Vishesh Kumar Vs. Shanti Prasad [1980]
INSC 46 (12 March 1980)
PATHAK, R.S.
PATHAK, R.S.
KRISHNAIYER, V.R.
CITATION: 1980 AIR 892 1980 SCR (3) 32 1980
SCC (2) 378
CITATOR INFO :
RF 1980 SC1575 (1,2,4) F 1987 SC 203 (22) RF
1987 SC2323 (3,4,6,10,13) E 1988 SC 812 (8,12,15,18,21,29)
ACT:
Code of Civil Procedure-S. 115-State
amendments bifurcated revisional jurisdiction between High Court and District
Court-High Court-If possesses revisional jurisdiction from an order of District
Judge disposing of revision petition.
Provincial Small Cause Courts Act-Section
25-High Court-If possesses jurisdiction under section 115 C.P.C.
against an order of District Judge under
section 25 of the Act disposing of a revision petition.
HEADNOTE:
Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure
confers on the High Court of a State power to remove any jurisdictional error
committed by a subordinate court in cases where the error cannot be corrected
by resort to its appellate jurisdiction. From its inception there was increasing
resort to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under s. 115. To
alleviate the burden of arrears and reduce the volume of litigation which had
reached an insupportable point, s. 115 was amended by successive state
amendments, each amendment attempting to close the gap left by its predecessor.
The amendments conferred revisional jurisdiction both on the High Court and the
District Court each enjoying mutually exclusive revisional powers. The
consistent object behind the successive amendments was to divide the work load
of revision petitions between the High Court and the District Court and
decentralise the jurisdiction. A proviso was added to s. 115 by the U.P.
Civil Laws Amendment Act, 1973 declaring that
"in respect of cases.......arising out of original suits of any valuation
decided by the District Court the High Court alone shall be competent to make
an order under this section." The Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act,
1976 superseded the scheme of bifurcation of revisional jurisdiction with
effect from 1st February 1977. With certain modifications the position reverted
to what it was under the original s. 115. An exception was made where a
revision petition under s. 115 had been admitted after preliminary hearing
before 1st February 1977; it would continue to be governed by s. 115 as it
stood before that date. But the Code of Civil Procedure (U.P. Amendment) Act
1978 substantially restored the status quo ante.
Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause
Courts Act was amended from time to time in its application to the State of
U.P. The first amendment substituted the District Judge for the High Court. A
further amendment made in 1972 added a proviso which declared that in relation
to any case decided by a District Judge or Additional District Judge exercising
jurisdiction of a Judge of Small Causes Court the power of revision under s. 25
would vest in the High Court.
33 The two questions that fell for
consideration were :
(i) whether the High Court possesses the
revisional jurisdiction under s. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure in respect
of an order of the District Court under s.115 disposing of a revision petition
and (ii) whether the High Court possesses revisional jurisdiction under s. 115
against an order of District Court under s. 25 Provincial Small Cause Courts
Act disposing of a revision petition, ^
HELD : The High Court is not vested with
revisional jurisdiction under s. 115 Code of Civil Procedure over the
revisional order made by the District Court under that section. [40 H] (a) To
recognise a revisional power in the High Court over the revisional order passed
by the District Court would plainly defeat the object of the legislative
scheme. The intent behind the bifurcation of jurisdiction-to reduce the number
of revision petitions filed in the High Court-would be frustrated. The scheme
would lose its meaning. If a revision petition is permitted to the High Court
against the revisional order of the District Court arising out of a suit of a
value less than Rs. 20,000 a fundamental contradiction would be allowed to
invade and destroy the division of revisional power between the High Court and
the District Court, for the High Court would then enjoy jurisdictional power in
respect of an order arising out of a suit of a valuation of below Rs. 20,000/-
[39 G-H] (b) What the proviso introduced in s. 115 by the Civil Laws Amendment
Act, 1973, stated was that no matter what the valuation of the original suit,
if a case arising out of such suit was decided by the District Court, the case
would be amenable to the revisional power of the High Court. What is covered by
the substantive provision are cases arising out of original suits of a value of
Rs. 20,000/- or more.
