C.I.T. Central, Calcutta Vs. National
Taj Traders [1979] INSC 249 (27 November 1979)
TULZAPURKAR, V.D.
TULZAPURKAR, V.D.
VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J)
CITATION: 1980 AIR 485 1980 SCR (2) 268 1980
SCC (1) 370
CITATOR INFO :
R 1982 SC 149 (256) R 1984 SC 420 (38) R 1984
SC 993 (21)
ACT:
Income Tax Act, 1922, Section
33B-Construction of section 33B with particular bearing on the scope of the
appellate powers of the Tribunal under sub-section 4 thereof and the effect of
sub-section 2(b) on sub section (4)- Whether sub section 2(b) of section 33B
has the effect of attenuation or curtailing the appellate powers of the
Tribunal under sub section 4.
HEADNOTE:
In respect of the accounting years ending
March 31, 1957 and March 1958 respectively on the voluntary returns submitted
by the respondent, the Income Tax Officer 'E' Ward District II (1) Calcutta
completed the assessment for these years (1957-58 and 1958-59) on total incomes
of Rs. 7000/- and Rs. 7500/- respectively, the same having been made in the
status of unregistered firm consisting of three partners, namely Asha Devi
Vaid, Santosh Devi Vaid and Sugni Devi Vaid with equal shares. On August 2,
1962, the Commissioner of Income Tax issued notice to show cause why the said
assessments should not be cancelled under section 33B of the Act as he felt
that the completed assessments were erroneous as being prejudicial to the
interests of the Revenue and the Income Tax Officer 'E' Ward District II(1)
Calcutta had no territorial jurisdiction over the case of the assessee. The
notice was served on the assessee on August 3, 1962 and the hearing was fixed
by the Commissioner for August 6, 1962. On the ground that none appeared and
there was no application for adjournment, the Commissioner passed his order
under section 33B ex parte on that date.
By his said order the Commissioner cancelled
the assessments made by the Income Tax Officer on three grounds (a) that some
of the partners were minors and were not competent to enter into any
partnership agreement with the result that the status of unregistered firm
assigned to the assessee by the Income Tax Officer was clearly wrong and as
such the assessments deserved to be cancelled; (b) that the books of accounts
were unreliable and they were not properly examined by the Income Tax Officer
with the result that the assessments made were prejudicial to the interests of
the revenue and (c) that the Income Tax Officer has no territorial jurisdiction
over the case which fell in the jurisdiction of Income Tax Officer, District
III Calcutta and directed the Income Tax Officer having proper jurisdiction to
make fresh assessments after examining the records of the assessee in
accordance with law.
The appeals preferred to the Appellate
Tribunal under section 33B(3) were accepted. Finding that the Commissioner's
order passed at 11.30 A.M. ex parte was bad in as much as the notice served
upon the assessee permitted filing of objections at any time during the course
of August 6, 1962 and the objections were in fact filed later in the day, the
Tribunal remanded the case with the direction to dispose it of afresh after
giving due opportunity to the respondent assessee. On a reference to the High
Court at the instance of the appellant, the 269 High Court held: (a) the
assumption of jurisdiction by the Commissioner under section 33B of the Income
Tax Act was valid in law; (b) the Tribunal acted properly in vacating or
cancelling the Commissioner's order, but, (c) the Tribunal did not act properly
in directing the Commissioner to act under section 33B(1) because the period of
limitation of two years prescribed under section 33(2)(b) for him to act under
section 33B(1) had expired. In doing so, the High Court held that the provision
of sub section 2(b) was absolute and covered even a revisional order of the
Commissioner passed in pursuance of a direction given by any appellate
authority.
Allowing the appeal by Certificate, the Court
HELD: 1. Under sub section (1) of section 33B
of the Income Tax Act, power has been conferred upon the Commissioner to revise
Income-Tax Officer's orders but the exercise of such power is regulated by the
two conditions mentioned therein namely, (a) he must consider the order sought
to be revised to be erroneous as being prejudicial to the interests of the
revenue and (b) he must give an opportunity to the assessee of being heard
before revising it. Sub-s. (2)(b) prescribes a period of limitation in negative
words by providing that "no order shall be made under sub-s(1) after the
expiry of two years from the date of the order sought to be revised".
Sub-s.(3) confers on the assessee a right to prefer an appeal to the Appellate.
Tribunal against the Commissioners' order
made under sub- s.(1) while sub-s. (4) indicates the power of the Appellate
Tribunal in dealing with such appeal by providing that "such appeal shall
be dealt with in the same manner as if it were an appeal under sub-s.(1) of s.
