Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu Vs. The Motor
& General Traders [1975] INSC 74 (18 March 1975)
KRISHNAIYER, V.R.
KRISHNAIYER, V.R.
RAY, A.N. (CJ) MATHEW, KUTTYIL KURIEN
CITATION: 1975 AIR 1409 1975 SCR (3) 958 1975
SCC (1) 770
CITATOR INFO :
RF 1976 SC 49 (8,9) R 1980 SC1334 (14) R 1981
SC1113 (6,15) E&R 1981 SC1711 (5,14) RF 1981 SC2085 (23) RF 1984 SC 143 (3)
F 1985 SC 817 (15) RF 1987 SC 741 (10) D 1988 SC 13 (4) RF 1990 SC 897 (9) RF
1991 SC1760 (22) RF 1992 SC 700 (4)
ACT:
Appellate Jurisdiction, exercise of--Court,
if can mould reliefs in appeal by taking into account facts subsequent to
institution of proceedings.
Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and
Eviction) Control Act, 1960, Section 10(3)(iii)(a) and (b)--Revision to High
Court against order of wholesale remittal to trial Court--High Court, if can
take into account subsequent fact and dismiss the eviction petition also.
HEADNOTE:
The appellant, a landlord of a large
building, had leased out in separate portions his building to several tenants.
One of such tenants is the respondent. The
former resolved to start a business in automobile spares and claimed eviction
of the respondent by Rent Control proceedings, under s. 10(3)(iii)(a) and (b)
of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960.
The petition was resisted and the Rent Controller dismissed the petition. The
appeal by the landlord failed but, in revision, the High Court chose to remand
the case to the appellate authority. The appellate authority, after hearing
parties, remitted the whole case to the trial Court for fresh disposal in
accordance with certain directions and, after allowing parties to lead
evidence. Instead of finishing the case at the trial Court level, the landlord
preferred a revision to the High Court on the ground that a wholesale remittal,
as against calling for a finding on a specific point, was illegal. The High
Court held that if the fact of the landlord having come into possession during
the pendency of the proceedings of Shop No. 2 is to be taken into account, then
clearly the petition is no longer maintainable under section 10(3)(iii) of the
Act. The inevitable sequel was the dismissal, not only of the civil revision,
but also of the eviction petition.
In this appeal by special leave, it was
contended for the appellants : (i) It was illegal for the High Court to have
taken cognisance of subsequent events; and (ii) Once the High Court held-as it
did-that the appellate tribunal acted illegally in remiting the whole case to
the Rent Controller, it could not go further to dismiss his whole eviction
proceedings.
Allowing the appeal partially,
HELD : (i) For making the right or remedy,
claimed by the party just and meaningful as also legally and factually in
accord with the current realities, the court can, and in many cases must, take
cautious cognisance of events 2nd developments subsequent to the institution of
the proceeding provided the rupees of fairness to both sides are scrupulously
obeyed. On both occassions, the High Court, in revision, correctly took this
view. The later recovery of another accommodation by the landlord, during the
pendency of the case, has as the High Court twice pointed out, a material
bearing on the right to evict, in view of the inhibition written into s. 10(3) (iii)
itself. The High Court was right in taking into consideration the facts which
came into being subsequent to the commencement of the proceedings. [960 G-H]
Lachmeshwar Prasad Shukul v. Keshwar Lal Chaudhuri [19401 F.C,R. 85; Patterson
V. State of Alabama, 294 U.S. 600, 607 and Minnesota v. National Co. 309 U.S.
551, 555, referred to.
(ii) It is unfair to drive parties to a new
litigation of unknown duration and therefore, in the special circumstances of
this case, it is directed that : (a) the revision before the High Court shall
stand dismissed; (b) the Rent Controller will take note of the subsequent
development disabling the landlord from seeking eviction on which there is
already an adverse finding by the High Court; (c) the 959 landlord be allowed to
amend his petition if he has a case for eviction on any other legally
permissible ground; and (d) the parties be given fair and full opportunity to
file additional pleadings and lead evidence thereon. But the subsequent event
that the petitioner had come by a nonresidential accommodation of his own in
the same town having been found by the High Court, cannot be canvassed ever
again. That finding of legal disability cannot be reopened.
