S.K. KALE V. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA
[1976] INSC 334 (17 December 1976)
FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA
BHAGWATI, P.N.
CITATION: 1977 AIR 822 1977 SCR (2) 533 1977
SCC (2) 394
CITATOR INFO :
R 1979 SC 826 (20,21)
ACT:
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, s.
5(1)(d), onus probandi, whether to be discharged by the accused.
Constitution of India, Article 136,
Re-appraisal of evidence under, when called for.
HEADNOTE:
The appellant was posted as the Local
Purchase Officer at the Army Ordnance Depot in Poona district. In connection
with the purchase of some engineering tools, charges were brought against him
under s. 5(1)(d) read with s. 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, for
having procured pecuniary benefit for a certain contractor by corrupt means,
thereby causing wrongful loss to the army department. The Trial Court convicted
the appellant, and in appeal the High Court confirmed the conviction. The
Supreme Court granted him Special Leave to appeal under Art. 136 of the
Constitution, and allowing the appeal,
HELD: 1. Both the courts below had proceeded
on the footing that it was for the accused to prove the ingredients of s.
5(1)(d) of the Act. This approach was wrong. It was for the prosecution to
prove affirmatively that the appellant by corrupt or illegal means or by
abusing his position obtained any pecuniary advantage for some other person.
[536 C-D]
2. Normally this Court in special leave
against a concurrent judgment of the High Court and the trial Court does not
re-appraise the evidence, but here we find that both the courts below have
drawn wrong inferences from proved facts and have made a completely wrong
approach to the whole case by misplacing the onus of proof which lay on the
prosecution on the accused and presuming that the accused had a dishonest
intention. [536 B-C, H] Narayanan Nambiar v. State of Kerala [1963] Supp. 2 SCR
724; 730-731, referred to.
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal
Appeal No. 301 of 1971.
(Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment
and Order dated the 15th/l6th June 1971 of the Bombay High Court in Criminal
Appeal No. 1405 of 1969).
P.H. Parekh and Miss Manju Jatley, for the
appellant..
H.R. Khanna and M.N. Shroff, for respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
FAZAL ALI, J.---Corruption and nepotism is so rampant in our society of to-day,
and more particularly in the services, that the Indian Penal Code was not
considered sufficient to meet this menace, and the Prevention of Corruption
Act, .1947 (Act II of 1947)--hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'--had to be
enacted and amended from time to time to stamp out this evil. This is an appeal
by special leave 534 directed against the judgment of the Bombay High Court
affirming the conviction of the appellant under s. 5(1)(d) read with s. 5(2) of
the Act and the sentence of six months rigorous imprisonment passed by the
Special Judge, Bombay.
The facts of the present case are more or
less undisputed and are the least complicated and, therefore, they fall within
a very narrow compass, and by and large we have to examine whether or not the
inferences drawn by the High Court from the proved facts are legally correct
and lead to only one hypothesis, namely, that the accused is guilty.
It may. be necessary to give a resume of the
prosecution case before indicating the evidence and the circumstances relied
upon by the courts below in convicting the appellant.
The appellant was a senior officer in the
Army, holding the rank of a Major, and was at the material time the local Purchase
Officer, hereinafter to be referred to as LPO, at Ordnance Depot at Talegaon
Dabhade, District Poona. Following the Chinese attack in 1962 an Emergency was
declared and the Army required certain engineering tools to be supplied
immediately. The Ordnance Depot, Jabalpur, sent a requisition of engineering
tools to the Ordnance Depot at Talegaon Dabhade, Poona. In this connection the
Control Officer of the Ordnance Depot wrote a letter to the Group Officer
requesting him to dispatch the stores immediately.
The Group Officer consequently wrote a letter
to the appellant who was the LPO at the relevant time to arrange the supply of
stores immediately. The appellant was directed to purchase the stores locally
and to deliver them to the Group Officer. The Group Officer also indicated in
his letter that the stores requisitioned by him were not available at the Depot
at Talegaon. The detailed list of the tools, while is at Ext. 9, was received
by the appellant on March 27, 1963. On the same day the Chief Ordance Officer
passed an order enabling the LPO to immediately purchase the tools on cash
purchase basis.
We might pause for a little while in order to
explain the nature of the order passed by the Chief Ordnance Officer.
