Yash Pal Mittal Vs. State of Punjab
[1977] INSC 206 (3 November 1977)
GOSWAMI, P.K.
GOSWAMI, P.K.
UNTWALIA, N.L.
DESAI, D.A.
CITATION: 1977 AIR 2433 1978 SCR (1) 781 1977
SCC (4) 540
ACT:
Penal Code (Act 45 of 1860), sec. 120A and
120B-Object and scope of.
Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), sec.
196A(ii)-sec.
196 of 1973 Code-Object of criminal
conspiracy, if clear from the charge itself, whether trial is vitiated for want
of sanction udder s. 196A(2).
HEADNOTE:
A criminal case was filed in 1961 against the
appellant under s. 120B of the Penal Code while in respect of others for
various offences under ss. 465, 471/ 466, 476/466, 470 and 419 read with s.
120B, Penal Code. The Special Judicial Magistrate, Punjab Camp Jullundur framed
charges under the aforesaid sections against the accused. An objection,
"that for want of sanction under s. 196A(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code
1898 the trial under s. 120B, I.P.C. was invalid," raised by the accused
appellant was rejected by the Trial Court on 6-6-1970 holding that no sanction
was necessary in the case. A revision application filed against the said orders
was dismissed by the Punjab High Court on 24-3-1972. The appellant thereafter
obtained special leave on 5-4-1973 from this Court.
'Dismissing the appeal the Court,
HELD:(1) The very agreement, concert or
league is the ingredient of the offence of criminal conspiracy under s.
120A introduced for the first time in 1913 in
Chapter VA of the Penal Code. It is not necessary that all the conspirators
must know each and every detail of the conspiracy as long as they are
co-participators in the main object of the conspiracy. There may be so many
devices and techniques adopted to achieve the common goal of the conspiracy and
there may be division of performances in the chain of actions with one object
to achieve the real end of which every collaborator must be aware and in which
each one of them must be interested. There must be unity of object or purpose
but there may be plurality of means sometimes even unknown to one another,
amongst the conspirators. In achieving the goal several offences may be
committed by some of the conspirators even unknown to the others. The only
relevant factor is that all means adopted and illegal acts done must be and purported
to be in furtherance of the object of the conspiracy even though there may be
sometimes misfire or over-shooting by some of the conspirators. Even if some
steps are resorted to by one or two of the conspirators without the knowledge
of the others it will not affect the culpability of those others when they are
associated with the object of the conspiracy.
[784 F-H, 785 A] Major B. G. Barsav v. The
State of Bombay [1962] 2 SCR 195 at 228, followed.
(2) That an accused himself is not charged
with the ultimate offence which is the object of the criminal conspiracy is
besides the point in a charge under s. 120B I.P.C. as long as he is a party to
the conspiracy with the end in view. Whether the charges will be ultimately
established against the accused is a completely different matter within the
domain of the 'Trial Court. [785 F] (3 ) In the instant case :
(a)The main object of the criminal conspiracy
in the first charge is undoubtedly "cheating by personation". The
other means adopted, inter alia, are preparation or causing to be prepared
spurious passports; forging or causing to be forged entries and endorsements in
that connection; and use of or causing to be used forged passport as genuine in
order to facilitate travel of IF persons abroad. The final object of the
conspiracy in the first charge being the offence of cheating by personation,
the other offences described therein are steps albeit offences themselves in
and of the ultimate crime. Without achieving that goal other acts would be of
no material use in which any person could be necessarily interested. That the
appellant himself does not personate another person is beside the point when
he, is alleged to be a collaborator of the conspiracy with that object.
[785D-E-F] (b)Although the word "cheating by personation" was not
mentioned in the charge, no valid objection could be made, as the entire
recitals are clear arid are also followed up by a specific mention of the
offence under s. 419, I.P.C.
[783 H 784 A] Bhanwar- Singh & Anr. v.
State of Rajasthan [1968] 2 SCR 528, distinguished.
(c)The object of criminal conspiracy is
absolutely clear, the object is not cheating simpliciter under s. 417, I.P.C.
[785 H] (d)Since the object of criminal
conspiracy is cheating by personation u/s. 419 I.P.C. punishable with
imprisonment which may extend to three years, section 196A(2) is no bar to the
present trial in the absence of a sanction. The fact that the accused are
charged with other non-cognisableoffences in the same trial cannot affect the
validity of the trial [786 C-D]
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal
No.81 1973.
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and
Order dated 24-3-1972 of the Punjab & Harayan High Court in Crl. Revision
No. 739 of 1970.
Frank Anthony and D. N. Mishra for the
Appellant.
