Income Tax Officer, Shillong & ANR
Vs. N. Takim Roy Rymbai [1976] INSC 31 (17 February 1976)
SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH
FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA
CITATION: 1976 AIR 670 1976 SCR (3) 413 1976
SCC (1) 916
CITATOR INFO :
R 1988 SC2062 (14) RF 1989 SC 100 (31) RF
1990 SC 913 (27) R 1990 SC1637 (21)
ACT:
Income-tax Act, 1961 S. 10(26)(a) Scope
of-Assessee, a person belonging to Scheduled Tribe residing in the specified
area income accruing or arising in a non-scheduled area-If entitled to exemption.
HEADNOTE:
Section 10(26)(a), Income-tax Act, 1961
provides that a person is entitled to exemption from income-tax if (1) he is a
member of a Scheduled Tribe as defined in Art. 366(25) of the Constitution, (2)
he is residing in any area specified in Part A or Part of the Table appended to
paragraph 20 of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution, or the State or Union-
Territories mentioned in s. 10(26)(a). and (3) the income in respect of which
exemption is claimed is income which accrues or arises to him from any source
in the area, State or Union Territories mentioned in the section.
The assessee belonged to the Jaintia
Scheduled Tribe and was a permanent resident of the United Khasi-Jaintia Hills
Autonomous District referred to in para 20 of the Sixth Schedule to the
Constitution. He was employed in the Secretariat of the Assam Government, and
his place of work was within the Shillong Municipality, and was not a part of
the area described in para 20 of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution. The Income-tax
officer held that . the income of the assessee from his salary arose in the
non-scheduled area and was not covered by the tax exemption provided under s.
10(26) (a). In a writ petition under Art. 226 the assessee challenged the
validity of 8. 10(26) (a) on the ground that the classification of members of
Scheduled Tribes into those having income from a source within the specified
areas and those having income from the source outside the areas was arbitrary.
The High Court struck it down as violative of Art. 14 on the ground that the
exemption clause which was enacted for the benefit of the Scheduled Tribes
would be frustrated if the income of such person was made subject to tax merely
because the source of that income was outside that area.
Allowing the appeals of the Department, ^
HELD: The High Court was in error in holding
that the classification contemplated by s. 10(26)(a), Income Tax Act, 1961, was
artificial and was not based on any intelligible differentia. [422D] 1 (a) . A
taxation law, like any other law. has to pass the equality test of Art. 14, but
given the legislative competence, the legislature has ample freedom to select
and classify persons, incomes and objects which it would or would not tax. The
mere fact that a tax falls more heavily on some in the same category, is not by
itself a ground to render the law invalid. It is only when, within the range of
its selection. the law operates unequally and cannot be justified on the basis
of a valid classification, that there would be a violation of Art. 14. [420B-D]
" East India Tobacco Co. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, [1963] I S.C.R. 404;
Vivan Joseph Ferriera v. Municipal Council of Greater Bombay, [1972] 1 S.C.C.
70 and Jaipur Hosiery Mills v. State of Rajasthan, [1970] 2 S.C.C. 27, followed.
(b) Classification for the purpose of
taxation or for exempting from tax with reference to the source of the income
is integral to the fundamental scheme of the Income Tax Act. The classification
made by sub-cl. (a) for the purpose of exemption is not unreal or unknown but
conforms to a well recognised pattern and is based on intelligible differentia.
The object of this differentiation between income accruing or received from a
source in the specified areas and 12-522SCI/76 414 the income accruing or
received from a source outside such areas IS to benefit not only the members of
the Scheduled Tribes residing in the specified areas but also to benefit such
areas economically. [420F; 421E-F] (c) If it is held that a member of the
Scheduled Tribe residing in a specified area was entitled to the exemption
irrespective of whether the source of his income lay within or outside such
area, it may lead to mischievous results. A non-Tribal assessee in India may
enter into a sham partnership with a member of the Scheduled Tribe residing in
the specified area and ostensibly give him a substantial share of the profits
of the business but really give him only a nominal amount and thus evade tax.