It appears that the normal procedure in the
Department was that the LPO had to draw cash and then go to the market and
purchase the goods against cash. But in view of the Emergency and the immediate
necessity of the tools this procedure was waived and the appellant was
permitted to buy the tools on covering purchase order basis; in other words,
the appellant could himself purchase the tools without obtaining the previous
sanction of the Chief Ordnance Officer, and on receiving the bills from the
supplier and processing the same could get them sanctioned by the Chief
Ordnance Officer and then make the payment to the supplier. According to the
prosecution the appellant, a day after he received the list, Ext. 9, placed
orders with Jayantilal Himatlal Shah, P.W. 2, for supply of the tools. It is
not disputed that P.W. 2 was one of the contractors on the approved list of the
Department, and still continues to be so. P.W. 2 further assured the appellant
that he would make the supply as early as possible, and that .he would do so at
moderate rates. P.W. 2 accordingly procured .the articles from Bombay and
delivered the same in the Depot by April 6, 1963 along with his bills after
which 535 the bills were placed before. the Chief Ordnance Officer and after
sanction by him the payment was made to P.W. 2.
Apart from engineering tools there was
another requisition for the supply of 900 dessert spoons. The appellant first
wanted to place this order also with P.W. 2, but he found that his rate was a
little higher than the rate which was tendered to the Department sometime
before, and, therefore, placed orders with another firm of M/s Devichand
Lalchand Gandhi, P.W. 11, and received 900 dessert spoons of stainless steel
from them.
Sometime in 1964, P.W. 18, an Inspector of
Police in the Office of Special Police Establishment, Bombay, received some
information regarding the appellant having committed an offence punishable
under the Act on the basis of which he recorded the First Information Report on
January 25, 1964.
Thereafter he obtained the permission of the
Special Judicial Magistrate for investigating the case and eventually submitted
a chargesheet against the appellant before the Special Judge, Bombay, on April
28, 1966 as a result of which the appellant was tried, convicted and sentenced
by the Special Judge, and his appeal against the said conviction and sentence
before the High Court failed.
The gravamen of the allegation against the
appellant is that although the supplies were to be made as quickly as possible
the appellant made a deliberate departure from the normal procedure which was
adopted in the Department, in that he followed the procedure of covering
purchase order basis and placed orders with P.W. 2 alone without making any
enquiries from the local market whether the tools were available there. It was
also alleged that by placing orders with P.W. 2 the appellant caused P.W. 2 to
earn a profit of 45% and thereby caused wrongful loss to the Army Department.
It was further alleged that a number of firms
in Poona were prepared to supply the goods required at a much lesser profit of
10 to 15 % and the appellant made no enquiries whatsoever from these firms
although some of them were also on the approved list of the Department. On the
basis of these circumstances only the prosecution sought the conviction of the
appellant. The appellant pleaded innocence and denied that he had any intention
to cause pecuniary benefit to P.W. 2. The appellant submitted that the articles
were very urgently required and as no time was left he had to act quickly and
take immediate decisions. It was for this purpose that the normal procedure was
waived and the Chief Ordnance Officer permitted him to adopt the covering
purchase order system. As regards the enquiries from the local market, the
definite case of the appellant in his statement under s. 342 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure was that he had in fact made enquiries from a few firms and
his enquiries revealed that either the firms did not possess the goods
themselves or that they were not dealers in all the goods. He further expressed
his ignorance that P.W. 2 made a profit of 45% and pleaded, on the other hand,
that he was given to understand by P.W. 2 that the articles would be supplied
at moderate rates. The appellant seemed to suggest that as all the articles
required were not available in the local market he thought it a prudent act to
place orders with a person who was in a position to supply all the tools
required at one stretch instead of running from one dealer to another for
purchasing goods piecemeal, and as P.W. 2 was prepared to supply all the goods
himself and he was also on the 18--1546 SCI/76 536 approved list of dealers the
appellant decided to place orders with him. He made no secret of the fact
because all the higher officers, including the Chief Ordnance Officer,
sanctioned the bills sent by P.W. 2. The Trial Court, after consideration of
the evidence and circumstances, found that the appellant had by corrupt means
procured pecuniary benefit for P.W. 2 and caused wrongful loss. The High Court
in appeal confirmed the finding of the Trial Court.
