Maharaj Singh Vs. State of Uttar
Pradesh & Ors [1976] INSC 278 (2 November 1976)
KRISHNAIYER, V.R.
KRISHNAIYER, V.R.
KHANNA, HANS RAJ
CITATION: 1976 AIR 2602 1977 SCR (1)1072 1977
SCC (1) 155
ACT:
U.P. Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms
Act, 1950--Section 117--Scope of--State vests lands in Gaon Sabha--Suit for
ejectment--Gaon Sabha did not appeal-State--If had locus standi.
Words & phrases--Vest Person
aggrieved--Appurtenance--Meaning of
HEADNOTE:
By virtue of s. 4 of the U.P. Zamindari
Abolition & Land Reforms Act, 1950, the right, title and interest of all
the intermediaries in every estate including hats, bazars and melas stood
terminated and vested absolutely in the State.
Section 9 provides' that all wells, trees in
abadi and all buildings situate within the limits of an Estate, belonging to an
intermediary, shall continue to belong to or be held by such intermediary and
the site of the buildings which is appurtenant thereto, shall be deemed to be
settled with him by the State Government. Section 117(1) empowers the State
Government to vest lands in Gaon Sabhas or other local authorities. Under s.
117(6) the State Government has power to resume from a Gaon Sabha the lands
vested in it. By a notification under s. 117(1 ) the State Government vested
the land in the village in the Gaon Sabha.
On the estate in dispute, the defendant who
was the quondam zamindar, had been conducting a cattle fair. The estate had on
it, among others, a few structures. The plaintiffs' (the State and the Gaon
Sabha) suit for ejectment of the defendant from the estate was dismissed by the
trial court. The Gaon Sabha, however, did not appeal; but the State went in
appeal to the High Court as 'a person aggrieved'. The High Court negatived the
defendants contentions that as a result of the notification under s. 117(1) the
land having vested in the Gaon Sabha, the State Government had no locus standi
and that it was not a person aggrieved, but allowed the defendant to keep all
the structures and a space of 5 yards running round each building.
Dismissing the appeal,
HELD: (1) The State has title to sustain the
action in ejectment. The Government, despite vesting the estates in Gaon Sabhas
has, and continues to have, a constant hold on these estates, when it chooses,
to take away what it had given possession of to a Gaon Sabha. This is plainly
'present legal interest' in the Government and a sort of precarium tenans in
the Sabha. [1082 D; 1079 F-G] (a) The Act contemplates taking over of all
zamindari rights as part of land reform. Instead of centralising management of
all estates at State level, the Act gives an enabling power to make over these
states to Gaon Sabhas.
Apart from management, no power is expressly
vested in the Sabhas to dispose of the estates absolutely. If the State thinks
fit to amend or cancel the earlier vesting declaration or notification it can
totally deprive the Sabha of, and resume from it, any estate. The vesting in
the State was absolute but the vesting in the Sabha was limited to possession and
management subject to divestiture by Government. Such a construction of vesting
in two different senses in the same section is sound because the word 'vest'
has many meanings. The sense of the situation suggests that in s. 117(1)
'vested in the State' carries a plenary connotation, while 'shall vest in the
Gaon Sabha' imports a qualified disposition confined to the right to full
possession and enjoyment so long as it lasts. To postulate vesting of absolute
title in the Gaon Sabha by virtue of the declaration under s. 117(1) is to
stultify s. 117(6). [1081 A-C; F-G] 1073 (b) The State is 'a person aggrieved'.
He, who has a proprietary right, which has been or is threatened by violation,
is an 'aggrieved person'. The right to a remedy apart, a larger circle of
persons can move the court for the protection of defence or enforcement of a
civil right or to ward off or claim compensation for a civil wrong, even if
they are not proprietarily or personally linked with the cause of action. The
nexus between the lis and the plaintiff need not necessarily be personal. A
person aggrieved is an expression which has expanded with the larger urgencies
and felt necessities of our time. [1082 E-F] (c) The amplitude of 'legal
grievance' has broadened with social compulsions. The State undertakes today
activities whose beneficiaries may be the general community even though the
legal right to the, undertaking may not vest in the community. The State starts
welfare projects whose effective implementation may call for collective action
from the protected group or any member of them. Test suits, class actions and
representative litigation are the beginning and the horizon is expanding with
persons and organisations not personally injured but vicariously concerned being
entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of the court for redressal of actual or
imminent wrongs. [1083 A-C] Dhabolkar [1976] 1 S.C.R. 306 followed.
'Locus standi' has a larger ambit in current
legal semantics than the accepted, individualistic jurisprudence of old.
Therefore, the State, in the present case, is
entitled to appeal under s. 96 of the= Code. of Civil Procedure. [1084 D] (2)
Where a wrong against community interest is done, 'no locus standi' will not
always be a plea to non-suit an interested public body chasing the wrongdoer in
court. In the instant case the Government is the 'aggrieved person'.
Its right of resumption from the Gaon Sabha,
meant to be exercised in public interest will be seriously jeopardised if the
estate slips into the hands of a trespasser. The estate belonged to the State,
is vested in the Gaon Sabha for community benefit, is controlled by the State
through directions to the Land Management Committee and is liable to be
divested. The wholesome object of the legislature of cautiously decentralised
vesting of estates in local selfgoverning units will be frustrated, if the
State is to be a helpless spectator of its purposeful bounty being wasted or
lost. [1083 H; 1084 A-B] (3)(a) The touchstone of 'appurtenance' is dependence
of the building on what appertains to it for its use as a building. Obviously
the hat, bazar, or mela is not an appurtenance to the building. Even if the
buildings were used and enjoyed in the past with the whole. st.retch of.vacant
space for a hat or mela, the land is not appurtenant to the principal subject
granted by s. 9, namely, buildings. [1085 G] (b) The larger objective of s. 9
is to settle with the former intermediary only such land as is strictly appurtenant
to buildings, all the rest going to the State. for implementation of the
agrarian reform policy. [1084 G] (c) The large open spaces cannot ,be regarded
as appurtenant to the terraces, stands and structures. What a integral is not
necessarily appurtenant. A position of subordination, something incidental or
ancillary or dependent is implied in appurtenance. That much of space required
for the use of the structures as such has been excluded by the High Court
itself. Beyond that may or may not be necessary for the hat or mela but not for
the enjoyment of the chabutras as such. [1085 B-C] (d) 'Appurtenance' in
relation to a dwelling, includes all land occupied therewith and used for the
purposes thereof. The word 'appurtenances' has a distinct and definite meaning.
Prima facie it imports nothing more than what is strictly appertaining to the
subject-matter of the devise or grant. What is necessary for the enjoyment and
has been used for the purpose of the building, such as easement, alone will be
appurtenant. The. word 'appurtenance' includes all the incorporeal
hereditaments attached to the land granted or demised such as rights of way,
but does not include lands in addition to that granted. [1086 D-E] (e) What the
High Court has granted viz., 5 yards of surrounding space is sound in law. [1086
H] 1074
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal
No. 1 of 1976.
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and
Order dated 23-5-1975 of the Allahabad High Court in First Appeal No. 392/ 64.
Shana Bhushan, V.P. Goel and Subodh
Markendeya, for the Appellant.
L.N. Sinha, Solicitor-General of India and
O.P. Rana, for the Respondent No. 1.
Bal Kishan Gaur and Amlan Ghosh, for
Respondent No. 2.
Yogeshwar Prasad and Rani Arora, for
Respondent No. 3.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
KRISHNA IYER, J.--Two principal submissions, whose implications' perhaps are of
profound moment and have public impact, have been, at wide-ranging length,
urged in this appeal by certificate, by Shri Shanti Bhushan, for the
appellant/defendant and, with effective brevity, controverted by the Solicitor
General, for respondent/1st plaintiff.
The two focal points of the controversy are:
(a) Is the appeal to the High Court by the State 1st plaintiff at all
competent, entitlement as a 'party aggrieved' being absent, having regard to
the provisions of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (U.P.
Act 1 of 1951) (for short, the Act) ?; and (b) Is it sound to conceptualise
'area appurtenant to buildings' in s. 9 of the Act so narrowly as has been'
done by the High Court ? There were two plaintiffs--the State of Uttar Pradesh
and the Gaon Sabha of Bedpura claiming common but alternative reliefs. The suit
was for injunction or ejectment, on title, of the sole defendant who was the
quondam zamindar of the 'estate' which is the 'subject matter of the suit. The
trial Court dismissed the suit whereupon the 2nd plaintiff dropped out of the
litigation, as it were, and the State alone pursued the matter by way of appeal
against the decree. The High Court partially allowed the appeal and the
aggrieved defendant is the appellant before us.
An expose of the facts may now be given to
the extent necessary for explaining the setting of the contention between the
parties. The State of Uttar Pradesh extinguished all zamindari estates by the
Act and implemented a scheme of settlement of lands with intermediaries,
tenants and others by first vesting all estates in the State and empowering it
to vest, divest and re-vest flora time to time according to flexible needs and ad
hoc requirements, the same estate's in Gaon Sabhas or other local authorities.
Settlement of trees, buildings and other
specified items in the intermediaries was also part of the agrarian reform. A
skeletal picture of the legislation may now be projected.
But, before that, a short sketch of the
actual dispute may illumine the further discussion.
The suit lands were part of an estate owned
and possessed by the defendant-zamindarini. The statutory consequence of the
abolition of all zamindaris by force of s. 4 is spelt out in s. 6, to wit, the
1075 cesser of the ownership of the zamindar and vesting of title and
possession in the State. By a notification under s. 117(1) of the Act the area
of lands was vested by the State in the 2nd plaintiff Gaon Sabha. The
legislative nullification notwithstanding, the defendant who had been
conducting a lucrative bi-weekly cattle fair, the best in the district,
persisted in this profitable adventure strengthened by s. 9 of the Act which
settles in the intermediary all buildings and area appurtenant thereto. This
resulted in possessory disputes between the Gaon Sabha and the
defendant--proceedings under s. 145 upholding the latter's possession and the
present suit for declaration of title and consequential injunction or
ejectment.
The estate, which is the site of the rural
cattle market, has a large number of trees on it, a temple in one plot, a
(veterinary) clinic in another and quite a number of cattle stands and other
auxiliary structures which are facilities for the bovine display and
transaction of business. Taking advantage of the provisions of the Act, the
defendant successfully claimed before the High Court that the trees and the two
plots with the shrine and the oushadhalaya should be deemed to have been
settled with her.
Her ambitious demand, based on some
provisions which we will presently X-ray more carefully, was that the entire
estate with all the buildings thereon was enjoyed as a unum quid and the vacant
lands were as much necessary for the meaningful running of the cattle fair as
the structures themselves. To dissect and detach the buildings from the vacant
spaces was to destroy the functional wholeness of the service rendered. In
short, the large intervening areas surrounding the chabutras and other edifices
were essential adjuncts or appurtenant lands which, together in their original
entirety, should be settled under s. 9 of the Act with the erstwhile
intermediary viz., the defendant. The High Court declined to go the whole hog
with the defendant but granted the plea to the limited degree of giving all the
structures and a space of 5 yards running round each 'building'. In the view of
the Court hats, bazars, and melas could not be held by a private owner under
the scheme of the Act and reliance on the conduct of the cattle market as an
indicator of 'appurtenant' area was, therefore, impermissible. The suit was
decreed pro tanto.