33". Two things stand out clearly on a fair reading of the two concerned
provisions, namely, sub-s.(2)(b) and sub-s.(4). The bar of limitation contained
in sub-s. (2)(b) is on the Commissioner's power to pass revisional orders under
sub-s. (1) and the same appears to be absolute in the sense that it applies to
every order to be made under sub-s.(1). At the same time sub-s.(4) confers on
the Appellate Tribunal very wide powers which it has while dealing with an
appeal under s. 33(1). In other words, the Appellate Tribunal has power
"to pass such orders thereon (i.e. on the appeal) as thinks fit." The
word "thereon" restricts the jurisdiction of the Appellate Tribunal
to the subject-matter of the appeal which merely means that the Tribunal cannot
adjudicate or give a finding on a question which is not in dispute and which
does not form the subject-matter of the appeal but the words "pass such
orders thereon as it thinks fit" include all the powers (except possibly
the power of enhancement) which are conferred on the Assistant Appellate
Commissioner by s. 31 and consequently the Tribunal has authority in exercise
of its appellate powers to set aside the order appealed against and direct
fresh assessment in the light of the observations made by it in its judgment.
In other words, similar power is possessed by the Appellate Tribunal while
dealing with the appeal under sub-s.(4) of s. 33B. [275 A-H, 276 A] Hukamchand
Mills's case, 63 I.T.R. 232; applied.
2. Two principles of construction are
relating to casus omissus and the other in regard to reading the statute as a
whole are well settled. Under the first principle, a casus omissus cannot be supplied
by the Court except in the case of clear necessity and when reason for it is
found in the four corners of the statute itself but at the same time a casus
omissus should not be readily inferred and 270 for that purpose all the parts
of a statute or section must be construed together and every clause of a
section should be construed with reference to the context and other clauses
thereof so that the construction to be put on a particular provision makes a
consistent enactment of the whole statute.
This would be more so if literal construction
of a particular clause leads to manifestly absurd or anomalous results which
could not have been intended by the Legislature. [277 B, 278 A-B] Artemiou v.
Procopiou, [1966] 1 Q.B., 878, Luke v. Inland Revenue Commissioner [1968] A.C.
557 and 577 Quoted with approval.
3. The object of introducing Section 33B with
effect from March 30, 1948 was to confer revisional powers upon the
Commissioner to correct the erroneous orders of an Income Tax Officer in so far
as they were prejudicial to the interests of the revenue. The language of the
sub-sec.(1) clearly suggests that the said power was contemplated to be
exercised suo motu by the Commissioner inasmuch as the opening words show that
it was upto the Commissioner to call for and examine the record of any
proceedings under the Act and on examination of the record if he were satisfied
that any order passed by an Income Tax Officer was erroneous as being
prejudicial to the interests of the revenue he could revise the same after
giving an opportunity to the assessee of being heard. It is true that
sub-s.(2)(b) thereof prescribed a period of limitation on his power by
providing that no order shall be made under sub-s.(1) after the expiry of the
two years from the date of the order sought to be revised by the Commissioner
and a literal construction of sub-s.(2)(b) also suggests that the bar of
limitation imposed thereby was absolute in the sense that it applied to every
kind of order to be made under sub-s.(1) and no distinction was made between a
suo motu order and an order that might be made by him pursuant to a direction
given by any appellate or other higher authority. Sub-s.(3) conferred on an
assessee a right to prefer an appeal to the appellate Tribunal against the Commissioner's
order made under sub section (1) and under sub-s.(4) the Tribunal had authority
to deal with the impugned order of the Commissioner in such manner as it deemed
fit in exercise of its appellate powers;
for instance, it could confirm the impugned
order, it could annul that order, or it could after vacating it remand the case
back to the Commissioner for making a fresh assessment in the light of the
observations made by it in its judgment or it could after calling for a remand
report, rectify the erroneous order of the Income Tax Officer. Further there
was no period prescribed within which an appeal against the impugned order of
the Commissioner had to be disposed of by the Tribunal and in the normal course
on rare occasions such appeals would have been heard and disposed of before the
expiry of two years from the date of the Income Tax Officer's order which was
regard as erroneous by the Commissioner. More often than not such appeals would
come up for hearing after the expiry of the said period of two years-a fact
fully known and within the contemplation of the Legislature when it introduced
the section in the Act in 1948. [278 E-H, 279 A-D]
4. The Legislature did not intend to
attenuate or curtail the appellate powers which it conferred on the appellate
Tribunal in very wide terms under sub-s.(4) by enacting sub section 2(b)
prescribing a time limit on the Commissioner's power to reverse an erroneous
order of the Income Tax Officer when the Commissioner was seeking the exercise
the same not suo motu but in pursuance of or obedience to a direction from the
appellate authority. Any contrary and literal construction would lead to
manifestly absurd result, because in a given 271 case, like the present one
where the appellate authority (Tribunal) has found (a) the Income Tax Officer's
order to be clearly erroneous as being prejudicial to the interests of the
revenue and (b) the Commissioner's order unsustainable as being in violation of
principles of natural justice; it would be difficult for the appellate
authority to exercise its powers. Obviously it could not withhold its hands and
refuse to interfere with Commissioner's order altogether, for, that would
amount to perpetuating the Commissioner's erroneous order, nor could it merely
cancel or set aside the Commissioner's wrong order without doing anything about
the Income Tax Officer's order, for that, would result in perpetuating the
Income Tax Officer's order which had been found to be manifestly erroneous as
being prejudicial to the revenue. Moreover, in exercise of its appellate powers
it was open to the Tribunal itself to call for a remand report from either the
Commissioner or the Income Tax Officer and rectify the Income Tax Officer's
erroneous order after giving opportunity to the assessee and in doing so no
question of limitation would arise. It was equally open to the Tribunal to set
aside the Commissioner's order and remand the case directly to the Income Tax
Officer giving requisite direction to rectify his erroneous order and thereupon
the Income Tax Officer would carry out the Tribunal's direction for,
admittedly, the bar of limitation under sub-s.(2)(b) was only on the
Commissioner's power to make an assessment afresh and not on the Income Tax
Officer.