Normally this Court in special leave against
a concurrent judgment of the High Court and the Trial Court does not reappraise
the evidence, but unfortunately in this case we find that both the courts below
have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts and have made a completely wrong
approach to the whole case by misplacing the onus of proof which lay on the
prosecution on the accused. Both the courts below had proceeded on the footing
that it was for the accused and not for the prosecution to prove that the
accused made enquiries from the local market or that he knew about the rates,
etc. This approach was obviously and manifestly wrong. It is plain that it was
for the prosecution to prove the ingredients of s. 5(1) (d), which runs thus:
"5( 1 ) A public servant is said to
commit the offence of criminal misconduced.
(a)....
(b)....
(c)....
(d) if lie, by corrupt or illegal means or by
otherwise abusing his position as public servant, obtains for himself or for
any other persons any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage .... " In
other words it was for the prosecution to prove affirmatively that the
appellant by corrupt or illegal means or by abusing his position obtained any
pecuniary advantage for some other person. In view of the clear defence taken
by the appellant it is obvious that it was for the prosecution to prove that
the accused made no enquiries, that the accused made a departure from the
normal procedure with oblique motive, and that the accused knew that P.W. 2
would make a profit of 45 % whereas others would be satisfied with a profit of
10-15%. The High Court, to begin with, started with the presumption that the
accused led no evidence to show that he made any enquiries. We might state at
the .risk of repetition that it was not for the accused to prove the
prosecution case but it was for the prosecution to disprove what the accused
said, namely, that he had made enquiries.
The prosecution could prove this fact only by
producing satisfactory and convincing evidence to show that the accused in fact
made no such enquiries and he knew about the margin of profit which other
dealers would have made. We shall immediately show that there is no legal
evidence to prove this fact. What the courts below have done is to disbelieve
the case of the appellant because he led no evidence to show that he made any
enquiries regarding the availability of goods or the rates, and therefore the
courts presumed that the accused had a dishonest intention.
537 In the case of Narayanan Nambiar v. State
of Kerala(1) this Court had the occasion to consider the import and
interpretation of the words "corrupt or illegal means" and the word
"abuse", as mentioned in s. 5 (1) (d). Tiffs Court observed thus:
"Let us look at the clause "by
otherwise abusing the position of a public servant", for the argument
mainly turns upon the said clause. The phraseology is very comprehensive. It
covers acts done "otherwise" than by corrupt or illegal means by an
officer abusing his position. The gist of the offence under this clause is that
a public officer abusing his position as a public servant obtains for himself
or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage.
"Abuse" means misuse i.e. using his position for something for which
it is not intended. That abuse may be by corrupt or illegal means or otherwise
than those means. The word 'otherwise' has wide connotation and if no
limitation is placed on it, the words "corrupt', 'illegal' and 'otherwise'
mentioned in the clause become surplus age, for on that construction every
abuse of position is gathered by the clause. So some limitation will have to be
put on that word and that limitation is that it takes colour from the preceding
words along with which it appears in the clause, that is to say something
savouring of dishonest act on his part ...... The juxtaposition of the word
'otherwise' with the words "corrupt or illegal means" and the
dishonesty implicit in the word "abuse" indicate the necessity for a
dishonest intention on his part to bring him within the meaning of the clause?'
We are satisfied that the judgment of the High Court runs counter to the
principles laid down by this Court in the case cited above, and the High Court
does not appear to have applied that principle in deciding the truth of the
case presented by the prosecution against the appellant. In the instant case it
is not alleged that the accused had used any corrupt or illegal means. It has
not been shown that the accused himself accepted any illegal gratification or
pecuniary benefit nor has it been shown that he violated any statutory rule or
order. Thus, even on the prosecution allegation the case of the appellant falls
only within the second part of s. 5 (1 ) (d), namely, abusing his position as
public servant. The abuse of position, as held by this Court, must necessarily
be dishonest so that it may be proved that the appellant caused deliberately
wrongful loss to the Army by obtaining pecuniary benefit for P.W. 2.
After having gone through the evidence
referred to by the courts below we think the prosecution has miserably failed
to prove this fact. To begin with, the first circumstance relied upon by the
High Court is that the accused made a deliberate departure from the usual
procedure of purchasing against cash. According to the prosecution, the
procedure was that the officer should have drawn cash from the office and then
he should have gone to the market 'and purchased the articles and (1) [1963]
supp. 2 S.C.R. 724, 730-731.
