Workmen of M/S Firestone Tyre &
Rubber Co. of India (P) Limited Vs. Firestone Tyre & Rubber Company [1976]
INSC 26 (13 February 1976)
UNTWALIA, N.L.
UNTWALIA, N.L.
KRISHNAIYER, V.R.
CITATION: 1976 AIR 1775 1976 SCR (3) 369 1976
SCC (3) 819
ACT:
Lay-off-Meaning of-Section 2(kkk) of the
Industrial Disputes Act (Act XIV of 1947), 1947.
Lay-off-Right of the management of an
Iudsustrial Establishment under the Industrial Disputes Act (Act XlV of 1947),
1947, to lay-off workmen-Section 2(kkk) 25A 25B(2)(i) and 25C of the Act Scope
of-Effect of s. 25.j.
Compensation-Lay-off compensation-Whether
laid-of workmen who do not come under Chapter VA of the Industrial Disputes Act
1947 by virtue of s. 25A are entitled to any compensation.
Industrial Disputes Act (Act XIV of 1947),
1947-Section 10(1), 33(c)(2), powers of the tribunal court to award layoff
compensation.
HEADNOTE:
The respondent-company manufacturing tyres in
Bombay, due to the general strike in its factory between the period 3rd March
1967 and 16th May 1967 and again from 4th October 1967 and due to the
consequent short supply of tyres had to lay-off 17 out of its 30 workmen in the
Delhi distribution office and also some out of its 33 workmen in its Madras
distribution office. The workmen in the Delhi and Madras offices were called
back to duty on 22nd April 1968 and 29th April 1968 respectively. The workmen
were not given their wages or compensation for the period of lay-off. An
industrial dispute was raised and referred to the tribunal by the Delhi
Administration even when the lay-off was in operation. The Presiding officer of
the Additional Industrial Tribunal, Delhi held that the workmen were not
entitled to any layoff compensation. The workmen in Madras filed petitions
under s. 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act for computation of their wages
for the period of their lay-off. The Presiding officer of the Additional Labour
Court, Madras, holding that the lay-off was justified, dismissed their
applications.
on appeal to this Court by special leave,
HELD: (I) The simple dictionary meaning
according to the concise oxford Dictionary of the term "lay-off' is
"period during which a workman is temporarily discharged".
Lay-off means the failure, refusal or
inability of employer on account of contingencies mentioned in cl. (kkk) of s.
2 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, to give employment to a workman whose
name is borne on the Muster Rolls of his Industrial Establishment. It has been
called a temporary discharge of the workmen or a temporary suspension of his
contract of service. Strictly speaking, it is not so. It is merely a fact of
temporary unemployment of the workman in the work of the lndustrial Establihment.
Mere refusal or inability to give employment to the workman when he reports for
duty on one or more grounds mentioned in cl. (kkk) of s. 2 is not a temporary
discharge of the workman. [372A, 374A, B, G] Gaya Cotton & Jute Mills Ltd.
v. Gaya Cotton & lute Mills Labour Union [1952] II Labour Law Journal 37,
referred to.
(2)(i) That the power to lay-off a workman is
inherent in the definition in cl. (kkk) of s. 2 is not correct, since no words
in the definition clause to indicate the conferment of any power on the
employer to lay-off a workman can be found. His failure or inability to give
employment, by itself militates against the theory of conferment of power.
No section in Chapter VA in express language
or by necessary implication confers any power, even on the management of the
Industrial Establishment to which the relevant provisions are applicable, to
lay-off a workman. There is no provision in the Act specifically providing that
an employer would be entitled to lay-off his workmen 370 for the reasons
prescribed by s. 2 (kkk). Such a power, therefore, must be found out from the
terms of contract of service or the Standing orders governing the
Establishment.
[374 B-G] (ii) In the instant case, the
number of workmen being only 3, there being no Standing orders certified under
the Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act (Act 20 of 1946), 1946, and
there being no contract of service conferring any such right of lay-off, the
inescapable conclusion is that the workmen were laid-off without any authority
of law or the power in the management under the contract of service. [374 G-H]
The Management of Hotel Imperial New Delhi & others v. Hotel Workers Union
[1960] 1 S.C.R. 476 and V. P. Gindroniya v. State of Madhya Pradesh & ors.