The Gaon Sabha, when defeated in the trial
Court, discreetly stepped out of the risks of an appeal but the Government,
first plaintiff, claiming to be gravely aggrieved, challenged the dismissal of
the suit and was faced with the plea that the land having vested in the Gaon
Sabha, on the issue of the notification under s. 117 (1 ) of the Act, .the
State had no surviving interest in the property and, therefore, forfeited the
position of a person aggrieved, who alone could competently appeal against a decree.
This contention, negatived by the High Court. has been reiterated before us
with resourceful embellishments and that, logically, is the first question of
law falling for our decision and is the piece de resistance, if we may say so,
in this appeal. If the 1st plaintiff's entire interests, by subsequent plenary
vesting in the 2nd plaintiff, have perished, the former cannot, as of right,
appeal under s. 96 C.P.C. Survival after death is unknown to 1076 real property
law and suits, without at least apprehended injury, are beyond the ken of the
procedural law. To put it in a nutshell, has the State current interest in the
estate, sufficient to sustain an appeal ? The anatomy of the Act, so far as
this dispute is concerned, needs to be' set out and alongside thereof, the
exercises in statutory construction necessary to resolve the two legal
disputes. The Act had for its primary object, as testified by its Preamble, the
extinction of intermediary rights viz., zamindaris and the like. The goal of
the legislation must make its presence felt while the judicial choice of
meanings of words of ambiguous import or plurality of significations is made.
Section 4 is the foundational provision, the very title deed of the State; and
it runs, to read:
"s. 4. Vesting of estates in the State.-(1
) As soon as may be after the commencement of this Act, the State Government
may, by notification, declare that, as from a date to be specified, all estate
situate in the Uttar Pradesh shall vest in the State and as from the beginning
of the date so specified (herin after called the date of vesting), all such
estates shall stand transferred to and vest except as hereinafter provided, in
the State free from all encumbrances.
(2) It shall be lawful for the State
Government, if it so considers necessary, to issue, from time to time, the
notification referred to in sub-section (1) in respect only of such area or
areas as may be specified and all the provisions of sub-section (1), shall be
applicable to. and in the case of every such notification." Section 6 sets
out the legal consequences of such vesting more specifically. We may extract
the provision:
"6. Consequences of the vesting of an
estate in the State.-When the notification under section 4 has been published
in the Gazette then, notwithstanding anything contained in any contract or
document or in any other law for the time being in force and save as otherwise
provided in this Act, the consequences as hereinafter set forth shall, from the
begining of the date of vesting, ensue in the area to which the notification
relates, namely-(a) all rights, title and interest of all the intermediaries-(i)
in every estate in such area including land (cultivable or barren), grove-land,
forests whether within or outside village boundaries, trees (other than trees
in village abadi, holding or grove), fisheries, tanks, ponds, water-channels,
fernes, pathways, abadi sites, hats, bazars and meals other than hats, bazars
and melas held upon land to which clauses (a) to (c) of sub-section (1) of
Section 18 apply, and 1077 (ii) in all sub-soil in such estates including
rights, if any in mines and minerals, whether being worked or not;
shall 'cease and be vested in the State of
Uttar Pradesh free from all encumbrances;
* * * * Reading the two sister sections
together, certain clear conclusions emerge. Emphatically, three things happened
on the coming into force of the Act. By virtue of s. 4 the right, title and
interest of all intermediaries in every estate, including hats, bazars and
melas, stood terminated.
Secondly, this whole bundle of interests came
to be vested in the State, free from all encumbrances, the quality of the
vesting being absolute. 'Thirdly, one and only one species of property in hats,
bazars and melas was expressly excluded from the total vesting of estates in
the State, viz., such as had been held on lands to which s. 18(1)(a) to (c) applied.
Section 9, at this stage, needs to be read since it is geared to the
nationalisation of zamindaris by providing for settlement, under the State, of
some kind's of landed interests in existing owners or occupiers. Section 9
states:
"Private wells, trees in abadi and
buildings to be settled with the existing owners or occupiers thereof-All
wells, trees in abadi, and all buildings situate within the limits of an
estate, belonging to or held by an intermediary or tenant or other person,
whether residing in the village or not, shall continue to belong to. or be held
by such intermediary, tenant or persons, as the case may be,, and the site, of
the wells or the buildings which are appurtenant thereto: shall be. deemed to.
be settled with him by the State Government on such terms and conditions as may
be prescribed" A close-up of this section is called for since the basic
plank of the defendant's case is the claim to the whole set of plots as
building and appurtenant area of land statutorily settled with her. If she is
such a settlee, the substantive merit of the plaintiff's title fails. We will
examine this aspect after a survey of the sections relevant to the locus standi
of the State is done.
So we shift to Chapter VII which relates to
Gaon Sabhas vesting by the State of resumed estates in them and the limitations
and other conditions to which it is subject.
Attributed legal personality by s.3, the Gaon
Sabhas are bodies corporate which, under the various provisions of Chapter VII,
have been invested with legal viability right to own and hold property, to
transfer and otherwise deal with movables and immovables and manage their
landed assets through the executive agency of Land Management Committees. This
comprehensive 'proprietary personality of the Sabha is indisputable but
unhelpful for our purpose.
1078 The controversy before us comes into
focus when we read s. 117 (1), (2) and (6), all the limbs being taken as belonging
to a legally living corporate body. Section 117, cls.
(1) and (2), provide:
"117. Vesting of certain lands etc., in
Gaon Shabhas and other local authorities.-(1 ) At any time after the
publication of the notification referred to in Section 4, the State Government
may, by general or special order to be published in the manner prescribed,
declare that as from a date to be specified in this behalf, all or any of the
following things, namely-* * * * * (v) hats, bazars and melas except hats,
bazars, and melas held on land to which, the provisions of clauses (a) to (c)
of sub-section (1) of section 18 apply or on sites and areas referred to in
section 9, and * * * * * which had vested in the State under this Act shall
vest in the Gaon Sabhas or any other local authority established t.or the whole
or part of the village in which the said things are situate, or partly in one
such local authority (including a Gaon Sabha) and partly in another:
Provided that it shall be lawful for the
State Government to make the declaration aforesaid subject to such exceptions
and conditions as may be specified in the notification.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in
this Act or in any other law' for the time being in force, the State Government
may, by general or special order to be published in the manner prescribed in
the Gazette, declare that as from a date to be specified in this behalf, all or
any of the things specified in clauses (i) to (vi) of sub-section (1) which
alter their vesting in the State under this Act had been vested in a Gaon Sabha
or any other local authority, either under this Act or under section 126 of the
Uttar Pradesh Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam 1959 (U.P. Act II of 1959) shall vest
in any other .local authority (including a Gaon Sabha) established for the
whole or part of the village in which the said things are situated."
Section 117(6) injects a precarious does into the system of estates vested in
Gaon Sabhas by sub-s.(1) and goes on to state:
"117(6). The State Government may, at
any time, by general or special order to be published in the manner prescribed,
amend or cancel any declaration or notification made in respect of any of the
things aforesaid.' whether 1079 generally or in the case of any Gaon Sabha or
other local authority, and resume such thing and whenever the State Government
so resumes any such thing, the Gaon Sabha or other. local authority, as the
case may be, shall be entitled to receive and be paid compensation on account
only of the development, if any, effected by it in. or over that thing:
Provided that the State Government may, after
such resumption, make a fresh declaration under sub-section (1) or sub-section
(2) vesting the thing resumed in the same or any other local authority
(including a Gaon Sabha) and the provisions of sub-sections (3), (4) and (5) as
the case may be, shall mutatis mutandis, apply to such declaration.
* * * * * Before moving further, we may
glance at a group of sections which have more than peripheral impact on the
legal equation between Government and Sabha visa vis estates vested in the
latter by the former. Section 119 carves out a power for the State Government
to take away hats, bazars and melas vested in a Gaon Sabha and transfer them to
a zilla parishad or other authority. Sections 122A and 122B create and regulate
the Land Management Committee which is to administer the estates vested in the
Sabha and s. 126, quite importantly, gives the power to the State Government to
issue orders and directions to the Management Committee.
Pausing here for an instant, let us look back
on the status of the State which, through its Executive branch, vests a resumed
estate in a Gaon Sabha, retaining power, at any time, and without conditions or
even compensation (save for actual developmental work done), to divest the land
so vested and make it over to another like local authority.
In such a situation where the State remains
the legal master with absolute powers of disposition over the land vested pro
tempore in a particular Gaon Sabha, can it be postulated that it has no legal
interest in the preservation of that over which it has continuous power of
operation, creation and deprivation? Government, despite vesting estates in
Gaon Sabhas on the wholesome political principle of decentralisation and local
self-government, has and continues to have a constant hold on these estates,
may be like a brooding omnipotence descending, when it chooses, to take away
what it had given possession of to a Sabha. This is plainly present legal
interest in Government and a sort of precarium tenans in the Sabha,
notwithstanding the illusory expression 'vesting' which may mislead one into
the impression that an absolute and permanent ownership has been created.
An overview of these legal prescriptions,
makes one sceptical about the statutory ideology of autonomous village
self-government since, so far as estates are concerned, these Sabhas have been
handcuffed and thrown at the mercy or mood of the State Government. The
pragmatics of the Act has reduced Gaon Sabhas to obedient 1080 holders, for the
nonce, of the limited bounty of estates vested in them --a formal, fickle,
homage to Art. 40 of the Constitution! Shri Shanti Bhushan did draw our
attention to certain cousin statutes and other 'remotely related provisions but
the soul of his submission does not suffer by their omission in the discussion.
We pass on to the spinal issues agitated before us.
Locus standi The estates first vest in the
State. The fulfillment of the purpose of the Act, the setting in which the
cornerstone for the statutory edifice is laid and the categorical language
used, especially 'free from all encumbrances', leave no doubt in our minds, nor
was it disputed before us, that this initial vesting is absolute and
inaugurates the scheme of abolition. The consequence of vesting articulated by
s. 6 only underscore this conclusion.
What next ensues. when the State Government,
acting under s.117(1), notifies a further vesting in a Gaon Sabha is the
cardinal question. Does the State retain a residuary legal interest, sufficient
to make it a 'person aggrieved', competent to challenge in appeal an adverse decree?
And can the State canvas for the position that a proprietary right persists in
it albeit its act of vesting the same estate earlier in a local authority? Does
the key word 'vest' connote and denote divergent things in the same section and
Act visa vis Government and the Gaon Sabha? Had drafting skills been better,
this unlovely ambiguity could have been avoided. But courts have no choice but
to take the text as it is. Zeroing in on the relevant provisions, we are
inclined to concur with the High Court. With certitude one may assert that the
State has that minimal interest to follow the proprietary fortunes of the
estate so as to.
entitle it to. take legal action to interdict
its getting into alien hands.
