Firm Panjumal Daulatram Vs. Sakhi
Gopal  INSC 135 (3 May 1977)
SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH, JASWANT
CITATION: 1977 AIR 2077 1977 SCR (3) 767 1977
SCC (3) 284
Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961
12(1)(e) & (f)--Scope of---Bona fide
requirement---Requirement of the land-lord of accommodation of both residential
and non-residential part of the building, if proved entitled eviction of the
Under sub clauses (e) and (f) of S. 12(1) of
the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961, a landlord can evict a
tenant, if the residential and the non-residential accommodation respectively
let out to the latter is required bona fide by him for occupation as a
residence and for the purpose of continuing or starting his business. Accommodation
under the Act means any building or part of a building, whether residential or
The appellant-tenant was inducted in by the
respondent in 1955 for the dual purposes of residential and non-residential
purpose of running a cloth shop. The landlord, bona fide required the building
for his residence and also for starting his business of running a Chemist shop.
The Eviction Suit filed by him was dismissed by the trial court, but the
appellant and the High Court ,,ranted him the eviction decree.
Discussing the appeal by special leave, the
HELD: The residential portion as well as a
non-residential portion are parts of the building and each is an accommodation
by definition. The landlord is entitled to eviction of the
"accommodation" if he makes out a bona fide residential and
non-residential requirement of the portions.
In the instant case the contract was integral
but had dual purpose. The landlord has put forward dual requirements which
neatly fit into S. 12(1)(e) and (f) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control
Act, 1961. The findings of the appellate Court regarding the bona fide
requirement of the landlord, not having been challenged in the High Court and in
this Court in the memorandum of Appeal, the consequence viz. eviction is
inevitable. [769 E-G] S. Sanyal v. Gianchand  1 S.C.R. 536,
[The Court, however granted time to the
appellants for vacating the building till 1-1-1978, in terms of equity].
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal
(Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment
and Order dated the 21.1.1976 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Second Appeal
No. 415 of 1971) S. Choudhury, D.N. Mishra, O.C. Mathur and Shri Narain for the
G.L. Sanghi, V.K. Sanghi, R.K. Sanghi and
S.N. Khanduja for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
KRISHNA IYER, J. A suit for eviction of an accommodation from the tenant to
whom it had been let for residential and non-residential 768 purposes resulted
in dismissal by the trial Judge. But in an appeal, the final court of fact took
the view that the landlord (respondent) was entitled to eviction. The tenant
challenged the appellate decree before the High Court in Second Appeal without
success and has therefore come up to this Court with this appeal by special
A short point has been raised which deserves
only a short answer. Since we agree with the High Court which in turn has
agreed with the first appellate court, our judgment can afford to be brief.
A statement of necessary facts may now be
given. The landlord had let out the premises, which is a storied building, to
be tenant as per Ex. P-1 of 1955. The significant clause in the lease deed runs
2. I take your house for my own use i.e. for
opening a cloth shop and for residential purposes and I will not sublet your
house to anybody.
XXX XXX XXX XXX." The tenant has thus
put the building to business and residential purposes. The landlord, who is an
M. Sc., claimed the building back on the score that he wanted to run a medical
store on the ground floor a non-residential purpose---and stay on the first
floor with his wife--a residential purpose. Thus the acommodation was let out for
dual purposes, was being used presumably for these requirements and was being
claimed back by the landlord for the twin purposes mentioned above. The final
court of fact has held that the landlord needs the building for his chemist's
shop and for his residential use. The High Court in Second Appeal has upheld
this finding and added that "the finding as to his bonafide requirement
was rightly not challenged before me ......
The conclusion that the courts have reached
is the only conclusion possible on the evidence on record in the light of the
circumstances appearing." This statement by the High Court that the
bonafide requirement of the landlord was not challenged before it has not been
questioned in the memorandum of appeal to this Court.
It must therefore be taken that the bonafide
need of the landlord is validly made out.
The short point that survives is as to
whether the composite purposes of the lease would put it out of the ground set
out for eviction under s. 2 of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act,
1961. The said Act defines 'accommodation' thus:
" 'accommodation' means any building or
part of a building, whether residential or nonresidential and includes,-XX XXX
XXX." 769 It follows that an accommodation can be residential, non-residential
or both. S. 12 bars an action of eviction of a tenant from any accommodation
except on one or more of the grounds set out therein. S. 12(1) (e) and (f),
bearing on the present case, may be appropriately extracted here:
"12. Restriction on eviction of tenents
(1) (a) to (d) x x x x x (e) that the accommodation let for residential
purposes is required bona fide by the landlord for occupation as a residence
for himself or for any member of his family, if he is the owner thereof, or for
any person for whose benefit the accommodation is held. and that the landlord
or such person has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation of
his own in the occupation in the city or town concerned;
(f) that the accommodation let for nonresidential
purposes is required bona fide by the landlord for the purpose of continuing or
starting his business or that of any of his major sons or unmarried daughters
if he is the owner thereof or for any person for whose benefit the
accommodation is held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably
suitable non-residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city
or town concerned;.
XXX XXX XXX." The residential portion is
a part of the building and is an accommodation by definition. The
non-residential portion is also a part of the building and is an accommodation
by definition. The lease has been given for residential as well as
non-residential purposes. The landlord is entitled to eviction of the
residential portion if he makes out a bonafide residential requirement.
Likewise he is entitled to eviction of the
non-residential portion which is an accommodation if he makes out a
non-residential requirement. We have already found that the final court of
fact, affirmed by the High Court, has found in favour of the landlord regarding
his residential as well as nonresidential requirements. Therefore, nothing more
can be done in defence of the tenant in the light of the present law.
Counsel contended that in a decision of this
Court, viz, S. Sanyal v. Gian Chand,(1) it has been held that it is not
permissible for the court to split up a contract in an eviction proceeding. We
agree. There is no question of splitting up of the contract in the present
case, as is abundantly plain from what we: have stated. The contract was
integral but had dual purposes. The landlord has put forward dual requirements
which neatly fit into s. 12(1)(e) and (f). The consequence is inevitable that
the eviction order has to be upheld.
(1)  1 S.C.R. 536.
770 It is seep, that the tenant has been
doing a thriving cloth business, with goodwill attached to it, for well knigh
30 years. It is therefore but fair that the. tenant is given sometime to
rehabilitate himself by securing an alternative but suitable accommodation. In
our towns where scarcity of accommodation is the rule it is not that easy to
secure alternative premises. Taking due note of this reality, we direct that
while dismissing the appeal the eviction order shall not be put into execution
before 1st January, 1978.
Parties will bear their respective costs.
S.R. Appeal dismissed.