N. C. Shinghal Vs. Union of India
[1980] INSC 48 (19 March 1980)
DESAI, D.A.
DESAI, D.A.
VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J)
CITATION: 1980 AIR 1255 1980 SCR (3) 44 1980
SCC (3) 29
CITATOR INFO :
RF 1983 SC 509 (28)
ACT:
Central Health Services Rules, 1963 as amended
by Central Health Service (Amendment) Rules, 1966,-Rule 8(3), Scope
of-Promotions to Super-time Grade II posts, whether made in accordance with
Rule 8(3)-Whether transfers in posts which are in the same grade or one
considered equivalent can be effected on administrative exigencies-Refusal to
accept the promotion by an employe whether the employer can offer to next
junior to the offeree-Adverse inference against parties remaining ex-parte and
therefore not served, whether can be drawn.
HEADNOTE:
The Union of India has enacted Central
Government Health Scheme and in implementation thereof has set up various
institutions for medical relief and medical education. A Central Health Service
became a necessity for effectively implementing the scheme. With a view to
constituting the service, Central Health Service Rules, 1963 were framed and
brought into operation on May 15, 1963. The Rules envisaged categorisation of
personnel manning the service into five different categories, to wit, category
'A' super-time scale Rs. 1600-2000; Category 'B' super-time scale Rs.
1300-1600; Category 'C' Senior scale Rs. 675-1300, Category 'D' Junior scale
Rs. 425-950; and Category 'E' class II scale Rs. 325-800. On account of various
imponderables the service could not be constituted and 1963 Rules were amended
by Central Health Service (Amendment) Rules, 1966. Initial constitution of
service was to be on and from September 9, 1966. 1966 Rules contemplated again
the division of service into four categories, namely, Category I comprising super-time
scale Grade I Rs. 1800-2250;
super-time scale grade II Rs. 1300-1800,
Category II consists of Specialists' grade Rs. 600-1300; Category III includes
General Duty officers Grade I Rs. 450-1250. and Category IV comprises General
Duty officers Grade II Rs. 350-900. 1966 Rules provided the method for initial
constitution of the service. Rules 7A(1) and 7A(2) provided for absorbing
departmental candidates holding posts in categories 'A' and 'B' under 1963
Rules in super-time Grade I and super-time Grade II respectively of reorganized
service under the 1966 Rules. Those in service on September 9, 1966 and holding
posts in Categories 'C', 'D' and 'E' were either absorbed in specialists' grade
or General Duty Officers Grade as the case may be. For the purposes of
selection and absorption of departmental candidates on the date of initial
constitution of reorganised service, a Selection Committee was set up and
absorption was made in accordance with the recommendation of the Committee.
This process of absorption was over in March 1967, but the constitution of the
service was deemed to be effective from September 9, 1966.
Rule 2(c) defines category to mean a group of
posts specified in column 2 of the table under Rule 4. Rule 4 provides for
classification categories and scales of pay.
Rule 5 of Rules 1966 provides for authorised
strength of the service. Rule 8 prescribes the manner in which future
vacancies, after appointments have been made to the Service under Rule 7 and 7A
shall be filled in Super-time Grade II.
45 The authorised strength of the various
categories of the service on the date of commencement of 1966 Rules shall be as
specified in the First Schedule. The vertical promotional channel is from
Specialists' grade and General Duty officers Grade I to super-time Grade II and
from thereon to Super-time Grade I. On the date of initial constitution of
service there were 275 permanent and 102 temporary, in all 377 posts in
Specialists' grade. Out of this strength of posts in specialists' grade 28 posts
were upgraded to super-time Grade II, 19 being classified as unspecified
specialists' posts and 9 unspecified posts.
The Central Government converted one post
from amongst the 19 unspecified specialists' grade posts in Super-time Grade II
in Ophthalmology specialty in Willingdon Hospital and transferred one Dr. B. S.
Jain, respondent 3, who was then working as Chief opthalmologist-cum-Associate
Professor of Ophthalmology, Himachal Pradesh Medical College, Simla, and
offered the vacancy to in Super-time Grade II caused by the transfer of
respondent 3 to appellant who was next in seniority by way of promotion on ad
hoc basis as per Memorandum dated December 7, 1970. As the appellant was
prepared to accept only if the posting was at Delhi and not in Simla, one Dr.
G. C. Sood was promoted to super-time Grade II post and was appointed at Simla.
The appellant, thereafter filed a writ
petition praying for Mandamus that he may be deemed to have been promoted from
February 18, 1971, the date when Dr. Jain was posted at Willingdon Hospital.
The appellant also questioned the promotions of respondents 4 to 24 to super-time
grade II on various dates after February 18, 1971 and before July 17, 1978 when
he was actually promoted on a certain interpretation of Rule 8(3) of the
Central Health Service Rules 1963. The High Court dismissed the writ petition.
A Letters Patent Appeal was partly allowed. Hence the appeal by special leave.
The appellant contended that: (a) the
promotions of Respondents 4 to 24 are in contravention of Rule 8 of 1966 Rules;
and (b) when a post in Ophthalmology at Willingdon Hospital was created on
February 1, 1971, by conversion of one post from amongst unspecified
specialists' grade posts in super-time Grade II, the post could only have been
filed in by promotion from amongst those holding the post in specialists' grade
in Ophthalmology speciality and he being the senior most and otherwise
qualified, he should have been promoted from that date; (c) filling in the post
at Willingdon Hospital by transfer of respondent 3 was in violation of the
statutory rule and hence invalid; (d) the offer of the post to him at Simla was
an eye wash and malafide as he lacked teaching experience and the post is a
teaching post; (e) "service in that category" means service in that
category which was constituted under the 1966 amendment Rules and (f) rule 8(3)
does not permit inter se transfers in posts which are in the same category.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court ^
HELD : 1. Unlike other professions, medical
profession has developed branchwise expert specialised knowledge referable
generally to number of parts in which human anatomy is divisible. General
medicine and general-surgery are two broad genus but under each one of them
there are numerous specialities and there is intensive study and research in
speciality for being qualified for the speciality. Being an expert in any one
speciality simultaneously results in being 46 excluded from other specialities
even though the specialities may be species of a genus like general medicine or
general surgery. Again, in each speciality there will be a post of a Lecturer,
an Assistant Professor, an Associate Professor and a Professor with a vertical
movement by way of promotion. In a nonteaching hospital there will be posts
like Junior Surgeon, Senior Surgeon, Head of the Department and so on. In a
profession so compartmentalised speciality wise ex hypothesi it is difficult to
provide for promotional avenue by way of a general seniority list integrating
different specialities categorywise, cadrewise or gradewise.
If such a general seniority list including
persons belonging to different specialities albeit in the same grade is drawn
up for purposes of promotion it might lead to a startling result because the
need may be of a promotional post in a speciality and the man at top of the
seniority list may not belong to that speciality and the man at top of the
seniority list may not belong to that speciality but may belong to a different
speciality and if any promotion was to be given to him to a post in a
speciality for which he is neither qualified nor eligible it would be
impossible to give vertical promotions by referring to such general seniority
list. If the promotion is to a post generally called administrative post in a
hospital a general seniority list including experts belonging to different
specialities may be helpful but when promotions are to be given to posts in
different specialities a general seniority list is not only unhelpful but may
really impede the process of promotion. Again, demands of different
specialities for additional strength may differ from hospital to hospital, from
area to area and even from time to time. In order to meet such unforeseen
eventualities the rules provide for an addition to the strength of super-time
grade II by keeping 19 posts designated as unspecified Specialists' grade,
posts and 9 unspecified posts in a pool. Whenever a demand came for providing a
higher post in super-time grade II in any particular speciality ordinarily
where the strength of the service is prescribed a post will have to be created
which anyone familiar with bureaucratic jaggornot would immediately realise how
time consuming it is. Anticipating such a situation and to meet with the
demands of specialities within a reasonable time it was provided that there
would be a pool of 19 unspecified specialists' posts in super-time grade II and
9 unspecified posts also in super-time grade II. This would facilitate
conversion from the pool of unspecified Specialists' posts of an unspecified
Specialists' post to a specified specialist post in a speciality where a need
has been felt. Once the need is felt and a post is converted from an
unspecified post to a specified post in super-time grade II it becomes an
addition to the strength of that speciality and the post can be filled in, in
accordance with the relevant rule. But it is implicit in this arrangement that
the person to be appointed to such a post would be one who is eligible to be
appointed to that speciality and not someone who is on top of the general
seniority list in Specialists' grade or general duty officers' grade from which
promotion is to be made. If promotion has to be made from a general seniority
list which includes all Specialists in the Specialists' grade the one at the top
may be Cardiologist and the post may be converted into Anesthesiology.
