Mohd-Ashfaq Vs. State Transport
Tribunal U.P. & Ors [1976] INSC 214 (10 September 1976)
BHAGWATI, P.N.
BHAGWATI, P.N.
FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA
CITATION: 1976 AIR 2161 1977 SCR (1) 563 1976
SCC (4) 330
ACT:
Motor Vehicles Act, 1939---S. 58(2)
proviso--Delay in applying for renewal of existing permit--If could be
condoned--Chapter IV A. -If a delf contained code--Renewal application under S.
68F(1D)Whether s.57 applicable.
Limitation Act, 1963--Ss. 5 and 29(2)--If
applicable.
HEADNOTE:
Under the proviso to s. 58(2) of the Motor
Vehicles Act, 1939 an application for renewal of an existing permit shall be
made not less than 120 days before the date of expiry of the permit. The
procedure to be followed in this respect is the same as provided in s. 57 for
the grant of a fresh permit. Under s. 58(3) a delay of not more than 15 days in
making the renewal application can be condoned by the Regional Transport
Authority.
The proviso to s. 68F (1D) provides for the
renewal of an existing permit for a limited period when a Scheme is published
under s. 68C. Since a Scheme was published under this section the appellant made
an application under s. 68F(1D) for renewal of his permit. R was rejected by
the RTA on the ground that there was delay of 18 days which was not capable of
being condoned. The Transport Appellate Tribunal dismissed his appeal and the
High Court summarily rejected his writ petition.
In appeal to this Court it was contended that
(i) Chapter IVA of the Act, which s. 68 occurs, being a self-contained code the
proviso to s. 58(2) was not applicable in the case of an application for
renewal filed under the proviso to s. 68F (1D) or (ii) in the alternative the
delay could be condoned by the RTA for sufficient cause under s. 5 read with s.
29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963.
Dismissing the appeal,
HELD: (1) (a) Section 68F(1D) imposes a
prohibition on grant or renewal of permit during the intervening period between
the publication of a scheme under s. 68C and the publication of the approved
scheme and if the proviso were not enacted. Renewal of an existing permit
expiring after the publication of the scheme under s. 68C would have been
barred. This, the legislature did not want and hence the proviso was introduced
permitting renewal of an existing permit though for a limited period, despite the
general prohibition enacted in sub-s. (1D). This renewal was not intended to be
some special kind of renewal. There is no reason why the provisions of s. 57
and the proviso to s.
58(2) should not apply in case of a renewal
application under the proviso to s. 68F(1D).[569 A-B] (b) chapter IVA is not a
self-contained code and the other sections apply to an application under the
proviso to s. 68F(1D)of the Act. [569D] (i) The procedure in s. 57 applies
because. there is no other procedure prescribed by the Act. [569C] (ii) The
time limit specified in the proviso to s. 58(2) also applied as otherwise there
would be no time limit for making an application for renewal.[569D] (iii)
Section 68F(3) also proceeds on the assumption that, but for its enactment, an
order made by the RTA under sub~3 (1) or (2) of s. 68F would have been
appealable under s. 64 and it was to exclude the applicability of s. 64 that
68F(3) was enacted. [569 E-F] 564 (2) The word used in sub-s. 3 is 'may' and
not 'shall' and the RTA is given a discretion to entertain an application for
renewal of a permit even where it is beyond time, though not more than 15 days.
It could never have been the intention of the legislature that even where there
is no sufficient cause for delay in making an application for renewal, the
Regional Transport Authority should still be bound to entertain the application
for renewal merely on the ground that the delay is of not more than 15 days.
[570F.
571A-B] 3 (a) Section 29(2) of the Limitation
Act, 1963 makes s. 5 applicable in the ease of an application for renewal
unless its applicability can be said to be expressly excluded by any provision
of the Act. Sub-section (3) of s. 58 in so many terms says that the RTA .may
condone the delay in making of an application for renewal and entertain it on
merits provided the delay is of not more than 15 days. This clearly means that
if the application for renewal is beyond time by more than 15 days, the RTA
shall not be entitled to entetain it.
