Kasambhai Ardul Rehmanbhai Shaikh Vs.
State of Gujarat & ANR [1980] INSC 24 (13 February 1980)
BHAGWATI, P.N.
BHAGWATI, P.N.
SEN, A.P. (J)
CITATION: 1980 AIR 854 1980 SCR (2)1037 1980
SCC (3) 121
ACT:
Prevention of Food Adulteration Act 1954,
Sections 7 and 16-Plea-bargaining-Magistrate if competent to record conviction
if accused pleads guilty.
Criminal Trial-Judgment-Cyclostyled form in
which merely blanks filled by Magistrate-Such Disposal- Reprehensible policy.
Sentencing-Offences of food
adulteration-Deterrent and punitive sentences-Necessity for.
HEADNOTE:
The appellants were prosecuted for committing
offences under section 16(1)(a)(i) read with section 7 of the Prevention of
Food Adulteration Act, 1954. After some evidence was led on behalf of the
prosecution, plea- bargaining took place between the prosecution, the accused
and the Magistrate. The accused pleaded guilty which plea was accepted by the
Magistrate. The accused were accordingly convicted and sentenced to undergo
imprisonment till the rising of the Court and to pay a small fine.
The High Court initiated suo motu proceeding
in revision. The accused appeared and challenged the convictions recorded
against them, but the High Court did not go into the circumstances in which the
plea of guilty was entered, enhanced the sentences imposed on them to three
months' simple imprisonment and fine.
Allowing the appeals,
HELD:
1. A conviction based on the plea of guilty
entered by the accused as a result of plea-bargaining cannot be sustained.
[1041E]
2. The High Court was clearly in error in not
setting aside the conviction and sending the case back to the Magistrate for
trial in accordance with law, ignoring the plea of guilty entered by the
appellants. [1041F]
3. The Magistrate trying an accused for a
serious offence like adulteration must apply his mind to the evidence recorded
before him and, on the facts as they emerge from the evidence, decide whether
the accused is guilty or not. [1040B] In the instant case the Magistrate had
got a cyclostyled form of judgment in which merely blanks were filled in by
him. This clearly indicates that the Magistrate was in the habit of encouraging
plea-bargaining and letting off the accused lightly if there was a plea of
guilty, enabling quick disposal without any effort. This was a highly
reprehensible practice. The High Court had expressed strong disapproval of it.
[1039H-1040A]
4. (i) It is highly regrettable that the
prosecution as well as the Magistrate should have been a party to any plea-
bargaining in a prosecution for adulteration involving the health and
well-being of the community. Adulteration has 1038 assumed alarming proportions
and it is essential to wipe it out ruthlessly and completely by bringing to
book offenders responsible for adulteration resulting in ruination of the
health of the people. The investigating agencies must intensify their efforts
and catch hold of those who for private economic gain are prepared to
jeopardize the health of the community. When such persons are arraigned before
the Court and found guilty a deterrent and punitive sentence must be imposed
upon them. [1039E-G] (ii) If it is possible to get away with a light sentence
in respect of an offence of adulteration the anti- adulteration law will cease
to have any meaning and validity. [1039H]
5. Administration of justice is a sacred task
and partakes of the divine function. It is with the greatest sense of
responsibility and anxiety that the judicial officer must discharge his
judicial function, particularly when it concerns the liberty of a persons.
[1040C]
6. It would be contrary to public policy to
allow a conviction to be recorded against an accused by inducing him to confess
to a plea of guilty on an allurement being held out to him that if he enters a
plea of guilty, he will be let off very lightly. Such a procedure would be
clearly unreasonable, unfair and unjust and would be violative of Art. 21 of
the Constitution. It would have the effect of polluting the pure fount of
justice because it might induce an innocent accused to plead guilty to suffer a
light and inconsequential punishment rather than go through a long and ardous
criminal trial. The judge also might be likely to be defected from the path of
duty to do justice and he might either convict an innocent accused by accepting
the plea of guilty or let of a guilty accused with a light sentence, thus,
subverting the process of low and frustrating the social objective and purpose
of the anti-adulteration statute. This practice would also tend to encourage
corruption and collusion and as a direct consequence, contribute to the
lowering of the standard of justice.
[1041B-E]
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal
Appeal Nos. 93-94 of 1980.
