Ram Lal Narang Vs. State of Delhi
(Admn.) [1979] INSC 4 (10 January 1979)
REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J) REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA
(J) UNTWALIA, N.L.
CITATION: 1979 AIR 1791 1979 SCC (2) 322
ACT:
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, Section
173-Whether the Police have powers to further investigate, after the magistrate
has taken cognizance of the offence-Scope and ambit of Section 173 Cr. P.C.
HEADNOTE:
A criminal case, arising out of F.I.R. 72 of
1967 against one Sri Bali Ram Sharma and two others for the offence of the
theft of two sandstone pillars of great antiquity, beauty and value from the
Suraj Kund Temple, in village Amin, Dist. Karnal, ended in the acquittal of the
accused. During the pendency of this case, on an application made by him one
Narinder Nath Malik (N. N. Malik) an alleged research scholar and a friend of
H. L. Mehta, the then Chief Judicial Magistrate was given the custody of these
two sandstone pillars which had been recovered from the accused.
The pillars remained in the custody of N. N.
Malik from 1-3- 1968 to 27-5-1968 and on the acquittal of the accused on 16-
7-1968, they were handed over to the Lambardar of Village Amin. Later, it came
to light that the pillars returned by Malik were not the original pillars but
fakes. Thereupon, F.I.R. RC 2-71-CIA/SPE/CBI was registered at Delhi against
Malik and H. L. Mehta under Section 120 B read with Sections 406 and 420 I.P.C.
After completing the investigation a charge sheet No. RC 2 of 1971 was filed on
30-12-1972, in the Court of Special Magistrate, Ambala against Malik and H. L.
Mehra for the aforesaid offences noted in the F.I.R. Though an order was passed
on 17-5-1976 directing the framing of charges, no charges were actually framed.
However, on 16-5-77, on an application dated
17-4-77 filed by the Public Prosecutor under Section 494 of the Criminal
Procedure Code, 1973, the Special Magistrate permitted the withdrawal of the
case and discharged the accused. During the pendency of the case, the two
genuine pillars were traced and found in London in the ware house of Spink
& Co.
It was suspected that Manohar Lal Narang and
Ramlal Narang had engaged Balkishan Rawal and Nathubai Rawal of Delhi to make
three sets of fakes and had exported the genuine pillars to London. This
resulted in the registering of F.I.R. RC 4/76-CIU(A)/SPE by the Superintendent
of Police, CIV (Antiquities SPE/CBI, New Delhi) against Manohar Lal Narang and
others for alleged offences under Section 120B, read with Section 411 I.P.C.
and Section 25 (1) of the Antiquities and Art Treasures Act, 1972. An
application under s. 306 Cr.P.C. filed by N. N. Malik on 26-6-1976 before the
Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi with reference to this F.I.R. RC 4/76,
was accepted on 3-7-1976 and Malik was granted pardon, after confessional
statement was recorded. On 19-7-1976 a charge sheet was filed (RC 4 of 1976)
before the same Court for offences under Sections 120B, I.P.C. read with
Section 420, 411 and 406 I.P.C. and Section 25 of the Antiquities and Art
Treasures Act 1972.
The case was transferred to the Court of
Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate. On 20-7-1976 the Magistrate issued
process for the appearance of the accused including the three Narang brothers
out of whom the appellant in Crl. Appeal 373 of 1978 was already under
detention under MISA and COFEPOSA. The other two who were in London were
extradited and brought 924 to India on 27-7-1977. An application filed by
Ramlal Narang in March 1977 immediately after his release from detention, to
drop the proceedings against him, to cancel the extradition warrants against
his two brothers and to discharge all the accused on the ground of illegality
of the Delhi case in view of the fact that a case on the same facts was already
pending in the Ambala Court failed. Thereafter two applications filed by the
three Narang brothers on 21-6- 1977 in the Delhi High Court under Section 482
Crl. P.C.
once again challenging the legality of the
proceedings arising out of charge sheet RC4 of 1974 were admitted on 22-
6-1977, but dismissed on 10-1-1978. During the pendency of these two appeals
Malik died sometime during May 1977 and Mehra was made a co-accused in the
Delhi case on 1-8-1977 in view of the withdrawal of the Ambala case on
16-5-1977.
Dismissing the appeals by special leave, the
Court,
HELD: 1. The police have the statutory right
and duty to 'register' every information relating to the commission of a
cognizable offence. The police also have the statutory right and duty to
investigate the facts and circmstances of the case where the commission of a
cognizable offence was suspected and to submit the report of such investigation
to the Magistrate having jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence upon a
police report. These statutory rights and duties of the police were not
circumscribed by any power of superintendence or interference in the
Magistrate; nor was any sanction required from a Magistrate to empower the
police to investigate into a cognizable offence. [937 F-H] (a) The scheme of
the 1898 Code of Criminal Procedure was that the First Information Report was
followed by investigation, the investigation led to the submission of a report
to the Magistrate, the Magistrate took cognizance of the offence on receipt of
the police report and finally, the Magistrate taking cognizance issued process
to the accused.
As such ordinarily the right and duty of the
police would end with the submission of a report under Section 173(1) Criminal
Procedure Code upon receipt of which it was up to the Magistrate to take or not
to take cognizance of the offence. [937 E-F, 938 F] (b) There was no provision
in the 1898 Code prescribing the procedure to be followed by the police, where
after the submission of a report under Section 173(1) Criminal Procedure Code
and after the Magistrate had taken cognizance of the offence, fresh facts came
to light which required further investigation. Similarly, there was no express
provision prohibiting the police from launching upon an investigation into the
fresh facts coming to light after the submission of the report under Section
173(1) or after the Magistrate had taken cognizance of the offence. Therefore
further investigation was permissible and was not altogether ruled out merely
because cognizance of the case has been taken by the Court; defective
investigation coming to light during the course of a trial could also be cured
by a further investigation, if circumstances permitted it. [938 F-H, 941 C-D]
King Emperor v. Khwaja Wazir Ahmed, 71 Indian Appeals, PC 203: followed.
Diwakar Singh v. A. Ramamurthy Naidu, AIR
1919 Madras 751. In re. Palaniswami Goundan, AIR 1946 Madras 502; Mohd. Niwaj
v. The Crown, 48 Crl. L.J. 744 Lahore;
Prosecuting Inspector v. Minaketan 925
Monato, AIR 1952 Orissa 350; Ramashankar v. State of U.P., AIR 1956 All. 525;
In re. State of Kerala v. State Prosecutor, 79 Crl. L.J. 1973 p. 1288 (Kerala)
D.B.; approved.
