Brijendra Singh Vs. State of U.P.
& Ors [1980] INSC 223 (25 November 1980)
SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH
VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J)
CITATION: 1981 AIR 636 1981 SCR (2) 287 1981
SCC (1) 597
CITATOR INFO :
R 1981 SC1157 (6) E&R 1991 SC1928 (4,6,8)
ACT:
Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling of Land
Holding Act, 1960 (Act 1 of 1961) -Section 5(6) proviso (b) Effect of the
Amending Act 1972 (Act 18 of 1973) "Good Faith"-True meaning and
scope of.
HEADNOTE:
The Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling of
Land Holding Act 1960 was amended by the Amending Act 1972. Section 5(6)
proviso (b) of the Act States :
"(6) In determining the Ceiling area
applicable to a tenure-holders, any transfer of land made after the
twenty-fourth day of January, 1971, which but for the transfer would have been
declared surplus land under this act, shall be ignored and not taken into
account :
Provided that nothing in this sub-section
shall apply to- (a) ...........................
(b) a transfer proved to the satisfaction of
the prescribed authority to be in good faith and for adequate consideration and
under an irrevocable instrument not being a benami transaction or for immediate
or deferred benefit of the tenure-holder of other members of his family.
The appellant sold 25 acres of land for
consideration by registered deeds dated 2nd January and 9th August, 1971. The Prescribed Authority under the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings
Act, 1960 issued notice to the appellant to show cause why 25.96 acres land
from his holding be not declared surplus. The appellant filed objections
stating that (i) the entire land was unirrigated; (ii) there was no source of
irrigation in the fields and he had made two sales of 25 acres for acquiring a
site and constructing a residential house. The Prescribed Authority rejected
the objections of the appellant and declared the said land as surplus.
Aggrieved by the said order the appellant
went in appeal before the Appellate Authority, who, partly allowed the appeal.
The appellant filed a writ petition in the High Court, which was dismissed in
limine. By special leave petition, the point for consideration was whether a
sale made by a tenure-holder on a date between January 24, 1971 and June 8,
1973 for adequate consideration and under an irrevocable instrument not being a
benami transaction or for immediate or deferred benefit of the tenure holder or
other members of his family, can be held to be not in `good faith' within the
contemplation of proviso (b) to sub-section (6) of section 5 of the Ceiling
Act, merely because the tenure- holder had failed to prove the satisfaction of
the Prescribed Authority or the Appellate Authority that the purpose for 288
which the sale was made, did not constitute an impelling necessity for the
sale.
Allowing the appeal, ^
HELD : It is clear that the crucial date on
or from which no tenure-holder is entitled to hold land in excess of the
ceiling area is June 8, 1973. It is a cardinal canon of construction that an
expression which has no uniform precisely fixed meaning, takes its colour,
light and content from the context. [293E-F, H] The benefit of clause (b) of
the proviso to sub-section (6) is available to a transfer made in good faith,
that is, to a bona fide transfer whereby the tenure-holder genuinely and irrevocably
transfers all right, title and interest in the land in favour of the
transferee, in the ordinary course of management of his affairs and which is
not a collusive arrangement, or device or subterfuge to enable the tenure-
holder to continue to hold the surplus land or any reserved interest in
presenti or in futuro therein, (or merely to convert it into cash), and thus
circumvent the ban under section 5(1) of the Ceiling Act. In order to be
entitled to the benefit of proviso (b) of Sec. 5(6), a transfer made in good
faith, must satisfy the further conditions, (ii) to (iv), enumerated in the
proviso (b). [294C-F] Once it is established by the transferring tenure holder
that the transfer in question effected in the course of ordinary management of
his affairs, was made for adequate consideration and he had genuinely,
absolutely and irrevocably divested himself of all right, title and interest
(including cultivatory possession) in the land in favour of the transferee, the
onus under Explanation II, in the absence of any circumstances suggestive of
collusion, or an intention or design to defraud or circumvent the Ceiling Act,
on the tenure holder to show that the transfer was effected in good faith will
stand discharged. It will not be necessary for the tenure to prove further that
the transfer was made for an impelling need or to raise money for meeting a
pressing legal necessity. [294G-H, 295A] The other conditions of Proviso (b) to
Sec. 5(6) being satisfied, the Appellate Authority was not justified in holding
that the sales were not in `good faith' merely on the ground that the
construction of a residential house in New Delhi did not in his opinion
constitute a compelling necessity for the sales. Moreover, in the instant case,
the tenure-holder at the material time was serving in the army in the rank of
Brigadier which implies that he was nearing the age of retirement from army
service. It is not shown that he had any other house where he could live. He
had, in fact, borrowed part of the cost of construction from the Government.
