Tara Prasad Singh Vs. Union of India
& Ors [1980] INSC 106 (7 May 1980)
CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. ((CJ) CHANDRACHUD, Y.V.
((CJ) BHAGWATI, P.N.
KRISHNAIYER, V.R.
SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH UNTWALIA, N.L.
KAILASAM, P.S.
TULZAPURKAR, V.D.
CITATION: 1980 AIR 1682 1980 SCR (3)1042 1980
SCC (4) 179
CITATOR INFO :
RF 1980 SC2031 (2) O 1983 SC 239 (2) E 1984
SC1130 (49) RF 1986 SC2123 (6) D 1989 SC1629 (23)
ACT:
Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Amendment Act,
67 of 1976- Legislative competence of the Parliament to enact Nationalisation
Amendment Act-Whether the Amending Act is violative of the provisions of
Articles 14, 19(1)(f), 19(1)(g) and 31 of the Constitution of
India-Applicability of the Act to leases of composite mines in which there are
alternate seams of coal and fire clay.
HEADNOTE:
Article 246(1) of the Constitution of India
confers upon the Parliament, notwithstanding anything contained in clauses 2
and 3 of that Article, the exclusive power to make laws with respect to any of
the matters enumerated in List I of the Seventh Schedule, called the Union
List, Clause 2 of Article 246 deals with the power of the Parliament and the
State Legislatures to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated
in the Concurrent List, while clause 3 deals with the power of the State
Legislatures to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the
State List.
Entry 23 List II, Schedule VII of the
Constitution read with Article 246(3) confers legislative power on the State
Legislatures in respect of "Regulation of mines and mineral
development" but that power is "subject to the provisions of List I
with respect to regulation and development under the control of the
Union". Entry 54 List I enables Parliament to acquire legislative power in
respect of "Regulation of mines and mineral development to the extent to
which such regulation and development under the control of the Union is
declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest".
Entry 24 List II relates to "Industries subject to the provisions of
entries 7 and 52 of List I". Entry 7, List I, relates to Industries
declared by Parliament by law to be necessary for the purpose of defence or for
the prosecution of war. Entry 52, List I, enables Parliament to acquire
legislative power in respect of "Industries, the control of which by the
Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public
interest".
Pursuant to these powers the Parliament
enacted the Industries (Development & Regulation) Act, 65 of 1951, the
Mines Act 35 of 1952, the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act
67 of 1957, the Coking Coal Mines (Emergency Provisions) Act, 64 of 1971, the
Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 36 of 1972, the Coking Coal Mines
(Nationalisation) Amendment Act, 56 of 1972, the Coal Mines (Taking over of
Management) Act, 15 of 1973 and the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act 26 of
1973. Thereafter the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Amendment Act 67 of 1976 was
passed, the objects and reasons being:
1043 "After the nationalisation of coal
mines, a number of persons holding coal mining leases unauthorisedly started
mining of coal in the most reckless and unscientific manner without regard to
considerations of conservation, safety and welfare of workers. Not only were
they resorting to slaughter mining by superficial working of outcrops and
thereby destroying a valuable national asset and creating problems of water-
logging fires, etc. for the future development of the deeper deposits, their
unsafe working also caused serious and fatal accidents. They were making larger
profits by paying very low wages, and by not providing any safety and welfare
measures. Thefts of coal from adjacent nationalised mines were also reported
after the commencement of these unauthorised operations which had shown an
increasing trend of late. Areas where illegal and unauthorised operations were
carried on, were without any assessment of reserves in regard to quality and
quantity of coal which could be made available after detailed exploration work
was undertaken and results analysed. No scientific exploitation of these
deposits could be undertaken in the nationalised sector without these details.
It was, therefore, considered that it would not be appropriate either to
nationalise these unauthorisedly worked mines after taking them over under the
Coal Mines (Taking over of Management) Act, 1973 or to get the concerned mining
leases prematurely terminated and regranted to Government Companies under the
Mining and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957. In view of the
policy followed by the Central Government that the Coal Industry is to be in
the nationalised sector, it was decided that the Coal Mines Nationalisation
Act, 1973 should be enacted to provide for termination of all privately held
coal leases except those held by privately owned steel companies, so that it
may be possible for the Central Government, Government Company or Corporation
to take mining leases where necessary, after necessary exploration has been
made as to the extent of the deposits of coal etc." The petitioners who
were the lessees of coal mines by the State Government, being aggrieved by the
provisions of the Amendment Act 67 of 1976, challenged the competence of
Parliament to enact the Amendment Act and also the validity of the Act and
contended:
(a) Laws made in the exercise of power
conferred by Entry 54 must stand the test of public interest because the very
reason for the Parliament acquiring power under that entry is that it is in
public interest that the regulation of mines and minerals should be under the
control of the Union. In other words, Entry 54 confers a legislative power
which is purposive, that is to say, any law made in the exercise of the power
under Entry 54 must be designed to secure the regulation and development of
coal mines in public interest or else it must fail. The Nationalisation
Amendment Act is not such a law which Parliament can pass under Entry 54
because, that Act not only terminates all leases but it destroys the contracts
of service of thousands of workmen, and indeed it destroys all other contracts
and all securities for moneys lent without even so much as making a provision
for priorities for the payment of debts.
Since the Nationalisation Amendment Act
terminates all leases, it is a complete negation of the integrated scheme of
taking over the management of mines, acquisition of the rights of lease-holders
and the running of the mines.
(b) The word 'Regulation' in Entry 54 does
not include 'Prohibition'. 'Regulation' should not also be confused with the
expression 'Restrictions' occur- 1044 ring in Article 19(2) to (6) of the
Constitution. In the very nature of things, there cannot be a power to prohibit
the regulation and development of mines and minerals'.
Section 3(4) inserted by the Nationalisation
Amendment Act imposes no obligation on the Central Government or any other
authority to obtain a mining lease and work the mines, the leases in respect of
which stand terminated under the Act.
The words "it shall be lawful" for
the Central Government to obtain a lease are words of discretionary power which
create no obligation. They only enable the Central Government to obtain a
lease, making something legal and possible for which there would otherwise be
no right or authority to do.
Section 3(4) does not confer a power coupled
with a duty; it merely confers a faculty or power. No Court can by a Writ of
Mandamus or otherwise compels the Central Government to obtain a lease of a
coal mine and to run it under any of the provisions of the Nationalisation
Amendment Act.
(c) Where the Legislative power is
distributed among different legislative bodies, the Legislature may transgress
its legislative power either directly or manifestly, or covertly or indirectly.
In the instant case, the exercise of power by the Parliament is colourable
because although in passing the Nationalisation Amendment Act it purported to
act within the limits of its legislative power, in substance and in reality it
transgressed that power, the transgression being veiled by what appears on
proper examination to be a mere pretence or disguise.
(d) In order to tear off the veil or disguise
and in order to get at the substance of the law behind the form, the Court must
examine the effect of the legislation and take into consideration its object,
purpose and design.
Where the legislative entry is purposive,
like Entry 54 of the Union List, it is the object or purpose of the legislation
which requires consideration. The purpose for which the Parliament is permitted
to acquire legislative power of Regulation and Development of mines must
dictate the nature of law made in the exercise of that power because public
interest demands that power. Under the provisions of the Nationalisation
Amendment Act, not only is there no obligation on the Central Government to run
a mine, but there is no obligation imposed upon it even to carry out
prospecting or investigation in order to decide whether a particular mine
should be worked at all. Section 3(4) merely authorises the Central Government
to apply for "a prospecting licence or a mining lease in respect of the
whole or part of the land covered by the mining lease which stands
determined". A close examination of the Act thus discloses that far from
providing for regulation and development of coal mines, it totally prohibits
all mining activity even if the State Government wants to run a mine.
It does not impose prohibition as a step
towards running the mines since there is neither any obligation to carry out
the prospecting or investigation nor to run the mines.
(e) The Nationalisation Amendment Act runs
directly counter to the whole policy of the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act of
1973, to acquire and run the mines.
The Parent Act becomes a dead letter in
regard to several of its provisions as a result of the Amendment Act. It only
adopts a colourable device to amend the Nationalisation Act while completely
negativing it in fact. The Act therefore lacks legislative competence and is,
in the sense indicated, a colourable piece of legislation.
1045 (f) Article 31(A)(1)(e) only lifts a
restriction on the legislative competence in so far as violation of fundamental
rights is concerned. The most benign motive cannot make a law valid if the
legislative competence is lacking.
(g) Under Article 31(1) of the Constitution,
no person can be deprived of his property without the authority of law. Article
31A(1) which exempts the laws mentioned in clauses (a) to (e) from invalidity
under Articles 14, 19 and 31 does not dispense with the necessity of the authority
of law for depriving a person of his property, because the opening words of
Article 31A(1) are "....... no law providing for ......." matters
mentioned in clauses (a) to (e) shall be deemed to be void as offending
Articles 14, 19 and 31.
(h) The Nationalisation Amendment Act confers
no authority to terminate a composite lease for mining coal and fire-clay. The
right to mine fire-clay is given to the petitioner by law and it can only be
taken away by law.
(i) Though the Nationalisation Amendment Act
does not in terms prohibit the petitioner from mining fireclay, the effect of
the law, in a practical business sense, is to prohibit the petitioner from
mining fireclay and, therefore, the position is the same as though the Act had
enacted the prohibition in express terms. The Court must look at the direct
impact of the law on the right of the party, and if that impact prohibits him
from exercising his right, the fact that there is no express prohibition in the
Act is immaterial.
(j) The Nationalisation Amendment Act by
making it punishable, to mine coal, in substance and in a practical business
sense, prohibits the petitioner from mining fireclay. For this prohibition the
Amendment Act does not provide, and therefore, there is no authority of law for
it.
Coal and fireclay are two distinct minerals
as shown by Schedule II to the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development)
Act, 67 of 1957 wherein item 1 is coal and item 15 is fireclay. The dictionary
meanings of coal and fireclay also show that they are two distinct minerals.
(k) The Nationalisation Amendment Act
affects, in substance, two kinds of transfers: the transfer of the lease-hold
interests of the lessees in favour of the lessor, namely the State; and the
transfer of the mining business of the lessees in favour of the Central
Government. Since these transfers amount to acquisition within the meaning of
Article 31(2), the Act is open to challenge under Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 31
of the Constitution.
(1) The Nationalisation Amendment Act is open
to challenge under Article 14 because lessees who fall within that Act are
patently discriminated against in comparison with lessees of other mines, both
coking and non-coking, who were paid compensation when their property was taken
over first for management under the Management Acts and then under the
Nationalisation Acts.
(m) The Nationalisation Amendment Act is open
challenge under Article 19(1)(g) because the prohibition against lessees from
carrying on their business and the transfer of their business, in substance, to
the Central Government or a Company is an unreasonable restriction on the right
of the lessees to hold their lease-hold property and to carry on their business
of mining.
(n) The Act is open to challenge under
Article 31 because no provision is made for the payment of any amount
whatsoever to the lessees whose mining business is taken over under the Act. No
public purpose is involved either in the 1046 termination of the lessees'
interest or in the acquisition of their business. Expropriation without payment
of any amount requires a very heavy public purpose.
(o) Since no provision whatsoever is made for
the payment of any amount to the lessees whose leases are terminated, the
Nationalisation Amendment Act is not a 'Law' within the meaning of Article
31(2) and therefore Article 19(1)(f) is attracted.
(p) The Act is not saved from the challenge
of Articles 14, 19 and 31 by Article 31A (1) (e) because that Article provides
for extinguishment which does not amount to acquisition by the State. If
extinguishment amounting to acquisition was intended to be saved under Article
31A(1) (e), the subject matter dealt with by clause (e) would have been
included in clause (a) of that Article.
Dismissing all the Writ Petitions except Writ
Petitions Nos. 111, 178, 220, 221, 257, 352, 600 & 1130-1134/77 which are
allowed in part, the Court, ^
HELD : (1) The provisions of the Amendment
Act 67 of 1976 are not a mere facade for terminating mining leases without any
obligation in the matter of regulation of mines and mineral development.
[1071H, 1072A] Grating that Entry 54, List I is purposive since it qualifies
the power to pass a law relating to "Regulation of Mines and Mineral
Development" by the addition of a restrictive clause, "to the extent
to which such regulation and development under the control of the Union is
declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest", the
provisions of the Nationalisation Amendment Act show that they are designed to
serve progressively the purpose of Entry 54. [1972 A-B] The Coal Mines
(Nationalisation) Act was passed in order to provide for the acquisition and
transfer of the right, title and interest of the owners in respect of the Coal
mines specified in the Schedule to that Act. This was done with a view to
re-organising and reconstructing such coal mines so as to ensure the rational,
co-ordinated and scientific development and utilisation of coal resources
consistent with the growing requirements of the country. The high purpose of
that Act was to ensure that the ownership and control of such resources are
vested in the State and thereby so distributed as best to subserve the common
good.
[1072 D-F] The several provisions of the
Nationalisation Amendment Act, are, (1) by section 3(3) (a) of the Coal Mines (Nationalisation)
Act, 1973 which was introduced by the Nationalisation Amendment Act, no person
other than those mentioned in clauses (i) to (iii) can carry on coal mining
operations after April 29, 1976, being the date on which section 3 of the
Nationalisation Amendment Act came into force; (2) by section 3 (3) (b) all
mining leases and sub- leases stood terminated except those granted before
April 29, 1976 in favour of the Central Government, a Government company or
corporation owned, managed or controlled by the Central Government; (3) section
3(3) (c) prohibits the granting of a lease for winning or mining coal in favour
of any person other than the Government, a Government company or a corporation
of the above description provided that a sub-lease could be granted by these
authorities to any person if the two conditions mentioned in the proviso are
satisfied; and (4) when a mining lease stands terminated under section 3(3),
"it shall 1047 be lawful" for the Central Government or the
Government company or the corporation owned or controlled by the Central
Government to obtain a prospecting licence or a mining lease in respect of the
whole or part of the land covered by the mining lease which stands terminated.
Section 4 of the Nationalisation Amendment Act introduced an additional penal
provision in the parent Act. The provisions of Ss. 3 and 4 are not a direct negation
of the principles of the parent Act and they do not destroy the integral scheme
of taking over the management of mines, of acquiring the rights of
lease-holders and continuing to run the mines.
On the contrary, the Nationalisation
Amendment Act is manifestly in furtherance of the object of nationalisation
mentioned in the preamble to the parent Act and effectuates the purpose
mentioned in sections 3(1) and 3(2) of that Act by the addition of a new
sub-section, sub-section (3), which terminates all coal mining leases and
sub-leases except those referred in sub-section (3) (b). The circumstance that
the marginal note to section 3 and the title of Chapter II of the
Nationalisation Act are not amended by the Nationalisation Amendment Act,
despite the addition of a new sub-section, is of little or no consequence. That
sub- section is a logical extension of the scheme envisaged by the original
sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 3. [1073 C- H, 1074A-B]
2. Besides, marginal notes to the sections of
a statute and the titles of its chapters cannot take away the effect of the,
provisions contained in the Act so as to render those provisions legislatively
incompetent, if they are otherwise within the competence of the legislature to
enact.