538 after having made the purchases he would
obtain the sanction of the Chief Commanding Officer. This procedure is known as
"cash purchase basis". The accused, however, adopted the procedure
known as "covering purchase order", i.e., he made the purchases and
got the bills sanctioned by the Chief Ordnance Officer. It is not disputed that
in the present case, in view of the emergent circumstances the Chief.
Ordnance Officer himself had allowed the
appellant to make the purchases on the basis of cash purchase and had himself
sanctioned the bills tendered by the supplier, P.W.
2. All the bills were paid to P.W. 2 by
cheque. It was contended by the State that in the instant' ease the appellant
had purchased these articles against cash and later on obtained the necessary
covering purchase orders. This is not correct because the appellant had merely
placed orders with P.W. 2 for supply of goods and it was only after all the
goods had been supplied, verified and found correct that the bills were
forwarded to the Chief Commanding Officer for sanction. The High Court itself
found that Lt. Col. Pun had passed an order directing the appellant as LPO to
purchase all the articles against cash immediately. In this connection the High
Court observed as follows:
"Similarly, it is not in dispute that
regarding the mode of purchase, Lt. Col. Purl had already passed an order
directing the appellant as Local Purchase Officer to purchase all the articles
against cash immediately." Even assuming that the appellant purchased the
articles against cash he was doing so in compliance with the orders of the
Chief Ordnance officer and there was absolutely no reason for the High Court or
the Special Judge to have drawn inferences against the appellant for violation
of the procedure when the highest officer of the Depot had sanctioned the
procedure which was adopted by the appellant and had in fact authorised him to
do so in view of the Emergency. It may be necessary to refer to the evidence of
P.W. 2, Lt.
Col. Des Raj (P.W. 10) who stated that a
covering purchase order is sanctioned only when the Chief Ordnance Officer is
satisfied that there are special circumstances which necessitate the sanction
of the purchase order after the stores are purchased. It is not disputed that
the Chief Ordnance Officer had issued a covering purchase order in this case.
In these circumstances the best person who
would have thrown a flood of light on the subject and whose evidence would have
clinched the issue whether or not the accused was authorised to depart from the
normal procedure was Col.
Anand, the Chief Ordnance Officer, who though
examined by the Police during investigations was not produced before the Court.
In the absence of his evidence there was no legal justification for the court
to hold that the accused had departed, from the normal procedure without the
authority of the Chief Ordnance Officer, particularly when it is admitted that
a covering purchase order was passed by the said Officer and the bill was also
finally sanctioned by him. In these circumstances, therefore, the entire fabric
of the reasoning of the High Court as also that of the Special Judge falls to
the ground.
Another circumstance on the basis of which
the appellant was convicted was the fact that he made no enquiries from the
local suppliers, nor did he ascertain the rates. On this question also the High
Court, as well as the Special Judge, have misplaced the onus on the accused.
539 To begin with, the accused has
categorically stated in his statement under s. 342, Cr.P.C., that he had in
fact made enquiries and had sent the Supply Clerk and one Deshmukh for getting
the rates and find out whether the stores were available. The prosecution could
succeed only in the statement of the accused could be falsified and this could
not only be done if the prosecution had examined the Supply Clerk who was sent
by the appellant or Deshmukh, both of whom were employees in the Army and in
possession and control of the prosecution, and yet none of these persons were
examined to falsify the statement of the accused. The High Court, on the Other
hand, was in error when it observed that the accused did not produce either the
clerk or Deshmukh forgetting that it was not for the accused but for the
prosecution to prove that what the appellant had said was false. Furthermore,
reliance was placed by the High Court and the Special Judge on the evidence of
P.W.s 14, 15 and 16. P.W. 14 does state that his firm was dealing in
engineering tools and other articles and that he was on the list of approved
contractors of ,Ordnance Depot. He, however, admitted that out of the articles
required only 80 to 90 percent wet available with the firm. In cross-examination,
when asked about a particular type of engineering tool the witness was unable
to state for what purpose it was used. The witness admitted that he did not
maintain any stock register at the shop and the fact that the articles were
available was being deposed by him merely on the basis of his memory. Finally,
the witness admitted thus:
"I had not gone to Talegaon Ordnance
Depot to enquire whether any engineering tools were required in the
depot." The High Court seems to think that as this witness's firm was
merely a retailor, therefore there was not necessity to keep a stock register,
The witness has nowhere stated that he was a retailer and not a whole saler
and, therefore, there was absolutely no basis for the High Court to have
conjectured or speculated on this point in order to raise an inference against
the appellant. On the other hand, in the absence of any document, register or
inventory to show the nature of goods the firm of P.W. 14 was dealing in, it is
difficult to accept the ipsi dixit of the witness consisting of his bare
statement based on pure memory that the engineering tools were available six
years before the date he was deposing. Such evidence, in our opinion, is
absolutely worthless. In fact P.W. 18, the Inspector, has deposed that in the
course of his investigations he had seized the accounts and documents of the
local firms, and yet no document was produced by the prosecution to show that
P.W. 14 in fact had in his possession engineering goods at the relevant time.
