R.K. Garg, Advocate Vs. State of
Himachal Pradesh [1981] INSC 99 (22 April 1981)
CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. ((CJ) CHANDRACHUD, Y.V.
((CJ) SEN, A.P. (J)
CITATION: 1981 SCALE (1)767
ACT:
Contempt of Courts Act 1971, Ss.2, 15 and
19-Advocate appearing in case-Throwing shoe at presiding Judge-Guilty of
contempt of Court-Punished with imprisonment and fine.
Legal Profession-Professional ethics and
cultured conduct-Results of violation of.
HEADNOTE:
The appellant a practising Advocate appeared
for the petitioner in a petition under the Rent Act. When the case was called
out for hearing, the Judge noticed that the petitioner had not paid the process
fee, as a result of which the summons could not be issued to the respondent.
The Judge, proceeded to dismiss the petition under Order IX Rule 2 of the Civil
Procedure Code. Taking umbrage at the dismissal of the petition the appellant
hurled his shoe at the Judge which hit him on the shoulder. The Judge intending
to proceed under Section 228 of the Penal Code issued a warrant of arrest
against the appellant. The appellant evaded the warrant and successfully
managed to prevent proceedings being taken by the Judge for the contempt of his
Court. The Judge thereupon made a reference to the High Court under Section
15(2) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
Before the High Court the appellant did not
dispute that he hurled a shoe at the Judge. He explained his conduct by saying
that he acted under an irresistible impulse generated by the provocative
language used by the Judge. The High Court being satisfied, that the appellant
was making a false allegation that the Judge had used abusive language against
him and that he had given an untrue version of the very genesis of the
incident, held the appellant guilty of contempt of Court and sentenced him to
simple imprisonment for six months and a fine of Rs. 200/-.
In the appeal to this Court it was pleased
that the appellant evidently lost his balance and whether or not there was any
justification for it, he acted under the impulse of grave passion for which he
had been sufficiently punished by the publicity which the incident had received
and the notoriety which he had invited for himself and as the appellant was
genuinely repentant for his conduct he should be enlarged on a mere admonition.
Allowing the appeal in part,
HELD: 1. (i) The sentence of simple
imprisonment for six months is reduced to a period of one month and the fine
for Rs. 200/- is enhanced to Rs. 1000/-.
537 The fine if recovered shall be paid over
to the Legal Aid Society functioning in the State. [540 G] (ii) The appellant
is guilty of conduct which is highly unbecoming of a practising lawyer. He
hurled his shoe at the Judge in order to overawe him and to bully him into
accepting his submission that the case should not be dismissed under Order IX
Rule 2 C.P.C. The appellant did his best or worst to see that the petition was
not dismissed for non-payment of process fee and finding that the Judge was not
willing to accept his argument, he took out his shoe in show of his physical
prowess. [540 C] (iii) The appellant's behaviour is condemned. It is most
reprehensible remembering that, as a practising lawyer he is an officer of the
Court. [540 D] (iv) A long sentence of imprisonment is not imposed on the
appellant since he has tendered an unconditional apology to this Court and to
the trial Judge. The appellant is deeply regretful and genuinely contrite. He
has suffered enough in mind and reputation and no greater purpose is going to
be served by subjecting him to a long bodily suffering. [540 E, F]
2. (i) The argument of the appellant's
counsel in the High Court that: "better part of discretion is to ignore it
instead of fanning it. It is a tussle between legal profession and
judiciary", is as much to be regretted as the conduct of the appellant
before the trial Judge. [541A-B] (ii) The Bar and the Bench are an integral
part of the mechanism which administers justice to the people. A discourteous
Judge is like an ill-tuned instrument in the setting of a Court room. But
Members of the Bar will do well to remember that flagrant violations of
professional ethics and cultured conduct will only result in the ultimate
destruction of a system without which no democracy can survive. [541 E, F]
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Contempt
Appeal No. 19 of 1981.
From the judgment and order dated the 17th
November, 1980 of the Himachal Pradesh High Court at Simla in Contempt Petition
(Crl.) No. 7 of 1980.