The legislative project and the legal
engineering visualised by the Act are clear and the semantics of the words used
in the provisions must bend, if they can, to subserve them. To be literal or be
blinkered by some rigid canon of construction may be to miss the life of the
law itself.
Strength may be derived for this
interpretative stand from the observation in a recent judgment of this Court(1)
"A word can have many meanings. To find out the exact connotation of a
word in a statute, we must look to the context in which it is used. The context
would quite often provide the key to meaning of the word and the sense it'
should carry. Its setting would give colour to it and provide a cue to the
intention of the legislature in using it. A word, as said by Holmes, is not a
crystal, transparent and unchanged; it is the skin of a living thought and may
vary greatly in colour and content according to the circumstances and the time
in which it is used." (1) Thiru Manickaru & Co. v. The State of Tamil
Nadu.
[1977] 1 S.C.R. 950.
1081 In the instant case the Act contemplates
taking over of all zamindari rights as part of land reform. However, instead of
centralising management of all estates at State level, to stimulate local
self-government, the Act gives an enabling power--not obligatory duty--to make
over these estates to Gaon Sabhas which, so long as they are in their hands,
will look after them through management committees which will be under the
statutory control of Government under s.126. Apart from management, no. power
is expressly vested in the Sabhas to dispose of the estates absolutely. The
fact that as a body corporate it can own and sell property does not mean that
the estates vested in a Sabha can be finally sold away, in the teeth of the
provisions striking a contrary note. For, under s.117(6), if, for any reasons
of better management or other, the State (Government is but the operational arm
of the State and cannot, as contended, be delinked as a separate entity, in this
context) the. State thinks fit to amend or cancel the earlier vesting declaration
or notification, it can totally deprive the Sabha of, and resume from it, any
estate. This plenary power to emasculate or extinguish the Sabha's right to the
estate is tell-tale. True, this cut-back on the amplitude of the vesting is not
an incident of the estate created but is provided for by the Act itself. Even
so, we have to envision, in terms of realty law, what are the nature and incidents
of the interest vested in the Sabha--full ownership divestible under no
circumstances or partial estate with the paramount interest still surviving in
praesenti in the State? It is reasonable to harmonize the statutory provisions
to reach a solution which will be least incongruous with legal rights we are
cognisant of in current jurisprudence.
Novelty is not a favoured child of the law.
So it is right to fix the estate created by s.117 into familiar moulds if any.
Such an approach lends to the position that the vesting in the State was
absolute but the vesting in the Sabha was limited to possession and management
subject to divestiture by Government. Is such a construction of 'vesting' in
two different senses in the same section, sound ? Yes. It is, because 'vesting'
is a word of slippery import and has many meanings. The context controls the
text and the purpose and scheme Project the particular semantic shade or nuance
of meaning. That is why even definition clauses allow themselves to be modified
by contextual compulsions. So the sense of the situation suggests that in
s.117(1) of the Act "vested in the State' carries a plenary connotation,
while 'shall vest in the Gaon Sabha' imports a qualified disposition confined
to the right to full possession and enjoyment so long as it lasts. Lexicographic
support is forthcoming, for this meaning. Black's Law Die1082 tionary gives as
the sense of 'to vest as 'to give an immediate fixed right of present or future
enjoyment, to clothe with possession, to deliver full possession of land or of
an estate, to give seisin'. Webster's III International Dictionary gives the
meaning as 'to give to a person a legally fixed immediate right of present or
furture enjoyment'.
The High Court has sought some Engilsh
judicial backing(1) for taking liberties with strict and pedantic construction.
A ruling of this Court(2) has been aptly pressed into service.
There is thus authority for the position that
the expression 'vest' is of fluid or flexible content and can if the context so
dictates, bear the limited sense of being in possession and enjoyment. Indeed,
to postulate vesting of absolute title in the Gaon Sabha by virtue of the
declaration under s.117(1) of the Act is to stultify s.117(6). Not that the
legislature cannot create a right to divest what has been completely vested but
that an explanation of the term 'vesting' which will rationalise and integrate
the initial vesting and the subsequent resumption is preferable, more plausible
and better fulfils the purpose of the Act. We hold that the State has title to
sustain he action in ejectment.
Aside from this stand, it is easy to take the
view that the 1st plaintiff is a person I aggrieved and has the competence to
carry an appeal against the dismissal of the suit. Of course, he who has a
proprietary right, which has been or is threatened to be violated, is surely an
'aggrieved person'. A legal injury creates a remedial right in the injured
person. But the right to a remedy apart, a larger circle of persons can move
the court for the protection of defence or enforcement of a civil right or to
ward off or claim compensation for a civil wrong, even if they are not
proprietarily or personally linked with the cause of action. The nexus between
the lis and the plaintiff need not necessarily be personal although it has to
be more than a wayfarer's allergy to an unpalatable episode. 'A person
aggrieved' is an expression which has expanded with the larger urgencies and
felt necessities of our times. Processual jurisprudence is not too jejune to respond
to societal changes and challenges:
"Law necessarily has to carry within it
the impress of the past traditions, the capacity to respond to the needs of the
present and enough resilience to cope with the demands of the future. A code of
law, especially in the social fields, is not a document for fastidious
dialectics; properly drafted and rightly implemented it can be the means of the
ordering of the life of a people."(3) (1) Richardson v. Robertson (1862) 6
L-R 75; & .Hiride v. Chorlton (1866) 2 CP 104, 116.
(2) Fruit & Vegetable Merchant's Union v.
The Delhi Improvement Dust, AIR 1957 SC 344.
(3) Address by--Khanna 1. at the Birth
Centenary of Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru d/16-10-76 at Allahabad.
1083 The classical concept of a 'person
aggrieved' is delineated in Re : Sidebotham ex p. Sidebotham (1880 14 Ch.D. 258).
But the amplitude of 'legal grievance' has broadened with social compulsions.
The State undertakes today activities whose beneficiaries may be the general
community even though the legal right to the undertaking may not vest in the
community. The State starts welfare projects whose effective implementation may
call for collective action from the protected group. or any member of them. New
movements like consumerism, new people's organs like harijan or mahila samajams
or labour unions, new protective institutions like legal aid societies operate
on the socio-legal plane, not to beat 'their golden wings in the void' but to
intervene on behalf of the weaker classes. Such burgeoning of collective social
action has, in turn, generated gradual processual adaptations. Test suits,
class actions and representative litigation are the beginning and the horizon
is expending, with persons and organisations not personally injured but vicariously
concerned being entitled to. invoke the jurisdiction of the court for redressal
of actual or imminent wrongs.
In this wider perspective, who is a 'person
aggrieved '? Dhabolkar (1974 1 SCR 306) gives the updated answer:
"The test is whether the words 'person
aggrieved' include a person who has a genuine grievance because an order has
been made which prejudicially affects his interests'." (p. 315)
"American jurisprudence has recognised, far instance, the expanding
importance of consumer protection in the economic system and permitted consumer
organisations to. initiate or intervene in actions, although by the narrow rule
of 'locus standi', such a course could not have been justified (see p. 807--New
York University Law Review, Vol. 46, 1971). In fact, citizen organisations have
recently been compaigning for using legal actions for protection of community
interest, broadening the scope of 'standing' in legal proceedings (see p.
403--Boston University Law Review, Vol.51.
1971).
In the well-known case of Attorney-General of
the Gambia v. Peirra Sarr N. 'Jie 1961 A.C.
617), Lord Denning observed about the Attorney-General's
standing thus:
" .... The words 'person aggrieved' are
of wide import and should not be subjected to a restrictive interpretation.
They do not include, of course, a mere busy body who is interfering in things
which do not concern him; but they do include a person who has a genuine
grievance because an order has been made which prejudicially affects his
interests." (p. 324-325) Where a wrong against community interest is done,
'no locus standi' will not always be a plea to non-suit an interested-public
body chasing the wrong-doff in court. In the case before us, Govern1084 ment,
in the spacious sense of 'person aggrieved' is comfortably placed. Its, right
of resumption from the Gaon Sabha, meant to be exercised in public interest,
will be seriously jeopardised if the estate slips into the hands of a
trespasser. The estate belonged to the State, is vested in the Gaon Sabha for
community benefit, is controlled by the State through directions to the Land
Management Committee and is liable to be divested without ado any time.
The wholesome object of the legislature of
cautiously decentralised vesting of estates in local self-governing units will
be frustrated, if the State, the watchdog of the whole project, is to be a
helpless. spectator of its purposeful bounty being wasted or lost. It must act,
out of fidelity to the goal of the statute and the continuing duty to salvage
public property for public use. Long argument is otiose to make out a legal
grievance in such a situation of peril and, after all, the star of processual
actions pro bono publico has to be on the. ascendant in a society where
supineness must be substituted by activism if the dynamic rule of law is to
fulfil itself. 'Locus standi' has a larger ambit in current legal semantics
than the accepted, individualistic jurisprudence of old. The legal dogmas of
the quiet past are no longer adequate to. assail the social injustices of the
stormy present. Therefore, the State, in the present case, is entitled to
appeal under s. 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The second, and from a practical point of
view equally potent ground of defence, is that 'appurtenant' space envelops the
whole area around the buildings and the suit for recovery of possession
deserves to be dismised in to.
Let us examine this submission.
Section 9 of the Act obligates the State to
settle (indeed, it is deemed to be settled) with the intermediary certain items
in the estate. That provision has been set out earlier. The short enquiry is
whether the entire land is 'appurtenant' to the buildings. The contention of
the defendant flows along these lines. The structures accepted by the High Court
as 'buildings' within the scope of s. 9 were part of a cattle fair complex.
Even the mandir and the oushadalya fitted in to the hat total and the integrity
of the whole could not be broken up without violating the long years of common
enjoyment. It would also be, a double injury: (a) to the defendant; and (b) to
the community. The hat or mela could not be held by the defendant if the land
were snatched away and the Government could do. nothing on a land without the
buildings belonging to the defendant.
Maybe there is some sociological substance in
the: presentation but the broader purpose of the' section cannot be sacrificed
to the marginal cases .like the. present. The larger objective is to settle
with the former intermediary only. Such land as is strictly appurtenant to
buildings, all the rest going to the State for implementation of the agrarian
reform policy.
The key to the solution of the dispute lies
in ascertaining whether land on which the cattle fair was being held was
appurtenant to the buildings or not on the strength of its use for the hat. The
Solicitor General made a twopronged attack on the defendant's proposition.
1085 Firstly, he argued that hats, bazars and
melas were a distinct interest in the scheme of Indian agrestic life and agrarian
law. This right had been virtually nationalised by the Act and only the State
or the Gaon Sabha. save where s.
18(a) to (c) otherwise provided, could hold a
'fair. A ruling by this Court on an analogous subject lends support to this
contention (See State of Bihar v. Dulhin Shanti Devi: AIR 1967 SC 427 relating
to Bihar Land Reforms Act).