The other category covered by the proviso
would include those instances where an original suit, although of a value
making it triable by a court subordinate, is transferred to the District Court
for trial. Orders passed by the District Court in such a suit could constitute
a case decided by it and amenable to the revisional power of the High Court.
The test incorporated in the proviso is the fact that the case has been decided
by the District Court. The valuation of the suit is irrelevant. The proviso
cannot be construed to include the case of a revisional order passed by the
District Court for that would be in direct conflict with the fundamental
structure itself of section 115. A proviso cannot be permitted by construction
to defeat the basic intent expressed in the substantive provision. [40 C-F]
M/s. Jupiter Fund (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Dwarka Diesh Dayal and others A.I.R. 1979 All.
218 approved.
2. (a) An order passed under s. 25 of the
Provincial Small Cause Courts Act by a District Court is not amenable to the
revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under s. 115 of the C.P.C. [42 F] (b)
An examination of the several provisions of the Provincial Small Cause Courts
Act indicates that it is a self-sufficient code so far as the present enquiry
is concerned. The Legislature clearly intended that a decree or order made by a
Court of Small Causes should be final subject only to correction by the
remedies provided under the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. All the
indications contained in the Act point to the conclusion that a case falling 34
within the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act was never intended to be subject
to the remedies provided by the Code of Civil Procedure. By way of abundant
caution, s. 7 of the Code made express provision barring the application of ss.
96 to 112 and 115 of the Code to courts constituted under the Provincial Small
Cause Courts Act. Section 7 of the Code merely embodies the general principle
against resort to remedies outside the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act.
Although the court of the District Judge is
not a court constituted under the Act the general principle continues to take
effects No change in the principle was brought about merely because revisional
power under s. 25, before the proviso was added, was now entrusted to the
District Judge.
The legislative intention behind the
amendment was to relieve the High Court of the burden of exercising revisional
jurisdiction in respect of cases decided under the Provincial Small Cause
Courts Act. Therefore the central principle continues to hold, notwithstanding
the amendment effected in s. 25, that the hierarchy of remedies enacted in the
Provincial Small Cause Courts Act represents a complete and final order of
remedies, and it is not possible to proceed outside the Act to avail of a
superior remedy provided by another statute. [4] E-42 A-D] Bimla Rani Kohli v.
M/s. Bandu Motor Finance Pvt. Ltd. A.I.R. 1972 All. 342; over-ruled.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal
No. 2844 of 1979.
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and
Order dated 17-8-1979 of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Revision No. 1273 of
1976.
Pramod Swarup for the Appellant.
N. K. Agarwal for the Respondent (Amicus
Curiae).
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
PATHAK, J. This appeal by special leave and the four associated special leave
petitions question the dismissal by the High Court of Allahabad of five
revision petitions filed under Section 115, Code of Civil Procedure, on the
ground that they are not maintainable.
Although the five cases before us must be
considered in the context of their individual facts, it is desirable to
appreciate the relevant jurisdictional structure of revisional power enjoyed by
the High Court from time to time. In 1970, the provisions of s. 115, Code of
Civil Procedure, read :
"115. Revision : The High Court may call
for the record of any case which has been decided by any court subordinate to
such High Court, and in which no appeal lies thereto, and if such court
subordinate appears :
(a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not
vested in it by law, or (b) to have exercised a jurisdiction so vested, or 35
(c) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally with material
irregularity, the High Court may make such order in the case as it deems
fit." A schematic analysis of the judicial hierarchy within a State
indicates that the High Court, as the apex court in the hierarchy, has been
entrusted, not only with the supreme appellate power exercised within the State
but also, by virtue of s. 115, the power to remove, in order to prevent a
miscarriage of justice, any jurisdictional error committed by a subordinate
court in those cases where the error cannot be corrected by resort to its
appellate jurisdiction. The two salient features of revisional jurisdiction
under s. 115 are, on the one hand, the closely limited grounds on which the court
is permitted to interfere and on the other, the wide expanse of discretion
available to the court, when it decides to interfere, in making an appropriate
order. The intent is that so serious an error as one of jurisdiction, if
committed by a subordinate court, should not remain uncorrected, and should be
removed and the record healed of the infirmity by an order shaped to re-instate
the proceeding within the proper jurisdictional confines of the subordinate
court. It is a power of superintendence, and fittingly it has been conferred in
terms enabling the High Court to exercise it, not only when moved by an
aggrieved person, but also suo motu. While considering the nature and scope of
the revisional jurisdiction, it is necessary however, to advert to prime
circumstance that in civil cases the jurisdiction has been entrusted to the
highest court of the State, demonstrating that broadly the order under s. 115
is to be regarded, in the absence of anything else, as a final order within the
State judiciary.