V. M. Tarkunde, S. S. Ray, K.K.Venugopal, Dr.
L. M. Singhvi, Kapil Sibbal, C. M. Nayar and L. K. Pandey for the Appellant.
L. N. Sinha, Attorney General for the
Respondent (Registrar, High Court) K. Parasaran, Soli. General and Miss A.
Subhashini for the Respondent (State of H. P.) 538 The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by CHANDRACHUD,C. J. This is an appeal under sec. 19(1)b of the Contempt
of Courts Act 1971, ("the Act",) against the judgment of the High
Court of Himachal Pradesh dated November 17, 1980 in Contempt Case (Criminal)
No. 7 of 1980, whereby the appellant was sentenced to simple imprisonment for
six months and a fine of Rs. 200.
The appellant practises as an Advocate at
Solan which is a district place in the State of Himachal Pradesh. It appears
that only one court generally sits at Solan which is that of the Senior
Sub-Judge-cum-Chief Judicial Magistrate.
The learned Judge, who presides over that
Court, also exercises the powers of a Rent Controller and of the Court of Small
Causes. On June 18, 1980, Shri Kuldip Chand Sud, who was the Presiding Officer
of the Court, was hearing a petition under the Rent Act in which the petitioner
was represented by the appellant. When the case was called out for hearing, the
learned Judge noticed that the petitioner had not paid the process fee, as a
result of which the summons could not be issued to the respondent. The Judge
therefore proceeded to dismiss the petition under Order 9, Rule 2 of the Civil
Procedure Code. Taking umbrage at the dismissal of the petition, the appellant
hurled his shoe at the Judge which hit him on the shoulder. The Judge asked his
Orderly to take the appellant in custody but the appellant slipped away. The
Judge evidently wanted to proceed under section 228 of the Penal Code for which
purpose he issued a warrant of arrest against the appellant. The appellant
successfully evaded the warrant and managed to prevent proceedings being taken
by the Judge for the contempt of his court. The Judge then made a reference to
the High Court of Himachal Pradesh under section 15(2) of the Act. The High
Court issued notice to the appellant enclosing therewith a copy of the
reference made by the Judge.
The appellant did not dispute in the High
Court that he hurled a shoe at the Judge. He explained his conduct by saying
that he acted under an irresistible impulse generated by the provocative
language used by the Judge. The appellant's version is like this:
On the previous date of hearing, the Judge
had directed the appellant to pay fresh process fee and to supply the address
of the respondent to the Rent Act petition. The appellant informed the Judge
that he was unable to comply 539 with that order since the respondent had been
admitted to a hospital and had since left the hospital. The house in which the
respondent lived was locked. The Judge then declared that he proposed to take
action under Order 9 Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code. The appellant asked
the Judge to record his statement as to why he was unable to pay the process
fee and supply the address of the respondent. Instead of recording the
appellant's statement, the Judge remarked: "You rascal, I will set you
right". The appellant protested at the abusive language used by the Judge,
but the Judge retorted: "I repeat what I said". The appellant
thereafter lost control over himself and under the "extreme heat of moment
and passion, his hand fell on his shoe" which he threw towards the dais.
Many persons were present in the court who witnessed the incident.
After hurling the shoe at the dais, the
appellant took off his coat and tie and told the court: "An unfortunate
incident has happened. Do you want to take any action against me ? I
surrender". Upon this the Judge remarked: "You scoundrel get out of
my court".
The appellant thereafter left the court room.
The High Court had called for the comments of
the Judge on the version of the appellant, from which it was satisfied that the
appellant was making a false allegation that the Judge had used abusive
language against him. The High Court also held that the appellant had given an
untrue version of the very genesis of the incident since the Judge had not
given any direction for furnishing the complete address of the respondent
before him.
Many technical contentions were raised in the
High Court, one of them being that section 10 of the Act was a bar to the High
Court taking cognizance of the matter. It is unnecessary to go into that
question or into various other matters raised in the High Court on behalf of
the appellant since, Shri V. M. Tarkunde and Shri S. S. Ray who appear on
behalf of the appellant, stated before us that the appellant did not desire to
take a contentious attitude. It was stated on behalf of the appellant that he
was prepared to tender an unconditional written apology to this Court and to
produce evidence before us of his having tendered a similar apology to the
trial court. Such apologies have been duly tendered.
Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
appellant appealed to us in all their persuation that in view of the fact that
the appellant 540 was genuinely repentant for his conduct, he should be
enlarged on a mere admonition. Counsel plead that the appellant evidently lost
his balance and whether or not there was any justification for it, he acted
under the impulse of grave passion for which he has been sufficiently punished
by the publicity which the incident has received and the notoriety which he has
invited for himself.
We had made it clear to the learned counsel
at the very time when they conveyed to us the willingness of the appellant to
apologise that we offer no promise or inducement that if the appellant
apologises we will take a lenient view of the matter. In our opinion the
appellant is guilty of conduct which is highly unbecoming of a practising
lawyer. He hurled his shoe at the Judge in order evidently to overawe him and
to bully him into accepting his submission that the case should not be
dismissed under Order 9 Rule 2, C.P.C. The appellant did his best or worst to
see that the petition was not dismissed for non-payment of process fee and
finding that the Judge was not willing to accept his argument, he took out his
shoe in show of his physical prowess. We cannot adequately condemn the
appellant's behaviour which strikes us as most reprehensible, remembering that,
as a practising lawyer, he is an officer of the court. Such incidents can
easily multiply considering the devaluation of respect for all authority,
whether in law, education or politics.
We do not, however, propose to impose a long
sentence of imprisonment on the appellant, since he has tendered an
unconditional apology to this Court and to learned trial Judge. The appellant
was present in our Court at the time when his appeal was argued and though, on
such occasions, histrionics cannot entirely be ruled out, we did form an
impression, backed by our small little experience of life and its affairs, that
the appellant is deeply regretful and genuinely contrite. He has suffered
enough in mind and reputation and no greater purpose is going to be served by
subjecting him to a long bodily suffering. Accordingly, we reduce the sentence
of six months to a period of one month, enhance the fine from Rs. 200 to Rs.
1000 and direct that the fine, if recovered, shall be paid over to a Legal Aid
Society, if any, functioning in the State of Himachal Pradesh. The High Court
will decide which society should get the money, if there is more than one such
society, of which there is precious little likelihood. Order accordingly.
We will be failing in our duty if before
parting with the case we did not draw attention to what the appellant's counsel
Shri 541 Bhagirath Das said in the High Court during the course of his
arguments. Shri Bhagirath Das told the learned Judges of the High Court:
"Better part of discretion is to ignore
it instead of fanning it. It is a tussle between legal profession and
judiciary". (emphasis supplied since it must have been placed).
This part of the argument of the appellant's
counsel in the High Court is as much to be regretted as the conduct of the
appellant before the learned trial Judge. Discretion is undoubtedly the better
part of valour but we did not know, until we read the argument advanced by the
appellant's counsel in the High Court, that the better part of discretion is to
ignore that a practising advocate had hurled a shoe at a Judge. We are also
unable to understand how the High Court was "fanning" the incident by
taking cognizance of it, which it was its clear duty to do. It makes sorry
reading that "a tussle between legal profession and judiciary" should
find its culmination in a member of that noble profession throwing a shoe at a
Judge.
Those who are informed of the question and
think deeply upon it entertain no doubt that the Bar and the Bench are an
integral part of the same mechanism which administers justice to the people.
Many members of the Bench are drawn from the Bar and their past association is
a source of inspiration and pride to them. It ought to be a matter of equal
pride to the Bar. It is unquestionably true that courtesy breeds courtesy and
just as charity has to begin at home, courtesy must begin with the Judge. A
discourteous Judge is like an ill-tuned instrument in the setting of a
courtroom. But members of the Bar will do well to remember that such flagrant
violations of professional ethics and cultured conduct will only result in the
ultimate destruction of a system without which no democracy can survive.
All this, of course, is said without meaning
any disrespect to Shri Bhagirath Das. Not he, but what he said, is the cause of
this comment.
N.V.K. Appeal partly allowed.
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