Gopal Krishna Das Vs. Sailendra Nath
Biswas & ANR [1975] INSC 48 (26 February 1975)
CHANDRACHUD, Y.V.
CHANDRACHUD, Y.V.
SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH GUPTA, A.C.
CITATION: 1975 AIR 1290 1975 SCR (3) 726 1975
SCC (1) 815
ACT:
Civil Procedure Code--Order 21 Rule
71--Meaning of deficiency of price accrued by reason of the auction purchasers'
default--Whether deficiency should be attributable to the default of auction
purchaser--Section 12(2) of Limitation Act 1963--Time requisite for obtaining
certified copy--Whether means time properly required or includes time spent
negligently.
HEADNOTE:
The appellant was one of the joint owners of
the premises in question. In ,,execution of a money decree obtained against the
appellant his share in the property was put to sale and was purchased by the
father of the first respondent for Rs. 77,000. The purchaser deposited 25 per
cent of the purchase price. The property was put to sale once again and was in
fact knocked down for a sum of Rs. 700/in favour of the father of respondent
No. 1. The appellant made an application under Order XXI Rule 71 of C.P.C. for
recovering the deficiency in the price realised in the second sale from the
purchase. Order XXI Rule 71 C.P.C. reads as under :-"Any deficiency of
price which may happen on a re-sale by reason of the purchaser's default and
all expenses attending such re-sale, shall be certified to the Court by the
Officer or other person holding the sale, and shall at the instance of either
the decree holder or the judgment debtor, be recoverable from the defaulting
purchaser under the provisions relating to the execution of a decree for the
payment of money." The proclamation of sale for the first sale stated that
the premises were free from encumbrances. Proclamation for the second sale,
however, states that the entire ground floor excepting two road-side shops, was
let out.
The Learned Single Judge allowed the
application of the appellant and directed the purchaser to pay the deficiency
with interest. The Division Bench ,of the High Court allowed the appeal and
dismissed application filed by the appellant under Order XXI Rule 71 for
recovering from the auction purchaser the deficiency in the said price. On
appeal by certificate under Article 133(1)(a) & (c) it was contended before
this Court by the appellant that he was entitled to recover from the first
respondent the deficiency in the price realised in the second sale under Order
XXI Rule 71. The respondent contended that the appellant can recover the
defficiency in the second sale only if it can be attributed to default of the
auction purchaser.
HELD:
The application of Order XXI rule 71 is
limited to cases in which the deficiency of price has occurred by reason of the
auction purchaser's default. Property once put to sale in execution proceedings
may have to be resold for reasons which may or may not be connected with the
default of the auction purchaser. It is not enough that the resale is
occasioned by the default of the auction purchaser. It is further necessary
that the resale must result in a deficiency of price which deficiency is
attributable to the default of the auction purchaser. In the first proclamation
of sale there was no mention of the lease. In the second proclamation the lease
has been mentioned. In the city of Calcutta where premises are situated, the
West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 was in force at the time of the second
sale. Under that Act tenants enjoyed the privileges of standard rent and
immunity from eviction. The reference in the second sale proclamation to a
lease and to the fact that substantial part of the property was in occupation
of the tenant was bound to affect the marketability of the property. Order XXI
rule 71 is intended to provide an expeditious remedy to the judgment debtor or
the decree holder who has suffered a detriment due to the default of the
auction purchaser. [729C; G; 731B-D] 727 (2) The appeal before the Division
Bench was not time barred. The time requisite for obtaining Certified copy
means time properly required and an appellant cannot in computation of the
period of limitation :for filing the appeal ask for exclusion of time which was
spent negligently. in the present case settlement of the, draft decree was
adjourned from time to time by an officer of the court on being properly
satisfied that there was good reason for adjournment. The Auction purchaser
cannot be blamed for the time thus spent in settling the draft of the decree
under appeal. [734F-G]
CIVIL APPELATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal
no. 10, 2332 & 2333 of 1968.
From the Judgment & Order dated the 21st
March, 1967 of the Calcutta High Court in Appeal Nos. 9, 10 and 43 of 1959.