One must principally have regard to the
object of an Act in order to find out whether the exercise of the legislative
power is purposive, unless, of course, the provisions of the Act show that the
avowed or intended objects is a mere pretence for covering a veiled transgression
committed by the legislative upon its own powers. Whether a particular object
can be successfully achieved by an Act, is largely a matter of legislative
policy. [1074 B-D]
3. The Nationalisation Amendment Act needs no
preamble, especially when it is backed up by a statement of objects and
reasons. Generally, an amendment Act is passed in order to advance the purpose
of the parent Act as reflected in the preamble to that Act. Acquisition of coal
mines, is not an end in itself but is only a means to an end. The fundamental
object of the Nationalisation Act as also of the Nationalisation Amendment Act
is to bring into existence a state of affairs which will be congenial for
regulating mines and for mineral development. In regard to the scheduled mines,
that purpose was achieved by the means of acquisition. In regard to mines which
were not included in the Schedule, the same purpose was achieved by termination
of leases and sub-leases and by taking over the right to work the mines.
Termination of leases, vesting of lease-hold properties in the State
Governments and the grant of leases to the Central Government or Government
Companies are together the means conceived in order to achieve the object of
nationalisation of one of the vital material resources of the community. [1074
D-G]
4. Section 18 of the Mines and Mineral
(Regulation and Development) Act 67, 1957 contains a statutory behest and
projects a purposive legislative policy. The later Acts on the subject of
regulation of mines and mineral development are linked up with the policy
enunciated in section 18.
Therefore, nothing contained in the later
analogous Acts can be construed as in derogation of the principle enunciated in
section 18 of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 67 of 1957,
which provides that it shall be the duty of the 1048 Central Government to take
all such steps as may be necessary for the conservation and development of
minerals in India. Therefore, even in regard to matters falling under the
Nationalisation Amendment Act which terminates existing leases and makes it
lawful for the Central Government to obtain fresh leases, the obligation of
section 18 of the Act of 1957 will continue to apply in its full rigour. [1074
G- H, 1075 A-B]
5. Entry 54 refers to two things : (1)
regulation of mines and (2) mineral development. It is true that the Entry is
purposive, since the exercise of the power under Entry 54 has to be guided and
governed by public interest. But neither the power to regulate mines nor the
power to ensure mineral development postulates that no sooner is a mining lease
terminated by the force of the statute, then the Central Government must begin
to work the mine of which the lease is terminated. It is possible that after
the Nationalisation Amendment Act came into force, there was a hiatus between
the termination of existing leases and the granting of fresh ones. But, the
Nationalisation Amendment Act does not provide that any kind of type of mine
shall not be developed or worked. Conservation, prospecting and investigation,
developmental steps and finally scientific exploitation of the mines and
minerals, is the process envisaged by the Nationalisation Amendment Act. It is
undeniable that conservation of minerals, which is brought about by the
termination of existing leases and subleases, is vital for the development of
mines. A phased and graded programme of conservation is in the ultimate
analysis one of the most satisfactory and effective means for the regulation of
mines and the development of minerals. [1075 D-G]
6. The Nationalisation Amendment Act is not
destructive of the provisions of the Parent Act. The destruction which the
Nationalisation Amendment Act brings about is of the lease or the sub-lease and
not of its subject matter, namely, the mine itself. In terminating the lease of
a house one does not destroy the house itself. It may be arguable that
prohibiting the use of the house for any purpose whatsoever may, for practical
purposes, amount to the destruction of the house itself. The Nationalisation
Amendment Act neither contains provisions directed at prohibiting the working
of mines, the leases in respect of which are terminated. A simple provision for
granting sub- leases shows that the object of the Nationalisation Amendment Act
is to ensure that no mine will lie idle or unexplored. Interregnums can
usefully be utilised for prospecting and investigation. They do not lead to
destruction of mines. In fact, it is just as well that the Amendment Act does
not require the new leases to undertake an adventure, reckless and thoughtless,
which goes by the name of 'scratching of mines', which ultimately results in
the slaughtering of mines. [1075H, 1976A-D] Natural resources, however, large
are not inexhaustible, which makes it imperative to conserve them.
Without a wise and planned conservation of
such resources, there can neither be a systematic regulation of mines nor a
scientific development of minerals. The importance of conservation of natural
resources in any scheme of regulation and development of such resources can be
seen from the fact that the Parliament had to pass in August 1974 an Act called
the Coal Mines (Conservation and Development) Act, 28 of 1974, in order,
principally, to provide for the conservation of coal and development of coal
mines, Section 4(1) of that Act enables the Central Government, for the purpose
of conservation of coal and for the development of coal mines, to exercise such
powers and take or cause to be taken such measures as it may be necessary or
proper or as may be prescribed. By section 5(1), a duty is cast on the 1049
owners of coal mines to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure the
conservation of coal and development of the coal mines owned by them. Measures
taken for judicious preservation and distribution of natural resources may
involve restrictions on their use and even prohibition, upto a degree, of the
unplanned working of the repositories of such resources. [1076 D-F, 1077 B]
Attorney-General for Ontario v. Attorney-General for Canada [1896] A.C. 348,
363; Municipal Corporation of City of Toronto v. Virgo [1896] A.C. 88 explained
and referred to.
7. Section 3(4) of the Act uses an enabling
or permissive expression in order that regulation of mines and mineral
development may be ensured after a scientific prospecting, investigation and
planning. It is doubtless that, in the language of Lord Cairns in Julius (1880)
5 Appeal Cases 214, 222, there is something in the nature of the things which
the Nationalisation Amendment Act empowers to be done, something in the object
for which it is to be done and something in the conditions under which it is to
be done which couples the power conferred by the Act with a duty, the duty
being not to act in haste but with reasonable promptitude depending upon the nature
of the problem under investigation. An obligation to act does not cease to be
so merely because there is no obligation to act in an ad-hoc or impromptu
manner. It is in the context of a conglomeration of these diverse
considerations that one must appreciate why, in section 3(4) which was
introduced by the Nationalisation Amendment Act, Parliament used the permissive
expression "it shall be lawful". [1078 H, 1079 A- C] A broad and
liberal approach to the field of legislation demarcated by Entry 54, List I, an
objective and practical understanding of the provisions contained in the
Nationalisation Amendment Act and a realistic perception of constitutional
principles will point to the conclusion that the Parliament had the legislative
competence to enact the Nationalisation Amendment Act. [1079 C-D] Julius v.
Bishop of Oxford [1880] 5 Appeal cases 214,222 referred to.
8. The Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation)
Act of 1972 and the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act of 1973 cover the whole
field of "Coal" which was intended to be nationalised.
The titles of the two Acts and the various
provisions contained therein show that what was being nationalised was three
distinct categories of mines: mines containing seams of coking coal
exclusively; mines containing seams of coking coal along with seams of other
coal; and mines containing seams of other coal. Though Parliament had power
under Article 31A(1)(e) of the Constitution to terminate mining leases without
payment of any compensation or 'amount', it decided to nationalise coal mines
on payment of amounts specified in the Schedules to the Nationalisation Acts of
1972 and 1973. Besides, even when something apart from coking coal mines was
acquired, namely, 'coke oven plants', provision was separately made in section
11 of the Nationalisation Act of 1972, read with the 2nd Schedule, for payment
of amounts to owners of coke oven plants. Thus, whatever was intended to be
acquired was paid for. This scheme is prima facie inconsistent with the
Parliament intending to acquire leasehold rights in other minerals, like
fireclay, without the payment of any amount. [1082 B-E] Coupled with this is
the unambiguous wording of section 3(3)(b) and section 3(3)(c) of the
Nationalisation Act of 1973 which were introduced therein by 1050 section 3 of
the Nationalisation Amendment Act. These provisions carry the scheme of the
Nationalisation Acts to their logical conclusion by emphasising that the target
of those Acts is coal mines, pure and simple. What stands terminated under
section 3(3)(b) is certain mining leases and sub-leases in so far as they
relate to the winning or mining of coal. The embargo placed by section 3(3)(c)
is on the granting of leases for winning or mining coal to persons other than
those mentioned in section 3(3)(a). [1082 E-F, H, 1083-A] The definition of
'coal mine' in section 2(b) of the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1973 has
an uncertain import and the scheme of that Act and of the Coking Coal Mines
(Nationalisation) Act, 1972 makes it plausible that rights in minerals other
than coke and coal were not intended to be acquired under the two
Nationalisation Acts.
A comparison of the definition of "coal
mine" in section 2(b) of the Act of 1973 with the definition of
"coking coal mine" in section 3(c) of the Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation)
Act of 1972 makes it clear that whereas in regard to coking coal mines, the
existence of any seam of other coal was regarded as inconsequential, the
existence of any seam of another mineral was not considered as inconsequential
in regard to a coal mine. The definition of coal mine in section 2(b) of the
Act of 1973 scrupulously deleted the clause, "whether exclusively or in
addition to" any other seam. The same Legislature which added the
particular clause in the definition of 'coking coal mine' in the 1973 Act,
deleted it in the definition of 'coal mine in the 1973 Act. In so far as coal
mines are concerned, by reason of the definition of coal mine contained in
section 2(b) of the Act of 1973, and the definition of coking coal mine in
section 3(c) of the Act of 1972 which presents a striking contrast to the
definition in section 2(b), composite coal mines, that is to say, coal mines in
which there are seams of coal and fireclay do not fall within the scope of the
definition of "coal mine" in section 2(b) of the Act of 1973. [1083
A-B, C-E, G-H]
9. The lessees of composite mines, therefore,
who hold composite mining leases of winning coal and fireclay, cannot continue
their mining operations unabated despite the provisions of the Nationalisation Amendment
Act. It is one thing to say that a composite mine is outside the scope of the
definition of coal mine in section 2(b) of the Nationalisation Act of 1972 and
quite another to conclude therefrom that the other provisions introduced into
that Act by the Nationalisation Amendment Act will have no impact on composite
leases for winning coal and fireclay. Section 3(3) (a) which was introduced
into the parent Act by the Nationalisation Amendment Act provides expressly
that on and from the commencement. Of section 3 of the Amendment Act, that is,
from April 29, 1976, no person other than those mentioned in clauses (i) to
(iii) shall carry on "coal mining operation, in India, in any form."
These provisions of sections 3(3)(a) and 30(2) of the parent Act will apply of
their own force, whether or not the lessee holds a composite lease for winning
coal and fireclay and whether or not the mine is a composite mine containing
alternate seams of coal and fireclay. In other words, if a person holding a
composite lease can do fireclay mining without mining coal, he may do so. But
if he cannot win or mine fireclay without doing a coal mining operation, that
is, without winning or mining coal, he cannot do any mining operation at all.
If he does so, he will be liable for the penal consequences provided for in
section 30(2) of the Nationalisation Act of 1973. The provision contained in
section 3(3)(a) totally prohibiting the generality of persons from carrying on
coal mining operation in India in any form and the penal provision of section
30(2) 1051 virtually leave with the lessees of composite mines the husk of a
mining interest. That they cannot win or mine coal is conceded and, indeed,
there is no escape from that position in view of the aforesaid provisions.
[1084 B-H, 1085 A] The lessees of composite mines cannot win or mine fireclay
though their composite lease is outside the scope of section 2(b) of the
Nationalisation Act of 1973. The lessees of composite mines will, for all
practical purposes, have to nurse their deeds of lease without being able to
exercise any of the rights flowing from them. On their own showing, they will
be acting at their peril if they attempt to win fireclay. If they cannot win
fireclay without winning coal, they cannot win fireclay either, even if they
hold composite leases under which they are entitled to win coal and fireclay.
[1085 C-D] (10). Though the Parliament provided for the payment of amounts for
acquisition of certain interests under the Nationalisation Acts of 1972 and
1973, it did not intent to pay any compensation or amount for the termination
of lease- hold rights in respect of composite mines. Mines which have alternate
seams of coal and fireclay are in a class by themselves and they appear to be
far fewer in number as compared with the coking coal mines and coal mines,
properly so called. The authority of law for the termination of the rights of
composite lessees is the provision contained in section 3(3)(a), the violation
of which attracts the penal provisions of section 30(2) of the Nationalisation
Act of 1973. The Parliament has deprived composite lessees of their right to
win fireclay because they cannot do so without winning coal. The winning of
coal by the generality of people is prohibited by section 3(3)(a) of the Act of
1973.
[1085 E-H] This is just as well, because
Parliament could not have intended that such islands of exception should
swallow the main stream of the Nationalisation Acts. Obviously, no rights were
intended to be left outstanding once the rights in respect of coking coal mines
and coal mines were brought to an end. [1085 G-H]
11. A close and careful examination of the
provisions of the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1973 and of the amendments
made to that Act by Nationalisation Amendment Act makes it clear that by the
Nationalisation Amendment Act, neither the petitioners' right to property has
been acquired without the payment of any amount nor they have been unreasonably
deprived of their right to carry on the business of mining. [1087 E-F] The Coal
Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1973 nationalised coal mines by providing by
section 3(1) that on the appointed day, that is on May 1, 1973, the right,
title and interest of the owners in relation to the coal mines specified in the
Schedule shall stand transferred to, and shall vest absolutely in, the Central
Government free from all incumbrances. The scheduled mines, 711 in number and
situated in reputed coal bearing areas, were the ones which were engaged
openly, lawfully and uinterruptedly in doing coal mining business. Since it was
possible to ascertain and verify the relevant facts pertaining to these
undertakings, they were taken over on payment of amounts mentioned in the
Schedule to the Act, which varied from mine to mine depending upon the valve of
their assets, their potential and their profitability. In the very nature of
things, the list of mines in the Schedule could not be exhaustive because there
were, and perhaps even now there are, unauthorised mines worked by persons who
did not possess the semblance of a title or right to do mining business.
Persons falling within that category cannot cite the Constitution as their
charter 1052 to continue to indulge in unauthorised mining which is
unscientific, unsystematic and detrimental to the national interest by reason
of its tendency to destroy the reserve of natural resources. But alongside
these persons, there could conceivably be mine operators who may have been
doing their business lawfully but who were not easily or readily identifiable.
Section 3(2) of the Nationalisation Act, 1973 made provision for taking over
the management of such mines by declaring for "the removal of doubts"
that if, after the appointed day, the existence of any other coal mine comes to
the knowledge of the Central Government, the provisions of the Coal Mines
(Taking Over of Management) Act, 1973, shall, until that mine is nationalist by
an appropriate legislation, apply to such mine. Owners of mines whose mines
were not included in the Schedule but whose right, title and interest was to
vest eventually in the Central Government under "an appropriate
legislation" envisaged by section 3(2) of the Nationalisation Act were, by
this method, placed on par with the owners of mines of which the management was
taken over under the Coal Mines (Taking Over of Management) Act, 1973. That Act
provides by section 7(1) that every owner of a coal mine shall be given by the
Central Government an amount in cash for the vesting in it, under section 3, of
the management of such mine. By section 7(2), for every months during which the
management of a coal mine remains vested in the Central Government, the amount
referred to in sub-section (1) shall be computed at the rate of twenty paise
per ton of coal on the highest monthly production of coal from such mine during
any month in the years 1969, 1970, 1971 and 1972. The two provisos to that
subsection and the other sub-sections of section 7 provide for other matters
relating to payment of amounts to the owners of coal mines of which the
management was taken over.