Certainly a Cardiologist cannot be appointed as an Anaesthetic. Therefore when
a post from amongst unspecified Specialists' posts is converted to a specified
post which means specified in the speciality in which a need has been felt from
amongst those in the Specialists' grade belonging to that speciality and in
order of their inter se seniority a promotion could be given. [54 FH, 55A-H
56A-B] Union of India and Ors. v. D. B. Kohli and Anr., [1973] 3 S.C.R. 117;
followed.
2. Merely because all 28 posts were deducted
from the strength of posts in Specialists' grade it could not be said that all
28 posts would be available for promotion to those belonging to Specialists'
grade only. The language employed in rule 5 also points in this direction. All
the 28 posts need not necessarily be filled in by promotion from amongst those
who belong to Specialists grade only. Hence with the division of 28 posts in
two different designations and dividing the 28 posts in two different
nomenclatures. 28 posts are made up of 19 posts designated as unspecified
Specialists posts and 9 unspecified posts. Undoubtedly 19 posts which were
designated as unspecified Specialists' post must be filled in from amongst
those belonging to the Specialists' grade but that itself also shows that the
remaining 9 unspecified posts can be filled in from amongst those who may be
promoted from General Duty Officers grade I because General Duty Officers grade
I are also promotable to super-time grade II. The nomenclature unspecified
Specialists' post and unspecified post provides an effective answer and
indicates that while in the case of the former promotion must be given from
Specialists in respect of the latter General Duty officers Grade I would
equally be eligible for promotion. [56 D-H]
3. To interpret that 19 unspecified
Specialists' posts could only by filled in by promotion would run counter to
the express provision contained in Rule 8(3) which is statutory. Rule 8 of the
Central Health Service Rules, provides for future maintenance of the service.
Rule 8(3) provides for 50% of the vacancies in super-time grade II to be filled
in by promotion of General Duty Officers Grade I and Specialists' grade
officers in the ratio of 2 : 3 and the remaining 50% of the vacancies to be
filled in by direct recruitment in the manner specified in the second schedule.
Now, once an unspecified Specialists' grade
post in super-time grade II is converted and made a specified post in a speciality
it is an addition to the strength of the speciality and the filling in of such
post shall be governed by rule 8(3). Undoubtedly if it is to be filled in by
promotion, that would only be from amongst those belonging to Specialists'
grade officers as the converted post was unspecified Specialists' post. But to
say that it can be filled in only by promotion is to ignore the mandate of
statutory rule 8(3) which provides for filling in posts in super-time grade II
by either promotion or nomination in the ratio therein prescribed. Once there
is a post in super-time grade II which is to be filled in subsequent to the
initial constitution of the service, rule 8(3) will be attracted in all its
rigour. [57 B-E] Further Rule 8(3) provides for filling in posts in super-time
grade II by promotion as well as by direct recruitment in the ratio of 1 : 1.
On a true interpretation of the 1966 Rules in general and rule 8(3) in
particular it could not be gainsaid that whenever an unspecified Specialists'
post is converted into a specified post and assigned to a speciality it can be
filled in either by promotion or by direct recruitment as the situation
warrants according to the rule and as determined by the quota rule.
[57 E-G] No argument can be founded or any
relief can be claimed merely on a stand taken by the Union of India in their
counter-affidavit in an earlier writ petition, unless estoppel is claimed or
urged. Even if such be the stand of the Central Government it will have to be
negatived and was in fact negatived in the case of Dr. B. S. Jain. [58C-D]
Union of India v. Bhim Singh, [1971] 2 SLR p. 111 @ 124; P. C. Sethi and Ors.
v. Union of India and Ors. [1975] 3 S.C.R. 201 at 210; J. K. Steel Ltd. v. 48
Union of India, [1969] 2 S.C.R. 481 @ 498; Commissioner of Income Tax v. K.
Srinivasan and K. Gopalan [1953] S.C.R. 486; applied.
4. When a post is created it is an addition
to the strength of that particular category and the additional strength has to
be filled in the manner prescribed in the rule and that no sanctity attaches to
the place where the post is created but the sanctity attaches to the number of
posts and the manner of filling them. [59 B-C] Transfers in posts which are in
the same grade or are considered equivalent can be effected on administrative
exigencies. Once a new post is created and it is an increase in the strength of
the cadre in which the post is created, everyone in that cadre is eligible to
fill in that post and transfer is permissible. There is no violation of Rule
8(3) and transfer of Dr. B. S. Jain was valid. [59 E-F] E. P. Royappa v. State
of Tamil Nadu and Anr., [1974] 2 S.C.R. 348 at 363.
5. If an employee eligible for promotion is
offered a higher post by way of promotion, his refusal to accept the same would
enable the employer, the Central Government in this case, to fill in the post
by offering it to a junior to the Government servant refusing to accept the
post and in so acting there will be no violation of Art, 16. Further, the
Government servant who refuses to accept the promotional post offered to him
for his own reason cannot then be heard to complain that he must be given
promotional post from the date on which the avenue for promotion opened to him.
[60 B- C] Undoubtedly, it may be that under the Medical Council Regulations stricto
sensu, the appellant may not be qualified for the post of Associate Professor
because he did not possess the requisite teaching experience. But an ad hoc
arrangement could have been made and it was open to the Central Government, if
the appellant had accepted the post, to move the Medical Council of India to
permit the Central Government to appoint the appellant at Simla. Some way could
have been found but the door was bolted by the appellant himself deciding the
offer for reasons other than his qualification which he may have found
compelling. The offer made to him by the Government was not eye wash or make
believe. His refusal to accept the offer of promotion would postpone his
promotion. Further, since his refusal to accept the promotion at Simla and till
July 1978, the appellant was never superseded by any one junior to him in his
speciality it is difficult to entertain the contention that in refusing
promotion to him when some posts were converted from unspecified Specialists'
posts into different specialities and were filled in by those who were
qualified to be promoted in the respective speciality in which the post was
created he could be said to have been superseded in violation of Art. 16. [62
D-H]
6. Remote chances of promotion could hardly
be said to be condition of service which if impaired would be violative of Art.
16. Even assuming that a remote chance of promotion in adversely affected would
give a cause of action, in view of appellants' impending retirement on
superannuation the argument would be of no avail to him. [63 F-G]
7. The word 'category' used in Rule 8(3) has
to be understood to mean the post included in that category and consequently
service in that category would mean service in a post included in that
category. [66 B-C] 49 It is a well recognised canon of construction that the
construction which makes the Rule otiose or unworkable should be avoided where
two constructions are possible and the Court should lean in favour of the
construction which would make the rule workable and further the purpose for
which the rule is intended. While prescribing experience qualification in 1966
Amendment Rules, the framers of the Rules could not have intended to ignore
wholly the past service. A Specialist who was in category 'C' was included in
category II with the designation Specialists' grade officer. Similarly, General
Duty Officer grade I in category 'D' acquired the same nomenclature General
Duty Officer grade I in category III. There was an upward revision of pay
scales of both the categories. The change in designation should not be
understood to mean that the service rendered as specialist or as General Duty
Officer is wholly wiped out for any future promotion. Even after change of
designation the duties never underwent any change. Same duty was performed a
day prior to September 9, 1966 and the day thereafter by both the categories in
the respective posts.