[1970] 3 S.C.R. 448, referred to.
Veiyra (MA ) Fernandez (CP.) and another
[1956] 1 Labour Law Journal. 547, reversed.
Workmen of Dewan Tea Estate and ors. v. The
Management [19641 S S.C.R. 548, applied.
Sanghi Jeevaraj Ghewar Chand & ors v.
Secretary Madras Challies Grains Kirana Merchants Workers Union and Anr.
[1969] 1 S.C.C. 366, distinguished.
(3) If the terms of a contract of service or
the statutory terms engrafted in the Standing orders do not give the power to
lay-off to the employer, the employer would be bound to pay compensation for
the period of lay-off which ordinarily and general would be equal to the full
wages of the concerned V workman. If, however, the terms of employment confer a
right of lay-off on the management then in the case of an Industrial Establishment
which is governed by Chapter VA, compensation will be payable in accordance
with the provisions contained therein. But compensation or no compensation will
be payable in the case of an Industrial Establishment to which the provisions
of Chapter VA do not apply and it will be so as per the terms of employment.
[377-B-D] Kanhaiya Lal Gupta v. Ajeet Kumar
Dey and others [1967] II Labour Law Journal. 761 and Steel and General Mills
Co.
Ltd v Additional District judge Rohtak and
others [1972] 1 Labour Law Journal, 2847 approved.
K. T Rolling Mills Private Ltd. and another
v. M R Meher and others A.I.R. 1963 Bombay 146. reversed.
(4) In a reference under s. 10(l) of the Act.
it is open to the tribunal or court to award compensation which may not be equal
to the full amount of basic wages and dearness allowance. But no such power
exists in the Labour Court under s. 33C(2) of the Act. Only the money due has
to be quantified. If the lay-off could be held to be in accordance with the
terms of contract of service. no compensation at all could be allowed under s.
33C(2) of the Act, while in the reference some compensation could be allowed.
[378-B-Cl [In the instant case as regards the workmen in the Delhi case. the
court held 75% of the basic wages and dearness allowance would be the adequate
compensation for the lay-off period.]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal
No. 2307 of 1969 (Appeal by Special leave from the Award dated the 1st April
1969 of the Addl. Industrial Tribunal, Delhi in I. D.- No. 83 of 1968) and
Civil Appeals Nos. 1857-1859/70. (Appeals by Special Leave from the Judgment
and order dated the 17th November 1969 of the Addl. Labour Court, Madras in
claim Petition Nos. 627 and 629 of 1968).
M. K. Ramamurthi and Jitendra Sharma and
Janardan Sharma, for the appellants in both the appeals.
371 S. N. Andley, (Rameshwar Nath and B. R.
Mehta in CAs 1857- A 59/70) for respondents in both the appeals.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
UNTWALIA, J.-As the main question for determination in these appeals by special
leave is common, they have been heard together and are being disposed of by
this judgment.
Civil Appeal No. 2307 of 1969 The respondent
company in this appeal has its Head office at Bombay. It manufactures tyres at
its Bombay factory and sells the tyres and other accessories in the markets
throughout the country. The company has a Distribution office at Nicholson
Road, Delhi. There was a strike in the Bombay factory from 3rd March, 1967 to
16th May, 1967 and again from 4th October, 1967. As a result of the strike
there was a short supply of tyres etc. to the Distribution office. In the Delhi
office, there were 30 employees at the relevant time. 17 workmen out of 30 were
laid-off by the management as per their notice dated the 3rd February, 1968,
which was to the following effect:
"Management is unable to give employment
to the following workmen due to much reduced production in the company's
factory resulting from strike in one of the factory departments.
These workmen are, therefore, laid-off in
accordance with law with effect from 5th February, 1968." The lay-off of
the 17 workmen whose names were mentioned in the notice was recalled by the
management on the 22nd April, 1968. The workmen were not given their wages or
compensation for the period of lay-off. An industrial dispute was raised and
referred by the Delhi Administration on the 17th April, 1968 even when the
layoff was in operation. The reference was in the following terms:
"Whether the action of the management to
'lay-off' 17 workmen with effect from 5th Feb. 1968 is illegal and/or
unjustified, and if so, to what relief are these workmen entitled? The
Presiding officer of the Additional Industrial Tribunal, Delhi has held that
the workmen are not entitled to any lay-off compensation. Hence this is an
appeal by their Union.