The Nationalisation Amendment Act carried the
scheme of these two Acts to its logical conclusion by terminating the so-called
leases and sub-leases which might have remained outstanding. [1087 G-H, 1088
A-G] Thus, the purpose attained by these Acts is (1) to vest in the Central
Government the right of management of all coal mines; (2) to nationalise the mines
mentioned in the Schedule; (3) to provide for the taking over of management of
coal mines the existence of which comes to the knowledge of the Central
Government after the appointed day and lastly (4) to terminate all mining
leases. The Management Act and the Nationalisation Act provide for payment of
amounts, by no means illusory, to the owners of coal mines whose rights were
taken over. In the normal course of human affairs, particularly business
affairs, it is difficult to conceive that owners of coal mines who had even the
vestige of a title thereto would not bring to the notice of the Central
Government the existence of their mines, when such mines were not included in
the Schedule to the Nationalisation Act. Those who did not care to bring the existence
of their mines to the knowledge of the Central Government, even though amounts
are payable under the Management Act for the extinguishment of the right of
management did not evidently possess even the semblance of a title to the
mines. The claims of lessees, holding or allegedly holding under such owners,
would be as tenuous as the title of their putative lessors. [1088 G-H, 1089
A-C]
12. The Nationalisation Amendment Act by
section 3(3) (b) undoubtedly terminates all existing leases and sub- leases
except those already granted in favour of persons referred to in clauses (i) to
(iii) of section 3(3)(a).
Similarly section 3(3)(a) imposes an embargo
on all future coal mining operations except in regard to the persons mentioned
in clauses (i) to (iii). But the 1053 generality of leases which are alleged to
have remained outstanding despite the coming into force of the Management Act
and the Nationalisation Act, were mostly precarious, whose holders could at
best present the familiar alibi that the origin of their rights or of those
from whom they derived title was lost in antiquity. Neither in law, nor in
equity and justice, nor under the Constitution can these lessees be heard to
complain of the termination of their lease-hold rights without the payment of
any amount. The provision contained in section 3(3)(b) of the Nationalisation
Amendment Act was made ex majore cautela so as not to leave any lease of a coal
mine surviving after the enactment of the Management Act and the
Nationalisation Act.
There was no reasonable possibility of a
lawful lease surviving the passing of those Acts; but if, per chance, anyone
claimed that he held a lease, that stood terminated under section 3(3)(b).
[1089 C-G]
13. Section 3(3)(b) of the Nationalisation
Amendment Act brings about an extinguishment simpliciter of coal mining leases
within the meaning of Article 31A(1) (e) of the Constitution. The termination
of the mining leases and sub-leases brought about by section 3(3)(b) of the
Nationalisation Amendment Act is not a mere pretence for the acquisition of the
mining business of the lessees and sub- lessees. The true intent of the
Nationalisation Amendment Act was not to "acquire" anyone's business.
This would be so whether the word 'acquire' is understood in its broad popular
sense or in the narrow technical sense which it has come to possess. Whatever
rights were intended to be acquired were paid for by the fixation of amount or
by the laying down of a formula for ascertaining amounts payable for
acquisition. Having provided for payment of amounts for acquisition of
management and ownership rights, it is unbelievable that the legislature
resorted to the subterfuge of acquiring the mining business of the surviving
lessees and sub-lessees by the device of terminating their leases and
sub-leases. The legislative history leading to the termination of coal-mining
leases points to one conclusion only that, by and large, every lawful interest
which was acquired was paid for; the extinguishment of the interest which
survived or which is alleged to have survived the passing of the Management Act
and the Nationalisation Act was provided for merely in order to ensure that no
loophole was left in the implementation of the scheme envisaged by those Acts.
Persons dealt with by section 3(3)(b) of the Nationalisation Amendment Act are
differently situated from those who were dealt with by the two earlier Acts,
namely, the Management Act and the Nationalisation Act. No violation of Article
14 is, therefore, involved.
[1089 G-1090 D-H, 1091 A-B]
14. The public purpose which informs the
Nationalisation Amendment Act is the same which lies behind its two precursors,
the Management Act and the Nationalisation Act. The purpose is to re-organise
and re- structure coal mines so as to ensure the rational, co- ordinated and
scientific development and utilisation of coal resources consistent with the
growing requirements of the country. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of
the Nationalisation Amendment Act points in the same direction.
Public purpose runs like a continuous thread
through the well-knit scheme of the three Acts under consideration.
[1091 B-D]
15. Making every allowance in favour of the
right to property which was available at the relevant time and having regard to
the substance of the matter and not merely to the form adopted for terminating
the interest of the lessees and the sub-lessees, the Nationalisation Amendment
Act involves no acquisition of the interest of the lessees and the sub-
lessees. It merely brings about in 1054 the language of Article 31A(1)(e)
"the extinguishment" of their right, if any, to win coal. Whichever
right, title and interest was lawful and identifiable was acquired by the
Management Act and the Nationalisation Act. And whichever interest was acquired
was paid for. Tenuous and furtive interests which survived the passing of those
Acts were merely extinguished by the Nationalisation Amendment Act.
[1091 F-H, 1092 A] The interest of the
lessees and sub-lessees which was brought to termination by section 3(3)(b) of
the Nationalisation Amendment Act does not come to be vested in the State. The
Act provides that excepting a certain class of leases and sub-leases, all other
leases and sub-leases shall stand terminated in so far as they relate to the
winning or mining of coal. There is no provision in the Act by which the
interest so terminated is vested in the State;
Nor does such vesting flow as a necessary
consequence of any of the Provisions of the Act. Sub-section (4) of section 3
of the Act provides that where a mining lease stands terminated under
sub-section (3), it shall be lawful for the Central Government or a Government
Company or a corporation owned or controlled by the Central Government to
obtain a prospecting licence or a mining lease in respect of the whole or part
of the land covered by the mining lease which stands so terminated. The plain
intendment of the Act, which is neither a pretence nor a facade, is that once
the outstanding leases and sub-leases are terminated, the Central Government and
the other authorities will be free to apply for a mining lease. Any lease-hold
interest which the Central Government, for example, may thus obtain does not
directly or immediately flow from the termination brought about by section
3(3)(b). Another event has to intervene between the termination of existing
leases and the creation of new interests. The Central Government etc. have to
take a positive step for obtaining a prospecting licence or a mining lease.
Without it, the Act would be ineffective to create of its own force any right
or interest in favour of the Central Government a Government Company or a
Corporation owned, managed or controlled by the Central Government. The
essential difference between "acquisition by the State" on the one
hand and "modification or extinguishment of rights" on the other, is
that in the first case the beneficiary is the State while in the second the
beneficiary is not the State. The Nationalisation Amendment Act merely
extinguishes the rights of the lessees and the sublesses. It does not provide
for the acquisition of those rights, directly or indirectly, by the State.
Article 31A(2A) will therefore come into play. It follows that the
Nationalisation Amendment Act must receive the protection of Article 31A(1)(e)
of the Constitution, that is to say, that the Act cannot be deemed to be void
on the ground that it is inconsistent with or takes away or abridges any of the
rights conferred by Articles 14, 19 and 31.
[1092 F-H, 1093 A-H] Ajit Singh v. State of
Punjab [1967] 2 SCR 143; Madan Mohan Pathak v. Union of India & Ors. [1978]
3 SCR 334 discussed and distinguished.
Dwarkadas Shrinivas v. The Sholapur Spinning
& Weaving Co. Ltd. [1954] SCR 674, 733-734 applied.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petitions Nos.
111,150-151, 180, 205-210, 220,226, 270-271, 346-352, 355, 403, 396-398, 599,
541, 543, 626, 635-639, 661, 687-692 and 758/77, 154, 178, 571-574, 600, 603,
605, 610, 611,257,221 and 1134- 1134/77.
1055 (Under Article 32 of the Constitution)
A. K. Sen, S. C. Banerjee, Y. S. Chitale, K. K. Sinha, S. K. Sinha, Pradeep
Hajela, S. K. Verma, A. K. Srivastava, M. P. Jha, C. K. Ratnaparkhi, B. N.
Lala, Surajdeo Singh, D. P. Mukherjee and A. K. Ganguli for the Petitioners in
W.Ps. Nos. 111, 150-151, 154, 178, 610-611 661, 180, 270-271, 599, 220, 226,
205-210, 396-398 and 600 of 1977.
H. M. Seervai, Kamal Nayan Choubey, A. K.
Srivastava, B. P. Singh and Bimal Kumar Sinha for the Petitioners in WP Nos.
237, 571-574, 603, 605, 355, 346 of 1977.
D. Goburdhan for the Petitioners in WP Nos.
687, 692, 635-639, 352, and Respondent No. 12 in WP Nos. 150-151/77.
A. K. Sen, S. C. Bannerjee, Y. S. Chitale, S.
B.
Sanyal, A. K. Banerjee and A. K. Nag for the
Petitioners in WP Nos. 626, 541, 543 and Respondent No. 15 in WP 154/77.
S. V. Gupte, S. N. Kacker, U. R. Lalit, S. P.
Nayar, R. N. Sachthey and Gobind Mukhoty for the Respondents Nos. 1, 9-12 in WP
No. 111, RR. 1, 7, 11 in WP Nos. 150-151, RR. 1, 8 to 12 in WP. 154, RR.
1&7 in WP. 178, RR. 1&7 in WPs. 610- 611 RR. 1,5,6 & 8 in WP. 661,
RR. 1 & 7 in WP Nos. 270-271, RR 1 & 7 in WP in 599, RR. 1, 8, 9-12
& 15 in WPs. Nos 571- 574, RR. 1, 8-13 & 16 in WP No. 603. RR.
1,2&9 in WP 605,RR.1,2,10,11,14&15 in WP. 355, RR. 1, 8-12 in WP 346,
RR. 1, 3-5, 8, 9 in WP No. 626, RR. 1, 6-10 & 14 in WP. 541, RR. 1-5 &
9 in WP. 543, RR. 1, 8 & 12 and 15 in WP. 758, RR 1, 7 in WP. 257, RR.
1&7 in WPs. 220 and 226 RR. 1&8 in WPs. 205-210, RR. 1&8 in WP.
600, RR. 1, 3, 11-15 in WP 403, RR. 1, 9 & 10 in WP No. 180/77.
Lal Narain Sinha, U. P. Singh, Shambhu Nath
Jha and U. S. Prasad for the Respondents Nos. 2-8 in WP Nos. 111, 2-7 in 154,
2-6 in 610-611, 2-4, 7 & 8 in 661, 2-8 in 180, 2-6, 10-12 in 270-271, 2-6
and 10-13 in 599, 2-7 in 571-574, 2-7, 14-15, 17-20 & 23 in 603, 2-7 in
605, 3-8, 12, 13, 16-18 in 335, 2-6 in 687-692, 2-6 in 635-637, 2-6 in 352, 2,
6, 7 & 10 in 626, 2-5, 11-13 in 541, 6-8 in 543, 2-6 in 758/77, 2- 7, 13,
14 & 16 in 257, 2-6 in 220 and 226, 2-6, 13, 14 in 205-210, 2-7 in 600, 2-6
in 638-639, 2, 4 to 10 in 403/77.
Mr. P. S. Khera for Intervener No. 1 in WP.
111/77.
S. K. Verma for the Intervener No. 2 in WP.
111/77.
A. P. Chatterjee and G. S. Chatterjee for
Respondents 2 & 6 in WPs. 150-151 & 2 to 6 in 396-398/77. M. P. Jha for
the Petitioner in WP. No. 758/77.
1056 The Judgment of the Court was delivered
by CHANDRACHUD, C. J.-This is a group of 61 Writ Petitions under article 32 of
the Constitution challenging the validity of the Coal Mines (Nationalisation)
Amendment Act 67 of 1976, on the ground that it is violative of the provisions
of articles 14, 19(1)(f), 19(1) (g) and 31 of the Constitution. For
understanding the basis of that challenge, it will be enough to refer to the
broad facts of two representative groups of petitions. The facts of writ
petitions 270 and 271 of 1977 are, by and large, typical of cases in which the
petitioners claim to be lessees of coal mines, while the facts of writ petition
257 of 1977 are typical of cases in which the petitioners claim to be lessees
of composite mines containing alternate seems of coal and fireclay. Most of the
facts are undisputed and only a few of them are in controversy.
In writ petitions 270 and 271 of 1977,
petitioner No. 1 claims to be the sole proprietor of 'S.D. Coal Company' which
is engaged in coal business and coal mining operations. Petitioner No. 2 is
said to be the agent of the company. Both the surface and underground rights in
Mouza Bundu in the District of Hazaribagh, Bihar, previously belonged to the
Raja of Ramgarh from whom or whose successors-in interest, the South Karanpura
Coal Co. Ltd.
appears to have obtained a lease of 242
Bighas of coal bearing lands in Mouza Bundu, called the 'Bundu Colliery'.
After the enactment of the Bihar Land Reforms
Act 30 of 1950, all rights of tenure-holders landlords and Zamindars, including
the rights in mines and minerals, vested in the State of Bihar but, by virtue
of section 10 of that Act, subsisting leases of mines and minerals in any
estate or tenure became leases under the State Government. It is alleged that
on 12th June, 1975 the South Karanpura Coal Co.
Ltd. entered into an agreement with the S. D.
Coal Company or prospecting, developing, raising and selling coal from the
Bundu Colliery and that on the strength of that agreement, petitioner No. 1 was
put in possession of the entire area of 242 Bighas of coal bearing land. The S.
D. Coal Company is stated to have made large investments in the colliery and to
have started paying rents and royalty to the State of Bihar. The petitioners
have cited various facts and figures in support of their contention that they
have been in working possession of the coal mine area in question and that they
were entitled to remove nearly 30,000 tonnes of coal raised by them at a heavy
cost. It appears that in a proceeding under section 144 of the Criminal
Procedure Code, the Sub-divisional Magistrate (Sadar), Hazaribagh, had made the
rule absolute against the South Karanpura Coal Co. Ltd.
as well as the S. D. Coal Company, on the
ground that 1057 the State Government had taken over the Bundu Colliery. But,
in C.R. Case No. 18318(W) of 1975, the High Court of Calcutta is stated to have
set aside the order of the State Government cancelling the lease of petitioner
1 in respect of the Bundu Colliery. Since that lease stands terminated under the
Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Amendment Act 1976, the petitioners have filed
writ petitions to challenge the validity of that Act.
On the factual aspect, the contention of the
State of Bihar is that the lease of the Bundu Colliery which was held by M/s
South Karanpura Coal Co. Ltd. was terminated by the Bihar Government on
November 24, 1975 on account of the violation of Rule 37 of the Mineral
Concession Rules, 1960 and that, actual possession of the colliery was taken by
the State Government on November 26, 1975 prior to the coming into force of the
Amendment Act of 1976.
In writ petition No. 257 of 1977, the
petitioner Nirode Baran Banerjee made an application dated September 17, 1966
for the grant of a mining lease in respect of fireclay covering an area of
1640.60 acres of the Hesalong Colliery.