Further this change was with a purpose in as
much as when certain qualifying service is prescribed for being eligible for
promotion in a category the emphasis is on service rendered in a post
irrespective of the grade. A Specialists' grade officer belonging to category
II was a Specialists' grade officer in category C. He was even then eligible
for promotion to super-time grade II. It was never intended that a Specialists
grade officer belonging to category 'C' under 1963 Rules who had put in more
than 8 years of service but who was not promoted prior to September 9, 1966,
the date of initial constitution of service, or on the date of initial
constitution of service, would be ineligible for promotion for a period of 8
years simply because the designation of the category changed. It was never
intended that there should be a complete hiatus for a period of 8 years in
promoting Specialists' grade officers to super-time grade II and for a period
of 10 years in case of General Duty Officers grade I. There is no warrant for
such an inference from the Rules. [65 A-H, 66 A-C]
8. The contention that executive instruction
cannot run counter to the statutory rule is untenable in the facts of this
case. Service rendered in equivalent post prior to the date of initial
constitution of service could be taken into account in calculating qualifying
service for next promotion. [66 E-F]
9. The need for the post or the requirements
of the hospital or the need for an ad hoc or additional appointment is a matter
which the Government is competent to decide and in the absence of requisite
material the Court cannot interpose its own decision on the necessity of creation
or abolition of posts. Whether a particular post is necessary is a matter
depending upon the exigencies of the situation and administrative necessity.
The Government is a better judge of the interests of the general public for
whose service the hospitable are set up. And whether a hospital catering to the
needs of general public providing medical relief in different specialities has
need for a particular post in a particular speciality would be better judged by
the Government running the hospital. If Government is a better judge it must
have the power to create or abolish the posts depending upon the needs of the
hospital and the requirements of general public. [67 C-E] Creation and
abolition of posts is a matter of Government policy and every sovereign
Government has this power in the interest and necessity of internal
administration. The creation or abolition of post is dictated by police
decision, 50 exigencies of circumstances and administrative necessity.
The creation, the continuance and the abolition
of post are all decided by the Government in the interest of administration and
general public. The Court would be the last competent in the face of scanty
material to decide whether the Government acted honestly in creating a post or
refusing to create a post or its decision suffers from mala fide, legal or
factual. In this background it is difficult to entertain the contention of the
appellant that posts were created to accommodate some specific individuals
ignoring the requirements of the hospital or the interests of the general
public at large. [67 F-H] M. Ramanatha Pillai v. State of Kerala and Anr.,
[1947] 1 S.C.R. 515 at 520; followed.
10. No adverse inference could be drawn
against a party unless they appear before the Court and they are served with
necessary papers. [68 C-D] In the present case, Respondents 9 and 23 had not
appeared in the High Court and there is no evidence that the subsequent
affidavit of the appellant was served on them. It may be that the Government
may not be interested in either denying or admitting this averment which
directly and adversely affects respondents 9 and 23. However, in view of the
fact that they were selected by the Departmental Promotion Committee and the
promotion was approved by the U.P.S.C. it is difficult to entertain the
contention at the hand of the appellant who is not in any way going to be
benefited by the invalidation of their promotion. [68 B, D, E]
11. Once the challenge on merits fails in a
case, the second string to the bow need not be examined. The appellant here, is
least competent to challenge the promotions of Respondents 4 to 24. [69 B-C]
Chitra Ghosh and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors. [1970] 1 S.C.R. 413 @ 420.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal
No. 2057 of 1979.
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and
Order dated 11-1-1979 of the Delhi High Court in L.P.A. No. 46/73.
S.R. Srivastava for the Appellant and Dr.
N.C. Shinghal (in person) P.P. Rao, and Miss A. Subhashini for Respondents 1
& 2.
B.R. Aggarwal for Respondent No. 15.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DESAI, J.-A highly qualified ophthalmic surgeon feeling aggrieved that he has
not been justly treated in the matter of promotion to a post in Super-time
Grade II seeks redress of his grievance praying for a mandamus that he may be
deemed to have been promoted from February 18, 1971, failing which more out of
frustration and less by any justification he seeks quashing of the promotion of
respondents 4 to 24 though convinced that even if the Court were to accede to
his request he is in no way likely to be benefited by this bizarre exercise.
51 First to the fact situation. The Union of
India has framed Central Government Health Scheme and in implementation thereof
has set up various institutions for medical relief and medical education. A
Central Health Service became a necessity for effectively implementing the
scheme. With a view to constituting the Service, Central Health Service Rules
1963 ('1963 Rules' for short), were framed and brought into operation on May
15, 1963. The Rules envisaged categorisation of personnel manning the Service
into five different categories, to wit, category 'A' super-time scale Rs.
1600-2000, category 'B' super-time scale Rs. 1300-1600, category 'C' senior
scale Rs. 675-1300, category 'D' junior scale Rs. 425-950 and category 'E'
class II scale Rs. 325-800. On account of various imponderables the Service
could not be constituted and 1963 Rules were amended by Central Health Service
(Amendment) Rules, 1966, ('1966 Rules' for short). Initial constitution of
Service was to be on and from September, 9, 1966. 1966 Rules contemplated again
the division of Service into four categories, namely, category I comprising super-time
grade I Rs. 1800-2250; super-time grade II Rs. 1300-1800; category II consists
of Specialists' grade Rs. 600-1300; category III includes General Duty Officers
grade I Rs. 450-1250; and category IV comprises General Duty Officers grade II
Rs.
350-900. 1966 Rules provided the method of
initial constitution of the Service. Rules 7A(1) and 7A(2) provided for
absorbing departmental candidates holding posts in categories 'A' and 'B' under
1963 Rules in posts in super-time grade I and super-time grade II respectively
of reorganised Service under the 1966 Rules. Those in service on September 9,
1966, and holding post in categories 'C', 'D' and 'E' were absorbed either in
the Specialists' grade or General Duty Officers, grade as the case may be. For
the purposes of constitution and absorption of departmental candidates on the
date of initial constitution of re- organised service a Selection Committee was
set up and absorption was made in accordance with the recommendations of the
Committee This process of absorption was over in March 1967, but the
constitution of the Service was deemed to be effective from September 9, 1966.
There were some promotions to super-time grade II up to 1971 but as they are
not the subject-matter of dispute in this appeal they may be ignored. There was
also direct recruitment to the Service between 1966 and 1971.
Between February 1971 to July 17, 1978, when
the appellant came to be promoted to super-time grade II, respondents 4 to 24
were promoted on different dates to super-time grade II, The promotion of
respondents 4 to 24 is challenged by the appellant on diverse grounds 52 but
the principal contention is that their promotions are in contravention of rule
8 of 1966 Rules. Rule 8 provides for future maintenance of the Service.
Relevant for the present appeal is rule 8(3) which provides for recruitment to super-time
grade II both by promotion and nomination by direct recruitment. As the
appellant claims promotion to super-time grade II from February 18, 1971, and
simultaneously questions promotion of respondents 4 to 24 to super-time grade
II on various dates after February 18, 1971, and before July 17, 1978, when he
was actually promoted, on a certain interpretation of the relevant rule, it may
be here extracted:
xx xx xx "8. Future maintenance of the
service-After appointments have been made to the Service under rule 7 and rule
7A, future vacancies shall be filled in the following manner, namely:- xx xx xx
(3) Super-time Grade I- (a) Fifty percent of the vacancies in Super-time Grade
II shall be filled by promotion of:
(i) General Duty officers, Grade I, with not
less than ten years of service in that category; or (ii) Specialists' Grade
officers with not less than eight years of service in that category;
in the ratio of 2:3 on the recommendation of
a Departmental Promotion Committee on the basis of merit and seniority of the
officer's concerned;
Provided that no person shall be eligible for
appointment to any such post unless he possesses the qualifications and
experience requisite for appointment to such post.
Provided that where the case of an officer
appointed to any post in the grade of General Duty Officer, Grade I or the
Specialists' Grade, as the case may be, is considered for the purposes of
promotion to any posts in Super-time Grade II under this sub-rule, the cases of
all persons senior to such officer in the grades of General Duty Officer, Grade
I or Specialists' Grade, as the case may be, shall also be considered,
notwithstanding that they may not have rendered 10 years or 8 years of service,
respectively, in those grades".