H. N. Rishbud v. State of Delhi, [1955] 1 SCR
1150; Tara Singh v. State [1951] SCR 72; referred to.
2. (a) Neither Section 173 nor section 190
lead to the conclusion that the power of the police to further investigate was
exhausted by the Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence. Practice,
convenience and preponderance of authority, permitted repeated investigations
and discovery of fresh facts. Notwithstanding that a Magistrate had taken
cognizance of the offence upon a police report submitted under Section 173 of
the 1898 Code, the right of the police to further investigate was not exhausted
and the police could exercise such right as often as necessary when fresh
information came to light. Where the police desired to make a further
investigation, the police could express their regard and respect for the Court
by seeking its formal permission to make further investigation.
[943 G-H, 944 A] (b) When it comes to the
notice of the investigating agency that a person already an accused of an
offence has a good alibi or where the involvement of persons who are not
already accused comes to the notice of the investigating agency, the
investigating agency cannot keep quiet and refuse to investigate the fresh
information. It is their duty to investigate and submit a report to the
Magistrate upon the innocence or involvement of the persons concerned.
In either case, it is for the Magistrate to
decide upon his future course of action depending upon the stage at which the
case is before him. If he has already taken cognizance of the offence, but has
not proceeded with the enquiry or trial, he may direct the issue of process to
persons freshly discovered to be involved and deal with all the accused in a
single enquiry or trial. If the case of which he has previously taken
cognizance has already proceeded to some extent, he may take fresh cognizance
of the offence disclosed against the newly involved accused and proceed with
the case as a separate case. What action a Magistrate is to take in accordance
with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure in such situations is a
matter best left to the discretion of the Magistrate. A further investigation
by the police cannot be considered as trenching upon the proceedings before the
Court because whatever the police may do, the final discretion in regard to
further action is with the Magistrate. That the final word is with the
Magistrate is sufficient safeguard against any excessive use or abuse of the
power of the police to make further investigation.
[942 F-H, 943 A-D] Ram Gopal Neotia v. State
of West Bengal, AIR 1969 Cal.
316 Hanuman and Anr. v. Raj. AIR 1951
Rajasthan 131; State v. Mehr Singh and Ors., ILR 1973 (3) P & H 561-[1974]
2 Cal.
LJ 970; over-ruled.
(c) Where the report of the second
investigation is submitted to a Magistrate other than the Magistrate who has
already taken cognizance of the first case, it is up to the prosecuting agency
or the accused concerned to take necessary action by moving the appropriate
superior Court to have the two cases tried together. The Magistrate themselves
may take action suo motu. [944 B] 926 In the instant case; the prosecution did
not act with any oblique motive or out of any malice by submitting a charge
sheet to the Delhi Court and by withdrawing the case in the Ambala Court. In
the charge sheet filed in the Delhi Court, it was expressly mentioned that a
case had been filed in the Delhi Court against Mehra and others and, therefore,
it was not necessary to prosecute Mehra in the Ambala Court.
The Court granted its permission for the
withdrawal of the case. [944 C-E]
3. Where the conspiracy discovered later is
found to cover a much larger canvas with broader ramifications, it cannot be
equated with the earlier conspiracy which covered a smaller field of narrower
dimentions. [936 B-C] In the present case, (a) the conspiracies which are the
subject matter of the two cases cannot be said to be identical though the
conspiracy which is the subject matter of the first case, may perhaps be said
to have turned out to be part of the conspiracy which is the subject matter of
the second case. When investigation commenced in First Information Report No.
RC4 of 1976, apart from the circumstance that the property involved was the
same, the link between the conspiracy to cheat and to misappropriate and the
conspiracy to dispose of the stolen property was not known. [936 C-D] (b) A
comparison of the two First Information Report coupled with the several facts
and circumstances show that the conspiracy which was the subject matter of the
second case could not be said to be identical with the conspiracy which was the
subject matter of the first case. The conspirators were different. Malik and
Mehra alone were stated to be the conspirators in the first case, while the
three Narang brothers were alleged to be the principal conspirators in the
second case. The objects of the two conspiracies were different. The alleged
object of the first conspiracy was to obtain possession of the pillars from the
Court by cheating and to misappropriate them. The alleged object of the second
conspiracy was the disposal of the stolen property by exporting the pillars to
London. The offences alleged in the first case were Section 120B read with
Section 420 and 406 Indian Penal Code while the offences alleged in the second
case were S. 120B read with S. 411 IPC and Section 25 of the Antiquities and
Art Treasures Act, 1972. [935 D-F] (c) No fault could be found with the police
for registering a first information Report against the Narang brothers for the
offence of conspiracy to commit an offence under section 411 Indian Penal Code.
In the course of the investigation into this offence, it transpired that the Narang
brothers were also parties to the original conspiracy to obtain possession of
the pillars from the Court by cheating Facts came to light which indicated that
the conspiracy which was the subject matter of the case pending in the Ambala
Court was but part of a larger conspiracy. The fresh facts which came to light
resulted in the filing of the second charge sheet. [935 C-D] (d) Neither at the
time when the First Information Report pertaining to the Ambala Case was
registered nor at the time when the Charge sheet was filed in the Ambala Court,
were the Narang brothers known to be in the picture.
The investigating agency was not also aware
of what Malik and Mehra had done with the pillars after they had obtained
possession of the pillars from the Court and substituted and returned fake
pillars to the Court. The First Information Report and the charge-sheet were
concerned primarily with the 927 offences of conspiracy to cheat and to
misappropriate committed by Malik and Mehra. At that stage, the investigating
agency was not aware of any conspiracy to send the pillars out of the country.
It was not known that Narang brothers were also parties to the conspiracy to
obtain possession of the pillars from the Court. It was much later, that the
pillars surfaced in London were discovered to be in the constructive possession
of Narang brothers. Even then, the precise connection between Malik and Mehra
on the one side and Narang brothers on the other was not known. All that was
known was that the pillars which were stolen property within the definition of
the expression in Section 410 Indian Penal Code were found to be in the
possession of Narang brothers in London. On the discovery of the genuine
pillars in the possession of Narang brothers, without anything further to
connect Narang brothers with Malik and Mehra, the police had no option but to
register a case under Section 411 Indian Penal Code against Narang brothers.