R. L. Kohli and R. N. Sachthey for the
Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
GOSWAMI, J.-The criminal case, out of which this appeal arises, goes back to
the year 1961. On July 1, 1967, the Special Judicial Magistrate Punjab, camp
Jullundur, committed the appellant along with several others to stand trial in
the Court of Sessions under various charges, such as under sections 465,
471/466, 476/466, 417, 419 read with section 120B IPC. Apparently it took
nearly three years for the trial to commence. On objection being raised by the
accused with regard to the sanction under section 196A(2) Cr. P. C., 1898, the
trial court on June 6, 1970, rejected the same by holding that no sanction was
necessary in the case. The trial court, however, held that the particular
sanction accorded under section 196A(2) Cr. P. C. was invalid, the correctness
of which was not challenged before us.
That led to a revision application by the
accused before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana. That was also rejected on
March 24, 1972. The appellant obtained special leave against the order of the
High Court on April 5, 1973.
Even such a short matter, as it is, where no
records are required to, be prepared. has come, up for hearing before us after
well over four years. True, the accused profits by the delay in many ways but
the State should have been vigilant to, apply for an expeditious hearing of
such a short matter since the trial has been inordinately delayed on account of
this. The methodology of disposal of such a matter, like the pattern we have
been recently adopting, may suitably be to dispose of the whole matter within a
month after notice of motion to the State at the the of hearing of the special
leave petition.
783 The only question raised before us by Mr.
Frank Anthony is with regard to the invalidity of the trial under section 120B
IPC in absence of sanction tinder section 196A(2) Cr. P. C., 1898.
In order to appreciate the objection we may
at once turn to the charges framed in the trial. The appellant faces only one
charge alone with II others as follows:- "Firstly:-That you all during the
period January, 1961 to May, 1962 in the State of Punjab, it Bombay and at
Calcutta were party with the following accused persons who are absconding
namely;
1. Julman Singh s/o Kishen Singh v. Mazara
Navabad, Distt. Jullundur.
2. Gurdev Singh s/o Munshi Ram v. Cheekahi,
Distt. Jullundur.
3. Minder s/o Sucha Singh v. Sarhala Distt.
Jullundur.
4. Harnam Singh s/o Udham Singh v. Pathlave,
Distt. Jullundur.
and with one Jodh. Singh son of Vir Singh, 8
Modern Colony, District Jullundur and others to a criminal conspiracy to do or
cause to be done certain illegal acts, namely to prepare or to be prepared
spurious Government of India Passports booklets, to forge or cause to be forged
entries and endorsements therein and to use or cause to be used such forged
passports as genuine, knowing or having reason to believe, them to be forged,
in order to facilitate travel of persons abroad including yourselves and
thereby to cheat the Em- barkation Authorities at Air Ports by inducing such
authorities to believe that the passports were valid and genuine and upon such
belief permit the travel abroad...... And thereby committed an offence
punishable u/s 120-B IPC read with sections 465, 476/466 and 419/IPC and within
the cognizance of the court of Sessions".
The first charge in which all accused. are,
named including tile appellant is tile principal charge describing the nature
and object of the conspiracy in which a number of persons including. absconders
and some unknown persons were involved. With regard, to the. twelve other
remaining charges, although the appellant was not charged under any of them,
his other companions were charged and in eight of these charges, specific
mention was made of various offences being committed "in pursuance of the
said conspiracy". Some of the accused persons are charged tinder
substantive offences which are connected with the object of tile conspiracy.
The court could have added in the remaining charges also that the offences
were, committed in pursuance of the said conspiracy but much cannot be made of
its non- mention at this stage at any rate.
Mr. Anthony submits very strenuously that the
first and the only charge in which the appellant is involved speaks merely of
"cheating" which is an offence under section 417 IPC punishable with
imprisonment for one year. When pointed out that the charges does refer
specifically to section 419 IPC, be submits that the mention of the offence 784
is not decisive when the recitals in the charge do not notify to the accused
"cheating by personation". He relies strongly on the decision of this
Court in Bhanwar Singh & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan(1) as his main plank of
attack.
He draws our attention to the observation
therein that "the object of the conspiracy has to be determined, not only
by reference to the sections of the penal enactment, referred to in the charge,
but on a reading of the charges themselves".
It is not possible to accede to the above
submission of Mr. Anthony. The aforesaid observation cannot be called in aid at
the threshold of a trial divorced from the context. That was a case where the
accused were, convicted at the trial and the appeal by special leave was
dismissed. The court was in a position to ascertain in that case as to whether
the accused had proper notice of the charge with the definite object of
conspiracy and whether there was any prejudice to the accused in any manner
affecting the trial.
We are however, called upon to examine the
matter at the threshold. We have carefully read the first charge and although
the words "cheating by personation" were not mentioned therein, no
valid objection could be made as the entire recitals are clear and are also followed
up by a specific mention of the offence under section 419 IPC. We are not
required to ascertain the object of the conspiracy from mere mention of section
419 IPC but from the recitals in the charge. The decision in Bhanwar Singh
(Supra) does not come to the aid of counsel in this case. Since an objection
like this has been made, it will be even open to the trial court to alter the
Words of the charge by specifically mentioning "cheating by
personation".