Also a tribal residing in the scheduled areas. earning large profits from
business located outside the specified areas would be totally exempt while a
non-tribal whose source of income is a share in the same business would be
taxed and thus the exemption is likely to operate unequally between individuals
similarly situated. [421G-H] (2) The decision in S. K. Datta. Income Tax
officer and or$. v. Lawrence Singh Ingty, [1968] 2 S.C.R. 165, on which the
High Court had relied is no authority for the proposition that the exemption
granted under s. 10(26) to the members of the Scheduled Tribes residing in the
specified area, as a class, could not be validly subjected to the condition
contained in sub-cl. (a) of that provision.
The sentence that "the exemption in
question was not given to individuals either on the basis of their social
status or economic resources. it was given to a class" occurring in that
case could not be torn out of the contest and used for spelling out a
proposition different from what was actually decided in that case. [419H; F]
(3) The State is the best judge to formulate its policies and to decide how far
and for what period and in what situations, the members of a particular
Scheduled Tribe residing in a particular Tribal area should be afforded ` the
protection and benefit in the matter of promotion of their educational and
economic interests embodied in Art. 46 of the Constitution. [422C]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals
Nos. 579 to 594 of 1975.
Appeals by special leave from the judgment
and order dated the 11 October 1974 of the High Court at Gauhati in Civil Rule
Nos. 252, 293, 305, 640 and 730 of 1976, and 24, 405, 507 & 510/71, 515 to
517 of 1972 and 165-166 of 1975.
N. M. Lahiri with D. N. Mukherjee, for the
appellants.
(in all the appeals) N. M. Lahiri with D. N.
Mukherjee, for respondents in CAs 579 & 583-586/75.
S. Chaudhuri for respondents in CAs 588 to
590/75 D. N. Mukherjee & R. P. Agarwala, for respondents in CAs 587-590 N.
M. Lahiri with D. N. Mukherjee & R. P. Agarwala for the respondents in CAs
591-592/75 N. M. Lahiri with D. N. Mukherjee for respondents in CAs 593-594 of
1975 Ex parte, for respondents in CAs 580-582, 593-594 of 1975 The Judgment of
the Court was delivered by SARKARIA, J. These appeals directed against a
judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Gauhati raise a common question in
regard 415 to the interpretation and constitutional validity of sub- clause (a)
of A clause (26) of s. 10 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (for short, called the
1961 Act). The appeals will be disposed by a common judgment.
R. Takin Roy Rymbai (respondent in Civil
Appeal 579 of ,1975) belongs to Jaintia Scheduled Tribe and is a permanent
resident of United Khasi-Jaintia Hills Autonomous District under the Sixth
Schedule of the Constitution within the State of Meghalaya. He joined service
under the Government of Assam in 1941. In the previous year relevant to the
assessment year 1970-71, he was posted at Shillong as Secretary to the
Government of Assam. The Assam Secretariat building and office, which
constitute his place of work was within that quarter of the town which is
included in Shillong Municipality and is not a part of the area described in
para 20 of the Sixth Schedule. C The Income-tax officer took the view that the
assessee's income from salary in the relevant year arose in the non-scheduled
area and as such, is not covered by the exemption provided under s. 10(26) (a)
of the Act.
The assessee claimed that his income from
salary had accrued or arisen within the specified area and, as such, he was
entitled to the exemption. In the alternative, he contended that this was not a
valid condition for denying him the benefit of the exemption under s. 10 (26).
The Income-tax officer over-ruled these contentions and completed the
assessment subjecting the assessee's salary to tax.
The assessee thereupon filed a petition under
Article 226 of The Constitution in the High Court for impugning the assessment
orders and the notices of demand for the assessment year 1970-1971, on the
ground that sub-clause (a) of s. 10(26) of the Act is invalid and ultra vires
Article 14 of the Constitution.
The writ petition was heard by a Bench of
three learned Judges of the High Court, which held that this exemption clause
has been enacted for the benefit of the Scheduled Tribes residing in specified
areas. The object of this exemption clause, according to the High Court, will
be frustrated and made nugatory if the income of a member of the Scheduled
Tribe residing in the specified areas, is made subject to tax merely because
the source of such an income is outside that area. In its view, the
classification between members of the Scheduled Tribes having income which
accrues or arises to them from any source from the Tribal area or the specified
territories on the one hand, and the members of Scheduled Tribe having income
which accrues or arises to them from any source outside the Tribal areas or
specified territories on the other, is not based on any intelligible
differentia; the classification is artificial and is not based on any
substantial distinction having a rational nexus to the purpose of the law. On
the contrary, the condition contained in sub-clause (a) would defeat the very
object of the exemption clause in s. 10 (26). For this enunciation, the High
Court has sought support from this Court's observations in S. K. Dutta,
Income-tax officer and ors. v. Lawrence Singh Ingty ( 1 ) .