That was what was done. [934 F-H, 935 A-B] Observation:
In the interests of the independence of the
magistracy and the judiciary, in the interests of the purity of the
administration of criminal justice and in the interests of the comity of the
various agencies and institutions entrusted with different stages of such
administration, it would ordinarily be desirable that the police should inform
the Court and seek formal permission to make further investigation when fresh
facts come to light. [943 E]
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal
Appeal Nos. 373-374 of 1978.
Appeals by Special Leave from the Judgment
and Orders dated 10-1-1978 and 14-9-1978 of the Delhi High Court in Criminal
Misc. (M) No. 323 and 322/77 and Criminal Misc.
Nos. 1083, 1149 of 1978 in Special Misc. (M)
No. 322/77.
Ram Jethmalani (In Crl. A.373), A. K. Sen (In
Crl.
A.374) and Harjinder Singh for the
Appellants.
U. R. Lalit and R. N. Sachthey for the
Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
CHINNAPPA REDDY, J.-On the intervening night of 31st March 1967 and Ist April
1967, two sandstone pillars of great antiquity, beauty and value were stolen
from Suraj Kund temple, in Village Amin (District Karnal, Haryana).
They were of the Sunga period (2nd Century
B.C.) and their present estimated value in the International Art Treasures'
Market is said to be around five hundred thousand American dollars. A first
information report (F.I.R. No. 72 of 1967) was registered by the Police of
Butana, District Karnal. The pillars were recovered on 2nd May 1967. On
completion of investigation a charge-sheet was filed on 3rd October 1967 in the
Court of the Ilaqa Magistrate at Karnal, against one Bali Ram Sharma and two
others. 3-119 SCI/79 928 The case ended in their acquittal on 16th July 1968.
During the pendency of the case one Narinder Nath Malik (N. N.
Malik) filed an application before the
Magistrate alleging that he was a research scholar and requesting that he might
be given custody of the two pillars to enable him to make a detailed study. At
the instance of H. L. Mehra, the then Chief Judicial Magistrate, Karnal and a friend
of N. N. Malik, the learned Ilaqa Magistrate gave custody of the two pillars to
N. N. Malik on his executing a personal bond in a sum of Rs. 20,000/-. The
order was written by H. L. Mehra himself and signed by the Ilaqa Magistrate.
The pillars remained in the custody of N. N. Malik from Ist March 1968 to 27th
May 1968, when N. N. Malik purported to return them to the Court of the Ilaqa
Magistrate, Karnal. After the acquittal of Bali Ram Sharma and others, the
pillars were handed over to the Lambardar of village Amin. Later, it came to
light that the pillars returned by N. N. Malik were not the original pillars
but fakes. Thereupon, First Information Report No. RC.2/71-CIA/SPE/CBI was
registered at Delhi against N. N. Malik and H. L. Mehra under Section 120-B
read with Sections 406 and 420 Indian Penal Code. After completing the
investigation the C.B.I. filed a charge-sheet No. R.C. 2 of 1971 in the Court
of Special Magistrate, Ambala, against N. N. Malik and H. L. Mehra for alleged
offences under Section 120-B read with Sections 406 and 420 Indian Penal Code.
The charge-sheet was filed on 30th December, 1972. On 17th May, 1976, the
learned Special Magistrate, Ambala, passed an order directing the framing of
charges against N. N. Malik and H. L. Mehra. But, no charges were actually
framed as the accused were not present in the Court. On 17th April, 1977, the
Public Prosecutor filed an application under Section 494 Criminal Procedure
Code for permission to withdraw the case against Malik and Mehra. The learned
Special Magistrate, Ambala, by his order dated 16th May 1977, permitted the
withdrawal of the case and discharged the accused.
Between May 1976 and May 1977 several other
things happened and the Narang brothers, the appellants in the two appeals,
made their appearance on the scene. It may be mentioned here, that of the three
Narang brothers, Om Prakash alias Omi Narang had been living in London since
1970, Manohar Lal alias Manu Narang had been similarly living in London since
July 1974 and Ram Lal Narang alone had been living in India. Ram Lal Narang was
detained first under the MISA from September 1974 till he was released under
orders of the High Court, and later, under the COFEPOSA from 1st July 1975 till
after the revocation of the internal Emergency in March 1977.
929 The two genuine pillars which had been
removed from Suraj Kund temple were traced and found in London in the warehouse
of Messrs Spink & Co. It was suspected that Manoharlal Narang and Ramlal
Narang had engaged Balkishan Rawal and Nathubhai Rawal of Delhi to make three
sets of fakes and had exported the genuine pillars to London. A First
Information Report (R.C. 4/76-CIU(A)/SPE) was registered by the Superintendent
of Police, CIU (Antiquities, SPE/CBI, New Delhi) against Manohar Lal Narang and
others, for alleged offences under Section 120-B Indian Penal Code read with
Section 411 Indian Penal Code and Section 25(1) of the Antiquities and Art
Treasures Act, 1972, On 26th June, 1976, N. N. Malik made and application
before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi, in case R.C. No. 4/76-
CIU(A)/SPE, New Delhi, purporting to be under Section 306 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973, praying that he might be granted pardon. The
application mentioned Sections 411, 406 and 420 Indian Penal Code read with
Section 120-B and Section 25(1) of the Antiquities and Art Treasures Act, 1972,
as the offences involved. The application was supported by the reply filed by
the Superintendent of Police, C.B.I. On 3rd July 1976, the Chief Metropolitan
Magistrate, Delhi, granted pardon to N. N. Malik. Before the grant of pardon
the confessional statement of N. N. Malik was got recorded by the Metropolitan
Magistrate, Delhi.
Thereafter, on 19th July 1976, a charge-sheet
(R.C. 4/1976) was filed in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Delhi, for offences
under Section 120-B Indian Penal Code read with Sections 420, 411 and 406
Indian Penal Code and Section 25 of the Antiquities and Art Treasures Act, 1972.