If this be the correct position then it is
gravely anomalous that the Tribunal should not be in a position to set aside
the Commissioner's order and remand the case back to the Commissioner for
making a fresh assessment because in the meantime two years' period of
limitation has expired, for, it would mean that the Tribunal was prevented from
achieving the desired effect directly through the Commissioner but it could do
so indirectly through the Income Tax Officer. A literal construction placed on
sub-s.(2) (b) would lead to such manifestly absurd and anomalous results,
which, were not intended by the Legislature. Therefore, the words of
sub-section 2(b) should be construed as being applicable to suo motu orders of
the Commissioner in revision and not to orders made by him pursuant to a
direction or order passed by the Appellate Tribunal under sub-s.(4) or by any
other higher authority. Such construction will be in consonance with the
principle that all parts of the section should be construed together and every
clause thereof should be construed with reference to the context and other
clauses thereof so that the construction put on that particular provision makes
a consistent enactment of the whole statute.
[279 D-H, 280 A-G] Commissioner of Income Tax
v. Kishoresingh Kalyan Singh Solanki, 39, I.T.R. 522 (Bombay); approved.
It is well settled that the principle that
the fiscal statute should be construed strictly is applicable only to taxing
provisions such as a charging provision or a provision imposing penalty and not
to those parts of the statute which contain machinery provisions and by no
stretch could s. 33B be regarded as charging provision. [281 C-D]
6. A casus omissus has not to be readily
inferred and it could not be inferred from the mere fact that both ss.
33B and 34(3) together with the second
proviso were inserted simultaneously in the Act by the same Amending Act of
1948 and that in the case of former a relaxing provision was not made as was
made in the case of the latter provision, firstly because the two provisions
operated in distinct fields and secondly it would be improper to do so without
compar- 272 ing the various stages of amendments through which each set of
these Provisions had undergone since inception. The further aspect the
Legislature has in the 1961 Act made the requisite provision removing or
relaxing the bar of limitation, in section 263(3), is, not of much importance.
Irrespective of the question whether the
second proviso to section 34(3) was enacted ex majore cautella or not (over
which conflicting views obtain) it is clear that s. 263(3) of the 1961 Act must
be regarded as an ex majore cautella provision. Admittedly, at the time when
the said provision was enacted in the 1961 Act, the Bombay view held the field
and there was no decision to the contrary of any other High Court. Obviously,
therefore, the enactment of s. 263(3) must be regarded as declaratory of the
law which was already prevailing and this position has been clarified in the
Notes on Clauses of the Income Tax Bill 1961 where it has been stated that sub-cl.
(3) of s. 263 was new and had been added to get over the difficulty experienced
in (wrongly stated 'caused by') the Bombay High Court's decision in Solanki's
case. The enactment of an ex majore cautella provision in the 1961 Act would,
therefore, be a legislative recognition of the legal position that obtained as
a result of judicial pronouncement qua the 1922 Act. [281 E-H, 282 A] C.I.T. v.
Sabitri Devi Agarwalla, 77 I.T.R. 934 over ruled.
Pooran Mall's case, 96 I.T.R. 390; relied on.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal
Nos. 171-172 of 1973.
From the Judgment and Order dated 9-3-1972 of
the Calcutta High Court in I.T Reference No. 117/67.
D. V. Patel, S. P. Nayar and Miss A.
Subhashini for the Appellant.
B. B. Ahuja (Amicus Curiae) for the
Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by.
TULZAPURKAR, J.-These two appeals by
certificate raise an important question as regards the proper construction of
s. 33B of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922 with particular bearing on the scope
of sub-s. (4) thereof and the effect of sub-s. (2) (b) on the sub-s. (4).
The facts giving rise to the aforesaid
question may briefly be stated: The assessment years involved are 1957-58 and
1958-59 corresponding to the accounting years ending March 31, 1957 and March
31, 1958 respectively. On or about August 5, 1960 the respondent-assessee
submitted voluntary returns, inter alia, for the said two assessment years
alongwith a declaration dated August 8, 1960. The assessment for these years
were completed on August 12, 1960 by the Income-Tax Officer, 'E' Ward, District
II(1) Calcutta on total incomes of Rs. 7,000/- and 7,500/- respectively, the
same having been made in the status of unregistered firm consisting of three
partners, namely, 273 Asha Devi Vaid, Santosh Devi Vaid and Sugni Devi Vaid
with equal shares.
