Concord of India Insurance Co Ltd. Vs.
Nirmala Devi & Ors [1979] INSC 85 (16 April 1979)
KRISHNAIYER, V.R.
KRISHNAIYER, V.R.
PATHAK, R.S.
CITATION: 1979 AIR 1666 1979 SCR (3) 694 1979
SCC (4) 365
CITATOR INFO :
R 1988 SC 898 (7) RF 1992 SC1261 (8)
ACT:
Negligence of Counsel which misleads a
litigant into delayed pursuit of his remedy-Propriety and reasonableness of
companies and other persons relying upon legal opinion in the matter of
computation of limitation-Limitation Act, 1963 (Act XXXVI) Section 5.
Need for no fault tortious liability by
State-Legal rights, literacy in the case of automobile, accidents and the
processual modalities which secure redressal of grievances, explained.
HEADNOTE:
A doctor and his brother riding a motor cycle
were hit by a jeep driver and both were killed in November 1971, but the Motor
Accident claims Tribunal delivered judgment on 5- 9-1976 five years later
awarding sums of Rs. 80,000/- and Rs. 73,500/- to the two sets of claimants.
The appeal in this case had to be filed on or
before 19-1-77 but was actually filed 30 days later with an application for
condonation under S. 5 of the Limitation Act on the ground of Counsel's mistake
in the calculation of the period of limitation. The High Court dismissed the
appeal and the application.
Dismissing the special leave petitions, the
Court
HELD: A company relies on its Legal Adviser
and the Manager's expertise is in company management and not in law.
There is no particular reason why when a
company or other person retains a lawyer to advise it or him on legal affairs
reliance should not be placed on such counsel. Of course, if there is gross
delay too patent even for layman or if there is in comprehensible indifference
the shield of legal opinion may still be vulnerable. If legal Adviser's
opinions are to be subjected by company managers to further legal scrutiny of
their own, an impossible situation may arise.
Indeed Government, a large litigant in this
country, may find itself in difficulty. [697E-F, 698 F-G] This does not
automatically secure a visa for the petitioner into this Court under Art. 136.
There must be manifest injustice or gross misappreciation or perversity in
factual findings. [698H] State of Kerala v. Krishna Kurup Madhava Kurup, A.I.R
1971 Kerala 211; approved.
State of West Bengal v. Howrah Municipal
Corporation, AIR 1972 SC 749; referred to.
Observations
1. The jurisprudence of compensation for
motor accidents must develop in the direction of no-fault liability and the
determination of the quantum must be liberal, not niggardly since the law
values life and limb in a free 695 country in generous scales. Social justice,
the command of the Constitution is being violated by the State itself by
neglecting road repairs, ignoring deadly over-loads and contesting liability
after nationalising the bulk of bus transport and the whole of general
insurance business.
[696C-D]
2. Medieval roads with treacherous dangers
and total disrepair, explosive increase of heavy vehicles often terribly
overloaded and without cautionary signals, reckless drivers crazy with speed
and tipsy with spirituous potions, non-enforcement of traffic regulations
designed for safety but offering opportunities for systematised corruption and
little else and, as a cumulative effect, mounting highway accidents, demand a
new dimension to the law of torts through no fault liability and processual
celerity and simplicity in compensation claims cases. [696B-C]
3. If only no-fault liability, automatic
reporting by the police who investigate the accident in a statutory proforma
signed by the claimants and forwarded to the tribunal as in Tamil Nadu and
decentralised empowerment of such tribunals in every district coupled with
informal procedures and liberation from court-fees and the sophisticated rules
of evidence and burden of proof were introduced-easy and inexpensive, if the
State has the will to help the poor who mostly die in such accidents-law's
delays in this compassionate jurisdiction can be banished.
Social justice in action is the measure of
the State's constitutional sensitivity. [696F-G]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Special Leave
Petition (Civil) Nos. 5228 and 5286 of 1977.
From the Judgment and order dated 8-8-1977 of
the Punjab and Haryana High Court in F.A.O. No. 81 and 82 of 1977.
P. P. Malhotra and R. N. Dikshit for the
Petitioner.
S. K. Gambhir for the Respondent.
The order of the Court was delivered by
KRISHNA IYER, J. An explosive escalation of automobile accidents, accounting
for more deaths than the most deadly diseases, has become a lethal phenomenon
on Indian Roads everywhere. The jural impact of this tragic development on our
legislatures, courts and law enforcing agencies is insufficient, with the
result that the poor, who are, by and large, the casualty in most of these
cases, suffer losses of life or limb and are deprived of expeditious legal
remedies in the shape of reasonably quantified compensation promptly paid-and
this, even after compulsory motor insurance and nationalisation of insurance
business. The facts of this special leave petitions, which we dismiss by this
order, raise two serious issues which constrain us to make a speaking order.
The first deals with legal 696 rights, literacy in the case of automobile
accidents and the processual modalities which secure redressal of grievances.
The second relates to the consequences of
negligence of counsel which misleads a litigant into delayed pursuit of his
remedy.