There was therefore nothing sinister in his intention if he arranged to sell
his lands to other cultivators to raise funds to acquire a site and build a
residential house in New Delhi where he would live in reasonable comfort after retirement
from army service.
[295G-H, 296A-D]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal
No. 2726 of 1980.
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and
Order dated 23-5-1978 of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Misc.
Writ No. 4497/78.
289 Manoj Swarup and Miss Lalita Kohli for
the Appellant.
O. P. Rana and Mrs. Shobha Dixit for the
Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SARKARIA, J.- This is an appeal by special leave against a judgment dated May
23, 1978 of the High Court of Allahabad. The material facts giving rise to this
appeal are as under :
The Prescribed Authority under Section 10(2)
of the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960 (Act No. 1 of
1961) (as amended by U.P. Act 18 of 1973) issued notice to the appellant to
show cause why 25.96 acres out of 44 acres of irrigated land from his holding
be not declared surplus. In response to this notice, the appellant filed
objections stating, inter alia, (i) that the entire land was unirrigated; (ii)
that there was no source of irrigation in field Nos. 1373, 79 and 80; (iii)
that the appellant had made two sales of 12.50 acres each, 25 acres in all, for
a valid necessity, namely, to raise funds for acquiring a site and constructing
a residential house in New Delhi. (a) The appellant being an Army Officer in
the rank of Brigadier, had after obtaining permission on January 2, 1971 from
the Army Headquarters, sold 12.50 acres of the land for a consideration of Rs.
25,000/- to one Inderjit Singh by a registered deed, dated August 9, 1971, and
handed over the possession to the vendee; (b) Similarly, after obtaining the
permission of the Army Headquarters on January 2, 1971, he sold 12.50 acres of
the land for Rs. 25,000/- to one Gurjeet Singh by another registered sale-deed
and handed over the possession to the vendee. Since the money raised by these
sales was insufficient to purchase a building site and constructing a house
thereon, the appellant also raised a loan of Rs. 50,000/- from the Government
for that purpose.
The Prescribed Authority by its order dated
June 26, 1977, rejected the objections of the appellant and declared 25.96
acres of the land as surplus.
Aggrieved by the order of the Prescribed
Authority, the appellant went in appeal before the Appellate Authority
(District Judge, Rampur). who, by his order dated December 8, 1977, partly
allowed the appeal, holding that the entire land was unirrigated and
accordingly declared 16.94 acres of unirrigated land as surplus. The District
Judge has not held that the aforesaid sales made in favour of Inderjit Singh
and Gurjeet Singh by two sale deeds of 12.50 acres each, were fictitious or
Benami, nor has he found that the vendees were not in 290 possession of the
sold land. The District Judge seems to have denied the protection of Proviso
(b) of sub-section (6) of Section 5 of the Ceiling Act to the said two sales,
merely for the reason that "the appellant had failed to prove any
impelling necessity for building a house and that he could not do without a
house in New Delhi", and therefore, "it could not be held that the
sales in question were not effected to avoid the Ceiling Law." To impugn
this decision of the District Judge, in so far as he did not uphold the
aforesaid sales relating to 25 acres of land, the appellant filed a writ petition
under Article 226 of the Constitution in the High Court, which dismissed the
same in limine by its order, dated May 23, 1978. Hence this appeal by special
leave.
The question of law that has been mooted
before us is, whether a sale made by a tenure-holder on a date between January
24, 1971 and June 8, 1973 for adequate consideration and under an irrevocable
instrument, not being a benami transaction or for immediate or deferred benefit
of the tenure-holder or other members of his family, can be held to be not in
'good faith' within the contemplation of proviso (b) to sub-section (6) of
Section 5 of the Ceiling Act, merely because the tenure-holder had failed to
prove to the satisfaction of the Prescribed Authority or the Appellate
Authority that the purpose for which the sale was made, did not constitute an
impelling necessity for the sale.
Answer to this question turns on a correct
interpretation of the expression "good faith" used in the aforesaid
proviso (b).