On August 2, 1962, the Commissioner of
Income-Tax issued a notice to show cause why the said assessments should not be
cancelled under s. 33B of the Act as he felt that the completed assessments
were erroneous as being prejudicial to the interests of the revenue and that
the Income-Tax Officer, 'E' Ward, District II(1) Calcutta had no territorial
jurisdiction over the case of the assessee. The notice was served on the
assessee on August 3, 1962 and the hearing was fixed by the Commissioner for
August 6, 1962. On the ground that none appeared and that there was no
application for adjournment, the Commissioner passed his order under s. 33B ex
parte on that date. By his said order the Commissioner cancelled the
assessments made by the Income-Tax Officer on August 12, 1960 on three grounds:
(a) that some of the partners were minors and were not competent to enter into
any partnership agreement with the result that the status of unregistered firm
assigned to the assesse by the Income-Tax Officer was clearly wrong and as such
the assessments deserved to be cancelled, (b) that the books of account were
unreliable and they were not properly examined by the Income-Tax Officer with
the result that the assessments made were prejudicial to the interests of the
revenue and (c) that the Income-Tax Officer concerned had no territorial
jurisdiction over the case which fell within the jurisdiction of Income-Tax
Officer, District III(II) Calcutta, and directed the I.T.O. having proper
jurisdiction to make fresh assessments after examining the record of the
assesse in accordance with law.
In the appeals preferred to the Appellate
Tribunal under s. 33B(3) the respondent-assessee challenged the said order of
the Commissioner on various grounds. The Tribunal, negativing all other
contentions of the respondent-assessee, came to the conclusion that on merits
the facts justified the assumption of jurisdiction under s. 33B by the
Commissioner but held that the Commissioner had not conformed to the
requirements of natural justice by putting to the respondent assessee what case
it had to meet and by giving due opportunity for explaining the same. The
Tribunal noted that the Commissioner had disposed of the matter at 11.30 A.M.
when none appeared on behalf of the respondent- assessee while the notice
served upon the latter permitted filing of objections at any time during the
course of August 6, 1962 and objections had been filed by the respondent-
assessee later in the day. The Tribunal, therefore, allowed the appeals,
vacated the Commissioner's order dated August 6, 1962 and remanded the case to
him with the 274 direction to dispose it of afresh after giving due opportunity
to the respondent-assessee.
Feeling aggrieved by the Tribunal's aforesaid
order dated July 5, 1965 the appellant sought to refer a set of six questions
of law said to arise out of the said order to the Calcutta High Court but the
Tribunal referred the following two questions only for the opinion of the High
Court:
"1. Whether on the facts and in the
circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that the
assumption of jurisdiction by the Commissioner under s. 33B of the Income-Tax
Act was valid in law?
2. Whether, on the facts and in the
circumstances of the case, the Tribunal acted properly by vacating the order of
the Commissioner under s. 33B of the said Act and in directing him to dispose
of the proceedings under the said section afresh after giving due opportunity
to the assessee?" The High Court disposed of the Reference (I.T.
Reference No. 117 of 1967) by its judgment
dated March 9, 1972 whereby it answered the first question in the affirmative
against the assessee, that is to say, on merits it held that the assessments
made by the Income-Tax Officer required revision at the hands by the
Commissioner. As regards the second question the High Court was of the view
that it comprised two aspects, one relating to the vacating of the
Commissioner's order and the other relating to the giving of a direction to him
to dispose of the case under s.
33B afresh after giving due opportunity to
the assessee and the High Court held that in exercise of its appellate powers
the Tribunal acted properly in vacating or cancelling the Commissioner's order
but did not act properly in directing him to dispose of the case afresh under
s. 33B(1) because the period of limitation of two years prescribed under s.
33(2)(b) for him to act under s. 33B(1) had
expired and answered the question accordingly (i.e. in the affirmative on the
first aspect and in the negative on the second aspect). In doing so the High
Court held that the provision of sub-s. 2(b) was absolute and covered even a
revisional order of the Commissioner passed in pursuance of a direction given
by any appellate authority and relied in that behalf on the aspect that, unlike
2nd proviso to sec. 34(3), there was no provision removing or relaxing the bar
of limitation on the power of the Commissioner under s. 33B(2) (b) . The High
Court preferred the view of the Assam High Court in C.I.T. v. Sabitri Debi 275
Agarwalla(1) to the view of the Bombay High Court in C.I.T.
v. Kishoresingh Kalyansinh Solanki(2). The
Revenue has come up in appeal to this Court challenging the aforesaid view of
the High Court.