The case was transferred to the Court of the Additional Chief Metropolitan
Magistrate. On 20th July 1976, the Additional Metropolitan Magistrate issued
process for the appearance of the three Narang brothers. The learned Magistrate
also issued warrants for the extradition of Omi Narang and Manu Narang who were
in London. Extradition proceedings were initiated in Britain at the instance of
the Government of India. The Metropolitan Magistrate, Bow Street, London
ordered the detention of Omi Narang and Manu Narang pending the issue of
warrants by the Secretary of State under Section 5 of the Fugitive Offenders
Act. A petition for the issue of Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad Subjiciendum was
filed in the High Court of Justice, Queen's Bench Division, London.
The Divisional Court directed the release of
Omi Narang and Manu Narang. The Government of India filed an appeal to the
House of Lords and on 24th March, 1977, the appeal was allowed. Omi Narang and
Manu Narang were finally extradited and brought to India on 27th July, 1977.
930 Meanwhile internal emergency was lifted
in India in March 1977 and Ram Lal Narang was released. Almost immediately he
filed a petition before the Additional Metropolitan Magistrate to drop the
proceedings against him, to cancel the extradition warrants and to discharge
the accused. The contention was that the entire investigation in First
Information Report No. R.C. 4/76 was illegal as a case on the same facts was
already pending before the Ambala Court and that the Delhi Court acted without
jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the case pursuant to a report of police
based upon such illegal investigation. The learned Magistrate held that he was
not competent to sit in judgment, as it were, over the order of his predecessor
taking cognizance of the case. He, however, found that the conspiracy which was
the subject matter of the case before the Court at Ambala and the conspiracy
which was the subject matter of the case before himself were one and the same,
but, he held that the question as to which Court should proceed with the case,
was not for him to decide; it was a matter for the High Court to decide under
Section 186 Criminal Procedure Code. The learned Magistrate also noticed an
application filed before him, after the conclusion of arguments, informing him
that the case in the Court at Ambala against Malik and Mehra had since been
withdrawn on 16th May 1977.
On 21st June 1977, two applications were
filed in the Delhi High Court under Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code, one by
Ramlal Narang and the other on behalf of Omi Narang and Manu Narang who were
still in England awaiting extradition. The applicants sought quashing of the
orders of the learned Metropolitan Magistrate issuing process to them and
warrants for the extradition of Omi Narang and Manu Narang. It was also sought
to be declared that the entire investigation in R.C. 4 of 1976 was illegal and
the orders of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate and the Additional Metropolitan
Magistrate taking cognizance of R.C. 4 of 1976 were illegal. The grant of pardon
to N. N. Malik was questioned. It was also prayed that the proceedings before
the Metropolitan Magistrate might be quashed. The petitions were admitted by
the Delhi High Court on 22nd June, 1977, but ultimately dismissed on 10th
January 1978, by a common judgment. Ramlal Narang having obtained special leave
from this Court has filed Criminal Appeal No. 373 of 1978 and Omi and Manu
Narang have preferred Criminal Appeal No. 374 of 1978. We may mention here that
on 1st August, 1977, a supplemental charge-sheet was filed making Mehra an
accused in the Delhi case, the case in the Ambala Court having been withdrawn
on 16th May, 1977, as mentioned earlier. Malik, we may add, died sometime
during August, 1977.
931 We are given to understand that Mehra
also was subsequently granted pardon.
Shri Harjinder Singh, learned Counsel for the
appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 373 of 1978 and Shri Ashok Sen, learned
Counsel for the appellants in Criminal Appeal No. 374 of 1978 argued that the
conspiracy and the overt acts which were the subject matter of the two First
Information Reports and the two charge-sheets were the same and, therefore,
there was an implied bar to the power of the Police to investigate into First
Information Report No. R.C. 4 of 1976 and the power of the Court at Delhi to
take cognizance of the case upon the report of such information.
It was submitted that the mere circumstance
that some more persons were mentioned as involved or the mere circumstance that
the property was said to have been recovered later would not affect the legal
position. It was submitted that gist of the conspiracy in both the cases was to
obtain possession of the pillars. The offence of conspiracy relating to the
obtaining of the pillars having been investigated and a charge-sheet having
been filed in the Ambala Court, the Police had no authority in law to start a
fresh investigation under the Criminal Procedure Code by registering another
First Information Report and to submit a charge-sheet in the Delhi Court for
the very same offence.
That was an unwarranted interference by the
Police with the proceedings pending in the Court. The whole of the
investigation subsequent to the filing of the charge-sheet in the Ambala Court
was without jurisdiction and no material or fact gathered during the course of
such illegal investigation could be used to found further proceedings.
The Delhi Court was, therefore, in error in
taking cognizance of offences which had already been investigated and which
were the subject matter of proceedings in another Court. It was also argued
that the subsequent withdrawal of the case from the Ambala Court did not and
could not confer jurisdiction on the Delhi Court. The withdrawal itself was an
abuse of the process of the Court.
Shri Lalit, learned Counsel for the
respondents urged that the conspiracy which was the subject matter of the
charge-sheet filed in the Delhi Court was not the same as the conspiracy which
was the subject matter of the charge- sheet filed in the Ambala Court. The
circumstance that some of the conspirators were common and part of the case was
the same did not make the two conspiracies identical with each other. There
was, therefore, no question of any bar against the Delhi Court from taking
cognizance of the case based upon the wider conspiracy merely because the
Ambala Court had taken cognizance of the case based upon the narrower
conspiracy. Shri Lalit also urged that the statutory right of the Police to
investigate into cognizable 932 offences was not fettered and did not end with
the submission of a charge-sheet to the Court. He submitted that the Police had
the right and indeed, the duty, to investigate into fresh facts coming to light
and to appraise the Court of the same.
The basic submission on behalf of the
appellants was that the two conspiracies alleged in the two cases were but one.
The sequitur was that the investigation into and the taking of cognizance of
the second case were without jurisdiction.
We will first examine the question whether
the conspiracy which was investigated by the Police and which investigation led
to the filing of the charge-sheet in the Ambala case can be said to be the same
as the conspiracy which was later investigated and which led to the filing of
the charge-sheet in the Delhi Court. For this purpose, it is necessary to
compare the First Information Report and the charge-sheet in the two cases.