P. K. Sen and G. S. Chatterjee, for the
appellant.
A. K. Sen, P. K. Chatterjee, Rathin Das and
Mrs. Anjana Sen, for respondent No. 1 The Judgment of the Court was delivered
by CHANDRACHUD, J. Premises No. 4-A, Chowringhee Road, Calcutta, belonged to
the appellant Gopal Krishna Das and four others, each having an undivided
one-fifth share therein.
In 1951, one Ganga Prosad Gupta obtained two
money-decrees against the appellant and another person in the total sum of Rs.
12,378. In execution of these decrees, the undivided one-fifth share of the
appellant was put to sale on June 16, 1954 and was purchased by Pashupati Nath
Biswas, the father of the first respondent, for Rs. 77,040. Pashupati Nath
Biswas deposited Rs. 19,260 in the court, being 25% of the purchase price and
later he deposited a further sum of Rs.
15,000. He however, failed to pay the balance
of the purchase price whereupon the appellant made an application that the
property be put to a fresh sale. Accordingly, the property was put to sale on
March 20, 1957 and once again Pashupati Nath Biswas was the highest bidder. But
whereas in the first sale he had offered a bid of Rs. 77,040 this time the sale
was knocked down in his favour for a paltry sum of Rs. 700. The second sale was
confirmed on May 29, 1957.
In the meanwhile, on May 16, 1957 the Sheriff
certified under Order XXI, Rule 71 of the Code of Civil Procedure that the deficiency
in the price realised in the second sale due to the default of the auction
purchaser, after giving him credit in the sum of Rs, 15,000 paid by him in the
first sale, amounted to Rs. 61,340 apart from the cost and expenses of the
sales.
On June 28, 1957 the appellant made an
application under Order XXI, Rule 71 C.P.C. for recovering the deficiency from
Pashupati Nath Biswas. A learned single Judge of the Calcutta High Court
allowed that application and direct by an order dated August 19, 1958 that Pashupati
Nath Biswas do pay to the appellant a sum of Rs. 42,080 with interest at 6% per
annum. This order was challenged by Pashupati Nath Biswas in appeal No. 10 of
1959.
The auction purchaser had also filed an
application asking that the appellant be restrained from taking execution
proceedings for recovering the deficiency in price. That prayer was rejected.
It may be mentioned that pursuant to an application dated April 13, 1957 filed
by the auction purchaser himself, it was directed by an order dated May 21,
1957 that a sum of Rs. 22,000 be paid by the, Sheriff out of the sale proceeds
lying with him, to the Official Receiver in satisfaction of the decree obtained
by Ganga Prosad Gupta against the appellant, in execution of which the two sales
were held. Ganga Prosad Gupta's estate, it seems, had come to be vested in the
Official Receiver, he is the second respondent to these appeals. The auction
purchaser prayed that the Sheriff do pay to him the balance after deducting
there from the sum of Rs. 22,000 and the cost and the expenses of the Sheriff.
This prayer was also rejected. The auction
purchaser filed appeal No. 9 of 1959 against the order rejecting this
application.
The appellant then filed an application for
an order directing that the Sheriff do pay to him all the moneys lying with him
after deducting the cost and the expenses of the sales. That application was
allowed by the learned single Judge on December 11, 1958. The auction purchaser
challenged that order in appeal No. 43 of 1959.
The three appeals were heard together and
disposed of by a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court by three separate
judgments. By its. judgment dated March 21, 1967 the Division Bench allowed
appeal No. 10 of 1959, and dismissed the application filed by the appellant
under order XXI, Rule 71 for recovering from the auction purchaser the
deficiency in the sale price. The two other appeals were disposed of
consistently with that judgment. The auction purchaser Pashupati Nath Biswas
having died on April 16, 1964, the first respondent Sailendra Nath Biswas came
on the record of the, appeals as his Executor and legal representative. On
December 15, 1967 the High Court granted to the appellant leave to file an
appeal to this Court under Article 133(1)(a) and (c) of the Constitution.