From its inception there was increasing
resort to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under s. 115. Over the
years the volume of litigation reached an insupportable point in the pending
docket of the Court. To alleviate the burden, a pattern of decentralisation of
revisional power was adopted and s. 115 was amended by successive State
amendments, each attempting to close the gap left by its predecessor. In its
meandering course from stage to stage, this is how s. 115 read :
1. From 7th April, 1970 :
By virtue of s. 3, U.P. Civil Laws
(Amendment) Act, 1970, s. 115 was amended and the result was that :
(i) The High Court had exclusive jurisdiction
under s. 115 in a case arising out of an original suit of the value of Rs.
20,000 and above; and 36 (ii) The High Court and the District Court had
jurisdiction under s. 115 concurrently in other cases.
2. From 20th September, 1972:
S. 6, U.P. Civil Laws (Amendment) Act, 1972
amended s. 115 further with effect from 20th September, 1972. Later, s. 115 was
amended by s. 2, U.P. Civil Laws (Amendment) Act, 1973 in its application to
Uttar Pradesh, retrospectively with effect from 20th September, 1972. In
consequence:
(i) The High Court possessed exclusive
jurisdiction under s. 115 in cases arising out of original suits of the value
of Rs. 20,000 and above, including such suits instituted before 20th September,
1972:
(ii) The District Court possessed exclusive
jurisdiction under s. 115 in any other case, including a case arising out of an
original suit instituted before 20th September, 1972.
Provided that in respect of cases decided
before 20th September, 1972 and also all cases arising out of original suits of
any valuation, decided by the District Court, the High Court alone was
competent to exercise revisional power under s. 115.
S. 2(e), U.P. President's Acts (Re-enactment
with Modifications) Act, 1974 repealed the U.P. Civil Laws (Amendment) Act,
1973, and re-enacted it with certain modifications which, however, for the
purposes of the present case are immaterial.
3. From 1st February, 1977:
S. 43, Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment)
Act, 1976 was enacted by Parliament and amended s. 115 with effect from 1st
February, 1977 making substantial changes therein.
Section 97(1) of the Amendment Act provided that
any amendment made, or provision inserted, in the Code of Civil Procedure by a
State Legislature before the 1st February, 1978 would stand repealed except
insofar as such amendment or provision was consistent with the Code as amended
by the said Amendment Act. As the Code now amended provided for revisional
jurisdiction in the High Court alone, the scheme embodied in s. 115 by the
successive U.P. Amendment Acts was plainly inconsistent with the Code as now
amended, and therefore stood repealed, the position reverting to what it was
under the original s. 115 before its amendment by the U.P. Civil Laws
(Amendment) Act, 1970. But s. 97(2) provided that s. 115 as now amended by the
Amendment Act, 1976 would not apply to nor affect any proceeding for revision
which had been admitted, after 37 preliminary hearing, before 1st February,
1977 and every such proceeding for revision would be disposed of as if s. 43
had not come into force. The proviso was without prejudice to the generality of
the provisions of s. 6, General Clauses Act, 1897. In the result :
(i) The High Court had exclusive jurisdiction
under s. 115 in a revision petition filed on and after that date, irrespective
of the valuation of the suit out of which the case arose :
(ii) A revision petition under s. 115 which
had been admitted, after preliminary hearing, before 1st February, 1977 would
continue to be governed by s. 115 as it stood before that date.