(1) [1968] 2 S.C.R.165.
416 On the above reasoning, the High Court
has struck down the aforesaid sub-clause (a) as violative of Article 14 of the
Constitution, allowed the writ petition and quashed the impugned notices and
the orders of assessment.
The Department has now come in appeal before
us after obtaining special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution.
The provisions of s. 10 of the 1961 Act are
in the nature of exemptions. The various clauses of this section indicate the
incomes which are to be excluded from computation of the total Income of a
person under this Act.
For a proper perspective, it will be useful
to have a look at the historical background of this provision.
The Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 did not
contain any provision specifically exempting members of the Scheduled Tribes
from the levy of income-tax. It was the Finance Act 1955 that first
incorporated in the Income-tax Act, 1922 provisions for exemption of the Tribal
people of the eastern region from payment of the tax. These provisions relating
to such exemptions were further amended and recast by s. 3 of the Finance Act
1958 as follows:
"S. 4(3) XXI. Any income of a member of
a Scheduled Tribe defined in clause (25) of Article 366 of the Constitution,
residing in any area specified in Part A or Part of the Table appended to
paragraph 20 of the Sixth Schedule , to the Constitution or in the Union
Territories of Manipur and Tripura, provided that such member is not in service
of Government." J The 1961 Act then re-enacted this clause as under:
"10 (26) In the case of a member of a
Scheduled Tribe as deemed in clause (25) of Article 366 of the Constitution,
residing in any area specified in Part A or Part of the Table appended to
paragraph 20 of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution or in the Union
Territories of Manipur and Tripura, who is not in the service of Government.
any income which accrues or arises to him.
(a) from any source in the area or Union
Territories aforesaid, or (b) by wag of dividend or interest on
securities." The State of Nagaland (Adaptation of Laws on Union Subjects)
order 1965 added with effect from the 1st December 1963, the State of Nagaland
also, to the areas, the Tribal people of which could claim this exemption.
The validity of the exclusion of the
Government servants from the exemption given under s. 10(26), as it stood
before the amendment of 1970, came up for consideration before this Court in S.
K. Datta, Income-tax officer and ors. v. Lawrence Singh Ingty (supra). It was
held that the classification of Tribals into Government servants 417 and others
for purposes of this exemption was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution
and, as such, invalid.
Thereafter, Parliament passed the Taxation
Laws (Amendment) Act 42 of 1970 whereby the words "who is not in the
service of the Government" appearing in s. 10(26), were deleted. The North
Eastern Areas (Reorganization) (Adaptation of Laws on Union Subjects), order 1974
amended this provision further with effect from January 25, 1972 so that it now
reads as follows:
"(26) in the case of a member of a
Scheduled Tribe as defined in clause (25) of Article 366 of the Constitution,
residing in any area specified in Part A or Part of the Table appended to
paragraph 20 of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution (or in the State of
Nagaland) Manipur and Tripura or in the Union Territories of Arunachal Pradesh
and Mizoram or in the areas covered by Notification No. TAD/R/35/50/109, dated
the 23rd February 1951, issued by the Governor of Assam under the provisions to
sub paragraph (3) of the said paragraph 20 (as it stood immediately before the
commencement of the North Eastern Areas (Reorganization) Act 1971 (81 of 1971)
any' income which accrues or arises to him, (a) from any source in the (area,
State or Union territories) aforesaid, or (b) by way of dividend or interest,
on securities". An analysis of this provision shows that in order to
entitle a person to the exemption, three conditions must co-exist: (i) He
should be as member of a Scheduled Tribe as defined in Clause (25) of Article
366 of the Constitution; (ii) He should be residing in any area specified in
Part A or Part of the Table appended to paragraph 20 of the Sixth Schedule to
the Constitution; or the State or Union Territories mentioned in this
provision; (iii) The income in respect of which exemption is claimed must be an
income which accrues or arises to him- (a) from any source in the (area, State
or Union territories) aforesaid, or.
(b) by way of dividend or interest, on
securities".