The heated debate at the bar on this and
allied aspects need not detain us further also because of our concurrence with
the second contention of the Solicitor General that the large open spaces
cannot be regarded as appurtenant to the terraces, stands and structures. What
is integral is not necesarily appurtenant. A position of subordination,
something incidental or ancillary or dependant is implied in appurtenance. Can
we say that the large spaces are subsidiary or ancillary to or inevitably
implied in the enjoyment of the buildings qua buildings? that much of space
required for the use of the structures as such has been excluded by the High
Court itself. Beyond that may or may not be necessary for the hat or mela but
not for the enjoyment of the chabutras as such. A hundred acres may spread out
in front of a club house for various games like golf. But all these abundant
acres are unnecessary for nor incidental to the enjoyment of the house in any
reasonable manner. It is confusion to miss the distinction, fine but real.
"Appurtenance', in relation to a
dwelling, or to a school, college .... includes all land occupied therewith and
used for the purpose thereof (Words and Phrases Legally Defined---Butterworths,
2nd edn). "The word 'appurtenances' has a distinct and definite meaning
....Prima facie it imports nothing more than what is strictly appertaining to
the subject-matter of the devise or grant, and which would, in truth, pass
without being specially mentioned:Ordinarily, what is necessary for the
enjoyment and has been used for the purpose of the building, such as easements,
alone will be appurtenant. Therefore, what is necessary for the enjoyment of
the building is alone covered by the expression 'appurtenance'. If some other
purpose was being fulfilled by the building and the lands, it is not possible
to contend that those lands are covered by the expression 'appurtenances'.
Indeed 'it is settled by the earliest authority, repeated without contradiction
to the latest, that land cannot be appurtenant to land. The word
'appurtenances' includes all the incorporeal hereditaments attached to the land
granted or demised, such as rights of way, of common ...but it does not include
lands in addition to that granted'. (Words and Phrase, supra).
In short, the touchstone of 'appurtenance' is
dependence of the building on what appertains to it for its use as a building.
Obviously, the hat, bazar or mela is not an appurtenance to the building. The
law thus leads to the clear conclusion that even if the buildings were used and
enjoyed in the past with the whole stretch of vacant space for a hat or mela,
the land is not appurtenant to the principal subject granted by s. 9, viz.,
buildings.
This conclustion is inevitable, although the
contrary argument may be ingenious. What the High Court has granted, viz., 5
yards of 1086 surrounding space, is sound in law although based on guess-work
in fact. The appeal fails and is dismissed but, in the circumstances, without
costs.
P.B.R. Appeal dismissed.
13.385CI/76---GIPF.
INDEX ACCOMPLICE:
Whether a pointer an accomplice [See
Representation of the People Act.] ...... 525 ACCUSED PLEADED GUILTY If lesser
sentence could be awarded.
Murlidhar Meghraj Loya etc. v.
State of Maharashtra etc. .. 1 ADMISSIONS:
admissibility in evidence [See Evidence Act]
.. 967
ADMINISTRATION OF EVACUEE PROPERTY ACT,
1950--S.40(4) (a)
and rule 22--Scope of, S. 10(2) (n) out of
the funds in his possession meaning of.
Custodian of Evacuee Property v.
Smt. Rabia Bai .. 255 ALTERNATE REMEDY
--Whether a bar to writ jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution under
Art 226 of the constitution. .. 64 [See Constitution of India, 1950] ... 64
ANDHRA PRADESH (ANDHRA AREA) Electricity Supply Undertaking(Acquisition) Act
(Andhra 15of 1954), Ss.
5(3)(vi), 6(2)(a) (iii) and
10(2)(b)(iii)--Amounts due to undertaking from consumers prior to vesting in
State-If can be recovered by State from the licence.
Vijayawada Municipal Council v. Andhra
Pradesh State Electricity Board and Anr. .. 846
ANDHRA PRADESH GENERAL SALES TAX ACT,
1957--Excise and
countervailing duty paid by the buyers
directly into the Treasury --Neither the invoice nor books of the assessee
(manufacturer) show the excise duty--Excise duty. If fails under "any sums
charge by the dealer" occurring in the definition of "turnover".
M/s Mc Dowell & Company Ltd. etc. v.
Commercial Tax Office VII Circle Hyderabad etc.
APPEAL AGAINST ACQUITT OF AN OFFENCE OF
CONSUMING LIQUOR--Mem because the High Court took view that a further charge
"possession of liquor" she have been framed setting aside the
acquittal without find whether the order of acquittal erroneous and ordering
re-t is bad--Bombay Prohibition A 1949 (Bern. XXV Sec. 66(1) r/w Sec. 378
Criminal Procedure Code (Act 11 of 1974) 1973.
Patel Jethabhai Chatur v. State of Gujarat
ARBITRATION ACT, 1940, Contract between lay parties
not be
thwarted by narrow pedal and legalistic
interpretatic Intendment of parties regarding validity of arbitraror's
appointment, whether material.
Union of India v. M/s D.M. R. &Co ....
ATTESTING WITNESS [See Succession Act]
BENAMI TRAINSACTION--Pr of Benami nature.
Union of India v. Moksh Buil and Financiers
and Ors. ..
BIHAR AND ORISSA EXC ACT, 1951 as amended
Amending Acts of
1970 and 1 --Ss. 22 and 29--Power of State 2
to auction exclusive privilege to vend liquor-Nature of payment received.
Lakhan Lal etc. v. The State of Orissa and
Ors. . .811
BIHAR ELECTRICITY DUTY ACT, 1948 (As amended)
S.3(2) (e)--Scope of.
Damodar Valley Corporation v. State of Bihar
and Ors. ..
HAR LAND REFORMS ACT, 1950--Ss. 4(a) and
10--Lessee of
nines--If a tenure-holder or intermediary
under the Act.
Sone Valley Portland Cement Co. Ltd. v. The
General Mining Synidicate (P) Ltd. .. 359
BOMBAY INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS ACT, 1946--S.
98(1)(a)--schedule
III item 6(ii)--Scope of -Workmen laid
off--Lock out declared later alleging unruly behaviour--Lockout if illegal.
priya Laxmi Mills Ltd. v. Mazdoor Maharan
Mandal, Baroda .. 709
BOMBAY PROHIBITION ACT, 949 (Bom. XXV) Sec.
66(1)(b).
[See Appeal against acquittal] .. 872
BOMBAY PROVINCIAL MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS ACT,
As applied
in Gujarat (Bom. 59 of 1949),
S.284N--Applicability of .5A, Land Acquirition Act.
Farid Ahmed Abdul Samad and Anr. v. The
Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad and Anr. .. 71
BOMBAY RENT, HOTEL AND LODGING HOUSE RATES ACT,
1947
Sub. Section 13(1)(B)--Suit for eviction on
the grond of bonafide and personal need of a landlord --Whether right to sue
survives to his heirs--Requirement of firm in which landlord is a partner
whether his requirement--Whether decree passed in favour of landlord can be
disturbed on his death.
Shantilal Thakordas and Ors. v. Chimanlal
Maganlal Telwala .. 341 2. Sec. 15A--Sec. 5(4A)--Indian Easements Act
1882--Sec.
52-62(c)--Revocation of licence by efflux of
time--Presidency Small Causes Courts Act 1882--Sec.' 47--Effect of filing of
application for eviction Meaning of licence under a Subsisting
agreement--Interpretation of statutes--Practice.
D.H. Manjar & Ors. v. Waman Laxman Kudav
. .403
BOMBAY VILLAGE PANCHAYAT ACT (BOM. 6 OF 1933)
S.89--'House' if includes 'building'.
Tata Engineering & Locomotive Company
Ltd. v. Gram Panchayat pimpri Waghere. .. 306 BURDEN OF --establishing urgency
under the . Land Acquisition Act [See Land Acquisition Act] .. 763 CENTRAL
CIVIL SERVICE (CLASSIFICATION, CONTROL AND APPEAL) Rules, 1965-Scope of--Rules
applicable only when disciplinary proceedings are taken.
Union of India and Anr. v.K.S. Subramanian ..
87
CENTRAL SALES TAX ACT 1956
1. Sec. 2(b) 9--Andhra Pradesh General Sales
Tax Act 1957, Central Government selling foodgrains and fertilisers, whether a
dealer--Profit motive, if relevant--Whether State carried on business.
Joint Director of Food, Visakapatham v. The
State of Andhra Pradesh. .. 59 3
2. S. 15(b)--Scope of--Assessee bought
declared goods and paid States Sales Tax--Sale by way of inter-state sale-If
entitled to refund of State Sales Tax.
Thiru Manickam and Co. v. The State of
TamilNadu . .950
3. (74 of 1956) S. 8(3)(6) and Central Sales
Tax (Regulation and Turnover) Rules, 1957, r. 13Goods used in the manufacture
or processing of goods for sale --Scope of--Fertilizers used for growing tea
plants, if could be included in goods used in the manufacture of tea for sale.
Travancore Tea Estates Co. Ltd. v. State of
Karnataka & Ors... 755 4. (74 of 1956) S.9(1), proviso-Scope of.
M/s Karam Chand Thapar and Bros. (Coal Sales)
Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ant. .. 25 CHARGE--Fresh charge on
appreciation of evidence can be ordered to be framed by the High Court in
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction--Criminal Procedure Code (Act.
II of 1974), 1973 Secs. 386(a), 464(I) and
462(2)(a).
Patel Jethabhai Chatur v. State of Gujarat ..
872 CITY OF BANGALORE MUNICIPAL CORPORATION SERVICES (GENERAL) CADRE AND
RECRUITMENT REGULATIONS 1971, Reg. 3'Absorption of Senior Health Inspectors by
Corporation contrary to provisions in Reg. 3--Effect of.
C. Muniyappa Naidu etc. v. State of Karnataka
& Ors. . .791
CITY OF MYSORE IMPROVEMENT ACT, 1903, Ss. 16,
18 and
33(1)--Relevant date for determining market
value for purposes of compensation, what is.
Special Land Acquisition Officer City
Improvement Trust Board, Mysore v.P. Govindan. .. 549 CIVIL SERVICE
1. Powers of relaxation--Whether rules can be
made retrospectively --Andhra Pradesh State and Subordinate Services Rules
1962--Rule 47--Andhra Pradesh Civil' Services (Co-operation Branch) Government
of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. v. Sri D. Janardhana Rao and Anr. .. 702
2. Seniority--Irregular
recruitment-RegularisationAppointments through Public Service
Commission--Recruitment through centralised recruitment scheme.
P.C. Patel and Ors. v. Smt. T.H. Pathak and
Ors. .. 677 CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
1. S.I 1 Res Judicata, whether invocable in
subsequent stage of same proceedings.
Y.B. Patel and Ors. v. Y. L. patil .. 320
2. Ss. 79 and 80, suit for compensation
against railway administration whether impleading Union of India as a party
necessary.