4. From 1st August, 1978:
Finally s. 3, Code of Civil Procedure (Uttar
Pradesh Amendment), Act, 1978, which was deemed to have come into force on 1st
August, 1978, amended s. 115 again and restored the bifurcation of revisional
jurisdiction between the High Court and the District Court. Accordingly now:
(i) The High Court alone had jurisdiction
under s. 115 in cases arising out of original suits or other proceedings of the
value of Rs. 20,000 and above, including such suits or other proceedings
instituted before 1st August, 1978;
(ii) The District Court alone has
jurisdiction under s. 115 in any other case, including a case arising out of an
original suit or other proceedings instituted before 1st August, 1978;
(iii) The High Court has jurisdiction under
s. 115 in respect of cases, arising out of original suits or other proceedings
of any valuation, decided by the District Court.
(iv) A revision proceeding pending
immediately before 1st August, 1978 of the nature in which a District Court
would exercise revisional power under s. 115 as amended by the Amendment, Act,
1978 if pending :
(a) in the District Court, would be decided
by that court as if the Amendment Act of 1978 were in force at all material
times ;
(b) in the High Court, would be decided by
the High Court as if the Amendment Act of 1978 had not come into force.
The submissions made by learned counsel
before us cover a wide field, but in the main, two questions arise :
(1) Whether the High Court possesses
revisional jurisdiction under s. 115, Code of Civil Procedure in respect of an
order of the District Court under s. 115 disposing of a revision petition ? 38
(2) Whether the High Court possesses revisional jurisdiction under s. 115
against an order of the District Court under s. 25, Provincial Small Cause Courts
Act disposing of a revision petition ? As regards the first question, it will
be noticed that a revisional power was formerly entrusted exclusively to the
highest court in the state, the High Court. The State amendments now divided it
between the High Court and the District Court. The amendment effect by the U.P.
Civil Laws (Amendment) Act, 1970 conferred exclusive jurisdiction under s. 115
in the High Court in cases arising out of original suits of the value of Rs.
20,000/- and above, and in other cases the revisional jurisdiction was
concurrently shared between the High Court and the District Court. It was
apparently supposed that the average litigant would prefer the less expensive
and more convenient forum of the District Court. The measure, it seems, did not
bring the relief expected, and the State Legislature found it necessary, by
enacting the U.P. Civil Laws (Amendment) Act, 1972 to make a clear-cut division
of jurisdiction between the High Court and the District Court, resulting in
exclusive revisional jurisdiction to the High Court in cases arising out of
original suits of the value of Rs. 20,000/- and above, and exclusive
jurisdiction under s. 115 to the District Court in other cases. There was a
sharp bifurcation of revisional jurisdiction, and the High Court and District
Court now enjoyed mutually exclusive revisional powers. A controversy arose
whether a revisional order under s. 115 made by the District Court was final or
was itself amendable to the revisional power of the High Court under the same
section.
The point was considered by a full Bench of
the High Court in Har Parasad Singh and others v. Ram Swarup and others and it
was held that no such revision petition was maintainable before the High Court.
Further State amendments were made to s. 115 without materially disturbing the
division of power.
But a proviso added to s. 115 by the U.P.
Civil Laws (Amendment) Act, 1973, followed by the U.P. President's Acts
(Re-enactment with Modifications) Act, 1974 stated :
"Provided that in respect of cases
decided before the 20th day of September, 1972, and also all cases arising out
of original suits of any valuation decided by the District Court, the High
Court alone shall be competent to make an order under this section." The
proviso reopened the controversy whether a revision petition lay to the High
Court against a revisional order passed by the District Court, and on a
difference of opinion between two learned judges a third learned judge of the
Allahabad High Court now held in Phool Wati and others v. Gur Sahai that a
revision petition would lie.
The Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act,
1976, however, superseded the scheme of bifurcation of revisional jurisdiction
with effect from 1st February, 1977 and, with certain modification the position
reverted to what it was under the original s. 115. In other words, the entire
sphere of revisional jurisdiction was restored to the High Court, no such power
being now vested in the District Court. An exception was made where a revision
petition under s. 115 had been admitted, after preliminary hearing, before 1st
February, 1977; it would continue to be governed by s. 115 as it stood before
that date. The situation lasted only briefly, for on 1st August, 1978 the Code
of Civil Procedure (Uttar Pradesh Amendment) Act, 1978 substantially restored
the status quo ante.