Since the question relates to the proper
construction of s. 33B of the Act with particular bearing on the scope of the
appellate powers of the Tribunal under sub-s. (4) thereof and the effect of
sub-s. (2) (b) thereon, it will be desirable to note the material provisions of
s. 33B. Under sub-s. (1) power has been conferred upon the Commissioner to
revise Income-Tax Officer's orders but the exercise of such power is regulated
by the two conditions mentioned therein, namely, (a) he must consider the order
sought to be revised to be erroneous as being prejudicial to the interests of
the revenue and (b) he must give an opportunity to the assessee of being heard
before revising it. Sub-s. (2) (b) prescribes a period of limitation in
negative words by providing that "no order shall be made under sub-s. (1)
after the expiry of two years from the date of the order sought to be
revised." Sub-s. (3) confers on the assessee a right to prefer an appeal
to the Appellate Tribunal against the Commissioner's order made under sub-s.
(1) while sub-s. (4) indicates the powers of the Appellate Tribunal in dealing
with such appeal by providing that "such appeal shall be dealt with in the
same manner as if it were an appeal under sub-s. (1) of s.
33". Two things stand out clearly or a
fair reading of the two concerned provisions, namely, sub-s. (2) (b) and sub-s.
(4). The bar of limitation contained in sub-s
(2) (b) is on the Commissioner's power to pass revisional orders under sub-s.
(1) and the same appears to be absolute in the sense that it applies to every
order to be made under sub-s. (1).
At the same time sub-s. (4) confers on the
Appellate Tribunal very wide powers which it has while dealing with an appeal
under s. 33(1). In other words, the Appellate Tribunal has power "to pass
such orders thereon (i.e. on the appeal) as it thinks fit". In Hukumchand
Mills(3), case this Court has explained that the word "thereon"
restricts the jurisdiction of the Appellate Tribunal to the subject-matter of
the appeal which merely means that the Tribunal cannot adjudicate or give a
finding on a question which is not in dispute and which does not form the
subject-matter of the appeal but the words "pass such orders thereon as it
thinks fit" include all the powers (except possibly the power of
enhancement) which are conferred on the Assistant Appellate Commissioner by s.
31 and consequently the Tribunal has authority in exercise of its appellate
powers to set aside the order appealed against and direct fresh assessment in
the light of the observations made by it in its 276 judgment. In other words,
similar power is possessed by the Appellate Tribunal while dealing with the
appeal under sub- s. (4) of s. 33B. The question that arises for our
consideration is whether such a direction to dispose of the case afresh can be
given to the Commissioner by the Appellate Tribunal when the period of
limitation prescribed under sub-s. (2) (b) has expired ? In other words,
whether sub-s. (2) (b) of s. 33B has the effect of attenuating or curtailing
the appellate powers of the Tribunal under sub-s. (4) ? Counsel for the Revenue
contended that it was a well settled principle that all the parts of a section
or statute should be construed together and that every clause of a section
should be construed with reference to the context and other clauses thereof, so
that the construction put on a particular provision makes a consistent
enactment of the whole statute. He further urged that the object of conferring
revisional power upon the Commissioner under s. 33B(1) obviously was to correct
erroneous orders of Income- Tax Officer in so far as they were prejudicial to
the interests of the revenue and such object would be defeated if the bar of
limitation contained in sub-s. (2)(b) is held applicable to revisional orders
passed by the Commissioner in pursuance of or in obedience to a direction given
or order made by the Appellate Tribunal in appeal under s. 33B(4) or for that
matter by the High Court or Supreme Court in case the matter is carried to
those Courts. According to him it would be proper to construe the provision in
sub-s. 2(b) as being applicable to suo motu revisional orders passed by the
Commissioner under sub-s. (1) and not to orders passed by him in pursuance of a
direction issued to him by the Tribunal in appeal. He urged that there was no
reason why sub-s. (2) (b) should be regarded as having the effect of
attenuating or curtailing the very wide appellate powers conferred upon the
Tribunal. He further urged that no argument could be based on the absence of a
provision, similar to the 2nd proviso to s. 34(3), in s. 33B of the Act the
support of his contention strong reliance was placed by him upon the Bombay
High Court's decision in Solanki's case (supra).
On the other hand, counsel for the assessee
canvassed the High Court's view for our acceptance by pointing out that both
ss. 33B and 34(3) together with the second proviso were introduced in the Act
by the same Amending Act 1948 but in s. 33B no provision for removing or
relaxing the bar of limitation contained in sub-s. (2)(b) was made and hence it
was not for the Court to supply a casus omissus. He also relied on the fact
that in the 1961 Act the necessary provision has been enacted in s. 263(3)
which also showed that in the absence of such provision in s. 33B of the 1922
Act the bar of sub-s. (2) (b) was 277 applicable to every order of the
Commissioner irrespective of whether it was made suo motu or in pursuance of a
direction issued by the appellate authority. According to him since the bar of
limitation contained in sub-s. (2) (b) of s. 33B always operated for the
benefit of the assessee as the same accorded finality to the assessment orders,
the appellate powers of the Tribunal under sub-s. (4) must be regarded as
having been curtailed to the extent that the Tribunal cannot remand the case to
the Commissioner for making fresh assessment if by then the limitation has
expired.