Learned counsel for the appellant vehemently
contends that the District Judge had committed an error of law inasmuch as he
held that in order to get the protection of the aforesaid Proviso (b), it is
essential for the tenure- holder to prove that the sale was made for some
pressing valid necessity. It is emphasised that this is not the requirement of
that provision; that the expression "good faith" only means that it
should not be a benami or fraudulent transaction in which the transferor
continues to be the beneficial owner or right-holder of the land on the crucial
date, viz. June 8, 1973.
It is emphasised that in the instant case, it
was not disputed that the sales were made to raise funds for purchasing a
building site and constructing a house thereon in New Delhi, that the
authenticity of the documentary evidence produced by the appellant to establish
that fact was not doubted by the Appellate Authority; nor the adequacy of the
sale considerations, nor the fact that the appellant had parted with possession
of the sold lands; that in this situation, by no stretch of 291 reasoning, it
could be said that the sale was not bona fide or in good faith.
On the other hand, Shri O. P. Rana stoutly
defends the finding, of the Appellate Authority (District Judge), which has
been upheld by the High Court, that the sale could not be said to be in 'good
faith' merely because no impelling necessity for making it had been
established.
Before dealing with these contentions, let us
have a look at the material part of sub-section (1) of Section 5, which reads
thus:
"(1) On and from the commencement of the
Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings (Amendment) Act, 1972, no
tenure-holder shall be entitled to hold in the aggregate throughout Uttar
Pradesh, any land in excess of the ceiling area applicable to him.
Explanation I.- In determining the ceiling
area applicable to a tenure-holder, all land held by him in his own right,
whether in his own name, or ostensibly in the name of any other person, shall
be taken into account." Explanation II is not material for our present
purpose.
The Amendment Act, 1972 (Act No. 18 of 1973)
(for short called the Ceiling Act) came into force with; effect from June 8,
1973. It is clear that the crucial date on or from which no tenure-holder is
entitled to hold land in excess of the ceiling area is June 8, 1973. Keeping
this in view, let us now examine sub-section (6), the relevant part of which
reads as under:- "(6) In determining the ceiling area applicable to a
tenure-holder, any transfer of land made after the twenty-fourth of January,
1971, which but for the transfer would have been declared surplus land under
this Act, shall be ignored and not taken into account:
Provided that nothing in this sub-section
shall apply to- (a)...............................................
(b) a transfer proved to the satisfaction of
the prescribed authority to be in good faith and for adequate consideration and
under an irrevocable instrument not being a benami transaction or for immediate
or deferred benefit of the tenure-holder or other members of his family.
292 Explanation I
.............................
Explanation II.- The burden of proving that a
case falls within clause (b) of the proviso shall rest with the party claiming
its benefit." It will be seen that when sub-section (6) of Section 5
provides that in determining the ceiling area and surplus area, any transfer of
land which but for the transfer would have been declared surplus land under the
Act, shall be ignored, it proceeds on the presumption that the tenure- holders
being aware of the resolution or manifesto adopted by the ruling All India
Congress Party on January 24, 1971, and of the consensus at the Chief Minister
Conference held in July 1972, to take measures to lower the ceiling on
agricultural holdings, might make attempts to defraud, defeat and evade the
ceiling law, then in offing, by making fictitious transfers of land in favour
of other persons.
The presumption which underlies the main
provision in Section 5(6) can be displaced, as the Legislature has itself
indicated, on proof of the conditions set out in Proviso (b). Although the
strength of the aforesaid presumption and the nature and quantum required to
satisfy the conditions of Proviso (b) may vary according to the circumstances
of the particular case, yet it can be said as a general proposition that in the
case of transfers made prior to the decision of the Chief Minister's Conference
in July 1972 to lower the ceiling the burden under Explanation II on the
tenure-holder to establish the facts bringing his case within clause (b) of the
Proviso, would be lighter than the one in the case of a transfer made after the
aforesaid decision in July 1972.
In order to bring his case within the purview
of Proviso (b), the tenure-holder has to show- (i) that the transfer has been
made in 'good faith';
(ii) that it is a transfer for adequate
consideration;
(iii)that it has been made under an
irrevocable instrument; and (iv) that it is not a benami transaction or for
immediate or deferred benefit of the tenure- holder or other members of his
family.
There is no dispute in regard to the
connotation, construction and existence of ingredients (ii), (iii) and (iv) in
the instant case. Controversy, however centres round the true meaning and scope
of the 293 expression 'good faith' within the contemplation of clause (b) of
the Proviso. In the instant case, the Appellate Authority appears to have taken
the view-a view which has been upheld by the High Court-that a transfer cannot
be said to have been made in 'good faith' merely because it has been honestly
or genuinely made and satisfies the aforesaid conditions (ii), (iii) and (iv),
unless it is proved further that it was made for a valid pressing necessity.