The controversy whether it is open to the
High Court to exercise revisional power in respect of a revisional order under
s. 115 of the District Court presents little difficulty. The basis for
determining that question flows from the principle incorporated in the
bifurcation of the revisional jurisdiction. And legislative history comes to
our aid. The consistent object behind the successive amendments was to divide
the work load of revision petitions between the High Court and the District
Court and decentralise that jurisdiction. That purpose was sought to be
achieved by classifying all cases into two mutually exclusive categories
depending on the valuation of the suit out of which they arose. In determining
whether the Legislature intended a further revision petition to the High Court,
regard must be had to the principle that the construction given to a statute
should be such as would advance the object of the legislation and suppress the mischief
sought to be cured by it. It seems to us that to recognise a revisional power
in the High Court over a revisional order passed by the District Judge would
plainly defeat the object of the legislative scheme. The intent behind the
bifurcation of jurisdiction-to reduce the number of revision petitions filed in
the High Court-would be frustrated. The scheme would, in large measure, lose
its meaning. If a revision petition is permitted to the High Court against the
revisional order of the District Court arising out of a suit of a value less
than Rs. 20,000/-, a fundamental contradiction would be allowed to invade and
destroy the division of revisional power between the High Court and the
District Court, for 40 the High Court would then enjoy jurisdictional power in
respect of an order arising out of a suit of a valuation below Rs. 20,000/-.
That was never intended at all.
In Phoolwati (supra), considerable importance
was attached to the proviso introduced in s. 115 by the U.P. Civil Laws
Amendment Act, 1973. The proviso declared that "in respect of...... all
cases arising out of original suits of any valuation decided by the District
Court, the High Court alone shall be competent to make an order under this
section". What it said was that no matter what the valuation of the
original suit, be it Rs. 20,000/- and above or below Rs. 20,000/-, if a case
arising out of such suit was decided by the District Court, the case would be
amenable to the revisional power of the High Court. We are already familiar with
the category of cases where the High Court wields revisional jurisdiction over
cases arising out of original suits of a value of Rs. 20,000/- or more. That is
the category already covered by the substantive provision in s.
115. The other category covered by the
proviso would include those instances, for example where an original suit
although of a value making it triable by a court subordinate is transferred to
the District Court for trial. Orders passed by the District Court in such a
suit could constitute a case decided by it and amenable to the revisional power
of the High Court. What must be noted is that the test incorporated in the
proviso is the fact that the case has been decided by the District Court. The
valuation of the suit is irrelevant.
But the proviso cannot be construed to
include the case of a revisional order passed by the District Court for that
would be in direct conflict with the fundamental structure itself of s. 115
evidencing that a mutually exclusive jurisdiction has been assigned to the High
Court and the District Court within its terms. A proviso cannot be permitted by
construction to defeat the basic intent expressed in the substantive provision.
Har Prasad Singh (supra) and Phoolwati (supra) were considered by a Full Bench
of the High Court in M/s Jupiter Fund (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Dwarka Diesh Dayal and
others and in our judgment the High Court rightly laid down there that the
phrase "case arising out of an original suit" occurring in s. 115
does not cover orders passed in revision.
We are of opinion on the first question that
the High Court is not vested with revisional jurisdiction under s. 115, Code of
Civil Procedure-over a revisional order made by the District Court under that
section.
41 We shall now advert to the second question,
whether a revisional order of the District Court under s. 25, Provincial Small
Cause Courts Act, is amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court
under s. 115, Code of Civil Procedure. Section 25 originally provided:
"25. The High Court, for the purpose of
satisfying itself that a decree or order made in any case decided by a Court of
Small Causes was according to law, may call for the case and pass such order
with respect thereto as it thinks fit." Section 25 was amended in its
application to the State of Uttar Pradesh from time to time. The first
amendment substituted the District Judge for the High Court, so that the
District Judge became the repository of revisional power instead of the High
Court. A further amendment, made in 1972, added a proviso, which declared that
in relation to any case decided by a District Judge or Additional District
Judge exercising the jurisdiction of a Judge of Small Causes the power of
revision under s. 25 would vest in the High Court.