[571E-G] (b) There is an express provision in
sub-s. (3) that delay in making an application for renewal shall be condonable
only if it is of not more than 15 days and that expressly excludes the
applicability of s. 5 in cases where an application for renewal is delayed by
more than 15 days.
[571G]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal
No. 871 of 1974.
(Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment
and Order dated 3-4-1973 of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Misc.
Writ Petition No. 2128/73).
Yogeshwar Prasad and Miss Rani Arora for M/S
Bagga for the Appellant.
G.N. Dikshit and O.P. Ran, for Respondents
No. 1 and 2.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
BHAGWATI, J. This appeal by special leave is directed against an order passed
by the High Court of Allahabad rejecting a writ petition filed by the appellant
challenging the validity of an order of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal
confirming an order of the Regional Transport Authority rejecting the
application of the appellant for renewal of his stage carriage permit for the
route NaginaJaspur.
The route Nagina-Jaspur lies within the
jurisdiction of the Regional Transport Authority Bareilly. The appellant and
his brother Mohd. Ashfaq held a stage carriage permit for this route for some
years and it was due to expire on 1st July, 1971. Before the expiration of the
period of permit, however, a scheme was prepared and published by the State
Transport Undertaking under Section 68C of the Motor Vehicles Act 1939
(hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and this scheme covered the route
Nagina-Jaspur. The publication of this scheme did not affect the validity of
the permit of the appellant and Mohd. Ashfaq and they continued to ply their
motor vehicles on the route NaginaJaspur on the strength of the permit. During
the currency of the permit, several amendments of a far-reaching character were
made in the Act by Act 56 of 1969 and sub-sections (1A) to (1D) were introduced
in Section 68F after sub-section (1). These sub-sections are material and they
may be reproduced as follows:
"68F(1A) Where any scheme has been
published by a State Transport Undertaking under section 68C, that Undertaking
may apply for a temporary permit. in respect of any 565 area or route or
portion thereof specified in the said scheme, for the period intervening
between the date of publication of the scheme and the date of publication of
the approved or modified scheme, and where such application is made, the State
Transport Authority or the Regional Transport Authority, as the case may be,
shall, if it is satisfied that it is necessary to increase, in the public interest,
the number of vehicles operating in such area or route or portion thereof,
issue the temporary permit prayed for by the State Transport Undertaking.
(1B) A temporary permit issued in pursuance
of the provisions of sub-section (1A) shall be effective,-(i) if the scheme is
published under sub-section (3) of section 68D, until the grant of the permit
to the State Transport Undertaking under subsection (1), or (ii) if the scheme
is not published under subsection (3) of section 68D, until the expiration of
the one week from the date on which the order under sub-section (2) of section
68D is made.
(1C) If no application for a temporary permit
is made under sub-section (1A), the State Transport Authority or the Regional
Transport Authority, as the case may be, may grant, subject to such conditions
as it may think fit, temporary permit to any person in respect of the area or
route or portion thereof specified in the scheme and the permit so granted
shall cease to be effective on the issue of a permit to the State Transport
Undertaking in respect of that area or route or portion thereof.
(1D) Save as otherwise provided in subsection
(1A) of sub-section (1C), no permit shall be granted or renewed during the
period intervening between the date of publication, under section 68C of any
scheme and the date of publication of the approved or modified scheme, in
favour of any person for any class of road transport service in relation to an
area or route or portion thereof covered by such scheme:
Provided that where the period of operation
of a permit in relation to any area, route or portion thereof specified in a
scheme published under section 68C expires after such publication, such permit
may be renewed for a limited period, but the permit so renewed shall cease to
be effective on the publication of the scheme under sub-section (3) of section
68D." Since the permit of the appellant and Mohd. Ashfaq was going to
expire on 1st July, 1971, the appellant made an application for renewal of the
permit under the proviso to subsection (1D) of Section 68F and submitted the
application to the Regional Transport Authority on 22nd March, 1971. When the
application came up for hearing before the 566 Regional Transport Authority,
there was admittedly no objector against it, but the Regional Transport
Authority took the view that under the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 58
an application for renewal of a permit is required to be made not less than 120
days before the date of expiry of the permit and even if there is delay in
making the application, it can be condoned under sub-section (3) of Section 58
but only if it is a delay of not more than 15 days and since in the present
case the application for renewal of the permit was made by the appellant on
22nd March, 1971, it was late by 18 days and hence the delay was not capable of
being condoned and in this view, the Regional Transport Authority by an order
dated 28th March, 1973 rejected the application for renewal of the permit as
time-barred.