To appreciate the contention of the appellant
as to how he claims promotion to super-time grade II on February 8, 1971, it
may be noted 53 that effective from that date the Central Government converted
one post from amongst unspecified specialists' Grade posts in super-time Grade
II in Ophthalmology Speciality at Willingdon Hospital and transferred Dr. B.S. Jain,
respondent 3, who was then working as Chief Ophthalmologist-cum-Associate
Professor of Ophthalmology, Himachal Pradesh Medical College, Simla, and
offered the vacancy in super-time grade II caused by the transfer of respondent
3, to appellant who was next in seniority by way of promotion on ad hoc basis
as per memorandum dated December 7, 1970. Appellant responded to this offer as
per his letter dated December 9, 1970, wherein after putting forward various
personal inconveniences and a possible loss in emoluments even on promotion, he
concluded his response to the offer as under:
"In view of my personal problems and in
the public interest I most humbly request that this promotion may kindly be
granted to me while in Delhi." Thereafter the Government offered the post
to Dr. Radha Natarajan but she declined the offer. Subsequently the Government
offered the post to Dr. M.C. Sharma who accepted the same but he was not
appointed and ultimately Dr. G.C. Sood was promoted to super-time grade II post
and was appointed at Simla.
Appellant contends that when a post in
Ophthalmology at Willingdon Hospital was created on February 1, 1971, by
conversion of one post from amongst unspecified Specialists' grade posts in super-time
grade II that post could only have been filled in by promotion from amongst
those holding the post in Specialists' grade in ophthalmology speciality and he
being the seniormost and otherwise qualified, he should have been promoted from
that date. Simultaneously he contends that filling in the post so created in super-time
grade II at Willingdon Hospital by transfer of respondent 3 Dr. B.S. Jain was
in violation of the statutory rule and hence invalid. He also contends that as
he was not qualified to hold the post of Chief Ophthalmologist cum-Associate
Professor of Ophthalmology, Himachal Pradesh Medical College, Simla, because it
was a teaching post and he lacked teaching experience which was an essential
qualification, the offer of that post to him was merely an eye wash and he
could not have accepted the same. It is necessary to examine three different
limbs of the submission separately.
Rule 5 of 1966 Rules provides for authorised
strength of the Service. The authorised strength of the various categories of
the service on the date of commencement of 1966 Rules shall be as specified in
the first schedule. Part A of the first schedule deals with super-time 54 grade
I and Part B deals with super-time grade II. Part C deals with Specialists'
grade. The vertical promotional channel is from specialists' grade and General
Duty Officers Grade I to super-time grade II and from thereon to super-time
grade I. On the date of initial constitution of Service there were 275
permanent and 102 temporary, in all 377 posts in specialists' grade. Out of
this strength of posts in specialists' grade, 28 posts were upgraded to super-time
grade II, 19 being classified as unspecified specialists' posts and 9
unspecified posts. To that extent the permanent strength of posts in
specialists' grade was reduced by 28 so as to leave it at 247. There is no
dispute that 19 unspecified Specialists' posts and 9 unspecified posts were
upgraded to super-time grade II. The controversy is how these posts were to be
filled in. Appellant contends that as these 28 posts were in Specialists' grade
and the strength of Specialists' grade posts was reduced by 28, whenever any
post out of these 28 posts added to super-time grade II is required to be
filled in, it can only be filled in by promotion from amongst those originally
belonging to specialists' grade, i.e. category 'C' under 1963 Rules.
Simultaneously he contends that as these
unspecified specialists' grade posts and unspecified posts, 28 in number, can
be filled in from those belonging to specialists' grade, ipso facto they can
only be filled in by promotion and not either by direct nomination or by
transfer. In support of this submission reliance is also placed on an affidavit
filed on behalf of Union of India in a petition filed by Dr. B.S. Jain wherein
it was in terms stated that these 28 posts could only be filled in by promotion
and in no other manner.
The raison d'etre for upgrading the 28 posts
from specialists' grade to super-time grade II yet dividing them in two
separate categories each having its own nomenclature, viz., 19 posts designated
as unspecified Specialists' grade posts and 9 designated as unspecified posts
is not difficult to discern.
Unlike other professions, medical profession
has developed branchwise expert specialised knowledge referable generally to
number of parts in which human anatomy is divisible. General medicine and
general surgery are two broad genus but under each one of them there are
numerous specialities and there is intensive study and research in speciality
for being qualified for the speciality. Being an expert in any one speciality
simultaneously results in being excluded from other specialities even though
the specialities may be species of a genus like general medicine or general surgery.
Again, in each speciality there will be a post of a Lecturer, an Assistant
Professor, an Associate Professor and a Professor with a vertical movement by
way of promotion. In a non-teaching hospital there will be posts like Junior
Surgeon, 55 Senior Surgeon, Head of the Department and so on. In a profession
so compartmentalised specialitywise, ex hypothesi it is difficult to provide
for promotional avenue by way of a general seniority list integrating different
specialities categorywise, cadrewise or gradewise. If such a general seniority
list including persons belonging to different specialities albeit in the same
grade is drawn up for purposes of promotion it might lead to a startling result
because the need may be of a promotional post in a speciality and the man at
top of the seniority list may not belong to that speciality but may belong to a
different speciality and if any promotion was to be given to him to a post in a
speciality for which he is neither qualified nor eligible it would be impossible
to give vertical promotions by referring to such general seniority list. If the
promotion is to a post generally called administrative post in a hospital a
general seniority list including experts belonging to different specialities
may be helpful but when promotions are to be given to posts in different
specialities a general seniority list is not only unhelpful but may really
impede the process of promotion. Again, demands of different specialities for
additional strength may differ from hospital to hospital, from area to area and
even from time to time. In order to meet such unforeseen eventualities the
rules provide for an addition to the strength of super-time grade II by keeping
19 posts designated as unspecified Specialists' grade posts and 9 unspecified
posts in a pool. Whenever a demand came for providing a higher post in super-time
grade II in any particular speciality ordinarily where the strength of the
service is prescribed a post will have to be created which anyone familiar with
bureaucratic jagornot would immediately realise how time consuming it is.
Anticipating such a situation and to meet with the demands of specialities
within a reasonable time it was provided that there would be a pool of 19
unspecified Specialists' posts in super-time grade II and 9 unspecified posts
also in super-time grade II. This would facilitate conversion from the pool of
unspecified Specialists' posts of an unspecified Specialists' post to a
specified Specialist post in a speciality where a need has been felt. Once the
need is felt and a post is converted from an unspecified post to a specified
post in super-time grade II it becomes an addition to the strength of that
speciality and the post can be filled in, in accordance with the relevant rule.
But it is implicit in this arrangement that the person to be appointed to such
a post would be one who is eligible to be appointed to that speciality and not someone
who is on top of the general seniority list in Specialists' grade or general
duty officers' grade from which promotion is to be made. If promotion has to be
made from a general seniority list which includes all Specialists in the
Specialists' grade the one at the top may be a Cardiologist and the post may be
converted into Anesthesiology and it 56 does not require long persuasive
argument to hold that a Cardiologist cannot be appointed as an Anaesthetic. It
is, therefore, crystal clear that when a post from amongst unspecified
Specialists' posts is converted to a specified post which means specified in
the speciality in which a need has been felt from amongst those in the
specialists' grade belonging to that speciality and in order of their inter se
seniority a promotion could be given. This position is inescapable and it is
difficult to comprehend a position contrary to this. In fact, this situation
has been expressly recognised by this Court in Union of India & Ors. v. S.
B. Kohli & Another, wherein it was held that for being appointed as a
Professor in a particular speciality in that case Orthopaedics, the condition
that a person must have a post-graduate degree in Orthopaedics would not result
in any classification without reference to the objectives sought to be achieved
and this would not result in any discrimination nor would it be violative of
Article 16.