State of Kerala v. The General Manager,
Southern Railway Madras. .. 419
3. S.80 Whether applicable to suits filed
under s.9(1) of the (M.P.) Public Trusts Act, 1951.
State of Maharashtra & Anr. v. Shri
Chartder Kant .. 993
4. S.115--Jurisdiction of High Court to
interfere with the Trial Court's discretionary order, when exercisable.
4 M/s Mechelec Engineers & Manu facturers
v. M/s Basic Equipment Corporation. .. 1060
5. (Act 5 of 1908) Order VI r/w Order, XIV,
rule 1(5)--Courts should not allow parties to go to trial in the absence of
proper pleadings.
Union of India v. Sita Ram Jaiswal .. 979 6.
(Act v of 1908) Order V], Rule 17.
[See Pleadings] .. 728
7. Act V of 1908-Section 11 Principle of res
judicata--Applicability when gratuity was awarded in a previous proceedings
under the Payment of Wages Act i.n the teeth of the clear provision of Rule
8.01--Scope of Rule 8.01.
Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport
Corporation Hyderabad v. Venkateswara Rao etc. ..... 248 CODE OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 1908
1. Whether Magistrate has jurisdiction to
recall dismissal order made u/s 203--Application for recalling dismissal order,
whether amounts to fresh complaint.
Bindeshwari Prasad Singh v. Kali Singh .. 125
2. S.99 A--Scope of --Whether 'Statement of
grounds' a mandatory provision.
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Lalai Singh Yadav
..616 3. (Act 2 of 1974)Ss. 235 and 465 Scope of.
Santa Singh v. The State of Punjab ..229
4. (Act II of 1974), 1973 S. 378. [See Appeal
against acquittal] .. 872
5. (Act 2 of 1974)--S.494 Prosecution
applying for withdrawal of prosecution--Principles to be considered by Court in
granting consent.
State of Orissa v. Chandrika Mohapalra &
Ors. .. 335 COMPULSORY RETIREMENT-Compulsory retirement made in public interest
under the Government of lndia Decision No. 23 dated 30th November 1962 below
Fundamental Rule 56 (later substituted as a new rule FR 56(i)--Mere reference
to a non-subsisting rule does not invalidate the order when retirement is in
public interest and bona fide.
Mayconghoan Rahamohan ,Singh v. The Chief
Commissioner(Administration) Manipur and Ors. ..1022
2. [see Constitution of India] ..128
CONDONATION OF DELAY --in applying for renewal of stage permits under the Motor
Vehicles Act.
[See Motor Vehicles Act] .. 503 CONDUCT OF
ELECTION RULES 1961, rr. 42 and 56(6)-.
Tendered ballot paper, what is and use of.
Dr. Wilfred D'Souza v. Francis Menino Jesus
Ferrao .. 942 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
1. Art. 14---Combines Seniority Scheme
introduced by the Reserve Bank of India to equalise opportunities of confirmation
and pro-motion of Clerks--Some Clerks affected adversely by unforseen
circumstances--if violative of equal opportunity clause--Right of State to
integrate Cadres and lay down principles of seniority..
Reserve Bank of India & Ors. v.N. C. Paliwal
& Ors. .. 377 5
2. Arts. 14, 16--Civil
Service---Seniority--Direct Recruits and promotees--Quota--Whether roster
implicit--Benefit of service-Words and Phrases "As far as
practicable." N.K. Chauhan and Ors. v. State of Gujarat and Ors. .. 1037
3. Art. 15(4)--Reservation of seats for
socially and educationally backward classes in educational institutions--Annual
family income test---if valid.
Kumari K.S. Jayasree and Anr. v. The State of
Kerala and Anr. .. 194 4. Art. 19(6)(ii) and 269(g):
[See Central Sales Tax Act] .. 59
5. Art. 3IA(1) Second Proviso-Art.
31(b)--Meaning of right conferred--9th Schedule-Whether different ceiling can
be imposed for different persons-Whether second proviso to Art. 31(A)(1)
imposed a feter on the legislative competence --Gujarat Agricultural Land
Ceiling Act 1961 (Gujarat Act 27 of 1961)--Section 2 (21), 6.
Hasmukhlal Dahayabhai and Ors. v. State of
Gujarat & Ors. .. 103
6. Art. 131--Disputes between State and Union
--Jurisdiction of High Court--Charge of Excise Duty-Condition ofWhether an
article manufactured or produced before the levy is imposed is excisable.
Union of India v. State of Mysore .. 842
7. Art.-136 Practice and Procedure-Whether a
Court of Criminal Appeal--Whether can interfere with concurrent findings of
fact--Interference when grave and substantial injustice.
Dalbir Kaur and Ors. v. State of Punjab .
.280
8. Art. 226--High Court--if could interefere
with the Appellate orders of Income Tax Appellate Tribunal under Art. 226.
Income Tax Officer, Lucknow v. M/s S.B.
Singbar Singh and Sons and Anr. . .214
9. Art. 226--When alternative remedies
available, whether writ petition maintainable.
G. Sarana v. University of Lucknow and Ors.
.. 64
10. Art. 226, whether concurrent findings of
facts by the Revenue Authorities, can be reopened in writ petition.
Y.B. Patel and Ors. v. Y. L. Patil .. 32
11. Art. 235--Disciplinary action over
subordinate judiciary-Governor--If bound by the recommendation of the High
Court--Consultation with State Public Service Commission-If warranted by Art.
235.
Baldev Raj Guliani and Ors. v. The Punjab
& Haryana High Court and Ors. ..425 12. Art. 288(2)--Scope of.
Damodar Valley Corporation v. State of Bihar
and Ors. ..
118
13. Arts. 309, 310 and 311---Scope of Art.
310 Visa Vis Arts. 309 and 311.
Union of India and Anr. v. K. S. Subramanian
.. 87
14. Art. 311--Termination of services of
temporary servant-Protection of Article when applicable.
State of U. P. v. Ram Chandra Trivedi .. 462
15. Art. 311(2), violation of --Penalty of
compulsory retirement-Hyderabad Civil Service (Classification, Control and
Appeal Rules,) reasonable opportunity of defence at the stages of enquiry and
punishment-6 Consideration of extraneous matters in recommendation of penalty
by High Court Chief Justice, whether valid.
State of Andhra Pradesh v. S.N. Nizamuddin
Ali Khan ..
128
CONTEMPT OF COURT ACT (ACT NO. 70 OF 1971)
Ss. 2(b) 10 and
12(1) read with Article 215, Constitution of
IndiaRemitting the punishment awarded after accepting the apology, tendered by
the contemnor and ordering him to pay the cost of paper books, whether
valid-Whether endorsing to the Registrar a copy of the wireless message, addressed
to the State Counsel for information only amounts to contempt.
Arun Kshetrapal v. Registrar, High Court,
Jabalpur & Anr... 98
2. 1971, S.19(1)(b)--Finding of committal of
contempt is basis of acceptance of apology--Judge exposing himself to public
controversy cannot shelter behind his office.
Ram Pratap Sharma and Ors. v. Daya Nand and
Ors. . .242
CONTRACT OF SALE OF GOODS
--Whether interstate or intra state Sale.
[See sale] .. 631
CORRUPT PRACTICE:
[See Election] . .490 COSTS:
tax matters when there is conflict among High
Courts.
[See Practice] .. 9
CUSTOMS ACT, 1962, Ss. 28, 131(1)(3) and (5):
[See Limitation] . .983 DEALER:
----Whether Central Government selling foodgrains
and fertilizers a dealer.
[See Central Sales Tax Act, 1956] . .59
DELEGATION OF POWERS TO OFFICERS for execution of contracts under s.122(1) of
Jammu & Kashmir Constitution-Contracts containing arbitration clause
validity executed on behalf of the Government cannot be questioned on the plea
of violation of s. 122(1.).
Timber Kashmir (P) Ltd. etc. v. Conservator
of Forests, Jammu and Ors. .. 937 DEVELOPMENT REBATE --Whether dividend when
withdrawn.
[See Income Tax Act] .. 638 DIRECTORATE
GENERAL OF TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENT (CLASS II POSTS) RECRUITMENT (AMENDMENT)
RULES, --1974, Rule 2, interpretation of --whether officer on special duty in
the same grade as Development Officers.
S. Ramaswamy v. Union of India and Ors. ..
221
DISCIPLINARY ACTION :
---Over subordinate judiciary by High Court.
[See Constitution of India] . .425 DISMISSAL
ORDER, recall of [See Code of Criminal Procedure] .. 125 DOCTRINE OF
WAIVER--Bar of waiver, whether applicable to later grievance against 'bias.' G.
Sarana v. University of Lucknow and Ors. . .64 ELECTION--Representation of the
People Act, 1951--Sec.
123(2)--Sec. 100(1)(b)--Corrupt practice
--Undue influence--Conduct of Election Rules 1961--Rules 39(2) --Ballot paper
containing mark on the reverse of the symbol-7 Can be rejected as
invalid-Charge of Corrupt practice--If of quasi criminal nature--Degree of
proof----Interference with appreciation of evidence by High Court --Whether
election result can be lightly interfered with.
M. Narayana Rao v.G. Venkata Reddy & Ors.
..490
ELECTRICITY ACT 1910 Section 22B--Electricity
Supply Act.
1948--Sections 18, 49 and 79(j) --Whether
section 49 invalid for excessive delegation--Whether Electricity Board can
reduce the quota of consumption if the State Government has done so--Board
having determined the quota, whether can further reduce it-Whether Board can
fix the quota without framing regulations--Practice and Procedure--Whether
appellant can be allowed to raise a new question of facts for the first time.
Adoni Cotton Mills etc. etc. v. The Andhra
Pradesh State Electricity Board and Ors. . .133
EMPLOYEES' STATE INSURANCE ACT, 1948--Sec.
61--If debars
grant of sick leave--If the Act deals with
all aspects of sickness.
The Alembic Glass Industries Ltd. Baroda and
Ors. v. The Workmen and Ors. .. 80 ESCAPED ASSESSMENT [See Income Tax ] .. 207
ESTATE DUTY ACT (34 of 1953)
1. Ss. 2(15), 9 and 27--Scope of.
Controller of Estate Duty, Gujarat v. Shri
Kantilal Trikamlal . .9
2. S.5--Land covered with wild. and natural
forest growths--of agricultural land.
Controller of Estate Duty, Kerala v V.
Venugopala Verma Rajah .. 346
3. S.10--Gift of property the deemed to be
part of the State of deceased-doner.
Controller of Estate Duty, Keral v. M/s R.V.
Vishwanathan and Ors. .. 64
EVIDENCE ACT (1 of 1872)
1. Ss. 17 and 33--Evidence of
admission--Admissibility.
Union of India v. Moksh Builder and
Financiers and Ors. .. 96 2. S.43 and Code of Civil Procedure (Act 5 of 1908)
0.41 r.
2 Admission of Judgments in land acquisition
preceedings an additional evidence.
The Land Acquisition Officer, City
Improvement Trust Board v. H. Narayaniah etc. etc.
