to a provision, often times made, that it shall be
bound by any directions that may be issued from time to time by Government in
respect of policy matters. So also a Corporation incorporated under law is
managed by a Board of Directors or committee of management in accordance with
the provisions of the statute under which it is incorporated. When does such a corporation
become an instrumentality or agency of Government ? Is the holding of the
entire share capital of the Corporation by Government enough or is it necessary
that in addition, there should be a certain amount of direct control exercised
by Government and, if so what should be the nature of such control? Should the
functions which the Corporation is charged to carry out possess any particular
characteristic or feature, or is the nature of the functions immaterial ? Now,
one thing is clear that if the entire share capital of the Corporation is held
by Government it would be a long way towards indicating that the Corporation is
an instrumentality or agency of Government. But, as is quite often the case the
Corporation established by statute may have no share or shareholders in which
case it would be a relevant factor to consider whether the administration is in
the hands of a Board of Directors appointed by Government though this
consideration also may not be determinative, because even where the directors
are appointed by Government, they may be completely free from governmental
control in the discharge of their functions." Even the conclusion,
however, that the Corporation is an agency or instrumentality of the Central
Government does not lead to the further inference that the Corporation is a
Government department. The reason is that the F.C. Act has given the
Corporation an individuality apart 717 from that of the Government. In any case
the Corporation cannot be divested of its character as a 'Company' within the
meaning of the definition in clause (e) of section 3 of the L.A. Act, for it
completely fulfils the requirements of that clause, as held by us above.
6. The Corporation being a 'Company',
compliance with the provisions of Chapter VII of the L.A. Act had to be made in
order to lawfully acquire any land for its purpose. It is not denied that such
compliance is completely lacking in the present case.
7. As a result of the foregoing discussion it
must be held that the land in dispute has not been acquired in accordance with
law, although our reasons in that behalf are different from those forming the
basis of impugned judgment.
This appeal is thus found to be without merit
and is dismissed but with no order as to costs.
S.R. Appeal dismissed.
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