Appeals by special leave from the Judgment
and order dated 30-1-1979 of the Gujarat High Court in Criminal Revision
Application No. 306/78 and 305/78.
T. U. Mehta and Vimal Dave for the Appellant.
H. R. Khanna and M. N. Shroff for the
Respondent.
The following Judgments were delivered:
BHAGWATI, J. This appeal by special leave is
directed against a judgment of the Gujarat High Court in suo motu revision
against an order passed by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Balasinor
convicting the appellant of the offence under s. 16(1)(a)(i) read with s. 7 of
the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 and sentencing him to suffer
simple imprisonment till the rising of the Court and to pay a fine of Rs. 125/-
or in default to undergo simple imprisonment for- 1039 a further period of 30
days. The appellant was prosecuted in the Court of the learned Magistrate for
an offence of adulteration of turmeric powder punishable under s. 16(1)(a)(1)
read with s. 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954.
It appears from the record that after some
evidence was led on behalf of the prosecution, plea bargaining took place
between the prosecution, the defence and the learned Magistrate and on the
basis of an understanding arrived at between these three parties, the appellant
pleaded guilty and the learned Magistrate accepting this plea of guilty,
recorded a finding of conviction against the appellant and let off the
appellant with a nominal sentence of imprisonment till the rising of the Court
and a small fine.
It is, of course true that there is no
specific evidence to show that the plea for guilty was entered by the appellant
as a result of plea bargaining, but two circumstances, viz., (1) that the
appellant pleaded guilty, even though the sample was treated as cancelled by
the public Analyst on account of its being broken and leaking and there was no
evidence of the report of the public Analyst showing the sample as adulterated
and (2) that the judgment of the learned Magistrate was given in a cyclostyled
form, clearly lead to the inference that the plea of guilty was entered by the
appellant in consequence of an assurance held out by the prosecution and
acquiesced in by the learned Magistrate that he would be let off with a very
light sentence. It is highly regrettable that the prosecution as well as the
learned Magistrate should have been a party to any such plea bargaining in a
prosecution for adulteration involving the health and well-being of the
community. Unfortunately, in our country adulteration has assumed alarming
proportions and it is absolutely essential to wipe it out ruthlessly and
completely by bringing to book offenders responsible for adulteration resulting
in ruination of the health of the people. The investigating agencies must
intensify their efforts and catch hold of those who for some private economic
gain are prepared to jeopardize the health of the community and indulge in mass
murder and when such persons are arraigned before the Court and found guilty a
really deterrent and punitive sentence must be imposed upon them.
If it comes to be known that even in respect
of an offence of adulteration, it is possible to get away with a light
sentence, the anti-adulteration law will cease to have any meaning and validity.
It will be mocked at by the people as a futile legislative exercise. Moreover,
we find that here the learned Magistrate had got a cyclostyled form of judgment
in which merely blanks were filled in by him and this is the clearest possible
evidence that he was in the habit of encouraging plea bargaining and letting
off the accused lightly if there was a plea of guilty, so that he may get quick
disposal 1040 without any effort. This was a highly reprehensible practice and
we are glad to note that the High Court has expressed strong disapproval of it.
The Magistrate trying an accused for a serious offence like adulteration must
apply his mind to the evidence recorded before him and, on the facts as they
emerge from the evidence, decide whether the accused is guilty or not. It must
always be remembered by every judicial officer that administration of justice
is a sacred task and according to our hoary Indian tradition, it partakes of
the divine function and it is with the greatest sence of responsibility and
anxiety that the judicial officer must discharge his judicial function,
particularly when it concerns the liberty of a person. The course followed by
the learned Magistrate in the present case clearly showed that there was no
application of mind by him to the case laid on behalf of the prosecution and he
was a consenting party to the appellant being persuaded to enter the plea of
guilty and, acting mechanically on the plea of guilty as extracted from the
appellant, he appeased his insensitive conscience by recording a finding
conviction against the appellant and let him off with a mere sentence of
imprisonment till the rising of the Court and a nominal fine.