Questions 'raised in the High Court by the
rival parties as regards the disbursement by the Sheriff of the balance
remaining with him after.satisfying Ganga Prosad Gupta's decree are incidental
to the main controversy arising out of the appellant's applicationunder Order
XXI, Rule 71, Code of Civil Procedure. The real question for decision is
whether the appellant is entitled under Order XXI, Rule 71, to recover from the
first respondent the deficiency in the price realised in the second sale.
The scheme of the Code in relation to
execution sales is like this Under Order XXI, Rule 64 any Court executing a
decree may order the sale of a property in satisfaction of the decree. Order
21, Rule 66 provides that the Court shall cause a proclamation of the intended
sale to be made. SubRule (2) of Rule 66 specifies the details which are
required to be mentioned in the proclamation of sale. The person declared to be
the purchaser must under order XXI, Rule 84, pay immediately after the declaration
a deposit of 25% of the purchase-money. In default of such deposit the property
has to be re-sold forthwith. By Rule 85 the full amount of purchase-money has
to be paid by the purchaser within 15 days from the date of sale. If the 729
purchaser commits a default, the deposit is liable to be forfeited to the
Government by virtue of Rule 86 and the property is liable to be re-sold. A
re-sale of property, in default of payment of the purchase-money, can be made
only after the issue of a fresh proclamation as provided in Rule 87. Under
Order 21, Rule 71 :
"Any deficiency of price which may
happen on a re-sale by reason of the purchaser's default, and all expenses
attending such re-sale, shall be certified to the Court by the officer or other
person holding the sale, and shall, at the instance of either the decree holder
or the judgment debtor, be recoverable from the defaulting purchaser under the
provisions relating to the execution of a decree for the payment of money It is
clear on a careful reading of Rule 71 that its application is limited to cases
in which the deficiency of price has occurred by reason of the auction
purchaser's default. Property once put to sale in execution proceedings may
have to be re-sold for reasons which may or may not be connected with the
default of the, auction purchaser. A resale consequent on the failure of the
auction purchaser to deposit 25% of the purchase price immediately after he is
declared to be the purchaser of the property or a re-sale consequent upon his failure
to deposit the balance of the purchase price within 15 days of the safe are
instances' when the re-sale is occasioned by the default of the auction
purchaser. On the other hand, re-sale consequent upon the setting aside of the
sale on the ground of material irregularity in publishing or conducting the
sale as provided in Order XXI, Rule 90, may not be attributable to the default
of the purchaser.' The provisions of Order XXI, Rule 71, come into play only if
the property is required to be resold on account of the default of the action
purchaser.
If the re-sale, is not due to the auction
purchaser's default, there can be no question of mulcting him with the
deficiency in the price realised in the re-sale.
The words : "Any deficiency of price
which may happen on a resale by reason of the purchaser's default"
occurring in Rule 71 therefore mean : "Any deficiency of price which on a
resale may happen by reason of the purchaser's default". As stated before,
the question of holding the auction purchaser liable to make good the
defficiency in price can arise only if the re-sale is occasioned by his
default. But though, this is necessary, it is not enough to meet the
requirements of Rule 71. What is necessary is that the re-sale occasioned by
the auction purchaser's default must result in a deficiency of price, which
deficiency is attributable to his default. A resale may have to be held because
the auction purchaser has committed default in paying the deposit of 25% under
Order XXI, Rule 84, or because of his default in paying the full price which 15
days of the sale as required by Rule 85. And yet the deficiency of price
realised in the re-sale may not be attributable to his default as, for example,
where the market value of the property is reduced to the discovery or
disclosure of an infirmity in the right, title and interest of the judgmentdebtor
in the property put to sale. An encumbrance existing on the property at 730 the
time of the first sale but not disclosed in the proclamation of that sale will
have no bearing on the price realised in the auction sale, unless the existence
of the encumbrance was otherwise known to the bidders. The disclosure of that
encumbrance in the sale proclamation accompanying the re-sale must, on normal
commercial considerations, have a direct impact on the price, of the property
put to sale. In such a case the deficiency of price realised in the resale will
be attributable not necessarily to the default of the auction ,purchaser but to
circumstances extraneous to his default. Order XXI, Rule 71, concerns itself
not with that class of cases but with those in which the deficiency of price
realised in the resale is attributable to the default of the auction purchaser.
