Kalumiya Karimmiya Vs. State of
Gujarat & Ors  INSC 10 (14 January 1977)
CITATION: 1977 AIR 497 1977 SCR (2) 606 1977
SCC (1) 715
Land Acquisition Act 1894--Secs. 4, 5A,
6--Reasonable opportunity in inquiry under sec. 5A--Whether collector bound to
give copy of the report submitted to Government to the owner of land--Effect of
not giving the copy--Delay between sec. 4 & 6 notifications --Effect
of--What is unreasonable delay--Vagueness of s. 4 notification.
A notification was issued under section 4(1)
of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 on 7.6.1966 intending to acquire a total area
of 13,900 sq. yds of land including 474 sq. yards of the appellant's land in
Surat City. After considering the objections under s. 5A a notification under
section 6 was issued on 13.1.1969. The appellant filed a writ petition in the
High Court challenging the said notifications which was summarily dismissed.
The High Court, however, granted a certificate under Art. 133(1) (b) & (c)
of the Constitution on the question of vires of sections 4, 5A and 6 of the
(1) In spite of the appellant's request for
furnishing a copy of the report under s. 5A the Collector did not give him a
copy and, therefore, he did not have adequate and proper hearing under s. 5A.
(2) There was considerable delay between the
notification under sections 4 and 6.
(3) Notification under s. 4 does not contain
the public purpose as the requirement for "fire station". The notification
merely mentions" station workshop and parking purpose." Dismissing
HELD: (1) Ordinarily there should be no
difficulty in furnishing a copy of the report under s. 5A to an objector when
he asks for the same. However, it is not a correct proposition that hearing
under s. 5A is invalid because of failure to furnish a copy of the report at
the conclusion of the proceeding under the said Act, [608 F-G] (2) A second
hearing by the State Government after the report is furnished by the Collector
is not necessary.
[608-H] Abdul Husein Tayabali & Ors. v.
State of Gujarat & Ors.  (1) SCR 597, followed.
(3) Since other dags of land belonging to
numerous persons were the subject matter of acquisition and individual objections
had to be heard there was no inordinate delay in making the section 6
notification. Even the appellant has not submitted before the High Court a copy
of his written objection. Nor has the same been produced in this Court with the
result that one does not know how much delay was caused by the appellant
himself. The delay in the present case is about 2-1/2 years and there is not
even a clear statement of the appellant about delay to be attributable to the
Government. [609 B-D] (4) Submission that s. 4 notification does not contain
the public purpose is made on the basis of the copy of the notification annexed
in the paper book. Even in the statement of case the appellant has not raised
On 607 the other hand it was conceded that
the purpose was fire station, workshop and parking place and the objection was
that the appellant's 1 and was not suitable for construction of fire station.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal
No. 2731 of 1972.
(From the Judgment and Order dated 20-11-1970
of the Gujarat High Court in Special Appeal No.. 1247/70).
Vimal Dave and Miss Kailash Mehta, for the
D.V. Patel and M.N. Shroff, for respondent
L.N. Sinha, Sol. Genl and Girish Chandra, for
K.C. Vakharia, P.H. Parekh and Miss Manju
Jetley, for respondent No. 3.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
GOSWAMI, J.--This appeal by certificate under Article 132 (1)(b) and (c) of the
Constitution is from the judgment of the Gujarat High Court. The certificate
was granted on October 21, 1972, before coming into force of the Constitution
(Thirtieth Amendment) Act, 1972.
Mr. Dave, learned counsel for the appellant,
does not press before us the challenge to the validity of sections 4, 5A and 6
of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
We will now state the facts as will appear
from the statement of case filed on behalf of the appellant.
A notification was issued under section 4(1)
of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (briefly the Act) on June 7, 1966, intending to
acquire a total area of 13900 sq. yds of land including 474 sq. yds. of the
appellant's land in Ward No 11 of Surat City included in City Survey Nos. 2365
We are informed that only the appellant in
raising objection to the. acquisition and the plan has not yet been implemented
on account of the pending litigation. The appellant submitted his objections
under section 5A(1) of the Act to the Collector who gave him a hearing under
sub-section (2) of section 5A. In due course the Collector submitted his report
to the State Government and after consideration of the same the Government
issued a declaration under section 6 on January 15, 1969 that the land was
required for the public purpose noted in the preliminary notification under
608 The appellant in para 3 of the statement
of case while referring to the notification under section 4(1) of the Act
averred as follows :-"It was stated in the said notice that the suit lands
were likely to be needed for fire station, workshop and parking purpose of the
Surat Municipality as indicated in Government Notification dated
In para 4 of the said statement it was
averted "that the appellant contested the notice by raising an objection
that the respondent No. 3--the Corporation--was not in need of the suit land
for the purpose of the fire station, etc." After the declaration under
section 6 of the Act, .as stated earlier, a notice under section 9 of the Act
was served on the appellant but he did not submit any claims with regard to compensation
under that section. On September 22, 1970, the appellant filed an application
under Article 226 of the Constitution before the High Court of Gujarat
challenging the aforesaid notifications under the Act. The High Court by its
order of November 30, 1970, rejected the petition. The High Court, however, by
its order of October 21, 1972, granted certificate under Article 133(1)(b) and
(c) of the Constitution on the question of vires of sections 4, 5A and 6 of the
Land Acquisition Act.