Medieval roads with treacherous dangers and
total disrepair, explosive increase of heavy vehicles often terribly overloaded
and without cautionary signals, reckless drivers crazy with speed and tipsy
with spirituous potions, non-enforcement of traffic regulations designed for
safety but offering opportunities for systematised corruption and little else and,
as a cumulative effect, mounting highway accidents demand a new dimension to
the law of torts through no fault liability and processual celerity and
simplicity in compensation claims cases. Social justice, the command of the
Constitution is being violated by the State itself by neglecting road repairs,
ignoring deadly overloads and contesting liability after nationalising the bulk
of bus transport and the whole of general insurance business. The jurisprudence
of compensation for motor accidents must develop in the direction of no-fault
liability and the determination of the quantum must be liberal, not niggardly
since the law values life and limb in a free country in generous scales. In the
present case, a doctor and his brother riding a motor cycle were hit, by a jeep
driver and both were killed. The fatal event occurred in November 1971 but the
Motor Accident Claims Tribunal delivered judgment five years later awarding
sums of Rs. 80,000/- and Rs. 73,500/- to the two sets of claimants.
The delay of five years in such cases is a
terrible commentary on the judicial process. If only no-fault liability,
automatic reporting by the police who investigate the accident in a statutory
proforma signed by the claimants and forward to the tribunal as in Tamil Nadu
and decentralised empowerment of such tribunals in every district coupled with
informal procedures and liberation from court-fees and the sophisticated rules
of evidence and burden of proof were introduced-easy and inexpensive if the
State has the will to help the poor who mostly die in such accidents-law's
delays in this compassionate jurisdiction can be banished. Social justice in
action is the measure of the State's constitutional sensitivity. Anyway, we
have made these observation hopefully to help focus the attention of the Union
and the States.
The nationalised insurance company appealed
to the High Court against the award. We have no doubt that the finding on both
the 697 culpability and the quantum as rendered by the trial court are correct.
But the High Court dismissed the appeal on the ground of delay, dismissing the
application of the petitioner for condonation under S. 5 of the Limitation Act.
The Accident Claims Tribunal pronounced its
award on September, 15, 1976, after making the necessary computations and
deductions. The appeal had to be filed on or before January 19, 1977 but was
actually filed 30 days later.
Counsel for the petitioner is stated to have
made the mistake in the calculation of the period of limitation. He had
intimated the parties accordingly with the result that the petitioner was
misled into instituting appeal late. The High Court took the view that the
lawyer's ignorance about the law was no ground for condonation of delay.
Reliance was placed on some decisions of the Punjab High Court and there was
reference also to a ruling of the Supreme Court in AIR 1972 SC 749(1). The
conclusion was couched in these words:
"The Assistant Divisional Manager of the
Company appellant is not an illiterate or so ignorant person who could not
calculate the period of limitation. Such like appeals are filed by such
companies daily. The facts of this case clearly show, as observed earlier, that
the mistake is not bonafide and the appellant has failed to show sufficient
cause to condone the delay." We are not able to agree with this reasoning.
A company relies on its Legal Adviser and the Manager's expertise is in company
management and not in law. There is no particular reason why when a company or
other person retains a lawyer to advise it or him on legal affairs reliance
should not be placed on such counsel. Of course, if there is gross delay too
patent even for layman or if there is incomprehensible indifference the shield
of legal opinion may still be vulnerable. The correct legal position has been
explained with reference to the Supreme Court decision in a judgment of one of
us in AIR 1971 Ker. 211:
"The law is settled that mistake of
counsel may in certain circumstances be taken into account in condoning delay
although there is no general proposition that mistake of counsel by itself is
always a sufficient ground. It is always a question whether the mistake was
bonafide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose such as laches 698
on the part of the litigant or an attempt to save limitation in an underhand
way. The High Court unfortunately never considered the matter from this angle.
If it had, it would have seen quite clearly that there was no attempt to avoid
the Limitation Act but rather to follow it albeit on a wrong reading of the
situation." "The High Court took the view that Mr. Raizada being an
Advocate of 34 years' standing could not possibly make the mistake in view of
the clear provisions on the subject of appeals existing under Section 39(1) of
the Punjab Courts Act and therefore, his advice to file the appeal before the
District Court would not come to the rescue of the appellant under Section 5 of
the Limitation Act. The Supreme Court upset this approach." "I am of
the view that legal advice given by the members of the legal profession may
sometimes be wrong even as pronouncement on questions of law by courts are sometimes
wrong. An amount of latitude is expected in such cases for, to err is human and
lay men, as litigants are, may legitimately lean on expert counsel in legal as
in other departments, without probing the professional competence of the
advice. The court must of course, see whether in such cases there is any taint
of mala fides or element of recklessness or ruse. If neither is present, legal
advice honestly sought and actually given, must be treated as sufficient cause
when an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is being considered.
The State has not acted improperly in relying on its legal advisers." We
have clarified the legal position regarding the propriety and reasonableness of
companies and other persons relying upon legal opinion in the matter of
computation of limitation since it is a problem which may arise frequently.
If Legal Adviser's opinions are to be
subjected by company managers to further legal scrutiny of their own, an
impossible situation may arise. Indeed Government, a large litigant in this
country, may find itself in difficulty.
That is the reason why we have chosen to
explain at this length the application of S. 5 vis-a-vis counsel's mistake.
This does not automatically secure a visa for
the petitioner into this Court under Article 136. There must be manifest
injustice or gross mis-appreciation or perversity in factual findings. We have
699 examined the merits of the matter to the extent available on the record and
have heard counsel for the petitioner. He has hardly convinced us that the
merits of the case call for any intervention at all. In this view we are
constrained to dismiss the Special Leave Petitions now that we have expressed
ourselves or both the points dealt with above.
S.R. Petitions dismissed.
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