3. S.68--Discharge of onusproban by
propounder-when executic of will surrounded by suspicious circumstances.
Seth Beni Chand (since dead) no by 1. rs. v.
Smt. Kamla Kunwar and Ors. .. 57 4. See. 116--Whether tenant cadeny the
landlord's title.
Sri Ram Pasricha v. Jagannat and Ors.
FINAL LIST, when may be set asid by Court.
Union of India v. Dr. R.D. Nanjia and Ors.
FINDINGS OF FACT
[See Constitution of India] .. 32 FIRST
INFORMATION REPORT--delay in lodging.
[See Penal Code] .. 280 FUNDAMENTAL RULE
56(j):
[See Compulsory retirement] .. 1025
GENERAL CLAUSES ACT 189' --Section 3(42)
Meaning of per
son--Whether legislatur 8 bound to follow
definition in General Clauses Act.
Hasmukhalal Dayabhai and Ors. v. State of
Gujarat and Ors.
etc. .. 103 OLD CONTROL RULES, 1963, whether
includes smuggled gold within their ambit.
Triveni Prasad Ramkaran Verma State of
Maharashtra .. 519 GRATUITY, entitlement to-whether a former employee of he
Nizam's State Railway can claim gratuity as of right in addition to provident
Fund--Government of Hyderabad Railway establishment Code, 1949, Rule . 01,
8.02, 8.05, 8.12, 8.13, .15, 8.16, 8.17 and 8.19 read with para 17 Chapter
VII-interpretation of.
Andhra Pradesh State .Road Transport
Corporation, Hyderabad v. Venkateswara .Rao. etc. . .248 GUJARAT MUNICIPALITIES
1963, S. 38 (10)(b)(i) "act as Councillor"--ScoPe of--President of
the Municipality applying or lease of land--If debarred taking land on
lease--General power of supervision conferred on the President--If resident
should be deemed to have acted within the meaning of 38(1)(b)(i) when lease was
ranted to him by the Chief officer.
Rustamji Nasorvanji Danger v. shri Joram
Kunverji Ganatra and Ors. .. 884 HINDU LAW If a co-widow can relinquish ght of
survivorship--Whether after relinquishment, a widow an dispose of property by
will.
Rindumati Bai v. Nrarbada' Prasad . .988
RELIGIOUS ENDOWMENT-Hindu temple forming part of a Jain Institution--When may
be treated as a Hindu religious endowment.
Commissioner of Hindu Religious &
Charitable Endowments Mysore v. Sri Ratnavaram Heggde (deceased) by 1.
rs. . .889 IDENTIFICATION PARADE:
[See Penal Code] .. 280
INCOME TAX ACT 1922
1. S.2.(4)--When can single and isolated sale
be a business transaction within the meaning of -Onus probandi on the Taxation
Department--Initial purchase with intention of advantageous sale--Earning
profit on delivery of goods not necessary.
Dalmia Cement Ltd., v. The Commissioner of
Income Tax, New Delhi. .. 5 54
2. (11 of 1922) Ss. 2 (6A)(e)'and 10(2)
(vi-b)-Development rebate treated as accumulated profits--Withdrawal of amount
by shareholder from Company's account--if withdrawal can be treated as dividend
since amount withdrawn is within accumulated profits.
P.K. Badiani v. The Commissioner of Income
Tax, Bombay . .638
3. S.9--Irrevocable rent--If could be
deducted from income from property of only one year-Exemption--If could be
given only once.
Commissioner of Income Tax, Lucknow v. Shri
Madho Parsad Jatia. .. 202
4. Sec. 23A(1)--Explanation 2(1) to Sec.
23A(1)--Meaning of investment Companies, whether restricted to shares stocks
and other securities or used in contradistinction with manufacturing processing
and trading operations--Indian Companies 9 Act 1913--Sec. 87(f)--Companies Act
1956--Sec. 372(11).
Nawn Estates (P) Ltd. v. C.I.T., West Bengal
.. 798
5. Ss. 23A and 35(1)--Whether income tax
officer has power under s. 35(1) to rectify an order passed under s.
23A.
Commissioner of Income Tax, Kanpur. v. M/s.
J.K. Commercial Corporation Ltd. etc. .. 512
6. Sec. 25A(3)--Claims for partition and
disruption of the Hindu Undivided family disallowed by I.T.O.--Appeal under the
Act filed against the orders of.I.T.O. also dismissed--No reference under the
Act challenging the Tribunal's order dismissing the appeal was taken, but subsequentiy
got a preliminary decree for partition passed by the civil court during the
pendency of the apPeal--Whether t he Income Tax Authorities are bound by the
subsequent partition decree of the civil court.
Narendra kumar J. Madi v. Commissioner of
Income Tax, Gujarat 11, Ahmedabad .. 112
7. Ss. 34 and 42, Income Tax Act (43 of 1961)
s. 147 and Income Tax Rules, 1922, r. 33 corresponding to r. 10 of 1962
Rules--One 0 f t he met hods mentioned in corresponding to r. 10 of 1962
Rules--One of the methods mentioned in r.
33 applied for assessment--Higher tax
liability if another method in rule adopted--If a case of income escaping assessment.
Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal1,
Calcutta v. Simon Carves Ltd. .. 207
8. S. 5(2)-Non-resident company receiving
income outside India-Income if accrued in India.
84SCI/77 The Performing Right Socio)Ltd.
& Anr. v. The Commr.Income Tax and Ors. .. 1 INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES A(
1907--Sec. 2(00)-Meaning of trenchment--Can termination service by efflux of time
cover by the expression retrenchment Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. The p siding
Officer, Labour.
Court Orissa and Ors. .. 6
2. Sec. 36--When legal practioners can appear
before the Tribunal--Whether Secs. 36(1) an 36(2) is controlled by s.
'36(4) Pradip Port Trust, Pradip Their
Workmen .. 5 INTER-STATE SENIORITY [See State's Reorganisation Act] . .82
INTERPRETATION
1. Amendment of a section--could be used to
interpret earlier provision in the Act.
Sone Valley Portland Cem Co. Ltd. v. The
General Mini Syndicate (P) Ltd. .. 3
2. "Refund meaning of--Subsequent
amendment of Section If could. be used to interpr earlier ambiguous provision.
Thiru Manickam & Co. v. Sic of Tamil Nadu
.. 9
3. "should" contained in a clause
"should" possesses a post graduate degree and requist experience
whether mandatory or directory--"Post-gradual Meaning of.
Smt. Juthika Bhattacharya The State of Madhya
prad and Ors. .. 4 4. Contract-of.
[See Arbitration Act] INTERPRETATION OF
DOCUMENTS--Principles application 10 to interpretation of
document-Notifications Nos. F. 9/5/59 R & S published in gazette dt.
17-1-60 u/s 507 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 (66 of 1957) and
Notification GSR 486 u/s 1(2) of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (59 of 1958)
gazetted on 21-4-62 Whether the whole of Mauza Chowkri Mubarakbad and whole of
Onkar Nagar and Lekhpura were meant to be notified.
Jangbirv. Mahavir Prasad Gupta ..670
INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES [See Bombay Rents/-Hotel and Lodging House Rates
Control Act, 1947] . .403 Estate Duty Act and other taxing
statutes--Principles.
Controller of Estate Duty, Gujarat v. Shri
Kantilal Trikamlal Expressions not being terms of art whether to be construed
in technical sense or ordinary popular sense as used by businessmen
--Legislative history as guide to construction--Genesis and development of law
as key to interpretation-Whether English decisions useful guides or
construction of analogous provisions, fundamental concepts and general
principles.
Nawn Estates (P) Ltd. v.C.I.T., West Bengal
.. 798 Provision in Act substituted by another--Amending provision avoid-Effect.
-State of Maharashtra v. The Central
Provinces Manganese Ore Co. Ltd. .. 1002 Rules as an aid--Use of Statement of
objects and reasons.
Tata Engineering & Locomotive Company
Ltd. v. Gram Panchayat Pimpri Waghere. .. 306 6. Statute when retrospective.
K. Eapen Chacko v. The Provident Investment
Co. P. Ltd. ..
1026 7. When a statute could be read retrospectively.
State of Kerala v. philomina etc. & Ors.
..
273 JAMMU & KASHMIR CONSTITUTION, S. 122
[See Delegation of Powers] .. 937
Admission of judgments in Land Acquisition
proceedings.
[See Land Acquisition] .. 178 JURISDICTION
1. --of High Courts to interfere with the
trial Court's discretionary order.
[See C.P.C.] .. 1061
2. of High Court under Art. 226 to interfere
with orders of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal.
[See Constitution of India ] .. 214
KARNATAKA LAND REFORMS ACT, 1961, Ss. 107 and
133'Whether
applicable to land unauthorisedly held after
expiry of lease.
Corporation of the City of Bangalore v.B.T. Kampanna
. .269 KARNATAKA RECRUITMENT OF GAZETTED PROBATIONERS (Class I and 11 Posts
appointment by competitive examination) Rules, 1966--R. 9 read with Part IV of
Schedule II--Scope of--Awarding block marks in interview--If violative of the
Rule.
State of Karnataka and Anr. v. M. Farida
& Ors. ..
323
KERALA LAND REFORMS ACT
1. 1963 S. 84 Scope of interpretation--When a
statute could be read retrospectively.
11 State of Kerala and Ors. v. Philomina etc.
and Ors. .. 273
2. 1964 Secs. 81, 83, 84, 85, 85A and
86--Voluntary transfers made after notified date whether valid.
State of Kerala and Ors. v. K.A. Gangadharan
.. 960 3. (Kerala 1 of 1964) as amended in 1969 and 1971, Secs.
3(1), 50A, 52, 73, 108, 125 and 132(3) Scope
of.
K. Eapen Chacko v. The Provident Investment
Co. P. Ltd.
.. 1026
LAND ACQUISITION ACT
1. City of Bangalore Improvement Act, 1945,
Ss. 16, 18 and 27--Notification under Ss. 16 and 18 on different dates--Date
for determining market .value for awarding compensation for acquisition of
land.
The Land Acquisition Officer, City
Improvement Trust, Board v. 11. Narayaniah etc. .. 178
2. Act 1894 Ss. 5A, 6 and 17(4)-Burden of
establishing urgency On whom lies.
Narayan Govind Gayate etc. v. State of
Maharashtra ..
763
3. (1 of 1894) s.6A--If mandatoryEffect of
non-compliance in case of beneficial schemes.
Farid Ahmed Abdul Samad and Anr. v. The
Municipal Corpn. of the City of Ahmedabad and Anr. . .71 LEGAL ENTITY [See
Railways Act, 1890] . .419 LIMITATION
1. for rectification under the U.P. Sales Tax
Act, 1948, S. 22.
[See U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948] . .25.
2. Period of limitation in respect of suo
moto revision by Central Government to annul or modify any order of erroneous
refund of duty when begins--Customs Act, 1962, Sec. 28, 131(1)(3)(5) scope of.
Geep Flashlight Industries Ltd. v. Union of
India & Ors. . .983
LIMITATION ACT
1. 1963 Ss. 5 and 29(23)-If applicable.