We were informed at- the Bar that some of the
workmen out of the batch of 17 have settled their disputes with the management
and their cases were not represented by the Union in this appeal. Hence this
judgment will not affect the compromise or the settlement arrived at between
the management and some of the workmen.
The question which for our determination is
whether the management had a right to lay-off their workmen and whether the
workmen are entitled to claim wages or compensation.
372 The simple dictionary meaning according
to the Concise oxford Dictionary of the term 'lay-off' is "period during
which a workman is temporarily discharged." The term 'lay- off' has been
well known in the industrial arena. Disputes were often raised in relation to
the 'lay-off' of the workmen in various industries. Sometime compensation was
awarded for the period of lay-off but many a time when the lay-off was found to
be justified workmen were not found entitled to any wages or compensation. In
Gaya Cotton & Jute Mills Ltd. v. Gaya Cotton & Jute Mills Labour
Union(l) the standing order of the company provided that the company could
under certain circumstances "stop any machine or machines or department or
departments, wholly or partially for any period or periods without notice or
without compensation in lieu of notice." In such a situation for the
closure of the factory for a certain period, no claim for compensation was
allowed by the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India. We are aware of the
distinction betwen a lay-off and a closure. But just to point out the history
of the law we have referred to this case.
Then came an amendment in the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947 -hereinafter referred to as the Act-by Act 43 of 1953.
In section 2 clause (kkk) was added to say:
"lay-off" (with its grammatical
variations and cognate expressions) means the failure, refusal or inability of
an employer on account of shortage of coal, power or raw materials or the
accumulation of stocks or the break-down of machinery or for any other reason
to give employment to a workman whose name is borne on the muster rolls of his
industrial establishment and who has not been retrenched Explanation-Every
workman whose name is borne on the muster rolls of the industrial establishment
and who presents himself for work at the establishment at the time appointed for
the purpose during normal working hours on any day and is not given employment
by the employer within two hours of his so presenting himself shall be deemed
to have been laid-off for that day within the meaning of this clause:
Provided that if the workman, instead of
being given employment at the commencement of any shift for any day is asked to
present himself for the purpose during the second half of the shift for the day
and is given employment then, he shall be deemed to have been laid-off only for
one-half of that day:
Provided further that if he is not given any
such employment even after so presenting himself, he shall not be deemed to
have been laid-off for the second half of the shift for the day and shall be
entitled to full basic wages and dearness allowance for that part of the
day.'" (1) [1952] II Labour Law Journal, 37.
373 By the same Amending Act, Chapter VA was
introduced in the Act to provide for lay-off and retrenchment compensation.
Section 25A excluded the Industrial
Establishment in which less than 50 workmen on an average per working day had
been employed in the preceding calendar month from the application of Sections
25C to 25E. Section 25-C provides for the right of laid-off workmen for
compensation and broadly speaking compensation allowable is 50% of the total of
the basic wages and dearness allowance that would have been payable 13 to the
workman had he not been laid-off. It would be noticed that the sections dealing
with the matters of lay-off in Chapter VA are not applicable to certain types
of Industrial Establishments. The respondent is one such Establishment because
it employed only 30 workmen at its Delhi office at the relevant time. In such a
situation the question beset with difficulty of solution is whether the laid-off
workmen were entitled to any compensation, if so, what'? We shall now read
section 25-J. It says:
"(1) The provisions of this Chapter
shall have effect not withstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in
any other law including standing orders made under the Industrial Employment
(Standing orders) Act, 1946:
Provided that where under the provisions of
any other Act or Rules, orders or notifications issued thereunder or under any
standing orders or under any award, contract of service or otherwise, a workman
is entitled to benefits in respect of any matter which are more favourable to
him than those to which he would be entitled under this Act, the workman shall
continue to be entitled to the more favourable benefits in respect of that
matter, notwithstanding that he receives benefits in respect of other matters
under this Act.