In passing a contention of the appellant that
all 28 posts which were deducted from the strength of permanent posts in
Specialists' grade and added to super-time grade II must on that account alone
be filled in by promotion from those belonging to the specialists' grade only
may be examined. There is no merit in this contention. If there was any
substance in this contention there was no reason to provide for two different
designations and divide the 28 posts in two different nomenclatures. 28 posts
are made up of 19 posts designated as unspecified Specialists' posts and 9
unspecified posts. Undoubtedly 19 posts which were designated as unspecified
Specialists' post must be filled in from amongst those belonging to the
Specialists' grade but that itself also shows that the remaining 9 unspecified
posts can be filled in from amongst those who may be promoted from 'General
Duty Officers grade- I because General Duty Officers grade-I are also
promotable to super-time grade-II. The nomenclature unspecified Specialists'
post and unspecified post provides an effective answer and indicates that while
in the case of the former promotion must be given from Specialists in respect
of the latter General Duty Officers Grade-I would be eligible for promotion.
Merely because all 28 posts were deducted from the strength of posts in
Specialists' grade it could not be said that all 28 posts would be available
for promotion to those belonging to Specialists' grade only. The language
employed in rule 5 also points in this direction. There is, therefore, no
substance in the contention that all 28 posts must be filled in by promotion
from amongst those who belong to Specialists' grade only.
57 The last limb of the argument is that the
19 unspecified Specialists' posts in super-time grade II can only be filled in
by promotion and not in any other manner and particularly not by transfer. The
provocation for this submission is posting of Dr. B. S. Jain in super-time
grade II post created at Willingdon Hospital in February 1971.
Undoubtedly one unspecified Specialists'
grade post was converted and was designated as specified post in super-time
grade II in Ophthalmology speciality at Willingdon Hospital in February 1971.
Appellant says that once an unspecified Specialists' grade post was converted
into a specified post and that as it was assigned to Ophthalmology speciality,
he being the seniormost Ophthalmologist and qualified for the post, that post
could only be filled in by promotion and he should have been promoted and the
posting of Dr. B. S. Jain by transfer to that post was illegal and invalid.
Rule 8 provides for future maintenance of the Service. Rule 8(3) provides for
50% of the vacancies in super-time grade II to be filled in by promotion of
General Duty Officers Grade I and Specialists' grade officers in the ratio of
2:3 and the remaining 50% of the vacancies to be filled in by direct
recruitment in the manner specified in the second schedule.
Now, once an unspecified specialists' grade
post in super-time grade II is converted and made a specified post in a
speciality it is an addition to the strength of the speciality and the filling
in of such post shall be governed by rule 8 (3). Undoubtedly if it is to be
filled in by promotion, that would only be from amongst those belonging to Specialists'
grade officers as the converted post was unspecified Specialists' post. But to
say that it can be filled in only by promotion is to ignore the mandate of
statutory rule 8(3) which provides for filling in posts in super-time grade II
by either promotion or nomination in the ratio therein prescribed. Once there
is a post in super-time grade II which is to be filled in subsequent to the
initial constitution of the Service, rule 8 (3) will be attracted in all its
rigour. And it should not be overlooked that rule 8 (3) provides for filling in
of posts in super-time grade II by promotion as well as by direct recruitment
in the ratio of 1:1. On a true interpretation of the 1966 Rules in general and
rule 8 (3) in particular it could not be, gainsaid that whenever an unspecified
Specialists' post is converted into a specified post and assigned to a
speciality it can be filled in either by promotion or by direct recruitment as
the situation warrants according to the rule and as determined by the quota
rule. But it was very strenuously contended that the Central Government in
implementing the rule has understood and in fact implemented the rule to this
effect that whenever an unspecified Specialist's post is converted as a
specified post and assigned to a speciality it can only be filled in by
promotion. Reliance was placed upon an affidavit made on behalf of the Central
Government in a writ 58 petition filed by Dr. B. S. Jain in Delhi High Court.
In the counter-affidavit on behalf of the Central Government a stand was taken
that the 19 unspecified Specialists' posts were meant only for promoting
category 'C' clinical Specialists to super-time grade II. In Union of India v.
Bhim Singh & Ors., the Court refers to the stand taken on behalf of the
Union of India in that case as under:
"Learned counsel for the appellant
(Union of India) submits that these posts were included in super-time grade II
not with reference to the actual number of officers who had completed 8 years
of service or more on a particular date but only with a view to providing
opportunities of promotion to the former Category 'C' officers holding clinical
Specialist posts".
It does appear that such a stand was taken on
behalf of the Union of India but simultaneously it may be noted that the Court
has not accepted the stand. And it would be too late in the day to say that on
such a stand of the Union of India, if it runs counter to the rule explicit in
meaning, any argument can be founded or any relief can be claimed unless
estoppel is urged. And no such estoppel is claimed In P. C. Sethi & Ors. v.
Union of India & Ors., the petitioners urged that the view put forward on
their behalf had been admitted by the Government in its affidavit filed in
connection with certain earlier proceedings of similar nature and other
admissions in Parliament on behalf of the Government. Negativing this
contention this Court held that such admissions, if any, which are mere
expression of opinion limited to the context and not specific assurances, are
not binding on the Government to create and estoppel.
Similar view was also expressed in J. K.
Steel Ltd. v. Union of India where following the earlier decision of this Court
in Commissioner of Income tax, Madras v. K. Srinivasan and K. Gopalan, it was
observed that the interpretation placed by the Department on various
sub-sections in the instructions issued by the Department cannot be considered
to be proper guide in a matter wherein the construction of a statute is
involved. Therefore, it cannot be said that 19 unspecified Specialists' posts
could only be filled in by promotion and such an interpretation or stand would
run counter to the express provision contained in rule 8(3) which is statutory.
Even if such be the stand of the Central Government it will have to be
negatived and was in fact negatived in the case of Dr. B. S. Jain.
59 Incidentally it would be incongruous to
hold that when a post is created in a certain grade, category or cadre and it
is to be filled in, someone who is already in that grade, category or cadre cannot
be transferred to that post and the post so vacated by him can be filled in, in
the manner prescribed. Even if there was some substance, though there is none,
in the contention on behalf of the appellant that whenever unspecified
Specialists' post is converted into a specified post it can only be filled in
by promotion yet when someone who is already in that grade is transferred to
the newly created post and the post vacated by such transferred employee is
offered by way of promotion which in fact was done in this case there is any
violation of the rule. As pointed out earlier, when a post is created it is an
addition to the strength of that particular category and the additional
strength has to be filled in the manner prescribed in the rule and that no
sanctity attached to the place where the post is created but the sanctity
attaches to the number of posts and the manner of filling them. Now, Dr. B. S.
Jain was already holding the post in super-time grade II at Simla when a post
in super-time grade II in Ophthalmology was created at Willingdon Hospital from
amongst unspecified Specialists' posts. Even if this additional post has to be
filled in by promotion as contended by the appellant, it is not open to him to
urge that the post at Willingdon Hospital alone must have been filled in by
Promotion. Dr. B. S. Jain was transferred to the post created at Willingdon
Hospital and the post vacated by him which was in super-time grade II was
offered to the appellant as and by way of promotion. Therefore, even if the
contention of appellant is to be accepted, there is no violation of rule 8(3).
Equally it is also not correct to contend that Dr. B. S. Jain could not have
been transferred to the post created at Willingdon Hospital. Transfers in posts
which are in the same grade or are considered equivalent can be affected on
administrative exigencies.
Once a new post is created and it is an
increase in the strength of the Cadre in which the post is created, every one
in that cadre is eligible to fill in that post and transfer is permissible.
Transfer of Dr. B. S. Jain is, therefore, beyond question. In E. P. Royappa v.
State of Tamil Nadu & Anr., it is observed that the services of cadre
officers are utilised in different posts of equal status and responsibility because
of exigencies of administration and employing the best available talent in
suitable post. There is no hostile discrimination in transfer from one post to
other when the posts are of equal status and responsibility.
Therefore, it is futile to urge that filling
in the post created at Willingdon Hospital in super-time grade II by transfer
of Dr. B. S. Jain, a person already promoted to super-time grade II was invalid
60 in as much as the post was not filled in by promotion or direct recruitment
but by transfer.
The next contention is that the refusal of
the appellant to accept the post at Simla offered to him will not debar him
from promotion because the appellant was not qualified for the post at Simla.