On September 19, 1966 he made a similar
application in respect of the same area, for a coal mining lease. These
applications were deemed to have been rejected since the State Government did
not pass any order thereon within the prescribed period. In a Revision
application preferred by the petitioner, the Central Government directed the
State Government to consider the petitioner's application for the grant of a
mining lease in respect of fireclay. The dispute relating to the petitioner's
application for a coal mining lease was brought to the Supreme Court, as a
result of which the Central Government on April 1, 1972 directed the State
Government to grant a coal mining lease to the petitioner.
On October 17, 1973 a formal lease was
executed by the State of Bihar in favour of the petitioner in respect of both
coal and fireclay. The lease was registered on October 18.
According to the petitioner, the Hesalong
Colliery in respect of which he holds the mining lease for coal and fireclay is
situated in an interior area of the hilly portion of the District of Hazaribagh
which has its own peculiar nature, trait and character. The reserves of coal in
the area are said to be in isolated small pockets and are not sufficient for
scientific or economical development in a co-ordinated and integrated manner.
The coal is ungraded and is not required to be transported by rail.
On the composite nature of the mine, the
petitioner has made a specific averment in paragraph 6 of his writ petition to
the following effect:
1058 The coal and fireclay deposits in the
said area are so mixed up that one cannot work either for extraction of coal or
for extraction of fireclay without disturbing each of the said two minerals.
The deposits are such that at one layer there is coal, the next layer is
fireclay, the other layer is coal, the next layer is again fireclay and so on.
In paragraph 15 of his writ petition the
petitioner has stated that in the Hesalong Mines, the deposit of fireclay is
spread over the entire area of 1640.60 acres in the first layer and just
beneath that, there is a deposit of coal in the second layer, so on and so
forth. According to the petitioner, it is absolutely impossible to carry on
mining operations in coal without disturbing the fireclay and any such
disturbance and inadvertent extraction of either coal or fireclay by different
lessees, if the composite lease is split up, will amount to unauthorise mining.
The petitioner contends that he employs about
9,000 workers, has invested a huge amount for making the colliery workable and
that a large amount of coal, which was lying exposed and unprotected, was ready
for dispatch. Since his composite lease too was in jeopardy under the Amendment
Act, he filed a writ petition in this Court to challenge the validity of the
Act, contending in addition that the Act is not applicable to composite mines
having alternate layers of fireclay and coal.
Some of the petitioners had filed writ
petitions in the High Court’s under article 226 of the Constitution challenging
the validity of the Amendment Act of 1976. Rules were issued in those petitions
and interim orders were passed under which the status quo was maintained on
certain terms and conditions. After the passing of the 42nd Constitution
Amendment Act, the High Court’s became incompetent to grant any relief in those
petitions whereupon, writ petitions were filed in this Court.
The petitions were argued on behalf of the
petitioners by Shri A. K. Sen, Shri H. M. Seervai, Shri Y. S. Chitale, Shri B.
K. Sinha, Shri D. Goburdhan and Shri A. K. Nag. The Attorney General argued in
support of the validity of the impugned Act and so did the Solicitor General,
appearing on behalf of the Union of India. Shri Lal Narain Sinha and Shri A. P.
Chatterjee argued respectively on behalf of the State of Bihar and the State of
West Bengal. Shri P. S. Khera and Shri S. K. Verma appeared on behalf of the
interveners.
Before examining the contentions advanced
before us by the various learned counsel, it will be useful to trace briefly
the history of laws bearing on the working of mines and exploitation of
minerals, 1059 the taking over of management and the nationalisation of mines
and finally the termination of certain leases under the impugned Act.
According to "India 1976"
(Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of
India), coal mining was first started at Raniganj, West Bengal, in 1774. Coal
is an important mineral as a source of energy and in India it constitutes a prime
source of energy.
On the attainment of independence, the
importance of coal to industrial development was realised by the Planners and
the problems of the coal industry were identified by the Planning Commission in
its report on the First Five Year Plan. The Fifth Plan provided for a
production target of
13.5 million tonnes of coal by 1978-79, which
amounted to an increase of 5.7 million tonnes from the level of production of
7.79 million tonnes at the end of the Fourth Five Year Plan. In 1950, after coal
mining was stepped up, the production was 32 million tonnes. In 1974-75 it
reached a record figure of 88.4 million tonnes. The overall reserves of coal,
both coking and non-coking were estimated in 1976 at 8,095 crore tonnes.
But, howsoever high the coal reserves may be,
they are not inexhaustible, which underlines the need for a planned development
of the natural resources. The reckless and unscientific methods of mining which
were adopted by most of the colliery owners without regard to considerations of
conservation of the mineral and safety and welfare of workers led the
Parliament to pass various legislations on the subject in the light of its
accumulated experience. The coking coal mines were nationalised in 1972 and the
non- coking coal mines were nationalised in the following year.
The production of coal in the country is now
almost completely controlled by the public sector with the exception of
isolated pockets wherein reserves are not sufficient for scientific and
economical development and the production is consumed locally. The only
important mines which are not nationalised are the captive coking coal mines of
the two private sector Steel Companies coking coal being a vital ingredient in
the production of Steel.
The production of coal in the public sector
is organised through three companies: the Coal Mines Authority Ltd., the Bharat
Coking Coal Ltd., and the Singareni Collieries Company Ltd. A holding company,
Coal India Limited, was formed in 1975 incorporating the Coal Mines Authority, the
Bharat Coking Coal and the Coal Mines Planning and Design Institute as separate
Divisions, besides other subsidiaries.
Entry 23 List II, Schedule VII of the
Constitution read with article 246(3) confers legislative power on the State
legislatures in respect of 1060 "Regulation of mines and mineral
development" but that power is "subject to the provisions of List I
with respect to regulation and development under the control of the
Union".
Entry 54 List I enables Parliament to acquire
legislative power in respect of "Regulation of mines and mineral
development to the extent to which such regulation and development under the
control of the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the
public interest".
Entry 24 List II relates to "Industries
subject to the provisions of entries 7 and 52 of List I". Entry 7, List I,
relates to Industries declared by Parliament by law to be necessary for the
purpose of defence or for the prosecution of war. Entry 52, List I, enables
Parliament to acquire legislative power in respect of "Industries, the
control of which by the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient
in the public interest".
The Industries (Development and Regulation)
Act, 65 of 1951, which came into force on May 8, 1952 contains a declaration in
section 2 that it was expedient in the public interest that the Union should
take under its control the industries specified in the First Schedule. Item
2(1) of the First Schedule comprises 'coal, lignite, coke and their
derivatives' under the heading 'Fuels'. The Act provides for the establishment
of a Central Advisory Council and Development Councils, registration and
licensing of industrial undertakings, the assumption of management or control
of industrial undertakings by the Central Government control of supply,
distribution and price of certain articles, etc.
The Mines Act, 35 of 1952, which came into
force on July 1, 1952, was passed by the Parliament in order to amend and
consolidate the law relating to the regulation of labour and safety in mines.
That Act was evidently passed in the exercise of power under Entry 55, List I,
"Regulation of labour and safety in mines and oil fields".
The Mines and Minerals (Regulation and
Development) Act, 67 of 1957, which came into force on June 1, 1958 was passed
in order to provide for the regulation of mines and the development of minerals
under the control of the Union.
Section 2 of that Act contains a declaration
that it was expedient in the public interest that the Union should take under
its control the regulation of mines and the development of minerals to the
extent provided in the Act.
The Act provides, inter alia, for general
restrictions on undertaking prospecting and mining operations, the procedure
for obtaining prospecting licences or mining leases in respect of lands in
which the minerals vest in the Government, the rule making power for regulating
the grant of prospecting licences and mining leases, special powers of 1061
Central Government to undertake prospecting or mining operations in certain
cases, and for development of minerals.
There was a lull in legislative activity in
regard to the enactment of further regulatory measures for controlling mines
and minerals. The Coking Coal Mines (Emergency Provisions) Ordinance, 12 of
1971, was passed on October 16, 1971, It was replaced by the Coking Coal mines
(Emergency Provisions) Act, 64 of 1971, which received the President's assent
on December 23, 1971 but was given retrospective operation from the date of the
Ordinance. The Act was passed to provide for the taking over, in the public
interest, of the management of coking coal mines and coke oven plants, pending
nationalisation of such mines and plants. By section 3 (1), the management of
all coking coal mines vested in the Central Government from the appointed
day-October 17, 1971.
Section 6(1) provided that every owner of
coking coal mine shall be given by the Central Government an amount, in cash,
for vesting in it, under section 3, the management of such mine.. Such amount
was to be calculated in accordance with the provisions of section 6(2). The Coking
Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 36 of 1972, was passed in order, inter alia,
to provide for the acquisition and transfer of the right, title and interest of
the owners of the coking mines and coke even plants. Sections 30 and 31 of that
Act dealing respectively with penalties, and offences by companies came into
force at once but the remaining provisions were deemed to have come into force
on May 1, 1972. Section 3(c) defines "coking coal mine" to mean-
"a coal mine in which there exists one or more seams of coking coal,
whether exclusively or in addition to any seam of other coal".
By section 4(1) the right, title and interest
of the owners in relation to the coking coal mines specified in the First
Schedule shall stand transferred to, and shall vest absolutely in, the Central
Government, free from all incumbrances. By section 4(2), after the appointed
day, that is May 1, 1972 if any other coal mine was found to contain coking
coal the provisions of the Coking Coal Mines (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1971
were to apply to such mine until it was nationalised by an appropriate
legislation. By section 6(1), the Central Government becomes the lessee of the
State Government where the rights of the owner under any mining lease granted
in relation to a coking coal mine by the State Government or any other person,
vest in the Central Government under section 4. Section 7(1) empowers the
Central Government to direct that the right, title and interest of 1062 the
owners in relation to coking coal mines or coke oven plants shall vest in a
government company. Sections 10 and 11 of the Act provide for payment of the
amounts to owners of the coking coal mines and coke oven plants for the vesting
of their right, title and interest in the Central Government.
By an Amendment Act, 56 of 1972, which came
into force on September 12, 1972, section 4A was added to the Mines and Minerals
(Regulation and Development) Act 1957. That section provides for premature
termination of mining leases and the grant of fresh leases to Government
companies or Corporations owned or controlled by Government.
The Coal Mines (Taking over of Management)
Act, 15 of 1973, which received the assent of the President on March 31, 1973
was given retrospective effect from January 30, 1973 except section 8(2) which
came into force at once. The Act was passed in order "to provide for the
taking over, in the public interest, of the management of coal mines, pending
nationalisation of such mines, with a view to ensuring rational and
co-ordinated development of coal production and for promoting optimum
utilisation of the coal resources consistent with the growing requirements of
the country, and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto."
Section 2(b) of the Act defines a "coal mine" to mean a mine "in
which there exists one or more seams of coal." Section 3(1) provides that
on and from the appointed day (that is, January 31, 1973) the management of all
coal mines shall vest in the Central Government. By section 3(2), the coal
mines specified in the Schedule shall be deemed to be the coal mines the
management of which shall vest in the Central Government under sub-section (1).
Under the proviso to section 3(2), if, after the appointed day, the existence
of any other coal mine comes to the knowledge of the Central Government, it
shall by a notified order make a declaration about the existence of such mine,
upon which the management of such coal mine also vests in the Central
Government and the provisions of the Act become applicable thereto. Section
3(5) casts an obligation on every person in charge of the management of a coal
mine, immediately before the date on which the Act received the assent of the
President, to intimate the Central Government within 30 days from the said date
the name and location of the mine as well as the name and the address of the
owner, if the mine is not included or deemed to be included in the Schedule.
All contracts providing for the management of any coal mine made before the
appointed day between the owner of the mine and any per- 1063 son in charge of
the mine and any person in charge of the management thereof are to be deemed to
have been terminated on the appointed day, under section 4, Section 6(1)
empowers the Central Government to appoint Custodians for the purpose of taking
over of the management of the mines. Section 7(1) provides that every owner of
a coal mine shall be given by the Central Government an amount in cash for the
vesting in it under section 3, of the management of such mine. Section 18(1)(a)
excludes from the operation of the Act any coal mine owned, managed or
controlled by the Central Government, or by a Government Company or by a
corporation which is owned, managed or controlled by the Government. Clause (b)
of section 18(1) also excludes from the operation of the Act a coal mine owned
by or managed by a company engaged in the production of iron and steel.
The Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 26 of
1973, was given retrospective operation with effect from May 1, 1973 except
sections 30 and 31 which came into force at once.
This Act was passed, "to provide for the
acquisition and transfer of the right, title and interest of the owners in
respect of the coal mines specified in the Schedule with a view to
re-organising and reconstructing such coal mines so as to ensure the rational,
co-ordinated and scientific development and utilisation of coal resources
consistent with the growing requirements of the country, in order that the
ownership and control of such resources are vested in the State and thereby so
distributed as best to subserve the common good, and or matters connected
therewith or incidental thereto." Section 2(b) defines a coal mine in the
same way as the corresponding provision of the Management Act viz., a mine
"in which there exists one or more seams of coal." Section 3(1)
provides that on the appointed day (that is, May 1, 1973) the right, title and
interest of the owners in relation to the coal mines specified in the Schedule
shall stand transferred to, and shall vest absolutely in the Central Government
free from all incumbrances. Section 4(1) provides that where the rights of an
owner under any mining lease granted, or deemed to have been granted, in
relation to a coal mine, by a State Government or any other person, vest in the
Central Government under section 3, the Central Government shall, on and from
the date of such vesting, be deemed to have become the lessee of the State
Government or such other person, as the case may be, in relation to such coal
mine as if a mining lease in relation to such coal mine had been granted to the
Central Government. The period of such lease 1064 is to be the entire period
for which the lease could have been granted by the Central Government or such
other person under the Mineral Concession Rules and thereupon all the rights
under the mining lease granted to the lessee are to be deemed to have been
transferred to, and vested in, the Central Government. By section 4(2), on the
expiry of the term of any lease referred to in sub-section (1), the lease, at
the option of the Central Government, is liable to be renewed on the same terms
and conditions on which it was held by the lessor for the maximum period for
which it could be renewed under the Mineral Concession Rules. Section 5(1)
empowers the Central Government under certain conditions to direct by an order
in writing that the right, title and interest of an owner in relation to a coal
mine shall, instead of continuing to vest in the Central Government, vest in
the Government company. Such company, under section 5(2), is to be deemed to
have become the lessee of the coal mine as if the mining lease had been granted
to it. By section 6(1), the property which vests in the Central Government or in
a Government company is freed and discharged from all obligations and
incumbrances affecting it. The mortgagees and other holders of incumbrances are
required by section 6(2) to give intimation thereof to the Commissioner within
the prescribed time. Section 7(1) provides that the Central Government or the
Government company shall not be liable to discharge any liability of the owner,
agent, manager or managing contractor of a coal mine in respect of any period
prior to the appointed day.
Section 8 requires that the owner of every
coal mine or group of coal mines specified in the second column of the Schedule
shall be given by the Central Government in cash and in the manner specified in
Chapter VI, for the vesting in it under section 3 of the right, title and
interest of the owner, an amount equal to the amount specified against it in
the corresponding entry in the fifth column of the Schedule. By section 11(1),
the general superintendance, direction, control and management of the affairs
and business of a coal mine, the right, title and interest of an owner in
relation to which have vested in the Central Government under section 3, shall
vest in the Government company or in the Custodian as the case may be. For the
purpose of disbursing the amount payable to the owner, the Central Government
is required by section 17(1) to appoint a Commissioner of Payments. By section
18(1), the Central Government shall within thirty days from the specified date,
pay, in cash, to the Commissioner for payment to the owner of a coal mine, an
amount equal to the amount specified against the coal mine in the Schedule and
also such sums as may be due to the owner under section 9. Section 26(1)
provides that if out of the monies paid to the Commissioner, any balance is
left after meeting the liabilities of all the secured and un- 1065 secured
creditors of the coal mine, he shall disburse the same to the owner.
The Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Amendment
Ordinance which was promulgated on April 29, 1976 was replaced on May 27, 1976
by the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Amendment Act, 67 of 1976. The Amendment
Act consists of five sections by which certain amendments were introduced into
the Principal Act, namely, the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 26 of 1973.
The Statement of objects and Reasons of the Nationalisation Amendment Act reads
thus:
"After the nationalisation of coal
mines, a number of persons holding coal mining leases unauthorisedly started
mining of coal in the most reckless and unscientific manner without regard to
considerations of conservation, safety and welfare of workers. Not only were
they resorting to slaughter mining by superficial working of outcrops and
thereby destroying a valuable national asset and creating problems of
water-logging fires, etc. for the future development of the deeper deposits,
their unsafe working also caused serious and fatal accidents. They were making
larger profits by paying very low wages, and by not providing any safety and
welfare measures. Thefts of coal from adjacent nationalised mines were also
reported after the commencement of these unauthorised operations which had
shown an increasing trend of late. Areas where illegal and unauthorised
operations were carried on, were without any assessment of reserves in regard
to quality and quantity of coal which could be made available after detailed
exploration work was undertaken and results analysed. No scientific
exploitation of these deposits could be undertaken in the nationalised sector
without these details. It was, therefore, considered that it would not be
appropriate either to nationalise these unauthorisedly worked mines after
taking them over under the Coal Mines (Taking Over of Management) Act, 1973 or
to get the concerned mining leases prematurely terminated and regranted to
Government Companies under the Mining and Minerals (Regulation and Development)
Act, 1957. In view of the policy followed by the Central Government that the
Coal Industry is to be in the nationalised sector, it was decided that the Coal
Mines Nationalisation Act, 1973 should be enacted to provide for termination of
all privately held coal leases except those held by privately owned steel
companies, so that it may be possible for the Central Government, Government
company or Corporation to take 1066 mining leases where necessary, after the
necessary exploration has been made as to the extent of the deposits of coal,
etc".
Sections 2 and 3 of the Nationalisation
Amendment Act were brought into operation with effect from April 29, 1976.
By section 2 of the Amendment Act a new
section, section 1A, was introduced under Sub-section (1) of which it was
declared that it was expedient in the public interest that the Union should
take under its control the regulation and development of coal mines to the
extent provided in subsections 3 and 4 of section 3 of the Nationalisation Act
and subsection 2 of section 30. By sub-section 2 of section 1A, the declaration
contained in sub-section (1) was to be in addition to and not in derogation of
the declaration contained in section 2 of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and
Development) Act, 1957. By section 3 of the Amendment Act a new sub-section,
namely, sub-section 3, was introduced in section 3 of the principal Act. Under
clause (a) of the newly introduced sub-section 3 of section 3, on and from the
commencement of section 3 of the Amendment Act no person other than (i) the
Central Government or a Government company or a corporation owned, managed or
controlled by the Central Government, or (ii) a person to whom a sub-lease,
referred to in the proviso to clause (c) has been granted by any such
Government, company or corporation, or (iii) a company engaged in the
production of iron and steel, shall carry on coal mining operation, in India,
in any form. Under clause (b) of sub-section 3, excepting the mining leases
granted before the Amendment Act in favour of the Government, company or
corporation referred to in clause (a), and any sub-lease granted by any such
Government, company or corporation, all other mining leases and sub- leases in
force immediately before such commencement shall in so far as they relate to
the winning or mining of coal, stand terminated. Clause (c) of the newly
introduced sub- section 3 of section 3 provides that no lease for winning or
mining coal shall be granted in favour of any person other than the Government,
company or corporation referred to in clause (a). Under the proviso to clause
(c), the Government, the company or the corporation to whom a lease for winning
or mining coal has been granted may grant a sublease to any person in any area
if, (i) the reserves of coal in the area are in isolated small pockets or are
not sufficient for scientific and economical development in a co-ordinated and
integrated manner, and (ii) the coal produced by the sub- lessee will not be
required to be transported by rail. By sub-section 4 of section 3, where a
mining lease stands terminated under sub-section 3, it shall be lawful for the
Central Government or a Government company or corporation owned 1067 or
controlled by the Central Government to obtain a prospecting licence or mining
lease in respect of the whole or part of the land covered by the mining lease
which stands terminated. Section 4 of the Amendment Act introduces an
additional provision in Section 30 of the Principal Act by providing that any
person who engages, or causes any other person to be engaged, in winning or
mining coal from the whole or part of any land in respect of which no valid
prospecting licence or mining lease or sub-lease is in force, shall be
punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years and also
with fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees. Section 5 of the
Nationalisation Amendment Act repeals the Coal Mines (Nationalisation)
Amendment Ordinance, 1976.
As stated at the beginning of this Judgment,
we are concerned in these writ petitions to determine the validity of the Coal
Mines Nationalisation (Amendment) Act, 67 of 1976, to which we will refer as
'The Nationalisation Amendment Act'.
Shri Seervai, who appears on behalf of the
petitioners in writ petition No. 257 of 1977, challenges the legislative
competence of the Parliament to enact the Nationalisation Amendment Act.
Article 246 (1) confers upon the Parliament, notwithstanding anything contained
in clauses 2 and 3 of that Article, the exclusive power to make laws with
respect to any of the matters enumerated in List I of the Seventh Schedule,
called the 'Union List'. Clause 2 of Article 246 deals with the power of the
Parliament and the State Legislatures to make laws with respect to any of the
matters enumerated in the Concurrent List, while clause 3 deals with the power
of the State Legislatures to make laws with respect to any of the matters
enumerated in the State List.
The relevant entries in List I are Entries 52
and 54 which read thus:
Entry 52:-Industries, the control of which by
the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public
interest.
Entry 54:-Regulation of mines and mineral
development to the extent to which such regulation and development under the
control of the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the
public interest.
Entry 24 of the State List reads thus:
Entry 24:-Industries subject of the
provisions of entries 7 and 52 of List I.
1068 We are not concerned here with Entry 7 of
List I which relates to 'Industries declared by Parliament by law to be
necessary for the purpose of defence or for the prosecution of war'.
Shri Seervai's argument runs thus:
(a) Laws made in the exercise of power
conferred by Entry 54 must stand the test of public interest because the very
reason for the Parliament acquiring power under that entry is that it is in
public interest that the regulation of mines and minerals should be under the
control of the Union. In other words, Entry 54 confers a legislative power
which is purposive, that is to say, any law made in the exercise of the power
under Entry 54 must be designed to secure the regulation and development of
coal mines in public interest or else it must fail. The Nationalisation
Amendment Act is not such a law which Parliament can pass under Entry 54
because, that Act not only terminates all leases but it destroys the contracts
of service of thousands of workmen, and indeed it destroys all other contracts
and all securities for moneys lent without even so much as making a provision
for priorities for the payment of debts. Since the Nationalisation Amendment
Act terminates all leases, it is a complete negation of the integrated scheme
of taking over the management of mines, acquisition of the rights of
lease-holders and the running of the mines.
(b) The word 'Regulation' in Entry 54 does
not include 'Prohibition'. 'Regulation' should not also be confused with the
expression 'Restrictions' occurring in Article 19(2) to (6) of the
Constitution. In the very nature of things, there cannot be a power to prohibit
'the regulation and development of mines and minerals'. Section 3(4) inserted
by the Nationalisation Amendment Act imposes no obligation on the Central
Government or any other authority to obtain a mining lease and work the mines,
the leases in respect of which stands terminated under the Act. The words
"it shall be lawful" for the Central Government to obtain a lease are
words of discretionary power which create no obligation. They only enable the
Central Government to obtain a lease, making something legal and possible for
which there would otherwise be no 1069 right or authority to do. Section 3 (4)
does not confer a power coupled with a duty; it merely confers a faculty or
power. No Court can by a Writ of Mandamus or otherwise compel the Central
Government to obtain a lease of coal mine and to run it under any of the
provisions of the Nationalisation Amendment Act.
(c) Where the Legislative power is
distributed among different legislative bodies, the Legislature may transgress
its legislative power either directly or manifestly, or covertly or indirectly.
In the instant case, the exercise of power by the Parliament is colourable
because although in passing the Nationalisation Amendment Act it purported to
act within the limits of its legislative power, in substance and in reality it
transgressed that power, the transgression being veiled by what appears on
proper examination to be a mere pretence or disguise.
(d) In order to tear off the veil or disguise
and in order to get at the substance of the law behind the form, the Court must
examine the effect of the legislation and take into consideration its object,
purpose and design, Where the legislative entry is purposive, like Entry 54 of
the Union List, it is the object or purpose of the legislation which requires
consideration. The purpose for which the Parliament is permitted to acquire
legislative power of Regulation and Development of mines must dictate the
nature of law made in the exercise of that power because public interest
demands that power.
Under the provisions of the Nationalisation
Amendment Act, not only is there no obligation on the Central Government to run
a mine, but there is no obligation imposed upon it even to carry out prospecting
or investigation in order to decide whether a particular mine should be worked
at all.
Section 3(4) merely authorises the Central
Government to apply for "a prospecting licence or a mining lease in
respect of the whole or part of the land covered by the mining lease which
stands determined". A close examination of the Act thus discloses that far
from providing for regulation and development of coal mines, it totally
prohibits all mining activity even if the State Government wants to run a mine.
It does 1070 not impose prohibition as a step towards running the mines since
there is neither any obligation to carry out the prospecting or investigation
nor to run the mines.
(e) The Nationalisation Amendment Act runs
directly counter to the whole policy of the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act of
1973, to acquire and run the mines. The Parent Act becomes a dead letter in
regard to several of its provisions ass a result of the amendment Act. It only
adopts a colourable device to amend the Nationalisation Act while completely
negativing it in fact. The Act therefore lacks legislative competence and is,
in the sense indicated, a colourable piece of legislation.
(f) Article 31(A)(1)(e) only lifts a
restriction on the legislative competence in so far as violation of fundamental
rights is concerned.
The most benign motive cannot make a law
valid if the legislative competence is lacking.
In support of his submission that the
provisions of the Nationalisation Amendment Act are not conceived in public
interest and therefore they transgress the limitations of Entry 56, List I,
learned counsel relies on the circumstance that whereas the Coal Mines
Management Act and the Coal Mines Nationalisation Act of 1973 contain elaborate
preambles, the Amendment Act contains no preamble setting out the mischief to
be remedied or the benefit to be secured, for which the parent Act had failed
to provide. At first blush, it is said, it would appear that the preamble to
the parent Act can be read into the Nationalisation Amendment Act but that is
impermissible since that preamble provides for acquisition and running of the
mines and can have no application to an Act which provides for termination
simpliciter of all mining leases. The preambles to the Management Act and the
Nationalisation Act are said to be significant in that they show that those
Acts were enacted in public interest with a view to rational and co-ordinated
development of coal production and for promoting the optimum utilisation of
coal production consistently with the growing requirements of the country.
Learned counsel has also compared and contrasted the provisions of these two
Acts with the provisions of the Nationalisation Amendment Act for making good
his point that the latter serves no public interest since it merely terminates
all existing leases. The contrast, it is argued, is also provided by section 4A
of the Mines and Mineral Regulation and Development Act 1957 which, while
providing for premature termination of mining leases, requires that 1071 such
termination has to be followed by the granting of a fresh mining lease so that
the mines will continue to work.
Reliance is placed by counsel on the decision
of this Court in K. C. Gajapati Narayan Deo & Ors. v. The State of Orissa
to show how although the legislature in passing an Act purports to act within
the limits of its legislative power, in substance and in reality it can
transgress that power, the transgression being veiled by what appears on proper
examination to be a mere pretence or disguise. Attention is then drawn to the
decision in Attorney General of Alberta v. Attorney General of Canada as
showing that in order to tear off the veil or disguise or in order to get at
the substance of the law behind the form, the court can examine the effect of
the legislation and take into consideration its object, purpose or design. In
support of the submission that the word regulation in Entry 54 does not include
prohibition, reliance is placed on the decision of the Federal Court in Bhola
Prasad v. The King Emperor wherein after setting out two decisions of the Privy
Council in Municipal Corporation of City of Toronto v. Virgo and
Attorney-General for Ontario v. Attorney-General for Canada in which it was
held that 'regulation' did not include 'prohibition', Gwyer, C.J.
Observed that he saw no reason to differ from
the view expressed in those cases.
The central theme of these diverse points is
only one:
that the laws made in the exercise of power conferred
by Entry 54, List I, must stand the test of public interest since the very
reason for the Parliament acquiring power under that Entry is that it is in the
public interest that the regulation of mines and mineral development should be
under the control of the Union. The contention is that since the
Nationalisation Amendment Act does not impose upon the Government the duty to
run the mines which are taken over or even to carry out prospecting and
investigation but simply provides for the termination of mining leases, the Act
is not in public interest. What is in public interest is the regulation and
development of coal mines, not total prohibition of their working.
On a careful consideration of this argument
which was made plausible in its presentation, we see no substance in it. The
learned Attorney General and the learned Solicitor General have drawn our
attention to various facts and circumstances and to the provisions of various
Acts including the Nationalisation Amendment Act which make it impossible to
hold that the provisions of that Act are a mere 1072 facade for terminating
mining leases without any obligation in the matter of regulation of mines and
mineral development.
Granting that Entry 54, List I is purposive
since it qualifies the power to pass a law relating to "Regulation of
Mines and Mineral Development" by the addition of a restrictive clause,
"to the extent to which such regulation and development under the control
of the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public
interest", the provisions of the Nationalisation Amendment Act show that
they are designed to serve progressively the purpose of Entry 54.
The Nationalisation Amendment Act, as its
very title shows, is an amending Act. It amended the Coal Mines (Nationalisation)
Act, 26 of 1973. One must primarily have regard to the object and purpose of
that Act in order to find out whether the Nationalisation Amendment Act
destroys the structure of that Act and is a mere pretence for acquiring new
rights without providing for payment of any amount for such acquisition.
The Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act was
passed in order to provide for the acquisition and transfer of the right, title
and interest of the owners in respect of the Coal mines specified in the
Schedule to that Act. This was done with a view to reorganising and
reconstructing such coal mines so as to ensure the rational, co-ordinated and
scientific development and utilisation of coal resources consistent with the
growing requirements of the country. The high purpose of that Act was to ensure
that the ownership and control of such resources are vested in the State and
thereby so distributed as best to subserve the common good.
In order to achieve that purpose, the
Nationalisation Act provides by section 3(1) that:
On the appointed day, the right, title and
interest of the owners in relation to the coal mines specified in the Schedule
shall stand transferred to, and shall vest absolutely in, the Central
Government free from all incumbrances.