The appellant preferred an appeal to the
State Transport Appellate Tribunal and in the appeal the appellant challenged
the correctness of the order of the Regional Transport Authority. The State
Transport Appellate Tribunal, however, agreed with the view taken by the
Regional Transport Authority and held that in view of the specific prohibition
contained in sub-section (3) read with the proviso to subsection (2) of Section
58 it was not competent to the Regional Transport Authority to condone the
delay in making of the application for renewal of the permit, since the delay
was of more than 15 days. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal also observed
that in any event the material produced before the Regional Transport Authority
did not make out any sufficient cause for not making the application for
renewal of the permit within time and hence even if there was no statutory bar
against condonation of delay of more than 15 days, this was not a fit case in
which the delay should be condoned. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal
accordingly confirmed the order of the Regional Transport Authority.
This led to the filing of a writ petition by
the appellant in the High Court of Allahabad. The High Court summarily rejected
the writ petition stating that no ground had been made out for exercise of the
extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.
Hence the appellant brought the present appeal with special leave obtained from
this Court.
Two contentions were urged on behalf of the
appellant in support of the appeal. The first contention was that the time
limit specified in the proviso to sub-section (2) of section 58 was not
applicable in case of an application for renewal of a permit under the proviso
to subsection (10) of section 68F and the Regional Transport Authority was not
entitled to reject the application of the appellant for renewal of his permit
as time-barred. It has also been contended in the alternative that even if the
time limit set out in to proviso to sub-section (2) of section 58 was
applicable, sub-section (3) extended such time limit by fifteen days and even if
thereafter there was any delay beyond the extended time limit, it could be
condoned by the Regional Transport Authority for sufficient cause by reason of
section 5 read with section 29, subsection (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963. The
second contention Which followed on the acceptance of the last contention was
that the appellant had sufficient cause for not preferring the application for
renewal 567 of his permit within the extended time limit and hence the Regional
Transport Authority should have condoned the delay and entertained the
application on merits. The validity of both these contentions was disputed on
behalf of respondents 1 and 2 and it was urged that the time limit specified in
the proviso to sub-section (2) of section 58 was applicable in the present case
and the only delay which could be condoned was a delay of 15 days and not more
and in any event, there was no sufficient cause made out by the appellant for
not making the application for renewal within time and hence the application
for renewal was rightly rejected as time barred. We shall proceed to consider
the merits of these rival contentions.
The first question which arises for
consideration on these contentions is as to whether the time limit prescribed
by the proviso to subsection (2) of section 58 applies in case of an
application for renewal of a permit under the proviso to sub-section (10) of
section 68F. The argument of the appellant was that Chapter IVA which contains,
inter alia, section 68F, is a self-contained Chapter and nothing in the other
provisions of the Act applies to proceedings under that Chapter and hence
neither the procedure under section 57 nor the time limit specified in the
proviso 10 sub-section (2) of section 58 has any application to an application
for renewal of a permit under the proviso to sub-section (10) of section 68-F.
This argument is, in our opinion, manifestly wrong. The scheme of Chapter IVA
is clear and it does not exclude the applicability of the provisions contained
in section 57 and the proviso to sub-section (2) of section 68. Chapter IVA
contains a fasciculus of sections commencing from section 68A and ending with
section 68-B. Section 68-A defines certain expressions used in Chapter IVA.
Section 68-B gives overriding effect to the provisions contained in Chapter IVA
by saying that these provisions shall have effect, notwithstanding anything
inconsistent therewith contained in Chapter IV or in any other law for the time
being in force.