The First Information Report relating to the
case in the Ambala Court was registered against "N. N. Malik and
others" for alleged offences under "Section 120-B Indian Penal Code
read with Section 420 and Section 406 Indian Penal Code." It was stated
therein that N. N. Malik applied to the Court of the Judicial Magistrate 1st
Class, Karnal and obtained possession of the two stone pillars and dishonestly
substituted two fake pillars in their place and returned them to the Court. The
charge-sheet which was filed on 30th December, 1972 mentioned N. N. Malik and
H. L. Mehra as the two accused in the case and recited that N. N. Malik was
introduced by Mehra to the Magistrate as an eminent archaeologist and that he
obtained possession of the pillars on the pretext that he wanted to make some
research. The actual order granting custody of the pillars to Malik was written
by Mehra but signed by the Magistrate R. K. Sen. It was further recited that
sometime after the pillars were returned by Malik to the Court it was
discovered that the pillars so returned were fakes and that N. N. Malik was not
an archaeologist. It was finally said that Malik and Mehra had "thus dishonestly
made misrepresentation of fact and got the delivery of the two statues which
were subsequently substituted by them" and they had "thus committed
the offence under Section 120-B read with Section 420 Indian Penal Code and
Section 406 Indian Penal Code." It is, therefore, seen from the
allegations in the charge-sheet filed in the Ambala Court that the conspirators
involved in the conspiracy which was its subject matter were two, namely, Malik
and Mehra, that the object of the conspiracy was to dishonestly obtain
possession of the pillars by making false representation to the Magistrate and
to substitute the pillars by fakes after 933 obtaining possession of the same
and that the offences committed were under Section 120-B read with Section 420
and 406 Indian Penal Code.
The First Information Report in the Delhi
case was registered on 13th May, 1976, and the offences mentioned were Section
120-B Indian Penal Code read with Section 411 Indian Penal Code and Section
25(1) of the Antiquities and Art Treasures Act, 1972. The accused mentioned in
the report were Manu Narang and Ramlal Narang. After reciting that the pillars
had been taken from the Court by N. N. Malik and had been substituted by fake
pillars, the First Information Report went on to recite that the genuine
pillars, which were stolen from Suraj Kund temple as mentioned above were found
to be in the possession and control of Manohar Lal alias Manu Narang in London.
It was further recited that Manu Narang was negotiating the sale of the pillars
through some London brokers and the price expected to be fetched was
approximately five hundred American dollars. It was recited further that Manu
Narang and his brother Ramlal Narang had commissioned two well known sculptors
of Delhi to make three sets of fake pillars. The two brothers and others,
acting in conspiracy, had dishonestly received and exported the two stone pillars.
The charge-sheet which followed the investigation was filed on 19th July 1976
in the Delhi Court. The charge-sheet mentioned the three Narang brothers,
Ramlal Narang, Manoharlal Narang and Om Parkash Narang, as the three accused
persons sent up for trial and H. L. Mehra as a person not sent up for trial as
he was already facing trial before the Special Magistrate, Ambala. The charge-
sheet recited, among other facts, that the Narang brothers had come to know in
or about the month of February 1978 about the invaluable nature of the pillars
and devised a stratagem to get the custody of the pillars. They discussed their
stratagem with their family friend N. N. Malik, informing him that the pillars
were worth a fortune. Ramlal Narang and Malik met Mehra and it was decided that
Malik should file an application for temporary custody of the pillars and that
Mehra should wield his influence over the Magistrate to help N. N. Malik to get
such temporary custody. That was done. Temporary custody of the pillars was
obtained and they were removed to Delhi in a truck at the instance of the
Narang brothers to a place in Defence Colony, New Delhi. Replicas of the
pillars were made by Balkrishan Rawal and Natwarlal, two eminent sculptors of
Delhi under the supervision of Ramlal Narang and Omi Narang.
Manu Narang also used to visit Delhi and
check the progress made. The original pillars were transported to Bombay by
Manu Narang and smuggled out of the country.
934 Fake pillars were substituted and
returned by N. N. Malik to the Court. Later on, suspicion was created by the
discovery of two fake pillars which were also attempted to be smuggled out of
the country. The two pillars returned by N. N. Malik were then got examined by
experts and were found to be fakes. Malik was presented by the Narang brothers
with a Fiat car, a revolving brass bed and a sum of Rs. 70,000/-.
They also paid for two pleasure trips made by
Malik and his wife to Bombay. It was recited in the charge-sheet that the facts
disclosed "the commission of offences under Section 406 (criminal breach
of trust), Section 411 (receiving and retaining stolen property), Section 420
(cheating) Indian Penal Code and Section 25(1) of the Antiquities and Art Treasures
Act, 1972, all read with Section 120-B Indian Penal Code, in pursuance of
criminal conspiracy to which Manoharlal Narang, Ramlal Narang and Om Prakash
Narang, H. L. Mehra and N. N. Malik (already granted pardon) were
parties." It was further recited "Manoharlal Narang, Ramlal Narang
and Omi Narang also abetted the commission of offences under Section 420 and
Section 406 Indian Penal Code by N. N. Malik approver and these three accused
were, therefore, liable for prosecution under Section 406 and Section 420
Indian Penal Code read with Section 109 Indian Penal Code and they had also
committed other offences under Section 411 Indian Penal Code." It was further
mentioned in the charge-sheet that Manoharlal Narang and Omi Narang were in
London and that proceedings for their extradition were under way. It was also
mentioned that H. L. Mehra was facing trial before the Special Magistrate,
Ambala, for the offences committed by him and, therefore, he was nor being sent
up for trial in this case.
It is obvious that neither at the time when
the First Information Report pertaining to the Ambala case was registered nor
at the time when the charge-sheet was filed in the Ambala Court, were the
Narang brothers known to be in the picture. The investigating agency was not
also aware of what Malik and Mehra had done with the pillars after they had
obtained possession of the pillars from the Court and substituted and returned
fake pillars to the Court. The First Information Report and the charge-sheet
were concerned primarily with the offences of conspiracy to cheat and to
misappropriate committed by Malik and Mehra. At that stage, the investigating
agency was not aware of any conspiracy to send the pillars out of the country.
It was not known that the Narang brothers were also parties to the conspiracy
to obtain possession of the pillars from the Court. It was much later that the
pillars surfaced in London and were discovered to be in the constructive
possession of Narang brothers. Even then, the precise connection between Malik
and Mehra on the one side and 935 Narang brothers on the other was not known.
All that was known was that the pillars which were stolen property within the definition
of the expression in Section 410 Indian Penal Code were found to be in the
possession of Narang brothers in London. On the discovery of the genuine
pillars in the possession of Narang brothers, without anything further to
connect Narang brothers with Malik and Mehra, the police had no option but to
register a case under Section 411 Indian Penal Code against Narang brothers.