The High Court on its attention being drawn
to the Order passed by the learned Magistrate initiated suo motu proceeding in
revision by issuing notice to the appellant to show cause why the sentence
imposed on him should not be enhanced. The appellant appeared in answer to the
notice and challenged the conviction recorded against him, but the High Court
did not go into the circumstances in which the plea of guilty was entered by
the appellant and relying on the plea of guilty proceeded on the basis that the
appellant was rightly convicted and since the offence said to be established
against the appellant, was with respect to an article of 'primary food'
punishable under s. 16(1)(a) (i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act,
1954, the High Court held that the appellant was liable to be sentenced to
imprisonment for a minimum term of 3 months and a fine of not less than Rs.
500. The High Court accordingly enhanced the sentenced imposed on the appellant
to 3 months' simple imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 500 or in default, further simple
imprisonment for 30 days. This order made by the High Court is challenged in
the present appeal preferred by the appellant after obtaining special leave of
this Court.
Now, it does not appear from the record
whether the entire prosecution evidence was completed before the learned
Magistrate before the plea of guilty was entered on behalf of the appellant,
but one thing is clear that the finding conviction recorded by the learned
Magistrate 1041 against the appellant was not based on the evidence led on
behalf of the prosecution. The conviction of the appellant based solely on the
plea of guilty entered by him and this confession of guilt was the result of
plea of bargaining between the prosecution, the defence and the learned
Magistrate. It is obvious that such conviction based on the plea of guilty
entered by the appellant as a result of plea bargaining cannot be sustained. It
is to our mind contrary to public policy to allow a conviction to be recorded
against an accused by inducing him to confess to a plea of guilty on an
allurement being held out to him that if he enters a plea of guilty, he will be
let off very lightly.
Such a procedure would be clearly
unreasonable, unfair and unjust and would be violative of the new activist
dimension of Art. 21 of the Constitution unfolded in Maneka Gandhi's case. It
would have the effect of polluting the pure fount of justice, because it might
induce an innocent accused to plead guilty to suffer a light and
inconsequential punishment rather than go through a long and ardous criminal
trial which, having regard to our combers and unsatisfactory system of
administration of justice, is not only long drawn out and ruinous in terms of
time and money, but also uncertain and unpredictable in its result and the
judge also might be likely to be defected from the path of duty to do justice
and he might either convict an innocent accused by accepting the plea of guilty
or let off a guilty accused with a light sentence, thus, subverting the process
of law and frustrating the social objective and purpose of the
anti-adulteration statute. This practice would also tend to encourage
corruption and collusion and as a direct consequence, contribute to the
lowering of the standard of justice. There is no doubt in our mind that the conviction
of an accused based on a plea of guilty entered by him as a result of
plea-bargaining with the prosecution and the Magistrate must be held to be
unconstitutional and illegal.
The High Court should have therefore, set
aside the conviction of the appellants and sent the case back to the learned
Magistrate for trial in accordance with law, ignoring the plea of guilty
entered by the appellant. The High Court was clearly in error in not doing so.
We accordingly allow the appeal, set aside
the judgments of the High Court as also the Order of conviction and sentence
recorded against the appellant by the learned Magistrate and remand the case to
the learned Magistrate so that he may proceed with the case from the stage at
which the appellant confessed to a plea of guilty. The learned trial Magistrate
will ignore the plea of guilty entered by the appellant and proceed further
with the case after giving an opportunity to the prosecution to lead such
additional evidence as it thinks fit and 1042 then allowing the appellant to
enter upon his defence and lead such evidence in defence as he thinks proper
and then dispose of the case in accordance with law. The appellant will
continue on the same bail on which he has been released by this Court by its
Order dated 30th March, 1979.
BHAGWATI, J. The facts giving arise to this
appeal by special leave are almost identical with those of Criminal Appeal No.
93 of 1980 save and except that the appellant is different and for the same
reasons as are given by us in our Judgment disposing of Criminal Appeal No. 93
of 1980, we allow the present appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court
as also the Order of Conviction and sentence recorded against the appellant by
the learned Magistrate and remand the case to the learned Magistrate so that he
may proceed with the case from the stage at which the appellant confessed to a
plea of guilty. The learned trial Magistrate will ignore the plea of guilty
entered by the appellant and proceed further with the case after giving an opportunity
to the prosecution to lead such additional evidence as it thinks fit and then
allowing the appellant to enter upon his defence and lead such evidence in
defence as he thinks proper and then dispose of the case in accordance with
law.
The appellant will continue on the same bail
on which he has been released by this Court by its Order dated 30th March, 1979.
N.V.K. Appeals allowed.
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