Two principles of construction-one relating
to casus omissus and the other in regard to reading the statute as a
whole-appear to be well settled. In regard to the former the following
statement of law appears in Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes (12th Edn.)
at page 33:
Omissions not to be inferred-"It is a
corollary to the general rule of literal construction that nothing is to be
added to or taken from a statute unless there are adequate grounds to justify
the inference that the legislature intended something which it omitted to
express. Lord Mersey said: 'It is a strong thing to read into an Act of
Parliament words which are not there, and in the absence of clear necessity it
is a wrong thing to do.' 'We are not entitled,' said Lords Loreburn L.C., 'to
read words into an Act of Parliament unless clear reason for it is to be found
within the four corners of the Act itself.' A case not provided for in a
statute is not to be dealt with merely because there seems no good reason why
it should have been omitted, and the omission in consequence to have been
unintentional." In regard to the latter principle the following statement
of law appears in Maxwell at page 47:
A statute is to be read as a whole-"It
was resolved in the case of Lincoln College [(1595) 3 Co.
Rep. 58b, at p. 59b] that the good expositor
of an Act of Parliament should 'make construction on all the parts together,
and not of one part only by itself.' Every clause of a statute is to 'be
construed with reference to the context and other clauses of the Act, so as, as
far as possible, to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute.' (Per
Lord Davey in Canada Sugar Refining Co., Ltd. v. R : 1898 AC 735)".
278 In other words, under the first principle
a casus omissus cannot be supplied by the Court except in the case of clear
necessity and when reason for it found in the four corners of the statute
itself but at the same time a casus omissus should not be readily inferred and
for that purpose all the parts of a statute or section must be construed
together and every clause of a section should be construed with reference to
the context and other clauses thereof so that the construction to be put on a
particular provision makes a consistent enactment of the whole statute. This
would be more so if literal construction of a particular clause leads to
manifestly absurd or anomalous results which could not have been intended by
the Legislature. "An intention to produce an unreasonable result",
said Danckwerts L.J. in Artemiou v. Procopiou(1) "is not to be imputed to
a statute if there is some other construction available." Where to apply
words literally would "defeat the obvious intention of the legislation and
produce a wholly unreasonable result" we must "do some violence to
the words" and so achieve that obvious intention and produce a rational
construction, (Per Lord Reid in Luke v. I.R.C.-1968 AC 557 where at p. 577 he
also observed: "this is not a new problem, though our standard of drafting
is such that it rarely emerges. In the light of these principles we will have
to construe sub-s. (2) (b) with reference to the context and other clauses of
s. 33B.
Section 33B was introduced in the Indian
Income-Tax Act, 1922 by the Income Tax and Business Profit Tax (Amendment) Act,
1948 with effect from March 30, 1948 and the object of introducing the same was
obviously to confer revisional powers upon the Commissioner to correct the
erroneous orders of an Income Tax Officer in so far as they were prejudicial to
the interests of the revenue. The language of the sub-sec. (1) clearly suggests
that the said power was contemplated to be exercised suo motu by the
Commissioner inasmuch as the opening words show that it was upto the
Commissioner to call for and examine the record of any proceedings under the
Act and on examination of the record if he were satisfied that any order passed
by an Income Tax Officer was erroneous as being prejudicial to the interests of
the revenue he could revise the same after giving an opportunity to the
assessee of being heard. It is true that sub-s. (2) (b) thereof prescribed a
period of limitation on his power by providing that no order shall be made
under sub-s. (1) after the expiry of two years from the date of the order
sought to be revised by the Commissioner and a literal construction of sub-s.
(2) (b) also suggests that the bar of limitation imposed thereby was absolute
in the sense that it applied to every kind of order to be made under sub-s. (1)
and no distinction was made between a 279 suo motu order and an order that
might be made by him pursuant to a direction given by any appellate or other
higher authority but the question is whether such a literal construction should
be accorded to that provision ? As stated earlier sub-s. (3) conferred on an
assessee a right to prefer an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal against the
Commissioner's order made under sub-s. (1) and under sub-s.