Even a broad and non-too-meticulous
examination of the two proclamation of sale in the instant case is enough to
conclude that the deficiency in price realised in the resale cannot be said to
have happened on account of the auction purchaser's default. The first sale was
held on June 16, 1954 and the proclamation of sale accompanying it is dated May
10, 1954. The second sale was held on March 20, 1957 for which the relevant
sale proclamation is dated February 8, 1957. Both the proclamations mention
that what was being put to sale was the right, little and interest of the
appellant, Gopal Krishna Das, in the undivided one fifth share in the
particular property. But there is a material difference in the terms of the two
proclamations in regard to the encumbrances existing on the property. The
proclamation of 1954 sets out in a tabular form encumbrances like leases and
mortgages to which the ,Property was previously subjected, as appearing from
the affidavit of one Damodar Mullick. The proclamation then says :"It
appears from the said affidavit that all the Mortgages have been reconveyed.
The lease has expired. The sale is in respect of the undivided 1/5th share of
Purna Ch. Das. It appears from the said affidavit that the 1/5th share of Gopal
Kr. Das in the said premises is free from encumbrances." The proclamation of
1957, relying on an affidavit of one Sudhansu Kumar Roy says undoubtedly that
the, appellant's one-fifth share was free from encumbrances but the tabular
statement of encumbrances included in the proclamation refers to a Term Lease
and Agreement of 1955 and the proclamation says :
"The lease of 1955 is for five years
from October, 1955 and the same is in respect of the Restaurant "Bombay
Crown" containing the entire ground floor excenting two road side shops
and was executed by one Abde Ali Abdul Hussain, in favour of Ashlifaq and
Jaffar Hussain." It is notorious that properties in possession of tenants
who enjoy the protection of Rent Acts do not fetch the same price as properties
of which the purchaser can obtain vacant possesion. In the 731 city of Calcutta
where the Property in question is situated, The West Bengal Premises Tenancy
Act, XII of 1956, was in force, at the time of the second sale. Under that Act
the tenants enjoyed the privileges of standard rent and immunity from eviction
save on stated grounds. It is unnecessary to enter into refinements arising out
of the West Bengal Act but even the sub-tenants would appear to enjoy
thereunder a certain amount of immunity from eviction. Reference may in this
behalf be made to sections 13(2), (4), (5) and section 16 of the Act of 1956.
The reference in the second sale proclamation
to a live lease and sub-lease and to the fact that a substantial part of tlie
property was in occupation of the tenant or the subtenant was bound to affect
the marketability of the property. The paltry price realised in the second sale
may justifiably be attributed to the disclosure of encumbrances in the second
proclamation, which were not mentioned in the first proclamation. It is not
without significance that apart from the auction purchaser there were no
bidders at the second sale. The paucity of bidders may reasonably be taken to
reflect the fall in the value of the property in the estimation of prospective
bidders.
Order XXI, Rule 71 is intended to provide an
expeditious remedy to the judgment-debtor or the decree-holder who has suffered
a detriment due to the default of the auction purchaser. The officer or other
person holding the sale has to. certify to the Court the deficiency of price
which on, the re-sale has happened by the purchaser's default and all expenses
attending the re-sale. Upon such certification the amount becomes recoverable
from the defaulting purchaser at the instance of the decree-holder or the
judgment-debtor, "under the provisions relating to the execution of a
decree for the payment of money". The Code has not made the certificate
conclusive of the facts stated therein and consequently it is permissible to
the purchaser who is alleged to have defaulted to challenge the correctness of
the certificate in all its particulars. But the object of certification, as
evidenced even more clearly by the provision that the proceeding to recover the
amount will be governed by provisions relating to the execution of a money
decree is to eschew an elaborate inquiry into the competing causes culminating
in the deficiency of price., This object can be achieved only if the property
successively put to sale is in material respects identical, that is to say if
the right. title and interest of the judgment debtor is put to sale under
substantially the same description. If that happens it is easy to predicate
that the deficiency of price has resulted on account of the purchaser's
default. But if, as here, what was shown as unencumbered in the previous
proclamation is expressly described in the later proclamation as being subject
to an encumbrance which on a reasonable assessment, is calculated to affect the
market value of the property, the proceeding ceases to be a simple enough
matter like the execution of a money decree and assumes the form of a
contentious claim open to diverse defences as in a substantive suit. The speedy
remedy intend to be provided by Order XXI, Rule 71 will lose its meaning and
732 purpose if the executing court seized of the claim against the, alleged
defaulting purchaser has to embark upon a comparative, evaluation of the causes
that led to the deficiency in the price. Such, meat is not for the executing
court.