An analysis of this provision shows that in
order to entitle a person to the exemption, there conditions must co- exist:
(i) He should be a member of a Scheduled
Tribe as defined in Clause (25) of Article 366 of the Constitution;
(ii) He should be residing in any area
specified in Part A or Part B of the Table appended to paragraph 20 of the
Sixth Schedule to the Constitution; or the State or Union Territories mentioned
in this provision;
(iii)The income in respect of which exemption
is claimed must be an income which accrues or arises to him- (a) from any
source in the area, State or Union territories mentioned in the provision or
(b) by way of dividend or interest, on securities".
Article 366(25) of the Constitution provides:
"Scheduled Tribes" means such
tribes or tribal communities or parts of or groups within such tribes or tribal
communities as are deemed under article 342 to be Scheduled Tribes for the
purposes of this Constitution." H Article 342 empowers the President with
respect to any State or Union Territory, and where it is a State, after
consultation with the 418 Governor thereof, by public notification, to specify
Tribes or Tribal communities or parts of or groups within tribes of tribal
communities which shall for the purpose of this Constitution be deemed to be
Scheduled Tribes, as the case may be. Clause (2) of this Article empowers the
Parliament to exercise the some power by enacting a law The respondent belongs
to Jaintia Scheduled Tribe which is one of the Scheduled Tribes notified under
Art. 342(1).
The first condition for applicability of s.
10(26) was thus indubitably satisfied.
Part II of the Table appended to paragraph 20
of the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution inter alia specifies the United Khasi
Jaintia Hills District as one of the Tribal Areas. According to the averments
in the writ petition, the respondent is a permanent resident of the United
Khasi- Jaintia Hills autonomous District. This allegation has not been denied
by the other side. Indeed, in the petition for special leave to appeal filed by
the appellant the- fact that he is a resident of a Tribal area specified in
Paragraph 20 of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution, is admitted. ,.
The first two conditions necessary for
claiming exemption under s. 10(26) existed in the present case.
Whether on the facts of the case, the third
condition embodied in sub-clause (a) was satisfied or not, is a question which
still remains to be determined. The High Court has advisedly left it open. The
controversy has thus narrowed down into the legal issue: whether the
classification made by sub-clause (a) for the purpose of the exemption under s.
10(26) between the income of a member of a Scheduled Tribe accruing or arising
from any source in the area, State or Union Territories specified in the
aforesaid Clause (26), and the income from a source outside such area, State or
Union Territories is constitutionally valid? In answering this question in the
negative, the High Court has propounded the proposition that the object of
clause (26) of s. 10 r is to grant a blanket exemption to members of Scheduled
Tribes as a class residing in the specified areas, and that the condition
contained in sub- clause (a) is destructive of that object. In propounding this
proposition, the learned Judges seem to have relied on certain observations of
this Court in Lawrence Singh Ingty's case (supra) Mr. Lahiri appearing for the
respondent, also, reiterates the reasoning of the High Court that the exemption
was given to the Tribal people as a class, and not on the basis of their
economic resources or sources of income. In this connection Counsel has cited a
few sentences from this Court's judgment in Lawrence Singh Ingty's case ,,
(supra) .
With due respect to the learned Judges of the
High Court, we are unable to accept this reasoning. The matter now in
controversy was, not even obliquely in issue before this Court in Lawrence
Singh Ingty's case. Therein, the only question for decision was, whether the
exclusion of the Government servants from the exemptions given in s. 4(3) (XXI)
of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 and later on in s.
10 (26) of the Income-tax Act 1961. was
violative of Article 14 of the Constitution 419 Although sub-clause (a) was
very much there, its validity was not, even indirectly questioned. The
contention of the Revenue, therein, was that the exemption from income-tax was
given to members of certain Scheduled Tribes, due to their economic and social
backwardness; that it was not possible to consider Government servants as
socially and economically backward and hence the exemption was justly denied to
the assessee, who was a Government servant having income from salary. It was
further urged by the Revenue that once a Tribal becomes a Government servant,
he is lifted out of his social environment and assimmilated into forward
sections of society and therefore he needs no more any crutch to lean on.
These arguments were found to be irrelevant
and unsustainable. In that context, the Court observed:
"The exemption in question was not given
to individuals either on the basis of their social status or economic
resources. It was given to a class. Hence individuals as individuals do not
come into the picture.