The question before us arises in those cases
only where the District Judge has exercised revisional power under s. 25. Is an
order so made open to revision by the High Court under s. 115, Code of Civil
Procedure ? An examination of the several provisions of the Provincial Small
Cause Courts Act indicates that it is a self-sufficient code so far as the
present enquiry is concerned. For the purpose of correcting decrees or orders
made by a Court of Small Causes the Act provides for an appeal and a revision
in cases falling under s. 24 and s. 25 respectively. Cases in which the
District Judge and the High Court respectively exercise revisional power,
revisional powers are specifically mentioned. A complete set of superior
remedies has been incorporated in the Act. Moreover, s. 27 of the Act provides:
"27. Finality of decrees and
orders.-Save as provided by this Act, a decree or order made under the
foregoing provisions of this Act by a Court of Small Causes shall be
final." The Legislature clearly intended that a decree or order made by a
Court of Small Causes should be final subject only to correction by the
remedies provided under the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. It is a point
for consideration that had s. 25, in its application to the State of Uttar
Pradesh continued in its original form the High Court would have exercised the
revisional power under s. 25, and no question could have arisen of invoking the
revisional power of the High Court under s. 115 of the Code. All the
indications point to the conclusion that a case falling within the 42
Provincial Small Cause Courts Act was never intended to be subject to the
remedies provided by the Code of Civil Procedure. By way of abundant caution s.
7 of the Code made express provision barring the application of ss. 96 to 112
and 115 of the Code to courts constituted under the Provincial Small Cause
Courts Act. Section 7 of the Code merely embodies the general principle against
resort to remedies outside the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act.
Although the court of the District Judge is
not a court constituted under the Act the general principle continues to take
effect. No change in the principle was brought about merely because revisional
power under s. 25, before the proviso was added, was now entrusted to the
District Judge.
It must be remembered that the legislative
intention behind the amendment was to relieve the High Court of the burden of
exercising revisional jurisdiction in respect of cases decided under the
Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. We are of firm opinion that the central
principle continues to hold, notwithstanding the amendment effected in s. 25,
that the hierarchy of remedies enacted in the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act
represents a complete and final order of remedies, and it is not possible to
proceed outside the Act to avail of a superior remedy provided by another
statute.
These considerations were apparently not
present before the High Court of Allahabad when it held in Bimla Rani Kohli v.
M/s. Bandu Motor Finance (P) Ltd. that a revisional order of the District Judge
under s. 25, Provincial Small Cause Courts Act could be revised by the High
Court under s. 115, Code of Civil Procedure. In our opinion, the view taken by
the High Court is not correct.
Accordingly, we hold that an order passed
under s. 25, Provincial Small Cause Courts Act by a District Court is not
amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under s. 115, Code of
Civil Procedure.
In Civil Appeal No. 2844 of 1979, S.L.P. No.
9104 of 1979, S.L.P. No. 9142 of 1979 and S.L.P. No. 9752 of 1979, the High
Court has rejected revision petitions filed under s. 115, Code of Civil
Procedure, against the revisional orders of the District Court under s. 25,
Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. On the opinion reached by us that a revision
petition under s. 115 is not maintainable against a revisional order under s.
25, the appeal and the associated special leave petitions must be dismissed.
43 S.L.P. No. 9031 of 1979 arises out of an
application for an ad interim injunction made in a pending suit. Since then the
suit has been dismissed, and an appeal against the decree is pending. As the
suit itself has been disposed of, all proceedings for grant of interim relief
must be regarded as having lapsed. The Special Leave Petition has become infructuous
and must be dismissed accordingly.
It has been urged by the appellant in Vishesh
Kumar v. Shanti Prasad (Civil Appeal No. 2844 of 1979) that in case this Court
is of the opinion that a revision petition under s. 115, Code of Civil
Procedure, is not maintainable, the case should be remitted to the High Court
for consideration as a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. We are
unable to accept that prayer. A revision petition under s. 115 is a separate
and distinct proceeding from a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution,
and one cannot be identified with the other.
In the result, the appeal and the special
leave petitions are dismissed. There will be no order as to cost.
P.B.R. Appeal and Petitions dismissed.
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