Mr. Dave confines his submissions before us
only to, the following points, which we will deal with seriatim:
First, that in spite of the appellant's
request for furnishing a copy of the report under section 5A the Collector did
not grant him a copy. He complains that there was no proper and adequate
heating under section 5A(2) of the Act. According to the learned counsel a
proper hearing would include furnishing of a copy of the report under section
5A. We are unable to accept this submission. Although, ordinarily, there should
be no difficulty in furnishing a copy of the report under section 5A to an
objector, when he asks for! the same, it is not a correct proposition that
bearing under section 5A is invalid because of failure to furnish a copy of the
report at the conclusion of the hearing under the said section. Unless there
are weighty reasons, a report in public enquiry like this, should be available
to the persons who take part in the enquiry. But failure' to furnish a copy of
the report of such an enquiry cannot vitiate the enquiry if it is otherwise not
open to any valid objection. Apart from this solitary ground, our attention has
not been drawn to any infirmity in the hearing under section 5A. We are, therefore
unable to hold that the said enquiry under section 5A was invalid.
The matter would have been different if a
second enquiry were essential under the law at the stage when the State
Government was considering the report under section 5A for issuing its
declaration under section 6 of the Act. We are, however, clearly of opinion
that there is no reason to hold that a second hearing by the State Government
at that stage is necessary under section 6 of the Act, 609 (See Abdul Husein
Tayabali & Ors. v. State of Gujarat & Ors.(1) Since that is the
position in law, failure to furnish a copy, of the report under section 8A is
The matter, again, may be different if there
is a proper allegation of mala fide against the Collector or the State
Government. There is no such allegation in this case.
The first submission of the learned counsel
is, therefore, devoid of substance.
The learned counsel next contends that there
was considerable delay between the notification under section 4 which was
issued on June 7, 1966, and the declaration under section 6 made on January 13,
1969. Since numerous dags of land belonging to a number of persons were the
subject matter of acquisition and individual objections had to. be heard, we do
not think that there has been any inordinate delay in making the notification.
Even. the appellant has not submitted before the High Court a copy of his
written objection nor is the same produced before us to indicate when his
objections were actually filed and whether he was not also responsible for some
delay in the conclusion of the enquiry. The delay in this case is only about
21/2 years and, as we have said, there is not even a clear statement of the
responsibility for delay which may be attributable to the Government. The
second submission of the learned counsel is also of no avail.
Mr. Dave lastly submits that the notification
under section 4 did not contain the public purpose as the requirement for
"fire station". The notification, says counsel, mentioned station,
workshop and parking purpose. He is able to make this submission from a copy of
the notification in the Paper Book at page 20 (Ex. A). we are, however, unable
to agree with counsel that the notification under section 4 did not in fact
contain the purpose as fire station. Even in the statement of case of the
appellant which we have set out earlier, no objection was ever taken against
the so-called vague description of the requirement in the notification. On the
other hand, it was conceded, therein, that the purpose was fire station,
workshop and parking purpose and the objection was that the appellant's land
was not "suited for the construction of fire station". There is,
therefore, no substance in this submission.
This Court rather liberally grants prayers
for dispensing with statement of case when such requests are made by parties.
Indeed, the form in vogue, in which statements of case are submitted in this
Court, has perhaps outlived its practical utility in hearings before this
Court. If anything, besides being expensive, it causes delay in making appeals
ready for hearing.
We, however, feel, instead of the usual
statements of case by both the parties, a very succinct statement of case and a
list of dates submitted by the appellant alone. with material facts necessary
for deciding the questions of law together with the findings of fact (1) 
1 S.C.R. 597.
610 of the court below and pinpointing the
only legal issues to be raised in this Court will be of advantage in
expeditious disposal of appeals before this Court.
For once, on occasion, we are able to; say
that the statement of case in this appeal is of use to us in visiting the
appellant with the forfeiture of his right to make his last submission with
regard to the vagueness or ambiguity of the purpose mentioned in the
notification under section 4 of the Act.
All the submissions having failed, the appeal
Having regard to the fact that there was a
certificate by the High Court, we will make no order as to costs.