For the removal of doubts, it is hereby
declared that nothing contained in this Chapter shall be deemed to affect the
provisions of any other law for the time being in force in any State in so far
as that law provides for the settlement of industrial disputes, but the rights
and liabilities of employers and workmen in so far as they relate to layoff and
retrenchment shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of this
Chapter." The effect of the provisions aforesaid is that for the period of
lay-off in an Industrial Establishment to which they said provisions apply,
compensation will have to be paid in accordance with section 25C. But if a
workman is entitled to benefits which are more favourable to him than those
provided in the Act, he shall continue to be entitled to the more favourable
benefits. The rights and liabilities of employers and workmen in so far as it
relate to lay-off and retrenchment, except as provided in section 25J, have got
to be determined in accordance with the provisions of Chapter VA.
The ticklish question which does not admit of
an easy answer is as to the source of the power of management to lay-off a
workman. The employer has a right to terminate the services of a workman.
Therefore, his power to retrench presents no difficulty as retrenchment means
the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason
whatsoever as mentioned in clause (oo) of section 2 of the 374 Act. But lay-off
means the failure, refusal or inability of employer on account of contingencies
mentioned in clause (kkk) to give employment to a workman whose name is borne
on the Muster Rolls of his Industrial Establishment. It has been called a
temporary discharge of the workman or a temporary suspension of his contract of
service. Strictly speaking, it is not so. It is merely a fact of temporary
unemployment of the workman in the work of the Industrial Establishment. Mr. S.
N. Andley submitted with reference to the explanation and the provisions
appended to clause (kkk) that the power to lay-off a workman is inherent in the
definition. We do not find any words in the definition clause to indicate the
conferment of any power on the employer to lay-off a workman. His failure or
inability to give employment by itself militates against the theory of
conferment of power. The power to lay-off for the failure or inability to give
employment has to be searched somewhere else. No section in the Act confers
this power.
There are two small matters which present
some difficulty in the solution of the problem. In explanation (1) appended to
sub-section ( 2) of section 25B the words used are:
"he has been laid-off under an agreement
or as permitted by standing order made under the Industrial Employment
(Standing orders) Act, 1946, or under this Act or under any other law
applicable to the industrial establishment." indicating that a workman can
be laid-off under the Industrial Disputes Act also. But it is strange to find
that no section in Chapter VA in express language or by necessary implication
confers any power, even on the management of the Industrial Establishment to
which the relevant provisions are applicable, to lay-off a workman. Clause (ii)
of section 25E says:
"No compensation shall be paid to a
workman who has been laid-off- If he does not present himself for work at the
establishment at the appointed time during normal working hours at least once a
day." This indicates that there is neither a temporary discharge of the
work man nor a temporary suspension of his contract of service. Under the
general law of Master and Servants an employer may discharge an employee either
temporarily or permanently but that cannot be without adequate notice. Mere
refusal or inability to give employment to the workman when he reports for duty
on one or more grounds mentioned in clause (kkk) of section 2 is not a
temporary discharge of the work man. Such a power, therefore, must be found out
from the terms of contract of service or the Standing orders governing the
establishment. In the instant case the number of workmen being only 30, there
were no Standing orders certified under the Industrial employment (Standing
orders) Act, 1946. Nor was there any term of contract of service conferring any
such right of lay-off. In such a situation the conclusion seems to be
inescapable that the workmen were laid-off without any authority of law or the
power in the management under the contract of service. In Industrial
Establishments where there is a power in the management to lay-off a workman
and to which the 375 provisions of Chapter VA apply, the question of payment of
compensation will be governed and determined by the said provisions. Otherwise
Chapter VA is not a complete Code as was argued on behalf of the respondent
company in the matter of payment of lay-off compensation. This case, therefore,
goes out of Chapter VA. Ordinarily and generally the workmen would be entitled
to their full wages but in a reference made under section 10(l) of the Act, it
is open to the Tribunal or the Court to award a lesser sum finding the
justifiability of the lay-off. `- In The Management of Hotel Imperial, New
Delhi & others v. Hotel Workers' Union(l) in a case of suspension of a
workman it was said by Wanchoo, J. as he then was, delivering the judgment on
behalf of the Court at page 482:
"Ordinarily, therefore, the absence of
such power either as an express term in the contract or in the rules framed
under some statute would mean that the master would have no power to suspend a
workman and even if he does so in the sense that he forbids the employee to
work. he will have to pay wages during the so-called period of suspension.