If an employee eligible for promotion is offered a higher post by way of
promotion, his refusal to accept the same would enable the employer, the
Central Government in this case, to fill in the post by offering it to a junior
to the Government servant refusing to accept the post and in so acting there
will be no violation of Art. 16. Further, the Government servant who refuses to
accept the promotional post offered to him for his own reasons cannot then be
heard to complain that he must be given promotional post from the date on which
the avenue for promotion opened to him. Appellant being conscious of this
position tried to circumvent it by saying that the Post at Simla offered to him
by way of promotion in super time grade II was a teaching post for which he was
not qualified and, therefore, his refusal to accept the same cannot come in his
way from claiming promotion from the very date on which he refused to accept
the promotion to a post for which he was not qualified. Appellant went so far
as to suggest that the Government action in offering him the post at Simla was
actuated by malice in that while making a show of offering him a promotional
post it so deliberately acted as would impel the appellant to refuse the same.
Says the appellant that one post from the pool of unspecified specialists,
posts was converted to a specified post in Ophthalmology and was sanctioned at
Willingdon Hospital which is not a teaching hospital and, therefore, the
appellant was fully qualified for being promoted to that post. Instead of
acting in this straight forward manner the Government transferred Dr. B. S.
Jain from Simla to the post newly created at Willingdon Hospital and purported
to offer the Simla post to the appellant for which appellant was not qualified
and thus deliberately thwarted the promotional opportunity of the appellant and
that this smacks of malice.
To substantiate this submission the appellant
points out that the designation of the post at Simla was Chief
Ophthalmoligist-cum-Associate Professor of Ophthalmology, Himachal Pradesh
Medical College, Simla. This according to the appellate was a teaching post and
the qualification prescribed by the regulation framed by the Medical Council of
India requires as an essential qualification a teaching experience as Reader or
Assistant Professor in Ophthalmology for five years in a Medical College after
requisite post- graduate qualification. It was further stated that the
appellant had no teaching qualification though he started teaching at the
Safdarjang Hospital when he was recognised as a post-graduate teacher in Ophthalmology
but 61 his teaching experience extended to barely two weeks. It was also said
that essential teaching experience prescribed by the Medical Council of India
under its regulation is not relaxable and that, therefore, appellant was not
qualified for the post of Associate-Professor which was offered to him. In S.B.
Kohli's case (Supra) this Court did observe that a discretion to relax teaching
experience qualification is conferred only on the U.P.S.C. in cases of direct
recruitment and not to the Departmental Promotion Committee in case of
promotion. That being the intent of the law it is to be given effect to. This
observation is in a slightly different context but one may safely proceed on
the assumption that essential teaching qualification for the post of an
Associate Professor prescribed by Medical Council of India is not relaxable.
Therefore it can be said with some justification that the appellant who did not
have the requisite teaching experience was not qualified for the post of
Associate Professor. But this want of qualification impelling refusal to accept
promotion appears to be an afterthought on his part. When the promotional post
was offered to him as per letter dated December 7, 1970, appellant did not
reply by saying that he was not qualified for the post. In his reply dated
December 9, 1970, to the offer made by the Government appellant pointed out
that he was involved in some litigation with regard to his house and that his
stand for eviction would be weakened by his transfer. He then proceeded to
point out that he was suffering from chronic bronchitis and that the climate at
Simla may not suit him. He also pointed out the adverse effect of climate on
the health of his wife. He then proceeded to point out that apart from his
personal problems he was engaged in the Safdarjang Hospital for teaching of
post-graduate students and, therefore, he requested the Government "the
post of Chief Ophthalmologist-cum-Associate Professor of Ophthalmology may
kindly be bestowed on me at Safdarjang Hospital where there is essential need
for such a post". Could this be the stand of a person offered a
promotional post honestly believing that he was not qualified for the same? The
post offered to him was of Chief Ophthalmologist-cum-Associate Professor. Appellant
believes and now says that he was not qualified for the same if the post was at
Simla but if the same post was created at Delhi with the same designation with
the same responsibility for teaching and that too at the post-graduate level he
considered himself to be fully qualified for the same and requested the
Government to bestow that post on him. He then proceeds to point out his merits
and puts forth his disinclination for being promoted to the post at Simla. In
the face of his bold statement that he is prepared to be appointed as Chief
Ophthalmologist continuing to do teaching work at the post-graduate level at
the Safdarjang Hospital, he now wants to assert that he was not qualified for
the post. This convenient after 62 thought cannot decry the fact that the
appellant declined to accept the post at Simla not because he believed he was
not qualified for the post but because he was not inclined to leave Delhi, may
be for reasons which may be true and compelling for him. This becomes explicit
from a further averment in paragraph 7 of his reply wherein he pointed out to
the Central Government that even though he was selected by the U.P. Government
for the post of Chief Medical officer, Gandhi Memorial Eye Hospital, Aligarh,
on a fabulous salary of Rs. 3,000/- p.m. and which offer was transmitted to him
through the Government so as to enable the Government to release him and
although the Government was considering his release on deputation for the post
but he himself declined the offer because of domestic problems.
There is thus no room for doubt that the
appellant considers himself qualified for any post in Delhi and was under no
circumstances willing to leave Delhi and his disinclination to accept any post
at Simla stemmed not from his honest belief that he was not qualified for the
post but because he was not inclined to leave Delhi. Undoubtedly it may be that
under the regulation stricto sensu he may not be qualified for the post of
Associate Professor because he did not possess the requisite teaching experience.
But an ad hoc arrangement could have been made and it was open to the central
Government, if the appellant had accepted the post, to move the Medical Council
of India to permit the Central Government to appoint the appellant at Simla.
Some way could have been found but the door was bolted by the appellant himself
declining the offer for reasons other than his qualification which he may have
found compelling. In this background it is difficult to accept the submission
of the appellant that the offer made by the Government was an eye wash or a
make-believe and, therefore, his refusal to accept the offer of promotion would
not postpone his promotion.
Incidentally it would be advantageous to take
note of the fact at this stage that the appellant was promoted to super-time
grade II on July 17, 1978 and between February 1971 when he declined to accept
promotion and July 1978 when he was in fact promoted, no one junior to him in
the speciality to which he belongs was ever promoted overriding his claim to super-time
grade II. Therefore, if since his refusal to accept promotion at Simla
appellant was never superseded by any one junior to him in his speciality it is
difficult to entertain the contention that in refusing promotion to him when
some posts were converted from unspecified Specialists' posts into different
specialities and were filled in by those who were qualified to be promoted in
the respective speciality in which the post was created he could be said to
have been superseded in violation of Art. 16. And in this view of the matter
nothing more need be examined but as certain other contentions were advanced 63
which even if accepted would not in any case benefit the appellant, it appears
to us an exercise in futility but we would rather dispose them of than gloss
over them.
In the High Court appellant canvassed twofold
contention that between 1966 and 1971, i.e. after the initial constitution of
service and before the proposal offering promotion to the appellant at Simla
was made 25 promotions were given to super-time grade II to persons who were
ineligible for the same and secondly after February 1971 and before July 1978
when he was actually promoted to super-time grade II, 29 promotions were given
to super-time grade II some of whom are respondents 4 to 24 and that their
promotion was in contravention of rule 8(3) of the Rules and, therefore,
invalid. Before this Court the first limb of the argument, namely, invalidating
promotions between 1966 and 1971 to super-time grade II was not canvassed. It
was the second limb of the argument that was pressed into service.
None of those who were promoted between
February 1971 and July 1978 belonged to the speciality to which appellant
belongs. Each of them belonged to a different speciality and admittedly
appellant was not qualified for being promoted to any super-time grade II post
in the speciality in which each one of them was promoted. When this aspect
became clear a question was posed to the appellant how he would be benefited
even if his contention were to prevail that none of them was eligible for
promotion to super-time grade II and, therefore, the promotion of each of them
deserved to be quashed. The answer was that there is a common seniority list of
persons belonging to super-time grade II and promotion to super-time grade I is
by seniority and that promotion of respondents 4 to 24, if quashed, would push
the appellant higher up in seniority above them and would enhance his chances
of promotion to super-time grade I.