Counsel for the appellant relied on certain
decisions to fasten liability on the auction purchaser but those decisions will
not help. In Annavajhula Venkatachellamayya v. Rama Girjee Milakanta Girjee(1),
a purchaser in a court auction of the judgment-debtor's right to get a reconveyance
of certain lands on payment of a specified sum was, on default in payment of
the balance purchase money, held liable to pay the deficiency in price on
re-sale under Order XXI, Rule 71, C.P.C., though the date stipulated for making
the payment in order to get the re-conveyance happened to be shortly after the
court sale and before the expiry of the 15 days within which the auction
purchaser could deposit the balance of the purchase-money. Wallis C.J. observes
in his judgment that the sale and the re-sale, were of the, judgment-debtor's
interest as it existed at the date of the sale and the re-sale and that the
depreciation which occurred in the meantime was one for which the auction
purchaser was exclusively responsible. In his concurring judgment Kumaraswami
Sastriyar J. observes that having regard to the fact that there is no warrant
of title in a court auction, the maxim caveat emptor applies and therefore the
purchaser cannot avoid the sale so long as the judgment debtor has some
saleable interest in the property, howsoever small. The learned Judge further observes
that the objections which a defaulting purchaser can urge are practically
confined to those which can be. urged in an application for setting aside the
sale under Order XXI.
Relying on these observations it is contended
on behalf of the appellant that since in the instant case the judgment debtor
had a saleable interest the auction purchaser cannot avoid his liability to
make up the deficiency in price on the ground that the deficiency was caused by
the disclosure of the encumbrance. We are unable to appreciate the relevance of
the maxim caveat emptor on a question like the one before us. The auction
purchaser is not attempting to avoid the sale. Far from it. He adheres to his
purchase but disputes his liability for the deficiency. There is no question of
any failure on his part to take due care at the time of the first sale because
that sale was held in 1954 whereas the encumbrance referred to in the second
proclamation was stated to have been created in 1955.
Madho v. Watsalubai(2), on which the
appellant relies, was a case in which the existence of a maintenance charge and
the right of residence were omitted to be mentioned in the sale proclamation.
The High Court at Nagpur held that the auction purchaser could not avoid his
liability to make good the deficiency in the sale price as the decree-bolder in
whose favour the charge was created had reiterated again and again that she was
willing to waive the charge. Hidayatullah J. who decided the case further
observes in his judgment that (1) I.L.R. 41 Mad. 474.
(2) I.L.R. [1947] Nag. 939.
733 on a comparison of the two sale
proclamations he found that the existence of the charge was not mentioned in
either.
Naturally, the deficiency in price could not
be attributed to the, existence of the charge.
In Nelluri Brahmaiah vs. Mohd. Sheik Mohiddin
and Anr.,(1) the auction purchaser disputed his liability for the, deficiency
on the ground that the judgment debtor had no saleable interest in the
property. This contention was based on the circumstance that though the
property was situated in Venkatapuram it was wrongly described as lying within
the limits of Borrampalem. There was no dispute about the boundaries, about the
survey number or the area and it was not suggested that there was any other
property of the particular description in Borrampalem. The High Court of Andra
Pradesh held that in these circumstances the property could be easily
identified, that the location of the property put to sale was known to everyone
concerned and therefore it was difficult to posit that the judgment-debtor had
no saleable interest in the property.