That was what was done.
No fault could, therefore, be found with the
police for registering a First Information Report against the Narang brothers
for the offence of conspiracy to commit an offence under Section 411 Indian
Penal Code. In the course of the investigation into this offence, it transpired
that the Narang brothers were also parties to the original conspiracy to obtain
possession of the pillars from the Court by cheating. Facts came to light which
indicated that the conspiracy, which was the subject matter of the case pending
in the Ambala Court was but part of a larger conspiracy. The fresh facts which
came to light resulted in the filing of the second charge-sheet. The several
facts and circumstances mentioned by us earlier and a comparison of the two
First Information Reports and the two charge-sheets show that the conspiracy
which was the subject matter of the second case could not be said to be
identical with the conspiracy which was the subject matter of the first case.
The conspirators were different. Malik and Mehra alone were stated to be the
conspirators in the first case, while the three Narang brothers were alleged to
be the principal conspirators in the second case. The objects of the two
conspiracies were different. The alleged object of the first conspiracy was to
obtain possession of the pillars from the Court by cheating and to
misappropriate them. The alleged object of the second conspiracy was the
disposal of the stolen property by exporting the pillars to London. The
offences alleged in the first case was Section 120-B read with Section 420 and
Section 406 Indian Penal Code, while the offences alleged in the second case
were Section 120-B read with Section 411 Indian Penal Code and Section 25 of
the Antiquities and Art Treasures Act, 1972. It is true that the Antiquities
and Art Treasures Act had not yet come into force on the date when the First
Information Report was registered. It is also true that Omi Narang and Manu
Narang were not extradited for the offence under the Antiquities and Art
Treasures Act and, therefore, they could not be tried for that offence in
India. But the question whether any of the accused may be tried for a
contravention of the Antiquities and Art Treasures Act or under the
corresponding provision of the earlier Act is really irrelevant in deciding
whether the two 936 conspiracies are one and the same. The trite argument that
a Court takes cognizance of offences and not offenders was also advanced. This
argument is again of no relevance in determining the question whether the two
conspiracies which were taken cognizance of by the Ambala and the Delhi Courts
were the same in substance. The question is not whether the nature and
character of the conspiracy has changed by the mere inclusion of a few more
conspirators as accused or by the addition of one more among the objects of the
conspiracy. The question is whether the two conspiracies are in substance and
truth the same. Where the conspiracy discovered later is found to cover a much
larger canvas with broader ramifications, it cannot be equated with the earlier
conspiracy which covered a smaller field of narrower dimensions. We are clear, in
the present case, that the conspiracies which are the subject matter of the two
cases cannot be said to be identical though the conspiracy which is the subject
matter of the first case may, perhaps, be said to have turned out to be part of
the conspiracy which is the subject matter of the second case. As we mentioned
earlier, when investigation commenced in First Information Report No. R.C. 4 of
1976, apart from the circumstance that the property involved was the same; the
link between the conspiracy to cheat and to misappropriate and the conspiracy
to dispose of the stolen property was not known.
The further connected questions arising for
consideration are, what was the duty of the police on discovering that the
conspiracy, which was the subject matter of the earlier case, was part of a
larger conspiracy, whether the police acted without jurisdiction in
investigating or in continuing to investigate into the case and whether the
Delhi Court acted illegally in taking cognizance of the case ? In order to answer
these questions, it is necessary to refer to the relevant provisions of the
Criminal Procedure Code. Counsel on both sides argued the questions on the
basis that the Old Criminal Procedure Code governed the situation. We proceed
on that assumption without deciding whether the trial in the Delhi Court will
be governed by the old Code or the new one.
Under the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898,
whenever an officer in charge of the Police Station received information
relating to the commission of a cognizable offence, he was required to enter
the substance thereof in a book kept by him, for that purpose, in the
prescribed form (Section 154 Criminal Procdure Code). Section 156 Criminal
Procedure Code invested the Police with the power to investigate into 937 cognizable
offences without the order of a Court. If, from the information received or
otherwise, the officer in charge of a Police Station suspected the commission
of a cognizable offence, he was required to send forthwith a report of the same
to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of such offence upon a police
report and than to proceed in person or depute one of his subordinate officers
to proceed to the spot, to investigate the facts and circumstances of the case
and to take measures for the discovery and arrest of the offender (Section 157
Criminal Procedure Code). He was required to complete the investigation without
unnecessary delay, and, as soon as it was completed, to forward to a Magistrate
empowered to take cognizance of the offence upon a police report, a report in
the prescribed form, setting forth the names of the parties, the nature of the
information and the names of the persons who appeared to be acquainted with the
circumstances of the case (Section 173(1) Criminal Procedure Code). He was also
required to state whether the accused had been forwarded in custody or had been
released on bail. Upon receipt of the report submitted under Section 173(1)
Criminal Procedure Code by the officer incharge of the Police Station, the
Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of an offence upon a police report
might take cognizance of the offence (Section 190(1) (b) Criminal Procedure
Code). Thereafter, if, in the opinion of the Magistrate taking cognizance of
the offence, there was sufficient ground for proceeding, the Magistrate was
required to issue the necessary process to secure the attendance of the accused
(Section 204 Criminal Procedure Code). The scheme of the Code thus was that the
First Information Report was followed by investigation, the investigation led
to the submission of a report to the Magistrate, the Magistrate took cognizance
of the offence on receipt of the police report and, finally, the Magistrate
taking cognizance issued process to the accused.
The police thus had the statutory right and
duty to 'register' every information relating to the commission of a cognizable
offence. The police also had the statutory right and duty to investigate the
facts and circumstances of the case where the commission of a cognizable
offence was suspected and to submit the report of such investigation to the
Magistrate having jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence upon a police
report. These statutory rights and duties of the police were not circumscribed
by any power of superintendence or interference in the Magistrate; nor was any
sanction required from a Magistrate to empower the Police to investigate into a
cognizable offence. This position in law was well established. In King Emperor
938 v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmed(1), the Privy Council observed as follows:
"Just as it is essential that every one
accused of a crime should have free access to a Court of justice, so that he
may be duly acquitted if found not guilty of the offence with which he is
charged, so it is of the utmost importance that the judiciary should not
interfere with the police in matters which are within their province and into
which the law imposes on them the duty of inquiry. In India, as has been shown,
there is a statutory right on the part of the police to investigate the circumstances
of an alleged cognizable crime without requiring any authority from the
judicial authorities, and it would, as their Lordships think, be an unfortunate
result if it should be held possible to interfere with those statutory rules by
an exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the Court. The functions of the
judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping, and the
combination of individual liberty with a due observance of law and order is
only to be obtained by leaving each to exercise its own function, always, of
course, subject to the right of the Courts, to intervene in an appropriate case
when moved under Section 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code to give directions
in the nature of Habeas Corpus. In such a case as the present, however, the
Court's function begin when a charge is preferred before it and not until
then....... In the present case, the police have under Sections 154 and 156 of
the Criminal Procedure Code, a statutory right to investigate a cognizable
offence without requiring the sanction of the Court..........