Furthermore, the witness positively states that he never went to Talegaon
Ordnance Depot to enquire whether any tools were required. It was also not put
to the witness whether the appellant personally or through one of his employees
had approached him regarding the supply of the goods. In these circumstances,
therefore, how possibly can an inference be drawn from his evidence that the
accused made no enquiries whatsoever when the accused had positively stated
that he did. Finally, on the question of rates or margin of profit also, the
witness makes 540 only a verbal statement that he would have charged 10-15%
which cannot be accepted in the absence of documentary proof of the fact that
the firm had sold these articles during the relevant time to various persons
and made 10-15% profit only. It is manifest that if the firm was carrying on
such a huge business then everything must have been written in the account
books which were in possession of the Inspector and yet not produced. In these
circumstances, therefore, we are satisfied that the High Court misread the
evidence of P.W.14.
Reliance was then placed on the evidence of
P.W. 15, Mahendra kumar who is a partner of the firm known as 'C. Ambalal &
Co.' To begin with, he clearly admits that his firm was dealing in hardware,
paints, sanitary ware and only files amongst the engineering tools. The witness
further states that Out of the articles mentioned in the list, Ex. 9, only
files, being items Nos. 75 to 94 and 96 to 99 were available with him and could
be supplied by him. He does not say that he was in a position to supply the
other engineering goods also. Again, the witness makes only a verbal statement
without any documentary proof that he would have charged 10-12% of profit on
the amount spent. It may be pertinent to note here that the appellant in his
statement under s. 342, has positively asserted that he did make enquiries from
the firm of Ambalal. Ambalal was examined by the police but not produced in
court and the explanation given was that he was ill. That by itself is not a
convincing explanation because the prosecution could have asked for adjournment
from the court to enable Ambalal to be examined as a witness for he alone could
have falsified the statement of the accused whether or not any enquiry was made
from him.
Finally, this witness himself states:
"I do not remember whether I was present
when the list, Ex. 9, was shown to Ambalal when his statement was
recorded." The evidence of this witness, therefore, does not exclude the
possibility of the accused having made enquiries from Ambalal and the accused
has in fact explained in his statement that no orders could have been placed
with this firm because he was only in a position to supply files which formed a
very small component of the engineering goods required. In these circumstances,
therefore, the evidence, of P.W. 15 does not falsify the statement of the
accused that he made enquiries from this firm but, on the other hand, goes to
support it. The High Court has observed that if the appellant had made
enquiries from P.W. 15, then he would have undoubtedly remembered this fact.
This process of reasoning appears to us to be absolutely perverse. When the
witness himself does not remember whether the appellant had made any enquiries
in his presence then the natural inference would be that he does not exclude
the possibility of the appellant having made an enquiry, and in the absence of
the examination of Ambalal it cannot be said that the statement of the accused
was false.
The next evidence on which reliance was
placed was of P.W.
16, Taharbhai. This witness clearly admits
that he had no engineering goods in his stock and if an order had been placed
he could have 541 supplied them by procuring them from somebody else. In these
circumstances he was in the same position as P.W. 2.
This witness further admits that out of the
list, Ex.9, only files and drills were available, but the stock of these
articles was scanty. He again orally says that he would have charged a profit
of 15%. This witness admits that he does not remember whether the appellant had
come to his shop on March 27, 1963 to enquire about the availability of the
goods and the rates of engineering tools. It was suggested to him that
enquiries were made from him by the appellant and he said, that the tools were
not available with his firm. The evidence of this witness also suffers from the
same infirmities as are to be found in the evidence of P.Ws. 14 and 15. He has
not produced the stock register nor any document or accounts or inventories to
show that he had all the goods required. His statement further does not exclude
the possibility of the accused having made enquires from him, or at any rate
does not falsify the statement of the accused. As regards the margin of profit,
that is also ipsi dixit without any basis and is not supported by his account
books.