Remote chances of promotion could hardly be said
to be condition of service which if impaired would be violative of Art. 16.
Even assuming that a remote chance of promotion if adversely affected would
give a cause of action, it was made clear that the appellant is retiring on
superannuation in the last quarter of this year and that even if he is assigned
a deemed date of promotion somewhere in February 1971 yet there are number of
persons above him in super-time grade II who were promoted between 1966 and
1971 and appellant has not even a remote chance of promotion.
Appellant at that stage reacted by saying
that even if it be true, yet the promotions of respondents 4 to 24 ought to be
quashed because when he with respondents 4 to 24 and others belonging to super-time
grade II attend a meeting convened to discuss some administrative matter or for
holding charge of higher post temporarily vacant they claim seniority over him
and his dignity is impaired. This calls for no comment save 64 and except
saying that the approach appears to be more emotional rather than realistic.
However, the contention may be examined on merit.
Promotion of respondents 4 to 24 was
questioned on the ground that each of them was ineligible for promotion to super-time
grade II on the date on which each of them was promoted in view of the
provision contained in rule 8(3).
Rule 8(3) has been extracted herein before.
The contention is that since the initial constitution of service on September
9, 1966, any future promotion to super-time grade II from departmental
candidates could be from amongst those who qualify for the same as provided for
in rule 8(3). Apart from academic qualification, the experience qualification
prescribed is that, the General Duty Officers grade I and Specialists' grade
officers should have put in 10 years and 8 years of service respectively in
that category. Appellant contents that service in the category means service in
that category which was constituted under the 1966 amendment rules. Rule 2(c)
defines category to mean a group of posts specified in column 2 of the table
under rule 4. Rule 4 provides for classification, categories and scales of pay.
It provides that there shall be four
categories in the service and each category shall consist of the grade
specified in column 2 of the table appended to the rule. The four categories
are: first category which includes super-time grade I and super-time grade II
posts. Category two is Specialists' grade posts, category three comprises
General Duty officers, grade I and category four includes General Duty Officers
grade II. It was contended that the service to be rendered for the qualifying
period must be in the category and, therefore, a general Duty Officer grade I
can only become eligible for promotion after he renders 10 years of service in
that category which came into existence on September 9,1966, and this would
apply mutatis mutandis to the Specialists' grade officers who must put in 8
years of service in the category which came into existence on September 9,
1966. If this contention were to prevail, apart from anything else, appellant
himself would not have been qualified for promotion to super-time grade II in
February 1971 from which date he claims as being eligible for promotion to super-time
grade II because he had not put in 8 years of service in the category of
specialists' grade officers formed on September 9, 1966. That apart, it is
impossible to overlook the history of the Service. The rules were initially
framed in 1963. At that time the service was sought to be classified in 5
categories styled category 'A' to category 'E'. Expression 'category' in 1963
Rules was defined to mean a group of posts carrying the same scale of pay.
Another salient feature of which notice should be taken is that save and except
upward revision in scale, category I under the 1966 amendment Rules includes
categories 'A' and 'B' under 1963 Rules. Category 'C' has been designated as
Specialists' grade, i.e. category II under the 1966 Rules. Category 'D' is
equated with General Duty Officers grade I styled category III and category 'E'
is equated with General Duty officers grade II, i.e. category IV. Expression
'service in the category' has to be understood in this historical background.
It is difficult to entertain the contention that the past service of
Specialists' category 'C' officers got wholly wiped out merely because the
nomenclature of category 'C' Specialists officers was changed to Specialists'
grade officers replacing the expression 'category C' by category II. And that
would apply mutatis mutandis to General Duty Officers grade I and grade II. The
change in the definition of the expression 'category' appears to be instructive
in that by the change service in the post is emphasised and the question of the
grade of pay is relegated into background.
And this change appears to be with a purpose
inasmuch as when certain qualifying service is prescribed for being eligible
for promotion in a category the emphasis is on service rendered in a post
irrespective of the grade. A specialists' grade officer belonging to category
II was a specialists' grade officer in category C. He was even then eligible
for promotion to super-time grade II. Was it ever intended that a Specialists'
grade officer belonging to category 'C' under 1963 Rules who had put in more
than 8 years of service but who was not promoted prior to September 9, 1966,
the date of initial constitution of service, or on the date of initial
constitution of service, would be ineligible for promotion for a period of 8
years simply because the designation of the category changed? Was it intended
that there should be a complete hiatus for a period of 8 years in promoting
Specialists' grade officers to super-time grade II and for a period of 10 years
in case of General Duty Officers grade I. There is no warrant for such an
inference from the Rules. Such an intention cannot be attributed to the framers
of the Rules nor is it possible to accept the submission of the appellant that
the posts could have been filled in by direct recruitment because where
candidates eligible for promotion were not available it was open to resort to
direct recruitment as provided in the Rules. It is a well recognised canon of
construction that the construction which makes the Rules otiose or unworkable
should be avoided where two constructions are possible and the Court should
lean in favour of the construction which would make the rule workable and
further the purpose for which the rule is intended. While prescribing
experience qualification in 1966 Amendment Rules, the framers of the Rules
could not have intended to ignore wholly the past service. A specialist who was
in category 'C' was included in category II with the designation specialists'
grade officer. Similarly, General Duty Officer grade I in category 'D' acquired
the same nomenclature General Duty Officer grade I in category III. There was
an upward revision of pay scales of both the categories. Should the change in
designation be understood to mean that the past service rendered as Specialist
or as General Duty Officer is wholly wiped out for any future promotion ? Even
after change of designation it is not suggested that the duties underwent any
change.
Same duty was performed a day prior to
September 9, 1966, and the day thereafter by both the categories in the
respective posts. In this background the High Court was right in holding that
the word 'category' used in rule 8(3)(a) has to be understood to mean the post
included in that category and consequently service in that category would mean
service in a post included in that category.
The appellant contended that this
construction would run counter to the posting of former categories 'D' and 'E'
officers on probation on September 9, 1966, in specialists' grade and General
Duty Officers grade I. In this connection it must be recalled that on initial
constitution of Service some persons who were in the category of General Duty
Officers were absorbed and appointed in Specialists' grade and vice versa was
true of some persons. It is equally true that Officers belonging to categories
'D' and E' were considered in a category lower to category 'C'. It is equally
possible, therefore, that on September 9, 1966, i.e. the date of initial
constitution of Service some of the officers belonging to categories 'D' and
'E' who were absorbed in categories II and III respectively may have been put
on probation but for qualifying service for upward promotion service rendered
as probationer is not to be ignored. Viewed from either angle it is crystal
clear that service rendered in equivalent post prior to the date of initial
constitution of Service could be taken into account in calculating qualifying
service for next promotion. This was the stand taken by the Government in the
affidavit filed in Civil Writ No. 1155/71 filed by Dr. Chandra Mohan in the
High Court of Delhi and that appears to be consistent with the construction of
rule 8(3). The contention, therefore, that executive instruction cannot run
counter to the statutory rule must be rejected as untenable in the facts of
this case.
It was next contended that the Government was
guilty of legal malice in that in February 1971 on a need being felt, a post in
super-time grade II in Ophthalmology speciality was sanctioned at Willingdon
Hospital and filled in by transfer of Dr. B.S. Jain overlooking and ignoring the
rightful claim of appellant and on transfer of Dr. B.S. Jain on March 7, 1972,
to Safdarjang Hospital, the post was also transferred to Safdarjang Hospital.
In this connection appellant also pointed out that there is material on record
to show that the Superintendent of Willingdon Hospital felt an acute need for a
post in super- 67 time grade II in Ophthalmology speciality and yet it was not
created while on the other hand in order to accommodate some favourites like
respondents, 4, 5,8,9,12,13 and 15 some posts in different specialities where
they could be accommodated were created without the need for the same.