Ordinarily, the right and duty of the police
would end with the submission of a report under Section 173(1) Criminal
Procedure Code upon receipt of which it was up to the Magistrate to take or not
to take cognizance of the offence.
There was no provision in the 1898 Code
prescribing the procedure to be followed by the police, where, after the
submission of a report under Section 173(1) Criminal Procedure Code and after
the Magistrate had taken cognizance of the offence, fresh facts came to light
which required further investigation. There was, of course, no express
provision prohibiting the police from launching upon an investigation into the
fresh facts coming to light after the submission of the report under Section
173(1) or after the Magistrate had taken cognizance of the offence. As we shall
presently point out, it was generally, thought by many High 939 Courts, though
doubted by a few, that the police were not barred from further investigation by
the circumstance that a report under Section 173(1) had already been submitted
and a Magistrate had already taken cognizance of the offence. The Law
Commission in its 41st report recognized the position and recommended that the
right of the police to make further investigation should be statutorily
affirmed. The Law Commission said :
"14.23. A report under Section 173 is
normally the end of the investigation. Sometimes, however, the police officer
after submitting, the report under Section 173 comes upon evidence bearing on
the guilt or innocence of the accused. We should have thought that the police
officer can collect that evidence and send it to the Magistrate concerned. It
appears, however, that Courts have sometimes taken the narrow view that once a
final report under Section 173 has been sent, the police cannot touch the case
again and cannot re- open the investigation. This view places a hindrance in
the way of the investigating agency, which can be very unfair to the
prosecution and, for that matter, even to the accused. It should be made clear
in Section 173 that the competent police officer can examine such evidence and
send a report to the Magistrate. Copies concerning the fresh material must of
course be furnished to the accused".
Accordingly, in the Criminal Procedure Code,
1973, a new provision, Section 173(8), was introduced and it says:
"Nothing in this section shall be deemed
to preclude further investigation in respect of an offence after a report under
sub-section (2) has been forwarded to the Magistrate and, where upon such
investigation, the officer in charge of the police Station obtains further
evidence, oral or documentary, he shall forward to the Magistrate a further
report or reports regarding such evidence in the form prescribed, and the
provisions of sub-sections (2) to (6) shall, as far as may be, apply in
relation to such report or reports as they apply in relation to a report
forwarded under sub section (2)".
The right of the police to make repeated
investigations under the old Code was recognised by the Madras High Court as
early as in 1919 in Divakar Singh v. A. Ramamurthi Naidu (1), where Phillips
and Krishnan, JJ., observed as follows:
940 "Another contention is put forward
that when a report of investigation has been sent in under Section 173,
Criminal P.C., the police has no further powers of investigation, but this
argument may be briefly met by the remark that the number of investigations
into a crime is not limited by law and that when one has been completed another
may be begun on further information received".
In re. Palaniswami Goundan(1) the Madras High
Court held that notwithstanding the filing of a final charge- sheet, a police
officer could still investigate and lay further charge-sheets if he got
information and that there was no finality either to the investigation or to
the laying of charge-sheets. In Md. Niwaz v. The Crown(2) a Bench of the Lahore
High Court consisting of Din Mohammad and Cornelius JJ., cited with approval
the decision of the Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Divakar Singh v.
A. Ramamurthi Naidu(3) already referred to by us. In Prosecuting Inspector v.
Minaketan Mahato(4), the High Court of Orissa held that the police had the
right to reopen investigation even after the submission of the charge-sheet
under Section 173 Criminal Procedure Code if fresh facts came to light. In Rama
Shanker v. State of U.P.(5) a Division Bench of Allahabad High Court took the
view that the submission of a charge-sheet not being a judicial act, the
submission of a fresh charge-sheet after submission of a report under Section
173 Criminal Procedure Code was not illegal. In re. State of Kerala v. State
Prosecutor(6) a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court thought it was well
settled law that the police had the right to reopen the investigation even
after the submission of a charge-sheet under Section 173 Criminal Procedure
Code and that there was no bar for further investigation or for filing of
supplementary report.
In H. N. Rishbud v. The State of
Delhi(7),this Court contemplated the possibility of further investigation even
after a Court had taken cognizance of the case. While noticing that a police
report resulting from an investigation was provided in Section 190 Criminal
Procedure Code as the material on which cognizance was taken, it was pointed
out that it could not be maintained that a valid and legal police report was
the foundation of the jurisdiction of the Court to take cognizance.
941 It was held that where cognizance of the
case had, in fact, been taken and the case had proceeded to termination, the
invalidity of the precedent investigation did not vitiate the result unless
miscarriage of justice had been caused thereby. It was said that a defect or
illegality in investigation, however serious, had no direct bearing on the
competence of the procedure relating to cognizance or trial.
However, it was observed:
"It does not follow that the invalidity
of the investigation is to be completely ignored by a Court during trial. When
the breach of such a mandatory provision is brought to the knowledge of the
Court at a sufficiently early stage, the Court, while not declining cognizance,
will have to take the necessary steps to get the illegality cured and the
defect rectified, by ordering such re-investigation as the circumstances of an
individual case may call for".
This decision is a clear authority for the
view that further investigation is not altogether ruled out merely because
cognizance of the case has been taken by the Court;
defective investigation coming to light
during the course of a trial may be cured by a further investigation, if
circumstances permit it.
In Tara Singh v. State(1) the police first
submitted a report styled as "an incomplete challan", which, however,
contained all the particulars prescribed by Section 173(1).