[961 G-H]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals
Nos. 2120 to 2122 of 1972.
Appeals by special leave from the judgment
and order dated the 7th April 1972 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in C.R.P.
No. 1576-78 of 1971.
K. S. Ramamurthi, M. S. Narayana Achari and
C. S. S. Rao, for the appellant.
K. R. Choudhury and K. Rajendra Choudhry, for
the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
KRISHNA IYER, J.-Once the facts are stated fairly, one is left to wonder what
substantial issue of law deserving of adjudication by the Supreme Court
survives at all in these appeals. We may straightway proceed to state, with
brevity, the case of the appellant presented for our scrutiny and make short
shrift of it as it merits little more.
The appellant, a landlord of a large
building, had leased out in separate portions his building to several tenants.
One of such tenants is the respondent. The
former resolved to start a business in automobile spares and claimed eviction
of the respondent by Rent Control proceedings, under s. 10(3) (iii) (a) and (b)
of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960.
The petition was resisted and the Rent Controller dismissed the petition. The
appeal by the landlord failed but, in revision, the High Court chose to remand
the case to the appellate authority. The litigation lengthened further because
the latter, after hearing parties, remitted the whole case to the trial Court
for fresh disposal in accordance with some directions and, after allowing
parties to lead evidence. Instead of finishing the case at the trial court
level, the landlord repeated a revision to the High Court on the perhaps
technically correct stand that a wholesale remittal, as against calling for a
finding on a specific point, was illegal. While hearing protracted arguments it
came to the ken of the court that certain material events of fatal import to
the maintainability of the eviction proceedings had come to pass and so it
decided to mould the relief in the light of these admitted happenings. The
learned judge observed "If the fact of the landlord having come into
possession during the pendency of the proceedings of Shop No. 2 is to be taken
into account, as indeed it must be, then clearly the petition is no longer maintainable
under Section 10(3) (iii) of the Act, as the requisite condition for the
invoking of that provision has ceased to exist viz., that the landlord was not
occupying a non-residential building in the town. 'Building, 960 of course
means a portion of a building. As the prerequisite for the entitlement of the
petitioner to institute and continue a petition has ceased to exist, it must
follow that ABA No. 5/1967 is no longer maintainable and must be
dismissed." The inevitable sequel was the dismissal, not only of the civil
revision, but also of the eviction petition. Thus, after a marathon forensic
battle lasting over six years, the landlord lost even the flickering hope of
success before the trial Court as a result of supererogatory revision to the
High Court. It is against this adverse decision he has, by special leave, come
to this Court.
Two submissions were advanced by Sri K. S.
Ramamurthy to salvage his client's case. He argued that it was illegal for the
High Court to have taken cognisance of subsequent events, disastrous as they
proved to be. Secondly, he urged that once the High Court held-as it did that
the appellate tribunal acted illegally in remitting the whole case to the Rent
Controller, it could not go further to dismiss his whole eviction proceedings,
a misfortune heavier than would have been, had he not moved the High Court at
all.
We feel the submissions devoid of substance.