Where, however. there is power to suspend either in the contract of employment
or in the statute or the rules framed thereunder, the suspension has the effect
of temporarily suspending the relation of master and servant with the
consequence that ` the servant is not bound to render service and the master is
not bound to pay." The same principle was reiterated in V. P. Gindroniya
v.
State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.(2) We have
referred to the suspension cases because in our opinion the principles
governing the case of lay-off are very akin to those applicable to a suspension
case.
In Veiyra (M. A.) v. Fernandez (C. P.) and
another(3) a Bench of the Bombay High Court opined that under the general law
the employer was free to dispense with the services of a workman but under the Industrial
Disputes Act he was under an obligation to lay him off; that being so, the
action of lay-off by the employer could not . be questioned as being ultra
vires. We do not think that the view expressed by the Bomby High Court is
correct.
There is an important decision of this Court
in Workmen of Dewan Tea Estate and ors. v. The Management(4) on which reliance
was placed heavily by Mr. M. K. Ramamurti appearing for the appellant and also
by Mr. Andley for the respondent.
One of the question for consideration was
whether section 25C of the Act recognises the common law right of the
management to declare a lay-off for reasons other than those specified in the
relevant clause of the Standing order.
While considering this question,
Gajendragadkar, J. as he then was. said at page 554:
"The question which we are concerned
with at this stage is whether it can be said that s.25C recognises a common law
(1) [1960] 1 S.C.R. 476. (2) [1970] 3 S.C.R. 448.
(3) [1956] I Labour Law Journal, 547. (4)
[]964] S S.C.R. 548.
376 right of the industrial employer to lay
off his workmen. This question must, in our opinion, be answered in the
negative. When the laying off of the workmen is referred to in s. 25C, it is
the laying off as defined by s. 2 (kkk) and so, workmen who can claim the
benefit of s. 25C must be workmen who are laid off and laid off for reasons
contemplated by s. 2 (kkk);
that is all that s. 25C means.
Then follows a sentence which was pressed
into service by the respondent. It says:
"If any case is not covered by the
Standing orders, it will necessarily be governed by the provisions of the Act,
and layoff would be permissible only where one or the other of the factors
mentioned by s. 2 (kkk) is present, and for such lay off compensation would be
awarded under s. 25C." In our opinion, in the context, the sentence
aforesaid means that if the power of lay-off is there in the Standing orders
but the grounds of lay-off are not covered by them, rather, are governed by the
provisions of the Act, then lay-off would be permissible only on one or the
other of the factors mentioned in clause (kkk). Subsequent discussions at pages
558 and 559 lend ample support to the appellant's argument that there is no
provision in the Act specifically providing that an employer would be entitled
to lay-off his workmen for the reasons prescribed by section 2 (kkk).
Mr. Andley placed strong reliance upon the
decision of this Court in Sanjhi Jeevraj Ghewar Chand & Ors. v.
Secretary, Madras Chillies, Grains Kirana
Merchants Workers' Union & Anr.(l) The statute under consideration in this
case was the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965 and it was held that the Act was
intended to be a comprehensive and exhaustive law dealing with the entire
subject of bonus of the persons to whom it should apply. The Bonus Act was not
to apply to certain Establishments. Argument before the Court was that bonus was
payable de hors the Act in such establishment also. This argument was repe11ed
and in that connection it was observed at page 381:
"It will be noticed that though the Industrial
Disputes Act confers substantive rights on workmen with regard to lay off,
retrenchment compensation, etc., it does not create or confer any such
statutory right as to payment to bonus. Bonus was so far the creature of
industrial adjudication and was made payable by the employers under the
machinery provided under that Act and other corresponding Acts enacted for ,.
investigation and settlement of disputes
raised thereunder. There was, therefore, no question of Parliament having to
delete or modify item S in the Third Schedule to Industrial Disputes Act or any
such provision in any corresponding Act or its having to exclude any right to
bonus thereunder by any categorical exclusion in the present case." And
finally it was held at page 385:
"Considering the history of the
legislation, the background and the circumstances in which the Act was enacted,
the (1) [1969] I S.C.C. 366.