Section 68-C provides that where any State
Transport Undertaking is of opinion that for the purpose of providing an
efficient, adequate, economical and properly coordinated road transport
service, it is necessary in the public interest that road transport service in
relation to any route should be run and operated by the State Transport
Undertaking, a scheme may be prepared by the S1ate Transport Undertaking giving
particulars of the nature of the services proposed to be rendered, the route
proposed to be covered and other prescribed particulars and such scheme shall
be duly published. Certain categories of persons are empowered by section 68-D
sub-section (1) to file objections against the scheme published under sect-ion
68-C and the State Government may then, after considering such objections and
hearing the parties, approve or modify the scheme under sub-section (2) of
section 68-D. Section 68-D sub-section (3) provides that the scheme as approved
or modified under sub-section (2) shall be Published in the Official Gazette
and it shall thereupon become final and shall be called the approved scheme and
the routes to which it relates shall be called the notified routes. Section
68-E provides for cancellation or modification of the scheme.
Then follows section 68-F which is material
for our purpose.
Sub-section (1) of that section provides for
issue of a permit to the State Transport Undertaking in respect of a notified
route 568 after publication of an approved scheme. But what is to happen during
the period between the publication of a scheme under section 68-C and the
publication of the approved scheme under sub-section (3) of section 68-D ? That
is taken care of by sub-sections (1A) to (1-D) of section 68F. Sub-section
(1-A) provides that for this intervening period, the State Transport
Undertaking may apply for a temporary permit in respect of a route specified in
the scheme and where such application is made, the Regional Transport Authority
shall, if it is satisfied that it is necessary to increase, in the public
interest, the number of vehicles operating on such route, issue the temporary
permit prayed for by the State Transport Undertaking. What shall be the
duration of such temporary permit is laid down in sub-section (1-B). Sub-section
(1-C) deals with the situation where no application for a temporary permit is
made by the State Transport Undertaking and it says that in such a case, the
Regional Transport Authority may grant temporary permit to any person in
respect of a route specified in the scheme. Sub-section (1-D) imposes a prohibition
that "save as otherwise provided in sub-section (1-A) and sub-section
(1-C), no permit shall be granted or renewed during the period intervening
between the date of publication under section 68-C of any scheme and the date
of publication of the approved or modified scheme, in favour of any
person" in relation to a route covered by such scheme, but this is subject
to a proviso that where the period of operation of a permit in relation to any
route "specified in a scheme published under section 68-C expires after
such publication, such permit may be renewed for a limited period". It
will, therefore, be seen that where a scheme is published under section 68-C,
no permit in respect of a route specified in the scheme can be granted or
renewed during the intervening period between the publication of the scheme
under section 68-C and the publication of the approved scheme, except a
temporary permit to the State Transport Undertaking under sub-section (1-A) or
failing that, a temporary permit to any other person under subsection (1-C),
with this qualification that an existing permit can be renewed for a limited
period. The holder of an existing permit would obviously exnecessit as have to
make an application, if he wants renewal of his permit and the application for
renewal would be considered by the Regional Transport Authority. The question
is: can this application for renewal be made at any time and when it is made,
what procedure would govern it. Section 57 lays down the procedure to be
followed in dealing with an application got grant of a permit and by reason of
section 58 sub-section (2), that procedure is applicable also in relation to an
application for renewal of a permit. There is also a time limit laid down in
the proviso to subsection (2) of section 58 which says, in so far as relevant,
that an application for renewal of a .permit shall be made not less than 120
days before the date of expiry of the permit. These provisions in section 57
and the proviso to sub-section (2) of section 58 on their plain language apply
to every application for renewal of a permit and it is indeed difficult to see
what difference there is between an application for renewal of a permit under
the proviso to sub-section (1-D) of section 68-F and any other application for
renewal of a permit. An application for renewal of a permit under. the proviso
to sub-section (1-D) of section 68-F is as much an application for renewal as
any other. It had to be specially provided for in the 569 proviso to
sub-section (1-D) of section 68-F, because sub-section (1-D) imposes a
prohibition on grant or renewal of permit during the intervening period between
the publication of a scheme under section 68-C and the publication of the
approved scheme and, ii the proviso were not enacted, renewal of an existing
permit expiring after the publication of the scheme under section 68-C would
have been barred.