First about the jurisdiction and propriety vis a vis circumstances which come
into being Subsequent to the commencement of the proceedings. It is basic to
our processual jurisprudence that the right to relief must be judged to exist
as on the date a suitor institutes the legal proceeding. Equally clear is the
principle that procedure is the handmaid and not the mistress of the judicial
process. If a fact, arising after the lis has come to court and has a
fundamental impact on the right to relief for the manner of moulding it, is
brought diligently to the notice of the tribunal, it cannot blink at it or be
blind to events which stultify or render inept the decrotal remedy. Equity
justifies bending the rules of procedure, where no specific provision or
fairplay is violated, with a view to promote substantial justice--subject, of
course, to the absence of other disentitling (actors or just circumstances. Nor
can we contemplate any limitation on this power to take note of updated facts
to confine it to the trial Court. If the litigation pends, the power exists,
absent other special circumstances repelling resort to that course in law or
justice. Rulings on this point are legion, even as situations for applications
of this equitable rule are myraid. We affirm the proposition that for making
the right or remedy claimed by the party just and meaningful as also legally
and factually in accord with the current realities, the court can, and in many
cases must, take cautious cognisance of events and developments subsequent to
the institution of the proceeding provided the rules of fairness to both sides
are scrupulously obeyed. On both occasions the High Court, in revision,
correctly took this view. The later recovery of another accommodation by the
landlord, during the pendency of the case, has as the High Court twice pointed
out, a material bearing on the right to evict in view of the inhibition written
into s. 10(3) (iii) itself.
We are not disposed to disturb this approach
in law or finding of fact.
961 The law we have set out is of ancient
vintage. We will merely refer Lo Lachmeshwar Prasad Shukul v. Keshwar Lal
Chaudhuri(1) which is a leading case on the point. Gwyer C.J., in the above
case, referred to the rule adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States in
Patterson v. State of Alabama(2) :
"We have frequently held that in the
exercise of our appellate jurisdiction we have power not only to correct error
in the judgment under review but to make such disposition of the case as
justice requires. And in determining what justice does require, the Court is
bound to consider any change, either in fact or in law, which has supervened
since the judgment was entered." and said that that view of the Court's
powers was reaffirmed once again in the then recent case of Minnesota v.
National Tea Co. (3). Sulaiman J., in the same case(1) relied on English cases
and took the view that an appeal is by way of a re-hearing and the Court may
make such order as the Judge of the first instance could have made if the case
had been beard by him at the date on which the appeal was heard (emphasis,
ours). Varadachariar J., dealt with the same point a little more
comprehensively. We may content ourselves with excerpting one passage which
brings out the point luminously (at p. 103) :
"It is also on the theory of an appeal
being in the nature of a re-hearing that the courts in this country have in
numerous cases recognized that in moulding the relief to be granted in a case
on appeal, the court of appeal is entitled to take into account even facts and
events which have come into existence after the decree appealed against."
The High Court, in this case, in the concluding stages slightly self
contradicted itself and observed : 'the civil revision petition cannot be
entertained' and proceeded further to state : 'It will not be desirable that I
should exercise my discretion in directing an amendment of the petition'. In
conclusion, the Court did interfere in revision by setting aside the order of
remittal to the Rent Controller and dismissing the eviction petition, leaving
the near decade-old litigation to be reopened in a fresh unending chapter of
forensic fight. The learned Judge gave little comfort to the litigant who had
come with a proved case of bona fide requirement to start his own business by
his obscure observation : 'If so advised the petitioner may seek to obtain such
relief as may be open to him by filing a fresh petition under the appropriate
provision of the Act, in view of the subsequent event of his having come into
possession of a portion of the building. We think it unfair to drive parties to
a new litigation of unknown duration but direct, in the special circumstances
of the case (which are peculiar) that : (a) the revision before the High Court
shall stand dismissed; (b) the Rent Controller will take note of the subsequent
development disabling the landlord from seeking eviction on which there is
already an adverse finding by the High Court;
(1) [1940] F.C.R. 85.
(3) 309 U. S. 551, 555.
(2) 294 U. S. 600, 607.
962 (c) The landlord be allowed to amend his
petition if he has a case for eviction on any other legally permissible ground;
and (d) the parties be given fair and full
opportunity to file additional pleadings and lead evidence thereon. But we make
it clear that the subsequent event that the petitioner had come by a
non-residential accommodation of his own in the same town having been found by
the High Court, cannot be canvassed over again. That finding of legal
disability cannot be reopened. We keep open for enquiry only grounds, if any,
which may reasonably be permitted by amendment it they are of any relevance or
use for eviction.
With these observations we partially allow
the appeal as indicated above and direct the parties to bear their respective
costs.
V.M.K. Appeal partly allowed.
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