The thrust of the arguments of the learned
counsel for the appellant is that the expression 'good faith' within the
contemplation of Proviso (b) only means that the transfer is honestly and
genuinely made and is not designed to circumvent the Ceiling Act or defeat its
object, and that this expression cannot be legitimately stretched so as to
import into Proviso (b), as a requirement of law, an additional obligation to
prove that the transfer was made for a pressing necessity, or valid personal
need of the transferor. The argument is not devoid of merit.
The expression 'good faith' has not been
defined in the Ceiling Act. The expression has several shades of meaning.
In the popular sense, the phrase in good
faith' simply means "honestly, without fraud, collusion, or deceit;
really, actually, without pretence and without intent to assist or act in
furtherance of a fraudulent or otherwise unlawful scheme". (See Words
& Phrases, Permanent Edition, Vol. 18A, page 91). Although the meaning of
"good faith" may vary in the context of different statutes, subjects
and situations, honest intent free from taint of fraud of fraudulent design, is
a constant element of its connotation. Even so, the quality and quantity of the
honesty requisite for constituting 'good faith' is conditioned by the context
and object of the statute in which this term is employed. It is a cardinal
canon of construction that an expression which has no uniform, precisely fixed
meaning, takes its colour, light and content from the context.
The meaning and scope of the expression 'good
faith' is therefore, to be considered in the light of the scheme and purpose of
Section 5, in general, and the context of Proviso (b) to sub-section (6), in
particular. We have already noticed that the primary object of the Ceiling Act,
as adumbrated in the pivotal provision in Section 5(1) is to prohibit and
disentitle a tenure-holder from holding land in the aggregate in the State of
Uttar Pradesh, in excess of the ceiling area, in his own right, whether in his
own name, or ostensibly in the name of any other person. The ceiling area and
surplus land of a tenure-holder under the Ceiling Act, as already mentioned,
are to be determined as on June 8, 1973 when the U.P. (Amendment) Act.
294 No. 18 of 1973 came into force. A
transfer, therefore, made after January 24, 1971 which is designed to serve as
a cloak for retention of a right or interest of the transferor in the
ostensibly transferred land in excess of the ceiling area, even on or after
June 8, 1973, will be patently not in 'good faith'. But the Proviso (b) to
subsection (6) of Section 5 extends the negative aspect of the concept 'good
faith' a little further by indicating, that even if the transfer is not an
ostensible transfer and the transferor divests himself of all interest and
rights in presenti in the transferred land, but reserves some benefit in future
for himself or other members of his family, then also the transfer will be not
in 'good faith'. A transfer solely for the purpose of converting surplus land
into cash without any kind of need (not to be confused with legal necessity)
may also lack good faith.
Broadly speaking, the benefit of clause (b)
of the Proviso to subsection (6) is available to a transfer made in good faith,
that is, to a bona fide transfer whereby the tenure-holder genuinely and
irrevocably transfers all right, title and interest in the land in favour of
the transferee, in the ordinary course of management, of his affairs and which
is not a collusive arrangement, or device or subterfuge to enable the
tenure-holder to continue to hold the surplus land or any reserved interest in
presenti or in futuro, therein (or merely to convert it into cash), and thus
circumvent the ban under Section 5(1) of the Ceiling Act. In order to be
entitled to the benefit of Proviso (b), a transfer made in good faith, must
satisfy the further conditions, (ii) to (iv), enumerated in the Proviso (b).
The positive conditions laid down in Proviso (b) are : that the transfer should
be for adequate consideration; that it should have been made under an
irrevocable instrument. The negative conditions set out in clause (b) of the
Proviso are : that it must not be a benami transaction; that it must not be for
immediate or deferred benefit of the transferring tenure-holder or other
members of his family. These tests or conditions (ii), (iii) and (iv) provided
in Proviso (b) may not by themselves be conclusive to hold that the transfer
was in 'good faith'. For instance, another important test for judging the
genuineness or otherwise of a sale would be whether or not cultivatory
possession and enjoyment of the land has passed under the sale to the vendee.