(4) the Tribunal had authority to deal with
the impugned order of the Commissioner in such manner as it deemed fit in
exercise of its appellate powers; for instance, it could confirm the impugned
order, it could annul that order, it could after vacating it remand the case
back to the Commissioner for making a fresh assessment in the light of the
observations made by it in its judgment or it could, after calling for a remand
report, rectify the erroneous order of the Income Tax Officer. Further there
was no period prescribed within which an appeal against the impugned order of
The Commissioner had to be disposed of by the Tribunal and in the normal course
on rare occasions such appeals would have been heard and disposed of before the
expiry of two years from the date of the Income Tax Officer's order which was
regarded as erroneous by the Commissioner. More often than not such appeals
would come up for hearing after the expiry of the said period of two years-a
fact fully known and within the contemplation of the Legislature when it
introduced the section in the Act in 1948. In these circumstances did the
Legislature intend to attenuate or curtail the appellate powers which it
conferred on the Appellate Tribunal in very wide terms under sub-s. (4) by
enacting sub-s. (2) (b) prescribing a time limit on the Commissioner's power to
revise an erroneous order of the Income Tax Officer when the Commissioner-was
seeking to exercise the same not suo motu but in pursuance of or obedience to a
direction from the Appellate authority ? According to the construction
contended for by the assesses and which found favour with the High Court the
answer was in the affirmative because sub-s. (2) (b), on its literal
construction, was absolute. In our view such literal construction would lead to
a manifest y absurd result, because in a given case, like the present one,
where the appellate authority (Tribunal) has found (a) the Income Tax Officer's
order to be clearly erroneous as being prejudicial to the interests of the
revenue and (b) the Commissioner's order unsustainable as being in violation of
principles of natural justice how should the appellate authority exercise its
appellate powers ? obviously it could not withhold its hands and refuse to
interfere with Commissioner's order altogether for, that would amount to
perpetuating the Commissioner's erroneous order, nor could it merely cancel or
set aside the Commissioner's wrong order without doing anything about the
Income Tax Officer's order, for. that would result in perpetuating the Income
Tax 280 Officer's order which had been found to be manifestly erroneous as
being prejudicial to the revenue. But such result would flow from the view
taken by the High Court which has held that the Tribunal acted properly in
vacating the Commissioner's order but did not act properly in directing him to
dispose of the proceedings afresh after giving opportunity to the assesses.
Such manifestly absurd result could never have been intended by the
Legislature.
Moreover, it was fairly conceded by the
counsel for the assesses before us that in exercise of its appellate powers it
was open to the Tribunal itself to call for a remand report from either the
Commissioner or the Income Tax Officer and rectify the Income Tax Officer's
erroneous order after giving opportunity to the assesses and in doing so no
question of limitation would arise. It was also not disputed by him that it was
equally open to the Tribunal to set aside the Commissioner's order and remand
the case directly to the Income Tax Officer giving the requisite direction to rectify
his erroneous order and thereupon the Income Tax Officer could carry out the
Tribunal's direction. for, admittedly, the bar of limitation under 1) sub-s.
(2) (b) was only on the Commissioner's paver to make an assessment afresh and
not on the Income Tax Officer. If this be the correct position then it is
gravely anomalous that the Tribunal should not be in a position to set aside
the Commissioner's order and remand the case back to the Commissioner for
making a fresh assessment because in the meantime two years' period of
limitation has expired, for, it would mean that the Tribunal was prevented from
achieving the desired effect directly through the Commissioner but it could do
so indirectly through the Income Tax Officer. A literal construction placed on
subs. (2) (b) would lead to such manifestly absurd and anomalous results,
which, we do not think, were intended by the Legislature. These considerations
compel us to construe the words of sub-s.. (2)(b) as being applicable to suo
motu orders of the Commissioner in revision and not to orders made by him
pursuant to a direction or order passed by the Appellate Tribunal under sub-s.
(4) or by any other higher authority.
Such construction will be in consonance with
the principle that all parts of the section should be construed together and
every clause thereof should be construed with reference to the context and
other clauses thereof so that the construction put on that particular provision
makes a consistent enactment of the whole statute.
Having regard to the above discussion we are
clearly of opinion that the view taken by the Bombay High Court in Solanki's
case (supra) on the construction of sub-s. (2) (b) of s. 33B is correct and we
approve of it. In Sabitri Devi Agrawalla's case (supra) the Assam High Court
took a contrary view and held that under s. 33B(4) of the 281 Act the Tribunal
would not be justified in remanding the case to the Commissioner after the two
years had expired from the date of the order sought to be revised. The decision
seems to rest on three aspects: (a) it being fiscal statute the same must be
strictly construed, (b) the bar of limitation contained in sub-s. (2)(b) was
absolute and unqualified and covered all types of orders and (c) that unlike
the second proviso to s. 34(3) there was no provision for removing or relaxing
the bar of limitation on the power of the Commissioner under s. 33B (2) (b) and
that since s. 33B as well as s. 34(3) with second proviso had been introduced
in the Act by the same Amending Act of 1948 there was a deliberate omission to
make a provision removing of relaxing the 'oar of limitation in s. 33B and for
such an omission the remedy lay with the Legislature and not with the Court.