There is evidence to the effect that
appellant had sent a proposal duly recommended by Medical Superintendent of
Safdarjang Hospital to the authorities for creating a super-time grade II post
in Eye Department in May 1971 as per letter dated May 3, 1971. There is also
material to show that some ad hoc appointments were made in super-time grade
II. It is, however, not possible to strike down those appointments on the
ground that some posts were created in super-time grade II though not needed
wherein some of the respondents were promoted or that there was no
justification for creation of posts or for making ad hoc appointments. It
should be distinctly understood that not a single post was created in
Ophthalmology speciality to which appellant could have been appointed. The need
for the post of the requirements of the hospital, or the need for an ad hoc or
additional appointment is a matter which the Government is competent to decide
and in the absence of requisite material the Court cannot interpose its own
decision on the necessity of creation or abolition of posts. Whether a
particular post is necessary is a matter depending upon the exigencies of the
situation and administrative necessity. The Government is a better Judge of the
interests of the general public for whose service the hospitals are set up. And
whether a hospital catering to the needs of general public providing medical
relief in different specialities has need for a particular post in a particular
speciality would be better judged by the Government running the hospital. If
Government is a better judge it must have the power to create or abolish the
posts depending upon the needs of the hospital and the requirements of general
public. Creation and abolition of posts is a matter of Government policy and
every sovereign Government has this power in the interest and necessity of
internal administration. The creation or abolition of post is dictated by
policy decision, exigencies of circumstances and administrative necessity. The
creation, the continuance and the abolition of post are all decided by the
Government in the interest of administration and general public (see M.
Ramanatha Pillai v. The State of Kerala and Anr). The Court would be the least
competent in the face of scanty material to decide whether the Government acted
honestly in creating a post or refusing to create a post or its decision
suffers from malafide, legal or factual. In this background it is difficult to
entertain the contention of the appellant that posts were created to
accommodate some specific individuals ignoring the requirements of the hospital
or the interests of the general public at large.
68 It was next contended that respondent 9,
Dr. K.P. Mathur and respondent 23, Dr. A. R. Majumdar should have been
considered ineligible for promotion because both of them were adversely
commented upon by the Madras High Court as being negligent in discharge of
duties and the Government had to pay a sum of Rs. 10,000/- as compensation by
way of damages for their negligence. He sought inspection of some files to
substantiate this allegation. Unfortunately though respondents 9 and 23 were
made parties they did not appear to controvert this fact. But it appears from
the record that they were promoted after they were selected by the Departmental
Promotion Committee and the promotion was approved by U.P.S.C. Appellant
contended that this averment on his part has remained uncontroverted and it
must be taken as having been admitted and proved. It may be mentioned that in
the petition filed by the appellant in the Delhi High Court this allegation was
not specifically averred. In a subsequent affidavit filed by him this
allegation was put forth. If respondents 9 and 23 had not appeared in the High
Court the appellant should have shown that this subsequent affidavit was served
upon them, and in that event alone some adverse inference may be drawn against
them. It may be that the Government may not be interested in either denying or
admitting this averment which directly and adversely affects respondents 9 and
23. However, in view of the fact that they were selected by the Departmental
Promotion Committee and the promotion was approved by the U.P.S.C. it is
difficult to entertain the contention at the hand of the appellant who is not
in any way going to be benefited by the invalidation of their promotion.
It was incidentally urged that promotions
given to respondents 9,12,13 and 15 must be set aside because they belonged to
former category 'D' and were given promotions against 19 unspecified posts in
contravention of the affidavit of the Government. As stated earlier, there were
some specialists in category 'D' also. At the time of initial constitution of
service those who qualified for being appointed General Duty Officers from
category 'D' were absorbed in category III and those who were eligible for
being absorbed in Specialists' grade were so absorbed. After absorption they
belonged to the respective category.
Thereafter on conversion of posts from the
pool of 19 unspecified specialists' posts they were promoted as being found
qualified for the same and for the post to which each one of them was promoted
appellant was not qualified and, therefore, the contention that the promotion
of the aforementioned four respondents should be set aside has no merit in it.
Having examined the challenge to the
promotion of respondents 4 to 24 on merits, it must be made clear that the
appellant is least 69 qualified to question their promotions. Each one of them
was promoted to a post in super-time grade II in a speciality other than
ophthalmology and appellant admittedly was not qualified for any of these
posts. Even if their promotions are struck down appellant will not get any post
vacated by them. Incidentally High Court also upheld their promotions observing
that by the time the petition was heard each one of them had requisite service
qualification and, therefore, the promotions could not be struck down. Once the
challenge on merits fails the second string to the bow need not be examined.
Having said all this, appellant is least competent to challenge their
promotions. In a slightly comparable situation this Court in Chitra Ghosh and
Anr. v. Union of India and Ors. observed as under:
"The other question which was canvassed
before the High Court and which has been pressed before us relates to the
merits of the nominations made to the reserved seats. It seems to us that the
appellants do not have any right to challenge the nominations made by the
Central Government. They do not compete for the reserved seats and have no
locus standi in the matter of nomination to such seats.
The assumption that if nominations to
reserved seats are not in accordance with the rules all such seats as have not
been properly filled up would be thrown open to the general pool is wholly
unfounded." It was last urged that the High Court has set aside the
promotion of respondent 18, Dr. P. C. Sen who was promoted in 1971 and, therefore,
there was an opening in super-time grade II in September 1971 and appellant
should be considered eligible for promotion to the post from that date and that
this Court should consider appellant's eligibility for promotion from September
1971 and if found eligible, should grant the same. Dr. P.C. Sen was General
Duty Officer grade I and he was posted as Director of Health Services, Manipur.
Appellant contends that he was in Specialists' grade and was senior to Dr. Sen
and was not unqualified for the post of Director of Health Services, Manipur,
but the post was not offered to him and, therefore, he must be considered
eligible for promotion from the date on which Dr.
P.C. Sen was promoted. The High Court in
L.P.A. 46/74 filed by the appellant has set aside the promotion of Dr. P.C. Sen
as also of Dr. Jasbir Kaur but the High Court has not thought fit to direct the
Government by a mandamus to consider eligibility of the appellant for the post
of Director of Health Services, Manipur. There is no material before us whether
the appellant was qualified for the post.
If he was eligible it would be for the
Government to consider how it should deal with the post. We 70 are, however,
surprised that the appellant who was not prepared to go to Simla in February
1971 would have been willing to go to Manipur in September 1971. In our opinion
it would be giving him an unfair advantage now by giving a technical benefit of
a situation whereby promotion of Dr. Sen has been invalidated by the High
Court. Neither Dr. Sen nor the Government have preferred appeal against the
judgment by which the promotions of Dr. P.C. Sen and Dr. Jasbir Kaur were
invalidated by the High Court. But the matter must remain at that stage and
there is no justification for giving a direction that the appellant should be
considered for the post which is deemed to have fallen vacant in September 1971
on the invalidation of promotion of Dr. P.C. Sen. In this connection it may be
pointed out that some time after the hearing was over in this Court learned counsel
for the appellant has circulated a letter that the High Court has set aside the
promotion of respondent 7, Dr. Ramesh Prasad Singh as also of respondent 21,
Dr. Brij Gopal Misra. It is undoubtedly true that the learned single Judge who
heard the petition initially had set aside the promotion of Dr. Brij Gopal
Misra to the post of Regional Deputy Director, N.M.E.P., Hyderabad. But neither
from the judgment of the learned single Judge nor from the judgment of the
Division Bench it is possible to ascertain that the promotion of Dr. Ramesh
Prasad Singh has been invalidated. No direction in that behalf can be given.
Before we conclude it may be pointed out that
on the conclusion of hearing of this appeal in order to heal the wound caused
by impaired dignity of the appellant as herein before mentioned, a suggestion
was made to the Government to see if the present appellant could be
accommodated in some way where he may not feel the humiliation which he claims
he suffers. Mr. P. Parameswara Rao, learned counsel for the Government promised
to discuss the matter with the Government and ultimately on March 7. 1980, the
Central Government offered the post of Director and Head of the Department for
a programme concerned with vision impairment and amelioration thereof. In that
post the appellant would be the Head of the Department and would continue to be
in super-time grade II. This offer did not appeal to the appellant and the
matter was left at that.
There is no substance in any of the
contentions urged on behalf of the appellant and, therefore, this appeal fails
and it is dismissed with no order as to costs.
V.D. Appeal dismissed.
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