Even so, once it is established by the transferring tenure-holder that the
transfer in question effected in the course of ordinary management of his
affairs, was made for adequate consideration and he has genuinely, absolutely
and irrevocably divested himself of all right, title and interest (including
cultivatory possession) in the land in favour of the transferee, the onus under
Explanation II. in 295 the absence of any circumstances suggestive of
collusion, or an intention or design to defraud or circumvent the Ceiling Act,
on the tenure-holder to show that the transfer was effected in 'good faith',
will stand discharged, and it will not be necessary for the tenure-holder to
prove further that the transfer was made for an impelling need or to raise
money for meeting a pressing legal necessity. Although proof of the fact that a
transfer was made for a valid pressing necessity, may highlight or strengthen
the inference in favour of the genuineness of the transfer, it is not an
indispensable constituent of 'good faith', nor is the proof of legal necessity
requisite, as a matter of law, to enable a tenure-holder to avail of the
benefit of clause (b) of the Proviso. It may be remembered that at the time
when such a transfer was made, there was no legal restriction on his power to
alienate the whole or any part of his holding. In other words, at the time when
such a transfer was made it was not unlawful, even if it were made without any
pressing necessity. It became unlawful by the subsequent enactment of a legal
fiction introduced in Section 5 (6) of the Ceiling Act (No. 18 of 1973) with
retrospective effect from January 24, 1971. Even so, under this statutory
fiction, a transfer of land made after January 24, 1971 does not become wholly
void for all purposes; it can be ignored and would not be taken into account in
determining the ceiling area of the transferring tenure-holder for purposes of
the Ceiling Act, and that too, if the following two conditions are satisfied:
(a) that the land but for the transfer would
have been declared surplus land under the U.P. Act 18 of 1973; and (b) that the
transfer is not of a kind covered by Proviso (b) to Section 5(6) of the Act.
This being the position, once a transfer is
shown to be bona fide and further satisfies all the other positive and negative
conditions laid down in the Proviso (b) to Section 5(6), there is no
justification in law to stretch the legal fiction further and to spell out from
the expression 'good faith' an additional requirement of proving pressing
necessity for the transfer before the tenure-holder is entitled to the benefit
of the aforesaid Proviso (b).
In the instant case, the two sales in
question have not only been found to be genuine and for adequate consideration,
but it has been further accepted that the sales were made by the tenure-holder
to meet an ordinary need of every house-holder i.e. for raising funds for
constructing a residential house in New Delhi. The sales have been held by the
Appellate Authority to be not in 'good faith' merely on the 296 ground that the
construction of a residential house in New Delhi by the tenure-holder could
not, in the opinion of the Authority, be said to be an "impending"
(impelling?) necessity. This approach and finding is manifestly erroneous.
As discussed above, in order to get the
protection of Proviso (b) to Section 5(6), it is not legally necessary to
proviso, in addition to the conditions set out in the Proviso (b), that the
sales were for valid pressing necessity. Even so, in the instant case, it had
been shown that the sales were made to raise funds for building a residential
house in New Delhi which was obviously a valid necessity. The necessity and its
urgency was to be judged from the tenure-holder's point of view. The
tenure-holder at the material time was serving in the Army in the rank of
Brigadier which implies that he was nearing the age of retirement from Army
Service. It is not shown that he had any other house where he could live. He
had, in fact, borrowed part of the cost of construction from the Government.
There was therefore nothing sinister in his intention if he arranged to sell
his lands to other cultivators to raise funds to acquire a site and build a
residential house in New Delhi where he would live in reasonable comfort after
retirement from Army service.
For all the foregoing reasons, we allow this
appeal, set aside the orders of the High Court and of the Appellate Authority
and the Prescribed Authority in so far as they relate to these two sales in
question of 12.5 acres each, and hold that both these sales were entitled to
the exemption of Proviso (b) to Section 5(6) of the Ceiling Act.
The Prescribed Authority is, therefore,
directed not to ignore these two transfers, but after taking them into account
determine afresh the ceiling area of the appellant.
We make it clear that the Prescribed
Authority shall determine the ceiling area and surplus area of the appellant on
the basis that the whole of the land held by the tenure- holder (appellant) on
the crucial date was unirrigated land, as the decision of the Appellate
Authority (which was upheld by the High Court) on that issue has become res
judicata.
In the circumstances of the case, there will
be no order as to costs of this appeal.
These, then, are the reasons for our Order
dated November 13, 1980, whereby we had allowed this appeal.
N.K.A. Appeal allowed.
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