The Assam High Court also alluded to the fact that under the 1961 Act the
Legislature had made a provision removing or relaxing the bar of limitation in
s. 263(3). As regards aspect (b) we have already dealt with it above. As
regards aspect (a) it is well settled that the principle that the fiscal
statute should be construed strictly is applicable only to taxing provisions
such as a charging provision or a provision imposing penalty and not to those
parts of the statute which contain machinery provisions and by no stretch could
s. 33B be regarded as a charging provision. As regards aspect (c) we have
already pointed out above that a casus omissus has not to be readily inferred
and it could not be inferred from the mere fact that both ss. 33B and 34(3)
together with the second proviso were inserted simultaneously in the Act by the
same Amending Act of 1948 and that in the case of former a relaxing provision
was not made as was made in the case of the latter provision, firstly because
the two provisions operated in distinct fields and secondly it would be
improper to do so without comparing the various stages of amendments through
which each set of these provisions had undergone since inception. The further
aspect that the Legislature has in the 1961 Act made the requisite provision
removing or relaxing the bar of limitation in s. 263(3), is, in our view, not
of much consequence. Irrespective of the question whether the second proviso to
s. 34(3) was enacted ex majore cautella or not (over which conflicting views
obtain), it is clear to us that s. 263(3) of the 1961 Act must be regarded as
an ex majore cautella provision. Admittedly, at the time when the said
provision was enacted in the 1961 Act, the Bombay view held the field and,
there was no decision to the contrary of any other High Court. Obviously,
therefore, the enactment of s. 263(3) must be regarded as declaratory of the
law which was already prevailing and this position has been clarified in the
Notes on Clauses of the Income Tax Bill 1961 where it has been stated that
sub-cl. (3) of s.
263 was new and had been 19 282 added to get
over the difficulty experienced in (wrongly state 'caused by') the Bombay High
Court's; decision in Solanki's case (supra) . The enactment of an ex majore
cautella provision in the 1961 Act would, therefore, be a legislative
recognition of the legal position that obtained as a result of judicial
pronouncement qua the 1922 Act. In our view, therefore. the Assam case was
wrongly decided.
Reference may now be made to a decision of
this Court in Pooran Mall's case, where in a similar situation arising under s.
132 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, a restricted construction was accorded by this
Court to sub-s. (5) thereof which prescribed certain period of limitation. In
that case pursuant to an authorisation issued under s.
132(1) of the 1961 Act searches were carried
out on October 15 and 16, 1971 at the residence and business premises of P, an
individual, and at certain office premises of the firms in which he was a
partner, and jewellery, cash and account books were seized. There was also a
search of two banks and a restraint order was made under s. 132(3) in respect
of l 14 silver bars pledged with those banks on the ground that they were the
property of P. On January 12, 1972, the Income Tax Officer passed a summary
order under s. 132(5) on the basis that all the assets seized and 114 silver
bars belonged to P. Thereupon, P & Sons, one of the firms in which P was a
partner, and P filed a writ petition in the High Court challenging the order
dated January 12, 1972 and on April 6, 1977, on the basis of the consent of the
parties, the High Court quashed the order and permitted the department to make
a fresh enquiry after giving an opportunity to the petitioner and pass a fresh
order within two months. After a fresh enquiry the Income Tax Officer passed an
order on June S, 1972. holding that the silver bars belonged to P, the
individual, and not the firm, P and Sons. Thereupon, the firm and P again filed
a writ petition challenging the second order. The High Court held that the
Income Tax Officer had no jurisdiction to pass that order beyond the period
prescribed in s. 132(5) and set aside the order and directed the return of the
114 bars of silver.
This Court held, inter alia, that the order
made in pursuance of a direction given - ' under s. 132(12) or by a Court in
writ proceedings, was not subject to the limitation prescribed under s. 132(5).
At page 394 this Court has observed thus:
"Even if the period of time fixed under
section 132(5) is held to be mandatory that was satisfied when the first order
was made. Thereafter, if any direction is given under section 132(2) or by a
Court in writ proceedings, as in this case, we do not think an order made in
pursuance of such a 283 direction would be subject to the limitations
prescribed under A section 132 (5) . Once the order has been made within ninety
days the aggrieved person has got the right to approach the notified authority
under section 132(11) within thirty days and that authority can direct the
Income Tax Officer to pass a fresh order. We cannot accept the contention on
behalf of the respondents that even such a fresh order should be passed within
ninety days. It would make the sub- sections (11) and (12) of section 132
ridiculous and useless." It may be pointed out that in s. 132 there is no
provision removing or relaxing the bar of limitation contained in s.
132(5) enabling the Income Tax Officer to
pass an order afresh pursuant to any direction issued to him by a higher
authority under s. 132(12) and even the this Court took the view that the
limitation prescribed under s. 132(5) will be applicable only to the initial
order to be made by the Income Tax Officer and not to an order that would be
made by him pursuant to a direction from the Board or notified authority. The
concerned provisions were read together and such construction was put on sub-s.
(5) of s. 132 as made a consistent enactment of the whole statute.
In the result, we are of opinion that the
answer given by the High Court to the second aspect of the second question
referred to it was clearly wrong and, in our view, the Tribunal's order
vacating the Commissioner's order and directing the Commissioner to make
assessment afresh after giving due opportunity to the respondent-assessee was
proper. The appeal is accordingly allowed but in the circumstances, there will
be no order as to costs.
V.D.K. Appeal allowed.
Back