This, the Legislature did not want and hence
the proviso was introduced permitting renewal of an existing permit though for
a limited period, despite the general prohibition enacted in sub-section (1-D).
This renewal was not intended to be sore6 special kind of renewal different
from any other ordinary renewal of a permit. There is, therefore, no reason in
principle why the provisions enacted in section 57 and the proviso to
sub-section (2) of section 58 should not apply in case of an application for
renewal of a permit under the proviso to sub-section (1-D) of section 68-F. If
the procedure set out in section 57 does not apply in such a case, there is no
other procedure prescribed by the Act which can possibly be invoked and the
result would be that them would be no procedure for dealing with such an
application. for renewal and in that event, how would the objections be invited
against the application for renewal and within what time and who would be
entitled to be heard and when ? And equally if the time Limit specified in the
proviso to sub-section (2) of section 58 does not apply, there would be no time
limit for making such an application for renewal and it would be possible to
make it any time, even after the expiry of the period of the permit and the
Regional Transport Authority would be bound to consider it.
That surely could never have been the
intention of the Legislature. Moreover, it is implicit in the enactment of
section 68-B that Chapter IV-A is not a self-contained Chapter to which the
other provisions of the Act are inapplicable. If Chapter IVA were a self-contained
Code by itself, there would have been no need to give overriding effect to the
provisions in that Chapter as against the other provisions of the Act. Section
68-F, sub-section (3) also proceeds on the assumption that, but for its
enactment, an order made by the Regional Transport Authority under sub-section
(1) or sub-section (2) of section 68-F would have been appealable under section
64 and it was to exclude the applicability of section 64 that sub-section (3 )
of section 68-F was enacted. These two circumstances dearly point to the
conclusion that the other provisions of the Act, to the extent to which their
language warrants, apply in relation to proceedings under Chapter IVA, save in
so far as they may be, expressly or by reason of repugnance or inconsistency,
overridden. We must, therefore, reject the first contention of the appellant
which seeks to exclude the applicability of the proviso to sub-section (2) of
section 58 to an application for renewal of a permit under the proviso to subsection
(1-D) of section 68-F.
That takes us to the next question as to the
applicability of section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to an application for
renewal of a permit. It would be convenient at this state to refer to the
provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of section 58, which, so far as material,
read as follows:
"(2) A permit may be renewed on an
application made 570 and disposed of as if it were an application for a permit:
Provided that the application for the renewed
of a permit shall be made-(a) in the case of a stage carriage permit or a
public carrier's permit, not less than one hundred and twenty days before the
date of its expiry; and (b) in any other case, not less than sixty days before
the date of its expiry:
Provided further that, other conditions being
equal, an application for renewal shall be given preference over new
applications for permits.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the
first proviso to sub-section (2), the Regional Transport Authority may
entertain an application for the renewal of a permit after the last date
specified in the said proviso for the making of such an application, if the
application is made not more than fifteen days after the said last date and is
accompanied by the prescribed fee." The proviso to sub-section (2)
requires that an application for renewal of a permit should be made not less
than 120 days before the date of expiry of the permit. But, notwithstanding
this provision, the Regional Transport Authority may, under sub-section (3),
entertain an application for renewal of a permit after the last date specified
in subsection (2), "if the application is made not more than 15 days after
the said last date and is accompanied by the prescribed fee." Sub-section
(3) thus vests a discretion in the Regional Transport Authority to entertain an
application for renewal of a permit even if it is beyond time, but in that case
the delay should not be of more than fifteen days. The word used in sub-section
(3) is "may" and not "shall" and the Regional Transport
Authority is given a discretion to entertain ,m application for renewal of a
permit even where it is beyond time, though not more than 15 days. It may
condone the delay or it may not, depending on the circumstances of each case.