It seems to us that before a presumption
against the accused could be raised that he knew that other firms would have
charged a much lesser profit than P.W.2, it should have been proved by the
production of account books of the firms concerned and their dealings during
the relevant time that they had sold similar of identical goods and made only a
profit of 10-15%. The verbal statement of the witnesses regarding the margin of
profit which they would have made had orders been placed six years back can
carry no weight.
This is all the evidence on the basis of
which inferences against the appellant have been drawn. After having gone
through the evidence we are satisfied that the prosecution has not produced any
reliable or conclusive material to prove that the appellant had any dishonest
intention in causing pecuniary benefit to P.W. 2. Even assuming that the
accused departed from the normal procedure in view of the urgent necessity of
the articles it cannot be said that this was done with a corrupt or oblique motive.
The appellant had been asked. by the Jabalpur Depot to supply these articles
immediately. The appellant, therefore, had t6 take a quick decision and he was
authorised to do so by his Chief. Since P.W. 2 was prepared to supply all the
goods in bulk at one stretch the appellant may have thought it better to place
the orders with him. May be, that this was an error of judgment or an act of
indiscretion, but from that alone an inference of dishonest intention cannot be
drawn. Moreover, P.W l0 has clearly stated thus:
"I had no reason to doubt the honesty or
sincerity of the accused during the period he was serving under me." This
would show that the appellant was really an honest and sincere officer and his
antecedents were good. Against this background we should have expected much
better and superior evidence to justify inference of the accused having been
animated by a dishonest intention in placing orders with P.W. 2.
542 There is yet one more intrinsic
circumstance which negatives the guilt of the accused. Although the appellant
had given orders with respect to all the articles to P.W. 2, yet when he found
that P.W. 2 was charging higher rate for the dessert spoons he did not place
orders for the same with him but placed the orders with P.W. 11, who supplied
at the rate of Re. 1/per spoon which was less than the rate at which P.W. 2 was
ready to supply. This shows that the appellant did take due care and caution
and did not act blindly. There is absolutely no legal evidence on the record to
show as to what was the nature of the margin of profit which the firms of P.Ws.
14, 15 and 16 had made if the orders had been placed with them, and in the
absence of such an evidence the court would not be justified in holding that
the accused abused his position in causing pecuniary benefit to P.W. 2. The
appellant had admitted that if he had known that P.W. 2 would have charged such
a high profit he would have been more careful.
On the other hand, what appears to us to be
most surprising is that although P.W. 2 was the sole beneficiary of the whole
transaction and had, according to the prosecution, made profit of 45% and was,
therefore, in the nature of an accomplice, yet he continues to be on the
approved list of the departmental suppliers even on the date when he was giving
evidence. Such a conduct on the part of the department can only be consistent
with the innocence rather than the. guilt of the accused. If the prosecution
allegation was true that P.W. 2 through his business influence obtained the
order in his favour, then before the prosecution was started against the
appellant, P.W. 2 should have been blacklisted. But this was not done. The High
Court appears to have been led away by the impression that the appellant had
personal relations with P.W. 2. There is, however, no such evidence on record
and P.W. 2 himself has categorically stated that his relations with the
appellant were purely business relations as he used to visit the office in
connection with the supplies off and on. In these circumstances, therefore, if
P.W. 2 was not suspected by the prosecution for having received huge pecuniary
benefit much less could the blame lie on the appellant.
In these circumstances, even if there was
some amount of carelessness or negligence on the part of the appellant it is
impossible to doubt his bona fides. He acted as a produent person and tried to
get the supplies as quickly as possible with the result that all the gods
required by Jabalpur Depot were supplied within two weeks.
A careful analysis of the evidence and the
circumstances would, therefore, show that the approach of the High Court was
clearly 543 wrong and that the inferences drawn by the High Court were not at
all warranted by the circumstances and facts proved in the case. The entire
charge against the appellant rested on circumstantial evidence and the
prosecution has failed to prove that the circumstances were such as could be explained
only on one hypothesis, namely, that the accused was guilty.
For these reasons, therefore, the appeal is
allowed, judgment of the High Court set aside and conviction and sentence
imposed on the appellant are hereby quashed, and he is acquitted of the charge
framed against him.
M.R. Appeal allowed.
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