The appointed day is May 1, 1973. For the
removal of doubts it was declared by section 3(2) that:
If, after the appointed day, the existence of
any other coal mine comes to the knowledge of the Central Government, the
provisions of the Coal Mines (Taking over of Management) Act, 1973, shall until
that mine is nationalised by an appropriate legislation, apply to such mine.
1073 By section 4, the Central Government
became the lessee of the scheduled coal mines while, section 5 empowers it to
transfer its leasehold rights to a Government company.
Chapter II of the Coal Mines (Nationalisation
Act deals with acquisition of the rights of owners of coal mines, Chapter III
with payment of amounts to owners of coal mines, Chapter IV with management of
coal mines, Chapter V lays down provisions relating to employees of coal mines,
Chapter VI contains provisions governing the payments of amounts to be made by
the Commissioner of Payments and the last Chapter, Chapter VII, contains
miscellaneous provisions.
We have already set out the provisions of the
Nationalisation Amendment Act in extenso, a little before enumerating the
various points made out by Shri Seeravai during the course of his argument. It
will now be enough to say by way of a summing-up of the provisions of the
Nationalisation Amendment Act that: (1) by section 3(3) (a) of the Coal Mines
(Nationalisation) Act, 1973 which was introduced by the Nationalisation
Amendment Act, no person other than those mentioned in clauses (i) to (iii) can
carry on coal mining operations after April 29, 1976, being the date on which
section 3 of the Nationalisation Amendment Act came into force; (2) by section
(3)(3)(b) all mining leases and sub-leases stood terminated except those
granted before April 29, 1976 in favour of the Central Government, a Government
company or corporation owned, managed or controlled by the Central Government;
(3) section (3)(c) prohibits the granting of a lease for winning or mining coal
in favour of any person other than the Government, a Government company or a
corporation of the above description provided that a sub-lease could be granted
by these authorities to any person if the two conditions mentioned in the
proviso are satisfied; and (4) when a mining lease stands terminated under
section 3(3), "it shall be lawful" for the Central Government or the
Government company or the corporation owned or controlled by the Central
Government to obtain a prospecting licence or a mining lease in respect of the
whole or part of the land covered by the mining lease which stands terminated.
Section 4 of the Nationalisation Amendment Act introduced an additional penal
provision in the parent Act.
We are unable to appreciate the argument so
meticulously woven that these provisions are a direct negation of the
principles of the parent Act and that they destroy the integral scheme of
taking over the management of mines, of acquiring the rights of lease-holders
and continuing to run the mines. On the contrary, the Nationalisation Amendment
Act is manifestly in furtherance of the object of nationalisation mentioned in
the preamble to the parent Act and effec- 1074 tuates the purpose mentioned in
sections 3(1) and 3(2) of that Act by the addition of a new sub-section,
sub-section (3), which terminates all coal mining leases and sub-leases except
those referred in sub-section (3)(b). The circumstance that the marginal note
to section 3 and the title of Chapter II of the Nationalisation Act are not
amended by the Nationalisation Amendment Act, despite the addition of a new
sub-section, is of little or no consequence. That sub-section is a logical
extension of the scheme envisaged by the original sub-sections (1) and (2) of
section 3. Besides, marginal notes to the sections of a statute and the titles
of its chapters cannot take away the effect of the provisions contained in the
Act so as to render those provisions legislatively incompetent, if they are
otherwise within the competence of the legislature to enact. One must
principally have regard to the object of an Act in order to find out whether
the exercise of the legislative power is purposive, unless, of course, the
provisions of the Act show that the avowed or intended object is a mere
pretence for covering a veiled transgression committed by the legislature upon
its own powers. Whether a particular object can be successfully achieved by an
Act, is largely a matter of legislative policy.
The Nationalisation Amendment Act needs no
preamble, especially when it is backed up by a statement of objects and reasons.
Generally, an amendment Act is passed in order to advance the purpose of the
parent Act as reflected in the preamble to that Act. Acquisition of coal mines,
be it remembered, is not an end in itself but is only a means to an end. The
fundamental object of the Nationalisation Act as also of the Nationalisation
Amendment Act is to bring into existence a state of affairs which will be
congenial for regulating mines and for mineral development. In regard to the
scheduled mines, that purpose was achieved by the means of acquisition. In
regard to mines which were not included in the Schedule, the same purpose was
achieved by termination of leases and sub-leases and by taking over the right
to work the mines. Termination of leases, vesting of lease-hold properties in
the State Governments and the grant of leases to the Central Government or
Government Companies are together the means conceived in order to achieve the
object of nationalisation of one of the vital material resources of the
community. An infirmity in Shri Seervai's argument is its inarticulate premise
that mere acquisition of coal mines is the end of the Nationalisation Act.
It is also important to bear in mind while we
are on the purposiveness of the Nationalisation Amendment Act that nothing contained
in the later analogous Acts can be construed as in derogation of the principle
enunciated in section 18 of the Mines and Minerals Regulation and (Development)
Act, 67 of 1957, which provides that it 1075 shall be the duty of the Central
Government to take all such steps as may be necessary for the conservation and
development of minerals in India. Therefore, even in regard to matters falling
under the Nationalisation Amendment Act which terminates existing leases and
makes it lawful for the Central Government to obtain fresh leases, the
obligation of section 18 of the Act of 1957 will continue to apply in its full
rigour. As contended by the learned Solicitor General, section 18 contains a
statutory behest and projects a purposive legislative policy. The later Acts on
the subject of regulation of mines and mineral development are linked up with
the policy enunciated in Section 18.
Much was made by Mr. Seervai of the
circumstance that the Nationalisation Amendment Act, While providing by section
3(4) that "it shall be lawful" for the Central Government, etc., to
obtain a prospecting licence or a mining lease, did not impose an obligation on
any one to work the mine of which the mining lease stood statutorily
terminated. No mandamus, it was urged, could therefore issue to compel, for
example the Central Government to work any particular mine. This argument
overlooks that Entry 54 refers to two things: (1) regulation of mines and (2)
mineral development. It is true that the Entry is purposive, since the exercise
of the power under Entry 54 has to be guided and governed by public interest.
But neither the power to regulate mines nor the power to ensure mineral
development postulates that no sooner is a mining lease terminated by the force
of the statute, than the Central Government must begin to work the mine of
which the lease is terminated. It is possible that after the Nationalisation
Amendment Act came into force, there was a hiatus between the termination of
existing leases and the granting of fresh ones. But, the Nationalisation
Amendment Act does not provide that any kind or type of mine shall not be
developed or worked. Conservation, prospecting and investigation, developmental
steps and finally scientific exploitation of the mines and minerals is the
process envisaged by the Nationalisation Amendment Act. It is undeniable that
conservation of minerals, which is brought about by the termination of existing
leases and sub-leases, is vital for the development of mines. A phased and
graded programme of conservation is in the ultimate analysis one of the most
satisfactory and effective means for the regulation of mines and the
development of minerals.
Learned counsel contended that the
Nationalisation Amendment Act is destructive of the provisions of the parent
Act. This contention 1076 is wholly unjustified. The destruction which the
Nationalisation Amendment Act brings about is of the lease or the sub-lease and
not of its subject matter, namely, the mine itself. In terminating the lease of
a house one does not destroy the house itself. It may be arguable that
prohibiting the use of the house for any purpose whatsoever may, for practical
purposes, amount to the destruction of the house itself. But we cannot accept
the contention that the Nationalisation Amendment Act contains provisions
directed at prohibiting the working of mines, the leases in respect of which
are terminated. A simple provision for granting sub-leases shows that the
object of the Nationalisation Amendment Act is to ensure that no mine will lie
idle or unexplored. Interregnums can usefully be utilised for prospecting and
investigation. They do not lead to destruction of mines. In fact, it is just as
well that the Amendment Act does not require the new lessee to undertake an
adventure, reckless and thoughtless, which goes by the name of 'scratching of
mines', which ultimately results in the slaughtering of mines.
Natural resources, howsoever large, are not
inexhaustible, which makes it imperative to conserve them.
Without a wise and planned conservation of
such resources, there can neither be a systematic regulation of mines nor a
scientific development of minerals. The importance of conservation of natural
resources in any scheme of regulation and development of such resources can be
seen from the fact that the Parliament had to pass in August 1974 an Act called
the Coal Mines (Conservation and Development) Act, 28 of 1974, in order,
principally, to provide for the conservation of coal and development of coal
mines. Section.
4(1) of that Act enables the Central
Government, for the purposes of conservation of coal and for the development of
coal mines, to exercise such powers and take or cause to be taken such measures
as it may be necessary or proper or as may be prescribed. By section 5(1), a
duty is cast on the owners of coal mines to take such steps as may be necessary
to ensure the conservation of coal and development of the coal mines owned by
them. While moving the Nationalisation Amendment Act in the Lok Sabha on May
17, 1976, the Minister of Energy said that:
for proper scientific working of coal mines,
you have to have the geological data; you have to have mine plans; you have to
know the size of the coal reserves, the quantity of coal that can be mined; the
quality of coal etc. For this, the detailed exploration has to be undertaken.
It is only after all this is done that the experts can decide whether it will
be economically viable and technically feasible-technical feasibility comes
first and then economic viability-to 1077 mine the coal in that particular
area. No scientific exploration of coal is possible from these areas until all
the facts are known, until investigation is done.
The nationalised sector cannot step in unless
all this information is gathered. (Lok Sabha Debates, 5th series, volume 61,
May 17, 1976, columns 91-92.) Measures taken for judicious preservation and
distribution of natural resources may involve restrictions on their use and
even prohibition, upto a degree, of the unplanned working of the repositories of
such resources. We may in this connection refer usefully to a passage at page
383 of the First Five Year Plan:
"Though a mining industry has been in
existence in this country for about half a century, only a comparatively small
number of mines are being worked in an efficient manner under proper technical
guidance.
Many units are too small in size or too
poorly financed for such working. Lack of a conservation policy is also
responsible for the present condition of the industry.
There is large wastage, especially in
minerals of marginal grades, as these are either abandoned in the mines or
thrown away on the mine dumps. Ways and means must be devised for the mining
and recovery of these low grade materials. Ores which it is not possible to
work economically under normal conditions should be left in the mines so that
they may be extracted at a later date without serious loss. The mine dumps all
over the country have to be carefully examined and sampled so that their
valuable mineral content may be recovered by methods of beneficiation now
available. It should be a rule that selective mining of high grade minerals
alone should not be undertaken and that all grades should be worked and
wherever possible, blended to produce marketable grades." It was observed in
Attorney-General for Ontario (supra) that a power to regulate assumes,
naturally if not necessarily, the conservation of the thing which is to be made
the subject of regulation. This position does not militate against what was
observed by Lord Davey in Virgo (supra) that "there is marked distinction
to be drawn between the prohibition or prevention of a trade and the regulation
or governance of it, and indeed a power to regulate and govern seems to imply
the continued existence of that which is to be regulated or governed". In
the former case, the Canada Temperance Act, 1886 was held ultra vires the
Dominion as it purported to repeal the prohibitory clauses of a provincial Act,
but its own provisions were held 1078 valid when duly brought into operation in
any provincial area as relating to the peace, order, and good Government of
Canada. In Virgo the question turned on the scope of power to frame by-laws and
the decision of the Privy Council was that a statutory power conferred upon a
municipal corporation to make by-laws for 'regulating and governing' a trade,
"does not authorise the making it unlawful to carry on a lawful trade in a
lawful manner". It may be borne in mind that different considerations
apply in the construction of power to frame by-laws but even then, the Privy
Council qualified the above statement of law by adding the clause, "in the
absence of an express power of prohibition".
In support of his submission that under the
Nationalisation Amendment Act there is no obligation on any person or authority
to run a mine, Shri Seervai relies on a passage in Craies on Statute Law, 6th
edition, page 284, to the following effect:
Statutes passed for the purpose of enabling
something to be done are usually expressed in permissible language, that is to
say, it is enacted that 'it shall be lawful', etc. or that 'such and such a
thing may be done'. Prima facie, these words import a discretion, and they must
be construed as discretionary unless there be anything in the subject-matter to
which they are applied, or in any other part of the statute, to show that they
are meant to be imperative".
But the very passage, after enunciating this
principle, refers to a decision in Julius v. Bishop of Oxford in which Lord
Cairns said that though the words 'it shall be lawful' are words making that
legal and possible which there would otherwise be no right or authority to do
and that though those words confer a faculty or power, still "there may be
something in the nature of the thing empowered to be done, something in the
object for which it is to be done, something in the conditions under which it
is to be done, something in the title of the persons for whose benefit the
power is to be exercised, which may couple the power with a duty, and make it
the duty of the person in whom the power is reposed to exercise that power when
called upon to do so".
It seems to us clear, and we have discussed
that aspect at length, that section 3(4) uses an enabling or permissive
expression in order that regulation of mines and mineral development may be
ensured after a scientific prospecting, investigation and planning. It is
doubt- 1079 less that, in the language of Lord Cairns in Julius, there is
something in the nature of the thing which the Nationalisation Amendment Act
empowers to be done, something in the object for which it is to be done and
something in the conditions under which it is to be done which couples the
power conferred by the Act with a duty, the duty being not to act in haste but
with reasonable promptitude depending upon the nature of the problem under
investigation. An obligation to act does not cease to be so merely because
there is no obligation to act in an ad-hoc or impromptu manner. It is in the
context of a conglomeration of these diverse considerations that one must
appreciate why, in section 3(4) which was introduced by the Nationalisation
Amendment Act, Parliament used the permissive expression "it shall be
lawful".
Thus, a broad and liberal approach to the
field of legislation demarcated by Entry 54, List I, an objective and practical
understanding of the provisions contained in the Nationalisation Amendment Act
and a realistic perception of constitutional principles will point to the
conclusion that the Parliament had the legislative competence to enact the
Nationalisation Amendment Act.
The argument which we have just disposed of
is common to all the matters before us. The contention to which we will now
turn is limited in its application to composite mines which contain layers of
coal and some other mineral, usually fireclay. This branch of Shri Seervai's
argument relates to the construction of the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act,
26 of 1973, and the Nationalisation Amendment Act. The argument is that leases
of composite mines in which there are alternate seams of coal and fireclay do
not fall within the scope of these Acts.
The pleadings in this behalf are full and
complete in Writ Petition No. 257 of 1977 argued by Shri Seervai and they are
tolerably adequate in a few other petitions. It is expressly averred and not
effectively traversed in Writ Petition 257 of 1977 that:
the coal and fireclay deposits in the said
area are so mixed up that one cannot work either for extraction of coal or for
extraction of fireclay without disturbing each of the said two minerals. The
deposits are such that at one layer there is coal, the next layer is fireclay,
the other layer is coal, the next layer is again fireclay and so on.
Nirode Baran Banerjee, who is the petitioner
in that Writ Petition, holds a composite lease dated October 17, 1973 for
mining coal as well as fireclay.
1080 It is urged by the learned counsel that
the Nationalisation Amendment Act terminates mining leases in respect of coal
only and that the law terminating leases for mining coal cannot apply to a mine
which contains not only coal but fireclay also. The totality of the submission
on this point may be put thus:
(a) Under Article 31(1) of the Constitution,
no person can be deprived of his property without the authority of law. Article
31A(1) which exempts the laws mentioned in clauses (a) to (e) from invalidity
under Articles 14, 19 and 31 does not dispense with the necessity of the
authority of law for depriving a person his property, because the opening words
of Article 31A(1) are ".... no law providing for ..." matters
mentioned in clauses (a) to (e) shall be deemed to be void as offending Articles
14, 19 and 31.