The discretion is be exercised not on any arbitrary of fanciful grounds or whim
or caprice of the Regional Transport Authority, but it is to be a judicial
discretion. It is true that the criterion which is to guide the Regional
Transport Authority in the exercise of its discretion is not articulated in
sub-section (3), but it is implicit in every conferment of discretion on a
judicial or quasi-judicial authority that the discretion is to be exercised in
a judicial manner on well settled legal principles. would not be right to
attribute to the Legislature an intention to confer unguided and unfettered
discretion on the Regional Transport Authority which is quasi-judicial
authority. The discretion is obviously to be exercised where sufficient cause
for not making the application for renewal within time is made out by the
applicant. This 571 criterion can legitimately be imported from section 5 of
the Limitation Act, 1963 which contains an allied provision for condonation of
delay where an application is made beyond time. It could never have been the
intention of the Legislature that even where there is no sufficient cause for
delay in making an application for renewal, the Regional Transport Authority
should still be bound to entertain the application for renewal merely, on the
ground that the delay is of not more than 15 days. Sub-section (3) enacts a
provision for condonation of delay in making an application for renewal and not
provision extending the time limit specified in the proviso to sub-section (2)
in all cases as a matter of course. If the intention of the Legislature were
that in every case delay of not more than 15 days in making an application for
renewal should be condoned as of course, there was no need for a separate
provision in subsection (3), but the Legislature could have very specified
"one hundred and five days" instead of "one hundred and twenty
days" in the proviso to sub-section (2).
It is, therefore, dear that sub-section (3)
of section 58 confers a discretion on the Regional Transport Authority to
entertain an application for renewal when it is made beyond the time limit
specified in the proviso to sub-section (2), but not more than 15 days late and
the discretion is to be exercised in favour of entertaining the application for
renewal when it is shown that there was sufficient cause for not making it in
time. Now the question which arises is: does section 5 of the Limitation Act,
1963 apply so as to empower the Regional Transport Authority, for sufficient
cause, to entertain an application for renewal even where it is delayed by more
than 15 days? Section 29, sub-section (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 makes
section 5 applicable in the case of an application for renewal unless its
applicability can be said to be expressly excluded by any provision of the Act.
The only provision of the Act sought to be pressed into service for this
purpose was sub-section (3).
Does sub-section (3) expressly exclude
further extension of time under section 5 ? If it does, then section 5 cannot
be availed of by the appellant for condonation of the delay.
Sub-section (3) in so many terms says that
the Regional Transport Authority may condone the delay in making of an
application for renewal and entertain it on merits provided the delay is of not
more than 15 days. This clearly means that if the application for renewal is
beyond time by more than 15 days, the Regional Transport Authority shall not be
entitled to entertain it or in other words, it shall have no power to condone
the delay. There is thus an express provision in sub-section (3) that delay in
making an application for renewal shall be condonable only if it is of not more
than 15 days and that expressly excludes the applicability of section 5 in
cases where an application for renewal is delayed by more than 15 days. This
provision may seem harsh, but it has been deliberately and advisedly made
because the question of renewal of a permit must obviously be decided before
the expiration of the period of the permit and in view of the elaborate
procedure set out in section 57 for dealing with an application for renewal, a
certain minimum period before the expiration of the period of the permit must
be provided within which this procedure can be completed so that the, renewal
can, if at all, be granted well in time before the permit expires. If an
application for renewal could be entertained even if made at any stage, it
would dislocate the procedural machinery set out in section 57 and that is why
the Legislature prescribed in sub-section (3) of section 58 that the delay in
making an application for renewal may be condoned by the Regional Transport
Authority only if it is of not more than 15 days. Here, the application made by
the appellant for renewal of his permit was admittedly late by more than 15
days and hence the delay was not condonable and the Regional Transport
Authority was right in rejecting the application for renewal as time barred.
We must, in the circumstances, dismiss the
appeal, but in view of the peculiar facts of the case we make no order as to
costs.
P.B.R. Appeal dismissed.
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