377 object of the Act and its scheme, it is
not possible to accept A the construction suggested on behalf of the
respondents that the Act is not an exhaustive Act dealing comprehensively with
the subject-matter of bonus in all its aspects or that Parliament still left it
open to those to whom the Act does not apply by reason of its provisions either
as to exclusion or exemption to raise a dispute with regard to bonus through
Industrial adjudication under the Industrial Disputes Act or other
corresponding law." In a case of compensation for lay-off the position is
quite distinct and different. If the term of contract of service or the
statutory terms engrafted in the Standing orders do not give the power of lay
off to the employer, the employer will be bound to pay compensation for the
period of lay-off which ordinarily and generally would be equal to the full
wages of the concerned workmen. If, however, the terms of r employment confer a
right of lay-off on the management, then, in the case of an industrial
establishment which is governed by Chapter VA, compensation will be payable in
accordance with the provisions contained therein. But compensation or no
compensation will be payable in the case of an industrial establishment to
which the provisions of Chapter VA do not apply, and it will be so as per the
terms of the employment.
In Kanhaiya Lal Gupta v. Ajeet Kumar Dey and
others(l) a learned single Judge of the Allahabad High Court seem to have
rightly held that in the absence of any term in the contract of service or in
the statute or in the statutory rules or standing orders an employer has no
right to lay-off a workman without paying him wages. A learned single Judge of
the Punjab and Haryana High Court took an identical view in the case of Steel
and General Mills Co. Ltd. v.
Additional District Judge, Rohtak and others.
(2) The majority view of the Bombay High Court in K. T. Rolling Mills Private
Ltd. and another v. M. R. Meher and other(8) that it is not open to the
Industrial Tribunal under the Act to award lay-off compensation to workmen
employed in an 'Industrial Establishment' to which S. 25-C does not apply, is
not correct. The source of the power of the employer to lay-off workmen does
not seem to have been canvassed or discussed by the Bombay High Court in the
said judgment.
In the case of the Delhi office of the
respondent the Tribunal has held that the lay-off was justified. It was open to
the Tribunal to award a lesser amount of compensation than the full wages.
Instead of sending back the case to the Tribunal, we direct that 75% the basic
wages and dearness allowance would be paid to the workmen concerned for the
period of lay-off. As we have said above this will not cover the case of those
workmen who have settled or compromised their disputes with the management.
Civil Appeals 1857-1859 (NL) of 1970 In these
appeals the facts are identical to those in the other appeal. There were only
33 employees in the Madras office of the respondent company. Certain workmen
were laid- off for identical reasons from the (1) [1967] II Labour Law Journal,
761. (2) [1972] 1 Labour Law Journal, 284.
(3) A.I.R. 1963 Bombay, 146.
378 5th February, 1968. The lay-off was
lifted on the 29th April, 1968. The concerned workmen filed petitions under
section 33C (2) of the Act for computation of their wages for the period of
lay-off. Holding that the lay-off was justified and valid the Presiding officer
of the Additional Labour Court, Madras has dismissed their applications for
salary and allowances for the period of lay-off. Hence these appeals.
In a reference under section 10 (1) of the
Act it is open to the Tribunal or the Court to award compensation which may not
be equal to the full amount of basic wages and dearness allowance. But no such
power exists in the Labour Court under section 33C (2) of the Act. only the
money due has got to be quantified. If the lay-off could be held to be in
accordance with the terms of the contract of service, no compensation at all
could be allowed under section 33C (2) of the Act, while, in the reference some
compensation could be allowed. Similarly on the view expressed above that the
respondent company had no power to lay-off any workmen, there is no escape from
the position that the entire sum payable to the laid-off workmen except the
workmen who have settled or compromised, has got to be computed and quantified
under section 33C(2) of the Act for the period of lay-off.
For the reasons stated above all the appeals
are allowed. In Civil Appeal No. 2307/1969 in place of the order of the
Tribunal, an order is made on the lines indicated above. And in Civil Appeals
1857 to 1859/1970 the orders of the Labour Court are set aside and the cases of
the appellants are remitted back to that Court for computation and
quantification of the sums payable to the concerned workmen for the period of
lay-off. There will be no order as to costs in any of the appeals.
S.R Appeals allowed:- Orders in CA 2307/69
modified : CAs 1857-1859/70 remitted hock to the Tribunal.
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