We fail to see in what manner the social
status and economic resources of a government servant can be different from
that of another holding a similar position in a corporation or that of a
successful medical practitioner, lawyer architect, etc. To over- paint the
picture of a government servant as the embodiment of all power and prestige
would sound ironical. Today his position in the society to put at the highest
is no higher than that of others who in other walks of life have the same
income. For the purpose of valid classification what is required is not some
imaginary difference but a reasonable and substantial distinction having regard
to the purpose of the law." The sentences which have been underlined are
the sheet- anchor of the arguments advanced by Mr. Lahiri. In our opinion, they
cannot be torn out of the context and used for spelling out a proposition
different from what was actually decided in that case. The ratio of that
decision is that within the members of the Scheduled Tribes residing in
specified areas selected by the State for the purpose of exemption, the mini
classification between individuals who were government servants deriving income
from salary and those who were not such government servants, was not based on
intelligible differentia. Since there was no rational whatever for this
differentiation, it was held that within the range of the selection, the
government servants had been unfairly discriminated against lawyers, medical
practitioners, private servants, businessmen, etc. whose income was derived
from non-government sources, and that the exclusion of government servants from
the exemption under s.
10(26) was bad and unconstitutional. This
vice of discrimination from which s. 10(26) was then suffering, was removed
when the Amending Act 42 of 1970 exercised the obnoxious limb of the provision.
The decision in Lawrence Singh Ingty is thus
no authority for the proposition that the exemption granted under s. 10 (26) to
the members of the Scheduled Tribes residing in the specified areas, as a
class, 420 could not be validly subjected to the condition contained in sub clause
(a) of the provision.
While it is true that a taxation law, cannot
claim immunity from the equality clause in Article 14 of the Constitution, and
has to pass like any other law, the equality test of that Article, it must be
remembered that the State has in view of the intrinsic complexity of fiscal
adjustments of diverse elements, a considerably wide discretion in the matter
of classification for taxation purposes. Given legislative competence, the
legislature has ample freedom to select and classify persons, districts, goods,
properties, incomes and objects which it would tax, and which it would not tax.
So long as the classification made within this wide and flexible range by a taxing
statute does not transgress the fundamental principles underlying the doctrine
of equality, it is not vulnerable on the ground of discrimination merely
because it taxes or exempts from tax some incomes or objects and not others Nor
the mere fact that tax falls more heavily on some in the same category, is by
itself a ground to render the law invalid. It is only when within the range of
its selection, the law operates unequally and cannot be justified on the basis
of a valid classification, that there would be a violation of Article
14. (See East India Tobacco Co. v State of
Andhra Pradesh(l) Vivian joseph Ferriera v. Municipal Council of Greater
Bombay;(2) Jaipur Hosiery Mills v. State of Rajasthan.(3) The validity or
otherwise of the classification of income envisaged by sub-clause (a), with
reference to the source of income, for the purpose of the exemption under s.
10(26) is to be judged in the light of the
above principles.
Classification for purposes of taxation or
for exempting from tax with reference to the source of the income is integral
to the fundamental scheme of the Income- tax Act. Indeed, the entire warp and
woof of the 1961 Act has been woven on this pattern.
Section 2(45) defines total income to mean
"the total amount of income referred to in s. 5 computed in the manner
laid down in this Act".
Section 5 makes the chargeability of income
dependent upon the locality of accrual or receipt of the income. It defines the
extent total income with reference to the residence of the assessee, and thus
makes the incidence of taxation dependent upon whether the assessee is a
resident in India. It is the residence in India which entails liability to tax.
A non-resident is not liable in India to get his income assessed, but if any
part of his income accrues or arises whether directly or indirectly through any
business connection in India or from any property in India, the same would be
assessable. An ordinary resident as defined in s. 6, does not attract
additional chargeability but being "not ordinarily resident" entitles
a person to partial exemption from (1)[1963] I S.C.R. 404. (2) [1972] I S.C.C.
70. (3) [1970] 2 S.C.C. 27.
421 chargeability as a resident, to which
exemption a person who is "ordinarily resident" is not entitled-(see
Kanga and Palkhivala Vol. I-Income-tax 6th Edn. p. 162).
The 1961 Act abounds in instances whereby
certain sources of income have been exempted from tax, while others are
assessable.