Mohd. Ashfaq v. State Transport Appellate
Tribunal M.P.
and Ors. .. 563
2. 1963, S.I 2(2) whether applicable to
revision petitions filed under section 10, U.P. Sales Tax Act. Time spent in
obtaining second--copy of. impugned order, whether to be excluded in computing
limitation period for filing revision petitions.
Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. v. Madan Lal
and Sons Bareilly. . .683
MADHYA pRADESH MUNICIPAL CORPORATION ACT
1956Sec.
138(b)--Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control
Act Sec.
7---Must rental value under the Municipal Act
follow the standard rent under Accommodation Control Act When premises let
out--When used by owner.
Municipal Corporation, Indore, and Ors. v.
Smt. Ratna Prabha ana Ors. .. 1017
MADHYA PRADESH PUBLIC TRUSTS ACT 1951s. 9(1):
[See Code of Civil Procedure] ..993
MADRAS GENERAL SALES TAX ACT 1959, Schedule
11, items 7(a
and (b)--If ultra vires.
M/s. Guruviah Naidu and Sons etc v. State of
T.N. and Anr.
MINES AND MINERALS (REGULATION AND
DEVELOPMENT) ACT, 1957-
12
1. State Government reserved certain areas
for exploitation of minerals in public sector--If had the power to do
so.--State Governments--If could reject application of private persons.
Amritlal Nathubhai Shah and Ors. v. Union
Government of India and Anr .... 372 2. S.30A--Scope of.
State of Bihar and Anr. etc. v. Khas
Karampura Collieries Ltd. etc. .. 157
MINIMUM WAGES ACT 1948, Entry 22 Explanation Part
1 of
Schedule, construction of word
includes--Whether ,potteries Industry includes manufacture of Mangalore pattern
roofing tiles.
The South Gujarat .Roofing Tiles
Manufacturers Associations and Ant. v. The State of Gujarat and Anr .. 878
MONOPOLY OF BUS ROUTES-Whether permitting the existing private operators to
operate till the date of expiry of their permits creates a monopoly.
Sarjoo Prasad Singh v. The State of Bihar and
Ors. .. 661
MOTOR VEHICLES ACTS 1939
1. S. 43(1)--State Government can direct
imposition of fiscal rates on stage-carriage operators for carrying mails as
condition of permit--Ss. 48(3) and 59(3)(c) such directions do not interfere
with quasi judicial functions of Regional Transport Authority. Special
provisions of s. 48(3) (XV) do not override general provisions of s.
43(1)(d)(1).
Sree Gajana Motor Transport Co. Ltd. v. The
State of Karnataka and Ors. .. 665
2. Sec. 47--Rajasthan Motor Vehicles Rules,
1951--Rule 108(c)-Whether considerations in Sec.47 for grant of stage permits
to be mentioned in the order.
Ikram Khan v. State Transport Appellate
Tribunal and Ors.
.. 459
3. S.58(2) proviso--Delay in.applying for
renewal of existing permit --If could be condoned--Chapter IVA--If a self
contained code --Renewal application under s.
68F(ID)--Whether s. 57 applicable.
Mohd. Ashfaq v. State Transport Appellate
Tribunal U.S. and Ors. .. 563
4. Sec. 68D--Scope of 'Whether there should
be a finding on each and every separate objection raised.
Sarjoo prasad Singh v. The State of Bihar and
Ors. ..
661 MURDER:
--Distinction between S.299 and 300 I.P.C.
[See Penal Code] .. 601 NECESSARY PARTY:
[See Civil Procedure Code] .. 419 NEW CASE
---Courts' Whether can make a [See Partnership Act] .. 583 NEW DELHI HOUSE RENT
CONTROL ORDER 1939---C1. Standard rent of house fixed in 1944--Rateable value
enhanced on the basis of rent received in 1966-Whether rating should be
correlated to actual income.
New Delhi Municipal Committee v.M.N. Soi and
Anr. . .731 NEW PLEA [See Adoni Cotton Mills v. Andhra Pradesh State Electricity
Board] .. 133 NOLLES PROSEQUE:
--Principle to be followed by court (See Criminal
Procedure Code Act 2 of 1974) . .335 13 OTHER RIGHTS in Explanation 2 to s.
2(15) meaning of.
Controller of Estate Duty, Gujarat v. Shri
Kantilal Trikamlal .. 9
PARTNERSHIP ACT 1932 Sec. 69 --Whether
mandatory--Whether
suit can be filed by unregistered
firm--Dissolution of firm--Suit by a 'partner of erstwhile unregistered firm,
If other partners of erstwhile firm necessary parties --Material alterations in
a document-Effect of--Suit for Specific and ascertained amount-Whether court
can make out new case and grant partial relief on another basis.
Loonkaran Setia etc. v. Ivan E. Johan and
Ors.
etc. .. 853 PENAL CODE--S.34--Specific
evidence for infliction of fatal wound not required--Community of intent with
participatory presence fixes constructive liability.
Harshadsingh @ Baba Pahalvansingh Thakura v.
The State of Gujarat .. 626
2. Ss. 299 and 300--Culpable homicide not
amounting to murder and murder--Distinction--Tests to be applied in each
case--S.300 Thirdly I.P.C.--Scope of.
State of Andhra Pradesh v. Rayavarapu
Punnayya and Anr.
. .601
3. Section 302--Non-examination of eye
witnesses--Interested witnesses--Meaning of--Necessity of examining independent
witnesses --Motive--Delay in lodging F/R and despatch to Magistrate-Identification
parade, necessity of.
Dalbir Kaur and Ors. v. State of Punjab ..
280 PLEADINGS
1. Amendments to--Amendment to the pleadings
to introduce an entirely different case, under the guise of permisible
inconsistent pleas which is likely to cause prejudice to the other side cannot
be allowed--Civil Procedure Code (Act V of 1908)--Order VI Rule 17.
M/s Modi Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd.
and Anr. v. M/s Ladha Ram and Col . .728
2. Under section 70 of the Contract (Act 9)
of 1872--Ingredients necessary to be pleaded.
Union of India v. Sita Ram Jaiswal. .. 979
POSSESSION "Possession" to attract criminal liability must be
"conscious possession".
Patel Jethabhai Chatur v. State of Gujarat ..
872 POWERS OF OFFICER to rectify an order passed u/s 23A [See Income Tax Act]
.. 512 POWER TO AUCTION --exclusive privilege to vend liquor [See Bihar and
Orissa Excise Act. . .811
PRACTICE
1. Costs in tax matters when there is
conflict among High Courts Controller of Estate Duty, Gujrart v. Shri Kantilal
Trikamalal ...
2. Duty of High Court when there is conflict
between decisions the Supreme Court--Upsetting concurrent findings of fact
second appeal-Propriety.
State of U.P . v. Ram Chandrs Trivedi ..
46:
3. Duty of High Court where there, is
conflict between the view expressed by Divisional bench and larger benches of
the Supreme Court.
Union of India and Anr. K.S. Subramanian.
14
4. Non-suiting for want of proper pleadings
at the appellate stage by the Supreme Court when parties went to trial and
issues were raised and the litigation went through the course of trial and
appeal is not desirable.
Union of India v. Sita .Ram Jaiswal .. 979
5. Supreme Court will not entertain a
complaint on facts and interfere with a finding of facts by the appellate Court
under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.
Patel Jethabhai Chatur v. State of Gujarat ..
872
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
1. Further plea taken in the affidavit
rejoinder to the writ petition shall not be allowed to be agitate Sarjoo Prasad
Singh v. The State of Bihar and Ors. .. 861
2. High Court's duty to give reasons even in
cases of summary dismissal.
Shankar Gopinath Apte v. Gangabai Hariharrao
Patwardhan ..
411
3. Interference with findings on reliability
of evidence only in exceptional circumstances.
4. Harshadsingh@ Baba pahalvansingh Thakur v.
The State ..
626
5. Re-appraisal of evidence by Supreme Court
in spite of concurrent findings of fact, proper when miscarriage of justice has
occurred.
Mohammad Aslam v. State of Uttar Pradesh ..
689 Whether High Court can direct a Minister to be impleaded as a party and
file his personal affidavit.
State of Punjab ana Anr. v. Y.P. Duggal and
Ors. .. 96
PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT, 1947 Sec.
5(1)(e) and 5(1)(d)
Sec. 5(2) Misappropriating Govt. funds.--Retaining
Govt.
Funds by a Govt. Servant--Evidence Act, Sec.
154--When can witness be declared hostile--Can evidence of a hostile witness be
accepted--Evidence Act Sec.-105--Onus of proving exceptions in IPC on
accused--Degree of proof--Criminal Trial--Effect of non--examination of material
witness-Conviction on evidence of a solitary witness--Whether adverse inference
can be drawn against accused for not leading evidence--Onus of prosecution-Presumption
of innocence.
Rabindra Kumar Dey v. State of Orissa . .439
PREVENTION OF FOOD ADULTERATION ACT 1910.
1. S. 16-Proviso--Scope of.
Murlidhar Meghraj etc. v. State of
Maharashtra etc. .. 1
2. sec. 16(1) (a) (2) (1)--2(1) (c) 2(1)
(j)--2(1) Prevention of Food Adulteration of Rules.Rules 23, 28 and 29 Can
conviction be based on sole testimony of Food Inspector--Can an article fail
under clause (j) and (i) of Sec. 2(i)--Are they mutually exclusive or
overlapping-When rules are silent about colouring material can use of dye be
punished--Do provisions of Probation of Offenders Act apply to offences under
the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act.
Prem Ballab and Anr v. The State (Delhi
Admn.) .. 592
PRIVITY OF CONTRACT
When a company has severa branches and there
is a contract between the buyer and one of the branches, the contract of sale
is between the company and the buyer.
English Electric Company of India 1Ltd. v.
The Deputy Commercial Tax Officer and Ors. .. 631 15
PROBATION OF OFFENDERS ACT,
1958--Applicability to
cases under POFA [See Prevention of Food
Adulteration Act, 1950] .. 59 PROCEDURE--When a court of appeal can interfere
in the lower court's Judgment.
Smt. Padma Uppal etc. v. State of Punjab and
Ors. .. 329 PROMOTIONS--Right to promotion-Whether promotion of class III
employees to Class is governed by "Advance Correction Slip No. 7)"
introducing w.e. f. March, 11, 1973, new rules 324 to 328 and substituting a
new rule 301 in Chapter III of the Indian Railway Establishment Manual Scope
and applicability of Rules 301 and 328 (2) (4) and (5) S.K. Chandan v. Union of
India and Ors. .. 785 PROPERTY right to dispose of by will by a widow [See
Hindu Law] . .988 PROVIDENT FUND--Illegal payment of gratuity in the past will
not affect legal claims to Provident Fund.
Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport
Corporation, Hyd. v.P. Venkateswara Rao etc. ..248
PUNJAB GENERAL SALES TAX ACT (Punjab Act 46
of 1948), S. 11(2) Notice under--Whether should be issued within a particular
period.