(b) The Nationalisation Amendment Act confers
no authority to terminate a composite lease for mining coal and fireclay. The
right to mine fireclay is given to the petitioner by law and it can only be
taken away by law.
(c) Though the Nationalisation Amendment Act
does not in terms prohibit the petitioner from mining fireclay, the effect of
the law in a practical business sense, is to prohibit the petitioner from
mining fireclay and, therefore, the position is the same as though the Act had
enacted the prohibition in express terms. The Court must look at the direct
impact of the law on this right of the party, and if that impact prohibits him
from exercising his right, the fact that there is no express prohibition in the
Act is immaterial, (d) The Nationalisation Amendment Act by making it
punishable to mine coal, in substance and in a practical business sense,
prohibits the petitioner from mining fireclay. For this prohibition the
Amendment Act does not provide, and therefore, there is no authority of law for
it. Coal and fireclay are two distinct minerals as shown by Schedule II to the Mines
and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 67 of 1957, wherein item 1 is
coal and item 15 is fireclay. The dictionary meanings of coal and fireclay also
show that they are two distinct minerals.
In support of these submissions Shri Seervai
relies very strongly on the definition of 'coal mine' in section 2(b) of the
Coal Mines (Nationalisation Act, 26 of 1973, and the definition, by contrast,
of 'coking coal mine' in section 3(c) of the Coking Coal Mines
(Nationalisation) Act, 36 of 1972.
1081 These submissions are met by the learned
Attorney General with the answer that if a mine has a seam of coal it is a coal
mine within the meaning of section 2(b) of Act 26 of 1973, and that, for the
purposes of that definition, it makes no difference whether the mine has seams
of fireclay also. The Attorney General says further that the definition of
'coking coal mine' in section 3(c) of Act 36 of 1972 contains words of
surplusage which ought rather to be ignored than be allowed to determine the
scope of the definition contained in section 2(b) of Act 26 of 1973. The
contention, in other words, is that a coal mine is a mine in which there is at
least one seam of coal, no matter whether there are seams therein of fireclay
or any other mineral.
The learned Solicitor General contends that
the authority of Law extends to whatever is the necessary consequence of that
which is authorised. In other words, authority to do a thing necessarily
includes the authority to do all other things which are necessary for the doing
of that which is authorised. If law authorises the termination of coal mining
leases, it must be taken to authorise whatever is necessarily incidental to and
consequential upon it. Therefore, composite leases cannot be excepted from the
provisions of an Act which terminates coal mining leases.
Section 3(3) (a) introduced by the
Nationalisation Amendment Act, it is contended, prohibits persons other than
those mentioned in clauses (i) to (iii) from carrying on coal mining operation
in any form. If a person holding a composite lease can do fireclay mining
without mining coal, he may do so; otherwise section 3(3) (a) is the authority
of law to prevent him from mining fireclay. In other words, according to the
learned Solicitor General, the necessary implication of law is that though a
composite lease for mining coal and fireclay may remain outstanding after the
enactment of the Nationalisation Amendment Act, the lessee cannot work it, if
it involves a coal-mining operation.
The point raised by Shri Seervai is so nicely
balanced that it is as difficult to reject it wholly as it is to accept it
wholly. The contrast in definitions favours him.
The Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 26 of
1973, defines a coal mine by section 2(b) thus:
"Coal mine" means a mine in which
there exists one or more seams of coal.
If this definition is considered in
isolation, the learned Attorney General could perhaps be right in his
submission that any mine in which there is one seam of coal, at least one, is a
coal mine. The definition takes no account of whether there are seams of other
minerals, and if so, how many, in the mine. One seam of coal is enough to make
a mine a coal mine. For reasons which we will presently mention, it is not easy
to 1082 stretch the definition as far as logic may take it, for that will
produce the result that just one seam of coal at the roof of a mine or at its
base will be enough to bring a mine within the definition contained in section
2(b).
The scheme of the Coal Nationalisation Acts
on which Shri Seervai relies has a relevance of its own on this point. The Coking
Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act of 1972 and the Coal Mines (Nationalisation)
Act of 1973 cover the whole field of 'Coal' which was intended to be
nationalised.
The titles of the two Acts and the various
provisions contained therein show that what was being nationalised was three
distinct categories of mines: mines containing seams of coking coal
exclusively; mines containing seams of coking coal along with seams of other
coal; and mines containing seams of other coal. Though Parliament had power
under Article 31A(1) (e) of the Constitution to terminate mining leases without
payment of any compensation or 'amount', it decided to nationalise coal mines
on payment of amounts specified in the Schedules to the Nationalisation Acts of
1972 and 1973. Besides, even when something apart from coking coal mines was
acquired, namely, 'coke oven plants', provision was separately made in section
11 of the Nationalisation Act of 1972, read with the 2nd Schedule, for payment
of amounts to owners of coke oven plants. Thus, whatever was intended to be
acquired was paid for. This scheme is prima facie inconsistent with the
Parliament intending to acquire lease-hold rights in other minerals like fireclay,
without the payment of any amount.
Coupled with this is the unambiguous wording
of section 3(3) (b) and section 3(3) (c) of the Nationalisation Act of 1973,
which were introduced therein by section 3 of the Nationalisation Amendment
Act. Section 3(3)(b) says that excepting the mining leases and sub-leases
granted before the commencement of the Act in favour of or by certain bodies or
authorities, all other mining leases and sub- leases in force before such
commencement, "shall in so far as they relate to the winning or mining of
coal, stand terminated". (emphasis supplied) Section 3(3)(c) provides
that:
"no lease for winning or mining coal
shall be granted in favour of any person other than the Government, company or
corporation, referred in clause (a)". (emphasis supplied).
These provisions carry the scheme of the
Nationalisation Acts to their logical conclusion by emphasising that the target
of those Acts is coal mines, pure and simple. What stands terminated under 1083
section 3(3)(b) is certain mining leases and sub-leases in so far as they
relate to the winning or mining of coal. The embargo placed by section 3(3)(c)
is on the granting of leases for winning or mining coal to persons other than
those mentioned in section 3(3)(a).
Since the definition of 'coal mine' in
section 2(b) of the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1973 has an uncertain
import and the scheme of that Act and of the Coking Coal Mines
(Nationalisation) Act, 1972 makes it plausible that rights in minerals other
than coke and coal were not intended to be acquired under the two
Nationalisation Acts, it becomes necessary to compare and contrast the
definition of 'coal mine' in section 2(b) of the Act of 1973 with the
definition of 'coking coal mine' in section 3(c) of the Coking Coal Mines
(Nationalisation) Act of 1972. Section 3(c) of the latter Act says:
"'coking coal mine' means a coal mine in
which there exists one or more seams of coking coal, whether exclusively or in
addition to any seam of other coal".
(emphasis supplied).
This definition justifies Shri Seervai's
argument that whereas in regard to coking coal mines, the existence of any seam
of other coal was regarded as inconsequential, the existence of any seam of
another mineral was not considered as inconsequential in regard to a coal mine.
The definition of coal mine in section 2(b) of the Act of 1973 scrupulously
deleted the clause, "whether exclusively or in addition to" any other
seam. The same Legislature which added the particular clause in the definition
of 'coking coal mine' in the 1972 Act, deleted it in the definition of 'coal
mine' in the 1973 Act.
The position in regard to the coking coal
mines is crystal clear, namely, that by section 4(1) of the Act of 1972, the
right, title and interest of owners in relation to the coking coal mines
specified in the First Schedule to the Act stood transferred to and vested
absolutely in the Central Government free from all incumbrances on the
appointed day. The same position obtained under section 5 of that Act in regard
to coke oven plants specified in the Second Schedule. But in so far as coal
mines are concerned, we have, willy-nilly, to proceed on the basis that by
reason of the definition of coal mine contained in section 2(b) of the Act of
1973, and the definition of coking coal mine in section 3(c) of the Act of 1972
which presents a striking contrast to the definition in section 2(b), composite
coal mines, that is to say, coal mines in which there are seams of coal and
fireclay (we are only concerned with fireclay in these petition), do not fall
within the scope of the definition of 'coal mine' in section 2(b) of the 1084
Act of 1973. To that extent Shri Seervai's contention must succeed.
But what then is the sequitur? Can the
lessees of composite mines (like the petitioners in Writ Petitions Nos.
257, 220, 111, 600, 1130-1134, 352, 221 and
178 of 1977) who hold composite mining leases for winning coal and fireclay,
continue their mining operations unabated despite the provisions of the
Nationalisation Amendment Act? We think not. It is one thing to say that a
composite mine is outside the scope of the definition of coal mine in section
2(b) of the Nationalisation Act of 1973 and quite another to conclude there from
that the other provisions introduced into that Act by the Nationalisation
Amendment Act will have no impact on composite leases for winning coal and
fireclay.
Section 3(3) (a) which was introduced into
the parent Act by the Nationalisation Amendment Act provides expressly that on
and from the commencement of section 3 of the Amendment Act, that is, from
April 29, 1976, no person other than those mentioned in clauses (i) to (iii)
shall carry on "coal mining operation, in India, in any form".
Section 4 of the Nationalisation Amendment Act which introduced sub-section (2)
in section 30 of the parent Act provides:
"Any person who engages, or causes any
other person to be engaged in winning or mining coal from the whole or part of
any land in respect of which no valid prospecting licence or mining lease or
sub-lease is in force, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which
may extend to two years and also with fine which may extend to ten thousand
rupees".
These provisions of sections 3(3)(a) and
30(2) of the parent Act will apply of their own force, whether or not the
lessee holds a composite lease for winning coal and fireclay and whether or not
the mine is a composite mine containing alternate seams of coal and fireclay.
In other words, as contended by the learned Solicitor General, if a person
holding a composite lease can do fireclay mining without mining coal, he may do
so. But if he cannot win or mine fireclay without doing a coal mining
operation, that is, without winning or mining coal, he cannot do any mining
operation at all. If he does so, he will be liable for the penal consequences
provided for in section 30(2) of the Nationalisation Act of 1973.
The provision contained in section 3(3)(a)
totally prohibiting the generality of persons from carrying on coal mining
operation in India in any form and the penal provision of section 30(2)
virtually 1085 Leave with the lessees of composite mines the husk of a mining
interest. That they cannot win or mine coal is conceded and, indeed, there is
no escape from that position in view of the aforesaid provisions. The only
surviving question then is whether they can win or mine fireclay since their
composite lease is outside the scope of section 2(b) of the Nationalisation Act
of 1973. The answer has to be in the negative on the basis of the very
averments made by the petitioners in their Writ Petitions. For example, the
petitioner in Writ Petition No. 257 of 1957 has stated in his petition, more
particularly in paragraph 5 thereof, that the seams of coal and fireclay are so
situated in the mine of which he is a lessee, that it is not possible to mine
fireclay without mining coal. This position was not only admitted but
reiterated by Shri Seervai, both during the course of his oral argument and in
his written brief. The conclusion is therefore inevitable that the lessees of
composite mines will, for all practical purposes, have to nurse their deeds of
lease without being able to exercise any of the rights flowing from them. On
their own showing, they will be acting at their peril if they attempt to win
fireclay. If they cannot win fireclay without winning coal, they cannot win
fireclay either, even if they hold composite leases under which they are
entitled to win coal and fireclay.
This position fortifies the argument of the
learned Solicitor General that though the Parliament provided for the payment
of amounts for acquisition of certain interests under the Nationalisation Acts
of 1972 and 1973, it did not intend to pay any compensation or amount for the
termination of leasehold rights in respect of composite mines. Mines which have
alternate seams of coal and fireclay are in a class by themselves and they
appear to be far fewer in number as compared with the coking coal mines and
coal mines, properly so called. The authority of law for the termination of the
rights of composite lessees is the provision contained in section 3(3) (a), the
violation of which attracts the penal provisions of section 30(2) of the
Nationalisation Act of 1973. The Parliament has deprived composite lessees of their
right to win fireclay because they cannot do so without winning coal. The
winning of coal by the generality of people is prohibited by the section 3(3)
(a) of the Act of 1973.
This is just as well, because Parliament
could not have intended that such islands of exception should swallow the main
stream of the Nationalisation Acts. Obviously, no rights were intended to be
left outstanding, once the rights in respect of coking coal mines and coal
mines were brought to an end.
1086 The petitioners in Writ Petitions Nos.
257, 220, 111, 600, 1130 1134, 352, 221 and 178 of 1977 hold composite mining
leases for mining fireclay and coal. In these Petitions we had passed the
following order on May 5, 1978:
"These petitions are allowed partly in
that the petitioners therein shall be entitled, for the duration of the
unexpired portion of their existing leases, to carry on mining operations for
the purpose of winning fireclay so long as, and to the extent that, they do not
carry on any coal mining operation or engage in winning or mining coal. In
these Writ Petitions there will be no order as to costs".
As we have already stated, no tangible
benefit will accrue to the petitioners from this order because, on their own
showing, they cannot carry on mining operations for the purpose of winning
fireclay without carrying on a coal mining operation or without engaging in
winning or mining coal. That is how the matter rests.
The only other arguments which requires
consideration is the one made principally by Shri A. K. Sen which, like Shri
Seervai's argument of legislative competence, is common to all the writ
petitions. Shri Sen's argument may be stated thus:
(1) The Nationalisation Amendment Act
affects, in substance, two kinds of transfers: the transfer of the leasehold
interests of the lessees in favour of the lessor, namely the State; and the
transfer of the mining business of the lessees in favour of the Central
Government. Since these transfers amount to acquisition within the meaning of
Article 31(2), the Act is open to challenge under Articles 14, 19(1) (g) and 31
of the Constitution.
(2) The Nationalisation Amendment Act is open
to challenge under Article 14 because lessees who fall within that Act are
patently discriminated against in comparison with lessees of other mines, both
coking and non-coking, who were paid compensation when their property was taken
over, first for management under the Management Acts and then under the
Nationalisation Acts.
(3) The Nationalisation Amendment Act is open
to challenge under Article 19(1) (g) because the prohibition against lessees
from carrying on their business and the transfer of their business, in
substance, to the Central Government or a Company is an unreasonable
restriction on the 1087 right of the lessees to hold their lease-hold property
and to carry on their business of mining.
(4) The Act is open to challenge under
Article 31 because no provision is made for the payment of any amount
whatsoever to the lessees whose mining business is taken over under the Act. No
public purpose is involved either in the termination of the lessees' interest
or in the acquisition of their business.
Expropriation without payment of any amount
requires a very heavy public purpose.
(5) Since no provision whatsoever is made for
the payment of any amount to the lessees whose leases are terminated, the
Nationalisation Amendment Act is not a 'Law' within the meaning of Article
31(2) and therefore Article 19 (1) (f) is attracted.
(6) The Act is not saved from the challenge
of Articles 14, 19 and 31 by Article 31A(1)(e) because that Article provides
for extinguishment which does not amount to acquisition by the State. If
extinguishment amounting to acquisition was intended to be saved under Article
31A(1) (e), the subject matter dealt with by clause (e) would have been
included in clause (a) of that Article.