Later, two supplemental challans were
submitted containing the names of certain formal witnesses. The Magistrate had
taken cognizance of the case when the incomplete challan was submitted. It was
urged that the Magistrate had taken cognizance of the case illegally and the
statements of witneses examined before submission of the supplemental challans
should be excluded from the record. This Court held that the so called
incomplete challan was in fact a complete report of the kind contemplated by
Section 173(1) (a), and, therefore, the Magistrate had properly taken
cognizance of the case. The Court declined to express any opinion on the
question whether the police could be permitted to send incomplete reports under
Section 173(1) Criminal Procedure Code. This case while neither approving nor
disapproving the practice of submitting incomplete challans in the first
instance, certainly notices the existence of such practice.
Some High Courts took the view that with the
submission of a charge-sheet under Section 173 the power of the police to
investigate came to an end and the Magistrate's cognizance of the offence
started.
942 It was said that any further
investigation by the police would trench upon the magisterial cognizance.
Vide-Ram Gopal Neotia v. State of West Bengal(1). In Hanuman & Anr. v. Raj.(2)
it was held that when a case was pending before a Magistrate, the action of the
police in resuming investigation and putting up a new challan against a person
not originally an accused as a result of the further investigation was
unauthorised and unlawful. In State v.
Mehar Singh & Ors.(3), a Full Bench of
the High Court of Punjab and Haryana held that the police became functus
officio once the Court took cognizance of an offence on the filing of a
charge-sheet by the police and thereafter further investigation by the police
was not permissible. The police, it was said, could not 'tinker' with the
proceedings pending in the Court. It was, however, observed that it would be
open to the Magistrate to 'suspend cognizance' and direct the police to make
further investigation into the case and submit a report. The High Court of
Punjab and Haryana acknowledged the existence of the practice of submitting
supplemental charge-sheets, but was of the view that such practice was not
sanctioned by the Code. Faced with the impracticality of banning all further
investigation once cognizance of an offence was taken by the Court, the High
Court tried to find a solution to the problem by suggesting the procedure of
the Magistrate suspending cognizance and ordering further investigation. The
procedure of 'suspending cognizance' suggested by the High Court of Punjab and
Haryana does not appear to us to be warranted by the provisions of the Criminal
Procedure Code.
Anyone acquainted with the day today working
of the criminal courts will be alive to the practical necessity of the police
possessing the power to make further investigation and submit a supplemental
report. It is in the interests of both the prosecution and the defence that the
police should have such power. It is easy to visualise a case where fresh
material may come to light which would implicate persons not previously accused
or absolve persons already accused. When it comes to the notice of the investigating
agency that a person already accused of an offence has a good alibi, is it not
the duty of that agency to investigate the genuineness of the plea of alibi and
submit a report to the Magistrate ? After all the investigating agency has
greater resources at its command than a private individual. Similarly, where
the involvement of persons who are not already accused comes to the notice of
the investigating agency, the investigating agency cannot keep quiet and refuse
to investigate the fresh information.
It is their duty 943 to investigate and
submit a report to the Magistrate upon the involvement of the other persons. In
either case, it is for the Magistrate to decide upon his future course of
action depending upon the stage at which the case is before him. If he has
already taken cognizance of the offence, but has not proceeded with the enquiry
or trial, he may direct the issue of process to persons freshly discovered to
be involved and deal with all the accused, in a single enquiry or trial. If the
case of which he has previously taken cognizance has already proceeded to some
extent, he may take fresh cognizance of the offence disclosed against the newly
involved accused and proceed with the case as a separate case. What action a
Magistrate is to take in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal
Procedure in such situations is a matter best left to the discretion of the
Magistrate. The criticism that a further investigation by the police would
trench upon the proceedings before the Court is really not of very great
substance, since whatever the police may do, the final discretion in regard to
further action is with the Magistrate. That the final word is with the
Magistrate is sufficient safeguard against any excessive use or abuse of the power
of the police to make further investigation. We should not, however, be
understood to say that the police should ignore the pendency of a proceeding
before a Court and investigate every fresh fact that comes to light as if no
cognizance had been taken by the Court of any offence. We think that in the
interests of the independence of the magistracy and the judiciary, in the
interests of the purity of the administration of criminal justice and in the
interests of the comity of the various agencies and institutions entrusted with
different stages of such administration, it would ordinarily be desirable that
the police should inform the Court and seek formal permission to make further
investigation when fresh facts come to light.
As observed by us earlier, there was no
provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 which, expressly or by
necessary implication, barred the right of the police to further investigate
after cognizance of the case had been taken by the Magistrate. Neither Section
173 nor Section 190 lead us to hold that the power of the police to further
investigate was exhausted by the Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence.
Practice, convenience and preponderance of authority, permitted repeated
investigations on discovery of fresh facts. In our view, notwithstanding that a
Magistrate had taken cognizance of the offence upon a police report submitted
under Section 173 of the 1898 Code, the right of the police to further
investigate was not exhausted and the police could exercise such right as often
as necessary when fresh information came to light. Where the police desied to
make a further investigation, the police could express their regard and respect
for the Court by seeking its formal permission to make further investigation.
As in the present case, occasions may arise
when a second investigation started independently of the first may disclose a
wide range of offences including those covered by the first investigation.
Where the report of the second investigation is submitted to a Magistrate other
than the Magistrate who has already taken cognizance of the first case, it is
up to the prosecuting agency or the accused concerned to take necessary action
by moving the appropriate superior Court to have the two cases tried together.
The Magistrates themselves may take action suo motu. In the present case, there
is no problem since the earlier case has since been withdrawn by the
prosecuting agency. It was submitted to us that the submission of a
charge-sheet to the Delhi Court and the withdrawal of the case in the Ambala Court amounted to an abuse of the process of the Court. We do not think that the
prosecution acted with any oblique motive. In the charge-sheet filed in the Delhi Court, it was expressly mentioned that Mehra was already facing trial in the Ambala Court and he was, therefore, not being sent for trial. In the application made to the
Ambala Court under Section 494 Criminal Procedure Code, it was expressly
mentioned that a case had been filed in the Delhi Court against Mehra and
others and, therefore, it was not necessary to prosecute Mehra in the Ambala Court. The Court granted its permission for the withdrawal of the case.
Though the investigating agency would have
done better if it had informed the Ambala Magistrate and sought his formal
permission for the second investigation, we are satisfied that the
investigating agency did not act out of any malice.
We are also satisfied that there has been no
illegality.
Both the appeals are, therefore, dismissed.
M.R. Appeals dismissed.
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