The Indian Aluminium Ltd. & Anr. v. The
Excise and Taxation Officer and Anr. . .716 PUNJAB CIVIL SERVICE RULES, Vol. 1
Rules 2.49 and 3.10 to 3.16--Junior Vernacular Cadre teachers officiating in
senior vernacular cadre entitled to benefit of their substantive post .
State of Punjab and Ors. v, Labh Ram and Ors.
.. 832
RAILWAYS ACT, 1890 S. 3(6), Railway
Administration, whether
a separate legal entity.
State of Kerala v. The General Manager. S.R.
Madras . .419 RAILWAYS ESTABLISHMENT CODE--Para--157--Whether the paragraph
empowers the Railway Board to make rules for the gazetted Railway
servants--Construction of para 157.
S.K. Chandan v. Union of India and Ors.
785 RAILWAY ESTABLISHMENT MANUAL--Whether
Rule 328 (2) providing for the invalidity of promotions made in the Diesel
Locomotive Works from August 1, 1961 to March 11, 1973 casts an obligation on
the Railway Board to recall all promotions and to form a fresh panel--Meaning
of "Promotion made in the Diesel Locomotive Works in Rule 328 (2) and
promotion to the higher grades in Rules 328(4)".
S.K. Chartdan v. Union of India and Ors. .
.785 RATEABLE VALUE (See New Delhi House Rent Control Order) .. 731 REAPPRAISAL
of Evidence by Supreme Court.
(See Practice and Procedure) ..689 REASONABLE
OPPORTUNITY See Constitution of India .. 128 2. to be heard.
(See State's Reorganisation Act) . .827
REHABILITATION ACT, 1954 S. 14(1) (b)
"Such cash balances
--Meaning of.
16 Custodian of Evacuee Property, v. Smt.
Rabia Bai . .255 REPRESEN TATION OF THE PEOPLE ACT 1950.
Election petition--Not accompanied by
impugned pamphlet-If liable to be rejected--Printer-If could be called an accomplice
--Failure to send pamphlet to District Magistrate as required by s. 127 A(2) If
makes the printer an accomplice.
Thakur Virendra Singh v . Vimal Kumar .. 525
See. 15, 21, 22, 23"Preparation and revision of electoral roll--Amendment,
transposition or deletion of entries in electoral roll--Provision of Sec. 23,
if mandatory--Representation of the People Act, 1951--Every person on electoral
roll whether entitled to vote even if name not brought in accordance with
law--Sec. 100(1) See. 123(1) (A)--Bribery --Proof of--Quasi-criminal in
nature--interference with appreciation of evidence by High Court, Bihar and
Orissa Act, 1922 Sec. 389.
Ramji Prasad Singh v. Ram Bilas Jha and four
Ors. . .741 REPRESENTATION OF THE PEOPLE ACT 1951.
S. 9A--Contract signed as President, Gram
Panchayat Rejection of nomination paper-If valid-Improper rejection-If courts
could give relief under s. 100(1) (c).
Jugal Kishore Patnaik v. Ratnakar Mohanty ..
49 Sec. 77 Incurring expenses in excess of what is permissible--Interference by
this Court with appreciation of evidence by High Court.
Nangthomban Ibomeha Singh v. Leisanghem
Chandramoni Singh and Ors, .. 573 RES JUDICATA.
(See Civil Procedure Code)..320 RETRENCHMENT
--Meaning of (See industrial Disputes Act) .. 586 RETROSPECTIVITY.
service rules.
(See Civil Service) . .702 REVISION --suo
moto limitation for (See Limitation) .. 983 RIGHT OF MANAGEMENT Hindu
Law--Joint Hindu Undivided family--Whether a junior member of the family can
act as Karta with the consent of all the other members, if the senior member
gives up his right.
Narendra Kurnar J. Modi v. Commissioner of
Income Tax Gujarat 11. Ahmedabad .. 112 RIGHT TO PLEAD --by legal Practitioners
before the Labour Tribunal.
(See IndustriaI Disputes Act).. 537 RIGHT TO
SUE by the heirs (See Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act,
1947) .. 341 RIGHT TO SUE for eviction --by a co-owner.
(See West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956)
. .395 SALE--Contract for sale of goods, whether inter-State sale or intraState
sale--Ingredients--Central Sales Tax Act --Section 3(a).
English Electric Company of India Ltd. v. The
Deputy Commercial Tax Officer and Ors. .. 631
SALES REORGANISATION ACT (37 of 1956) s. 115-
Oppertunity to hear after final inter-state
seniority list is prepared 17 after giving opportunity to aggrieved officers to
make representation against provisional list--If should be given.
Union of India v. Dr. R.D. Nanjiah and Ors.
.. 827 SALES TAX --Central Provinces Bear Sales Tax Act, 1947 s.
2(g) Expln. II--Goods within States at the
time of contract of sale, mixed up outside state and the mixture sold 'sale' if
taxable.
State of Maharashtra etc. v. Central
Provinces Manganese Ore. Co. Ltd. .. 1002
2. Supply of crude oil by Oil and Natural Gas
Commission from Assam to refinery of Indian Oil Corporation in Bihar --Supply
under directions of Government at price fixed, by Government-If inter-state
sale liable to Central Sales Tax.
Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. State of
Bihar and Ors...
364 SECOND APPEAL 1 Disturbance of concurrent
finding of fact without considering the objects of the notification or
discussing any principle of construction of documents which could indicate that
a point of law had really arisen for a decision is patently exceeding the
jurisdiction of the High Court--Civil Procedure Code (Act V) 1908, S. 100.
Jangbir v. Mahavir Prasad Gupta .. 670
2. -Propriety of upsetting concurrent
findings in (See Practice) .. 462 SENIORITY 1. -Direct recruits of Promotees.
(See Constitution of India) ..1037
2. When recruitment irregular. (See Civil
Service) .. 677 SENIORITY SCHEME -Right of State to lay down principles of
seniority (See Constitution of India) .. 377 SENTENCE Judicial Jurisdiction to
soften the sentence in economic crimes and food offences.
(See Prevention of Food Adulteration Act,
1954) ..
1 SICKNESS BENEFIT (See Employees' State
Insurance Act, 1948) ..80 SOLE WITNESS --conviction based on (See Prevention of
Corruption Act) . . .439 SPECIAL RULES 1962--Rule 4.
Government of A.P. and Ors. v. Shri D.
Janardhana Rao Anr. .. 702
SUCCESSION ACT, 1925--Sec. 6" legal will
--Genuineness of
Suspicious circumstances--Burden of
proof--Degree of proof.
Jaswant Kaur v. Amrit Kaur and Ors. .. 925 2.
1975, S. 63 (c), Attesting witness defined.
Seth Beni Chand (Since dead now by 1. rs. v.
Smt. Kamh Kunwar and Ors. .. 578 SUMMARY DISMISSAL --Court's duty to give
reasons.
(See Practice and Procedure) . .411 SUSPENDED
OFFICER REINSTATED AND LATER COMPULSORILY RETIRED --Effect of--If order of
suspension merge with order of reinstatement.
Baldev Raj Guliani and Ors. v. The Punjab
& Haryana High Court and Ors, ....42 18 SUSPENSION ORDERS --Whether merges
with order of Retirement (See Suspended Officer) . .425 TERMINATION -of
services of temporary servants.
(See Constitution of India) .. 462
TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT (4 of 1882) S. 53A,
Indian
Easements Act (5 of/882) s. 60(b) and Indian
Contract Act (9 of 1872) S. 221--Scope of.
Shankar Gopinath Apte v. Gangs bai Hariharrao
Patwardhan ..
411
U.P. INTERMEDIATE EDUCATION ACT, 1921--Whether
the
basic section of a college is within the
scope of.
Commissioner, Lucknow Division and Ors. v.
Kumari Prem Lata Misra. . . 957
U.P. SALES TAX ACT, 1948
S. 3-A, Notification issued under-Rule for
constructing words--Whether carbon paper is taxable as 'Paper' Whether ribbon
is accessory or part of typewriter.
State of Uttar Pradesh v. M/s Kores (India)
Ltd. ..
837 S. 22 Order of rectification passed
within 3 years of orginal order, but served beyond 3 years--/f barred by
limitation.
M/s Karam Chand Thapar and Bros. (Coal Sales
) Ltd. v. State of U.P. and Anr. .. 25
U.P. ZAMINDARI ABOLITION AND LAND REFORMS
ACT,
1950, -Section 117-Scope of--State vests
lands in Gaon Sabha--Suit for ejectment--.Goan Sabha did not appeal-State--If
had locus standi.
Maharaj Singh v. State of Uttar 5. Pradesh
and Ors. .. 1072 UNION AND STATE DISPUTES (See Constitution of India) .. 842
VOLUNTARY TRANSFERS (See Kerala Land Reforms Act) . .960
WEALTH TAX ACT (27 of 1957)
S.2(e)(i) --Agricultural Lands, What are--Tests
for determining.
Commissioner of Wealth Tax, A.P. v. Officer
in charge (Court of Wards ) Paigah. .. 146
WEST BENGAL PREMISES TENANCY ACT 1956-Sec.
13(1)
(f)--Whether one of the co-owners can file
suit for eviction without impleading other co-owners-Whether a co-owner,
an-owner for the purpose of an eviction suit--Stage for raising objection about
frame of suit.
Sri Ram Pasricha v. Jagannath and Ors. .. 395
WILL -genuineness of legal will degree of proof.
(See Succession Act, 1925) .. 925 WORDS AND
PHRASES
1. "As far as Practicable" (See
Constitution of India) ....1037 2. "House, if it concludes
buildings".
(See Bombay Village Panchayat Act) .. 306
3. "Other rights" in Explanation 2
to S. 2(15) of the Estates Duty Act, meaning of.
(See "Other rights") .. 9
4. "Out of the funds in his
possession" and "such cash balances". Meaning of Custodian of
Evacuee Property v. Smt. Rabia Bai . .255
5. -See "Person" meaning of General
Clauses Act) .. 103 19
6. "Post graduate" Meaning of (See
Interpretation) . .477
7. "restoration" in Section 70 of
the Contract Act, meaning of.
union of India v. Sita Barn Jaiswal .. 979 8.
"Substituted" meaning of.
State of Maharashtra etc. v. The General
Provinces Manganese Ore. Co. Ltd. .. 1002 9. -Vest--Persons
aggrieved-Appurtenance meaning of.
Maharaj Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and
Ors. .. 1072 WRIT JURISDICTION -High Court cannot interfere with a finding .of
fact based upon relevant circumstances and when it is not shown to be
perverse--The Constitution of India, Article 226.
Khazan Singh Ors. v. Hukan Singh and Ors. ..
636 WRIT JURISDICTION OF THE HIGH COURT--Scope for interference with findings
of depart. mental authorities.
Mis Khushiram Behari Lal and Co. v. The
Assessing Authority Sangrur Anr. .. 752 M-184 SCI/77--2500-9-8-77--GIPF.
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