It shall have been noticed that the entire
argument hinges around the premise that, by the Nationalisation Amendment Act,
the petitioners right to property has been acquired without the payment of any
amount and that they have been unreasonably deprived of their right to carry on
the business of mining. A close and careful examination of the provisions of
the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1973 and of the amendments made to that
Act by the Nationalisation Amendment Act will show that there is no substance
in either of these contentions.
The Coal Mines (Nationalisation Act, 1973)
nationalised coal mines by providing by section 3(1) that on the appointed day,
that is on May 1, 1973, the right, title and interest of the owners in relation
to the coal mines specified in the Schedule shall stand transferred to, and
shall vest absolutely in, the Central Government free from all incumbrances.
The Scheduled mines, 711 in number and situated in reputed coal bearing areas,
were the ones which were engaged openly, lawfully and uninterruptedly in doing
coal mining business. Since it was possible to ascertain and verify the
relevant facts pertaining to these undertakings, they were taken over on
payment of amounts 1088 mentioned in the Schedule to the Act, which varied from
mine to mine depending upon the value of their assets, their potential and
their profitability. In the very nature of things, the list of mines in the
Schedule could not be exhaustive because there were and perhaps even now there
are, unauthorised mines worked by persons who did not possess the semblance of
a title or right to do mining business. Persons falling within that category
cannot cite the Constitution as their charter to continue to indulge in
unauthorised mining which is unscientific, unsystematic and detrimental to the
national interests by reason of its tendency to destroy the reserve of natural
resources. But alongside these persons, there could conceivably be mine
operators who may have been doing their business lawfully but who were not
easily or readily identifiable. Section 3(2) of the Nationalisation Act, 1973
made provision for taking over the management of such mines by declaring for
"the removal of doubts" that if, after the appointed day, the
existence of any other coal mine comes to the knowledge of the Central Government,
the provisions of the Coal Mines (Taking Over of Management) Act, 1973, shall,
until that mine is nationalised by an appropriate legislation, apply to such
mine. Owners of mines whose mines were not included in the Schedule but whose
right, title and interest was to vest eventually in the Central Government
under "an appropriate legislation" envisaged by section 3(2) of the
Nationalisation Act were, by this method, placed on par with the owners of
mines of which the management was taken over under the Coal Mines (Taking Over
of Management) Act, 1973.
That Act provides by section 7(1) that every
owner of a coal mine shall be given by the Central Government an amount in cash
for the vesting in it, under section 3, of the management of such mine. By
section 7(2), for every month during which the management of a coal mine
remains vested in the Central Government, the amount referred to in sub-
section (1) shall be computed at the rate of twenty paise per tonne of coal on
the highest monthly production of coal from such mine during any month in the
years 1969, 1970, 1971 and 1972. The two provisos to that sub-section and the
other sub-sections of section 7 provide for other matters relating to payment
of amounts to the owners of coal mines of which the management was taken over.
The Nationalisation Amendment Act carried the scheme of these two Acts to its
logical conclusion by terminating the so-called leases and sub-leases which
might have remained outstanding. Thus, the purpose attained by these Acts is
(1) to vest in the Central Government the right of management of all coal
mines; (2) to nationalise the mines mentioned in the Schedule; (3) to provide
for the taking over of management of coal mines the existence of which comes to
the knowledge of the Central Government after the appointed day and lastly (4)
to terminate all mining leases. The Management Act and the Nationalisation Act
provide for payment of amounts, by no means illusory, to the owners of coal
mines whose rights were taken over. In the normal course of human affairs,
particularly business affairs, it is difficult to conceive that owners of coal
mines who had even the vestige of a title thereto would not bring to the notice
of the Central Government the existence of their mines, when such mines were
not included in the Schedule to the Nationalisation Act. Those who did not care
to bring the existence of their mines to the knowledge of the Central
Government, even though amounts are payable under the Management Act for the
extinguishment of the right of management, did not evidently possess even the
semblance of a title to the mines. The claims of lessees, holding or allegedly
holding under such owners, would be as tenuous as the title of their putative
lessors.
The Nationalisation Amendment Act by section
3(3) (b) undoubtedly terminates all existing leases and sub-leases except those
already granted in favour of persons referred to in clauses (i) to (iii) of
section 3 (3)(a). Similarly, section 3 (3)(a) imposes an embargo on all future
coal mining operations except in regard to the persons mentioned in clauses (i)
to (iii). But the generality of leases which are alleged to have remained
outstanding despite the coming into force of the Management Act and the
Nationalisation Act, were mostly precarious, whose holders could at best
present the familiar alibi that the origin of their rights or of those from
whom they derived title was lost in antiquity. Neither in law, nor in equity
and justice, nor under the Constitution can these lessees be heard to complain
of the termination of their lease-hold rights without the payment of any
amount. The provision contained in section 3(3)(b) of the Nationalisation
Amendment Act was made ex majore cautela so as not to leave any lease of a coal
mine surviving after the enactment of the Management Act and the
Nationalisation Act. There was no reasonable possibility of a lawful lease
surviving the passing of those Acts; but if, per chance, anyone claimed that he
held a lease, that stood terminated under section 3(3)(b).
Once the real nature of the scheme envisaged
by the Management Act the Nationalisation Act and the Nationalisation Amendment
Act is appreciated, it will be easy to see that section 3(3) (b) of the
Nationalisation Amendment Act brings about an extinguishment simpliciter of
coal mining leases within the meaning of Article 31A (1)(e) of the
Constitution. That Article, as it stood prior to the 44th Amendment, read thus:
1090 "31A. (1) Notwithstanding anything
contained in Article 13, no law providing for (e) the extinguishment or
modification of any rights accruing by virtue of any agreement, lease or
licence for the purpose of searching for, or winning, any mineral or mineral
oil, or the premature termination or cancellation of any such agreement, lease
or licence, shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent
with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by article 14,
article 19 or article 31".
We are not concerned with the amendment
introduced by the 44th Amendment Act which deleted the reference to Article 31,
since that Amendment Act came into force prospectively with effect from June
20, 1979.
We are unable to accept that the termination
of the mining leases and sub-leases brought about by section 3(3)(b) of the
Nationalisation Amendment Act is a mere pretence for the acquisition of the
mining business of the lessees and the sub-lessees. We have already shown how,
in the context of the scheme of the Management Act, the Nationalisation Act and
the Nationalisation Amendment Act, it is impossible to hold that the true
intent of the last mentioned Act was to 'acquire' anyone's business. This would
be so whether the word 'acquire' is understood in its broad popular sense or in
the narrow technical sense which it has come to possess. Whatever rights were
intended to be acquired were paid for by the fixation of amounts or by the
laying down of a formula for ascertaining amounts payable for acquisition. It
is hard to believe that having provided for payment of amounts for acquisition
of management and ownership rights, the legislature resorted to the subterfuge
of acquiring the mining business of the surviving lessees and sub-lessees by
the device of terminating their leases and sub-leases. The legislative history
leading to the termination of coal-mining leases points to one conclusion only
that, by and large, every lawful interest which was acquired was paid for; the
extinguishment of the interest which survived or which is alleged to have
survived the passing of the Management Act and the Nationalisation Act was
provided for merely in order to ensure that no loophole was left in the
implementation of the scheme envisaged by those Acts.
1091 This will provide a short answer to Shri
Sen's argument that persons whose leases and sub-leases are terminated without
payment of any amount are discriminated against in comparison with other
lessees who were paid amounts when their property was taken over. The answer is
that persons dealt with by section 3(3)(b) of the Nationalisation Amendment Act
are differently situated from those who were dealt with by the two earlier
Acts. No violation of Article 14 is therefore involved.
Likewise, we see no substance in the
contention that no public purpose is involved in the termination of the
interest of the lessees and sub-lessees which was brought about by the
Nationalisation Amendment Act. The public purpose which informs that Act is the
same which lies behind its two precursors, the Management Act and the
Nationalisation Act. The purpose is to reorganize and re- structure coal mines
so as to ensure the rational, coordinated and scientific development and
utilisation of coal resources consistent with the growing requirements of the
country. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Nationalisation Amendment
Act points in the direction.
Public purpose runs like a continuous thread
through the well-knit scheme of the three Acts under consideration.
This discussion is sufficient to meet the
contention of the petitioners that the interest of the lessees and sub- lessees
has been "acquired" under the Nationalisation Amendment Act by the
termination of leases and sub-leases.
But, we may examine that contention in the
light of the relevant Constitutional provisions and principles. It was observed
in Dwarkadas Shrinivas v. The Sholapur Spinning & Weaving Co. Ltd. that the
provisions of the Constitution touching fundamental rights must be construed
broadly and liberally in favour of those on whom the rights have been
conferred. "The form is unessential. It is the substance that we must
seek". Making every allowance in favour of the right to property which was
available at the relevant time and having regard to the substance of the matter
and not merely to the form adopted for terminating the interest of the lessees
and the sub-lessees, we are of the opinion that the Nationalisation Amendment
Act involves no acquisition of the interest of the lessees and the sub-lessees.
It merely brings about in the language of Article 31A(1)(e) "the
extinguishment" of their right, if any, to win coal.
Whichever right, title and interest were
lawful and identifiable was acquired by the Management Act and the
Nationalisation Act. And whichever interest was acquired was paid for. Tenuous
and furtive interests 1092 which survived the passing of those Acts were merely
extinguished by the Nationalisation amendment Act.
In Ajit Singh v. State of Punjab, it was
observed by Hindayatullah, J. in the dissenting judgment which he gave on
behalf of himself and Shelat, J., that in the case of extinguishment within the
meaning of Article 31A, if all the rights in a property are extinguished the
result would be nothing else than acquisition, because no property can remain
in suspense without the rights therein being vested in some one or the other.
These observations made by the learned Judge are not contrary to anything
contained in the majority judgment delivered by Sikri, J., and naturally
therefore, great reliance is placed upon them by the petitioners. Even greater
sustenance is drawn by the petitioners from the judgment of a 7-Judge Bench of
this Court in Madan Mohan Pathak v. Union of India & Ors. In that case, a
settlement which the Life Insurance Corporation had arrived at with its
employees was substantially set at naught by the Life Insurance Corporation
(Modification of Settlement) Act, 1976. It was held by this Court that the Act
was violative of Article 31(2) since it did not provide for payment of any
amount for the compulsory acquisition of the debts owed by the Life Insurance Corporation
to its employees; that the direct effect of the impugned Act was to transfer
ownership of the debts due and owing to Class III and Class IV employees in
respect of annual cash bonus to the Life Insurance Corporation and that, since
the Corporation is owned by the State, the impugned Act was a law providing for
compulsory acquisition of the debts by the State within the meaning of Article
31(2A).
These decisions have no application to the
instant case because the interest of the lessees and sub-lessees which was
brought to termination by section 3(3) (b) of the Nationalisation Amendment Act
does not come to be vested in the State. The Act provides that excepting a
certain class of leases and sub-leases, all other leases and sub-leases shall
stand terminated in so far as they relate to the winning or mining of coal.
There is no provision in the Act by which the interest so terminated is vested
in the State;
Nor does such vesting flow as a necessary
consequence of any of the provisions of the Act. Sub-section (4) of section 3
of the Act provides that where a mining lease stands terminated under
sub-section (3), it shall be lawful for the Central Government or a Government
company or a corporation owned or controlled by the Central government to obtain
a prospecting licence or a mining lease in respect of the whole or part of the
land covered by the mining lease which stands so terminated.
1093 The plain intendment of the Act, which,
may it be reiterated, is neither a pretence nor a facade, is that once the
outstanding leases and subleases are terminated, the Central Government and the
other authorities will be free to apply for a mining lease. Any lease-hold
interest which the Central Government, for example, may thus obtain does not
directly or immediately flow from the termination brought about by section
3(3)(b). Another event has to intervene between the termination of existing
leases and the creation of new interests. The Central Government, etc. have to
take a positive step for obtaining a prospecting licence or a mining lease.
Without it, the Act would be ineffective to create of its own force any right
or interest in favour of the Central Government, a Government Company or a
Corporation owned, managed or controlled by the Central Government. As observed
by Sikri, J., in Ajit Singh, (supra) the essential difference between
"acquisition by the State" on the one hand and "modification or
extinguishment of rights" on the other, is that in the first case the
beneficiary is the State while in the second the beneficiary is not the State.
The Nationalisation Amendment Act merely extinguishes the rights of the lessees
and the sub-lessees.
It does not provide for the acquisition of
those rights, directly or indirectly, by the State. Article 31(2A) will therefore
come into play, by which, "Where a law does not provide for the transfer
of the ownership or right to possession of any property to the State or to a
corporation owned or controlled by the State, it shall not be deemed to provide
for the compulsory acquisition or requisitioning of property, notwithstanding
that it deprives any person of his property." The position in Madan Mohan
Pathak (supra) was entirely different because the direct effect of the impugned
Act was to transfer ownership of the debts due and owing to Class III and Class
IV employees in respect of annual cash bonus to the Life Insurance Corporation;
since the L.I.C. is a Corporation owned by the State, the impugned Act was held
to be a law providing for compulsory acquisition of these debts by the State
within the meaning of clause (2A) of Article 31.
Shri Sen's argument on the question of
acquisition of the rights of lessees and sub-lessees by the State therefore
fails. It follows that the Nationalisation Amendment Act must receive the
protection of Article 31A(1)(e) of the Constitution, that is to say, that the
Act cannot be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with or
takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by Articles 14, 19 and 31.
1094 These are our reasons for the order
passed by us on May 5, 1978 which reads thus :
The stay orders passed in these Writ
Petitions are vacated except in those Writ Petitions, viz., Writ Petitions Nos.
257, 220, 111, 600, 1130-1134, 352, 221 and 178/77 in which composite mining
leases have been granted for mining both fireclay and coal. The stay orders in
these latter petitions shall stand modified as from to-day on the lines of the
order recorded below.
All the Writ Petitions are dismissed with
costs except Writ Petitions Nos. 257, 220, 111, 600, 1130- 1134, 352, 221 and
178/77 in each of which there is a composite mining for mining fireclay and
coal. These Petitions are allowed partly in that the petitioners therein shall
be entitled, for the duration of the unexpired portion of their existing
leases, to carry on mining operations for the purpose of winning fireclay so
long as, and to the extent that, they do not carry on any coal mining operation
or engage in winning or mining coal. In these writ petitions there will be no
order as to costs.
We have already indicated how, though the
petitioners holding composite leases were permitted to carry on mining
operations for the purpose of winning fireclay, they, according to their own
showing, cannot win or mine fireclay without doing a coal mining operation or
without engaging in winning or mining coal. It is self-evident that in
attempting to win fireclay, they will have to act at their own peril since they
will run the risk of being prosecuted under section 30(2) of the Coal Mines
(Nationalisation) Act, 1973.
Petition Nos. 111, 178, 220, 221, 257, 352,
600 and 1130-1134 partly allowed.
Petition Nos. 150, 151, 180, 205-210, 226,
270-271, 346, 355, 403, 396-398, 599, 541, 543, 626, 635-639, 661, 687-692,
758/77 and 154, 571-574, 603, 605, 610 and 611/77 dismissed.
S. R.
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