Section 10 of the 1961 Act, itself contains
no less than 30 instances of such classification for the purpose of granting
exemptions from tax. This is so, in spite of the fact that another source of
the same person's income may be assessable. A person may have agricultural
income apart from salary or business income. The income from the former source
is not to be included in the total income of the assessee (vide s. 10(1) );
while income from the latter source is not so exempted. Again, interest
realised from Scheduled banks on deposits upto a certain limit is exempt, while
interest realised from non- banking concerns is assessable.
Sections 80A to 80U further provide
exemptions from tax to incomes derived from certain sources. A business man's
income is assessable, but if it is from a newly established industrial
undertaking or priority industry, to that extent, the same is exempted. Section
80H provides for deductions in cases of new industrial undertakings employing
displaced persons etc.
It is not necessary to multiply such
instances. Suffice it to say that classification of sources of income is
integral to the basic scheme of the 1961 Act. It is nobody's case that the
entire scheme of the Act is irrational and violative of Article 14 of the
Constitution. Such an extravagant contention has not been canvassed before us.
Thus the classification made by the aforesaid
sub-clause (a) for purposes of exemption is not unreal or unknown. It conforms
to a well recognised pattern. It is based on intelligible differentia. The
object of this differentiation between income accruing or received from a source
in the specified areas and the income accruing or received from a source
outside such areas is to benefit not only the members of the Scheduled Tribes
residing in the specified areas but also to benefit economically such areas. If
the contention advanced by Mr. Lahiri is accepted and a member of the Scheduled
Tribe residing in a specified area is held entitled to the exemption
irrespective of whether the source of his income lies within or outside such
areas, it will lead to potentially mischievous results and evasion of tax by
assessees who do not belong to the Scheduled Tribes. All that a non-tribal
assessee in India need do would be to enter into a sham partnership with a
member of the Scheduled Tribe residing in the specified area and ostensibly give
him under the partnership a substantial share of the profits of the business
while, in reality, pay the tribal only a nominal amount. Moreover, but for the
condition provided in sub-clause (a), the exemption granted under s. 10(26) is
likely to operate unequally and cause inequality of treatment between
individuals similarly situated. A Tribal residing in the Scheduled areas
earning large income from business located outside the specified areas, would
be totally exempt while the non-tribal whose source of income is a share in the
same business would be taxed although with reference to the source of the
income, both were similarly situated.
422 We are not persuaded to accept Mr.
Lahiri's argument that the making of the exemption conditional upon the classification
envisaged by sub-clause (a) would deter the members of the Scheduled Tribes
from joining the mainstream of national life, or, would be inconsistent with
the Directive Principle embodied in Article 46. This Article contains a
Directive Principle of State Policy for promotion of educational and economic
interests of the weaker sections of the people, particularly the Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Its primary objective is to provide protection to
the "weaker sections" of society. Members of the Scheduled Tribes who
are enterprising and resourceful enough to move out of the seclusion of the
tribal areas and successfully compete with their Indian brethren outside those
areas and rise to remunerative positions in service or business, cease to be "weaker
sections". In any case, the State is the best judge to formulate its
policies and to decide how far and for what period and in what situations, the
members of a particular Scheduled Tribe residing in a particular Tribal area
should be afforded the protection and benefit in the matter of promotion of
their educational and economic interests.
In view of what has been said above, we are
of opinion that the learned Judges of the High Court were in error in holding
that the classification contemplated by sub-clause (a) of cl. (26) of s. 10 of
the 1961 Act is artificial and is not based on any intelligible differentia. We
would therefore, reverse the judgment of the High Court and hold that the
aforesaid sub-cause (a) is constitutionally valid Before we part with this
judgment, we may note that Mr.
Lahiri made a detailed survey of the history
of the Tribal areas of Assam and Scheduled Tribes residing in those
'autonomous' areas. Counsel also argued that virtually the source of the salary
received by the assessee lay in the Tribal areas forming the State of
Meghalaya, notwithstanding the fact that on account of the exigencies of
service, the office of the assessee was located in those Wards of Shillong
which are not a part of the tribal areas. In our opinion, it is not necessary
to go into this question which, as already noticed, still remains open and
undetermined.
In the result we allow these appeals, but in
the circumstances of the case, leave the parties to pay and bear their own
costs.
P.B.R. Appeals allowed.
Back