Besides. the other charges levelled against
the alleged co- conspirators also throw sufficient light on the object of the
conspiracy and it is not necessary that the appellant should figure or for the
matter of that all accused should figure in all the charges.
The offence of criminal conspiracy under
section 120A is a distinct offence introduced for the first time in 1913 in
Chapter VA of the Penal Code. The very agreement, concert or league is the
ingredient of the offence. It is not necessary that all the conspirators must
know each and every detail of the conspiracy as long as they are co-
participators in the main object of the conspiracy. There may be so many
devices and techniques adopted to achieve the common goal of the conspiracy and
there may be division of performances in the chain of actions with one object
to achieve the real end of which every collaborator must be aware and in which
each one of them must be interested.
There must be unity of object or purpose but
there may be plurality of means sometimes even unknown to one another, amongst
the conspirators. In achieving the goal several offences, may be committed by
some of the conspirators even unknown to the others. The only relevant factor
is that all means adopted and illegal acts done must be and purported to be in
furtherance of the object of the conspiracy even though there may be sometimes
misfire or over-shooting by some of the conspirators. Even if some steps are
resorted to by one or two- of the conspirators without the knowledge of the
others it will not affect the culpability of those (1)[1968] 2 S.C.R. 528.
785 others when they are associated with the
object of the conspiracy. The significance of criminal conspiracy under section
120A is brought out pithily by this Court in Major B. G. Darsay v. The State of
Bombay.(1) thus:
"The gist of the offences is an
agreement to break the law. The parties to such an agreement will be guilty of
criminal conspiracy, though the illegal act agreed to be done has not been
done. So too, it is not an ingredient of the offence that all the parties
should agree to do a single illegal act. It may comprise the commission of a
number of acts. Under s. 43 of the Indian Penal Code, an act would be illegal
if it is an offence or if it is prohibited by law.
Under the first charge the accused are
charged with have conspired to do three categories of illegal acts, and the
mere fact that all of them could not be convicted separately in respect of each
of the offences has no relevancy in considering the question whether the
offence of conspiracy has been committed.
They are all guilty of the offence of
conspiracy to do illegal acts, though for individual offences all of them may
not be liable." We are in respectful agreement with the above observations
with regard to the offence of criminal conspiracy.
The main object of the criminal conspiracy in
the first charge is undoubtedly cheating by personation. The other means
adopted, inter alia, are preparation or causing to be prepared spurious
passports; forging or causing to be forged entries and endorsements in that connection;
and use of or causing to be used forged passports as genuine in order to
facilitate travel of persons abroad. The final object of the conspiracy in the
first charge being the offence of cheating by personation, and we find, the
other offence described therein are steps, albeit, offences themselves, in aid
of the ultimate crime. The charge does not connote plurality of objects of the
conspiracy. That the appellant himself is not charged with the ultimate
offence,, which is the object of the criminal conspiracy, is beside the point
in a charge under section 120B IPC as long as he is a party to the conspiracy
with the end in view. Whether the charges will be ultimately established
against the accused is a completely different matter within the domain of the
trial court.
The principal object of the criminal
conspiracy in the first charge is thus "cheating by personation" and
without achieving that goal other acts would be of no material use in which any
person could be necessarily interested. That the appellant himself does not
personate another person is beside the point when he is alleged to be a
collaborator of the conspiracy with that object. We have seen that some persons
have been individually and specifically charged with cheating by personation
under section 419 IPC. They were also charged along with the appellant under
section 120B IPC. The object of criminal conspiracy is absolutely clear and
there is no substance in the argument that the object is merely to cheat
simpliciter under section 417 IPC.
(1)[1962] 2 S.C.R. 195 at 228.
786 Section 196A(2) Cr. P. C. provides that
"no court shall take cognizance of the offence of criminal conspiracy
punishable under section 120 B of the Indian Penal Code, (2) in a case where
the object of the conspiracy is to commit any non-cognizable offence, or a
cognizable offence not punishable with death, imprisonment for life or rigorous
imprisonment for a term of two years or upwards, unless the State Government or
a Chief Presidency Magistrate or District Magistrate empowered in this behalf
by the State Government has, by order in writing, consented to the initiation
of the proceedings." x x x x Since the object of the criminal conspiracy
is cheating by personation under section 419 IPC punishable with imprisonment
which may extend to three years, section 196A(2) is no bar to the present trial
in the absence of a sanction. The fact that the accused are charged with other
non-cognizable offences in the same trial cannot affect the validity of the
trial. There is no merit in this appeal which is dismissed. The records shall be
dispatched immediately to the trial court which will dispose of the case at an
early date.
S.R. Appeal dismissed'.
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