The decisions in Baijnath Sahai vs. Moheep
Narain Singh(") and in Gangadas Dayabhai vs. Bai Suraj(3) , are more to
the point. These cases arose under section 293 of the Code of 1882
corresponding to Order XXI, Rule 71, of the Code of 1908. In the Calcutta case,
at the first sale no encumbrance upon the properties sold was notified. In the
re-sale two encumbrances were notified. The second sale was held because the
auction purchaser had committed a default in paying the balance, of the
purchase-price in the first sale. The price fetched in the second sale resulted
in a deficiency for which the auction purchaser was sought to be made liable.
Apart from the circumstance that the decreeholder was himself to blame for not
mentioning the encumbrances in the first proclamation and was therefore
attempting to obtain an advantage of his own wrong, the Calcutta High Court
expressed the legal position correctly by saying that "the re-sale
contemplated by s. 293 of the Code of Civil Procedure must be a sale of the
same property that was first sold, and under the same description, and any
substantial difference of description at the sale and the re-sale in any of the
matters required to be specified by s.
287 to enable intending purchasers to judge
of the value of the property should disentitle the decree-holder to recover the
deficiency of price ,under s. 293." In the Bombay Case the errors in the
two proclamations were so confusing that the deficiency in the price could not,
it was held, be attributed to the default of the purchaser. The description in
the second proclamation being materially different from that in the first, the
re-sale was not of the same property and the auction purchaser, though he had
defaulted in paying the balance of the purchase-price was absolved from making
good the deficiency.
It was contended that Pashupati Nath Biswas,
the auction purchaser, being in possession of a part of the property must be
deemed (1) [1964] (1) Andhra Law Times, 321.
(2) I. L. R. 16 Cal. 535.
(3) I. L. R. 36 Bom. 329.
734 to have been aware of the lease and the
sub-lease and therefore he is estopped from relying upon the same as having led
to the deficiency in, price. No estoppel can arise against the auction
purchaser on the question whether the deficiency in price can be recovered from
him. The question which arises under Order XXI, Rule 71 is whether the
deficiency can be attributed to the default of the, auction purchaser or whether
it can be reasonably attributed to any other supervening circumstance. This is
not a case in which the auction purchaser can be said to be taking advantage of
his own wrong. He cannot therefore be estopped from contending that the
disclosure of the encumbrance is the operative cause of the fall in price.
We may mention that the matter under
consideration arose out of the Ordinary Original civil jurisdiction of the
Calcutta High Court and therefore the Original Side Rules of the High Court
would govern the matter. That will, however, not make any difference to our
decision because Chapter XXV, Rule 7 of the Rules of 1914 provides by the Third
clause for resale of the property in default of the payment of the price by the
purchaser within the stipulated time,. The Third clause of Rule 7 provides :
"Where the proceeds of the resale are less than the price bid by such
defaulting purchaser, the difference shall be leviable from him under the rules
contained in Order XXI of the Code for the execution of a decree for
money." The Fifth clause of Rule 7 also provides that the sale. is made
under and subject to all other provisions contained in the Code of Civil
Procedure relating to sales in execution of decrees. Order XXI, Rule 71 of the
Code would therefore apply.
It was finally contended on behalf of the
appellant that the appeal filed by the auction purchaser from the judgment of
the single Judge to the Division Bench of the High Court was barred by
limitation. We see no substance in this contention. The time requisite for
obtaining certified copies undoubtedly means "the time properly
required" and an appellant cannot in the computation of the period of
limitation for filling the appeal ask for exclusion of time which was spent
negligently. But the facts and dates mentioned to us by the appellant's counsel
show that the settlement of the draft decree was adjourned from time to time by
an officer of the court on being property satisfied that there was good reason
for adjournment. The auction purchaser cannot be blamed for the time thus spent
in settling the draft of the decree under appeal. The argument must therefore
fail.
For these reasons we confirm the judgments
and dismiss these appeals with Costs. Costs shall be in one set.
P.H.P. Appeals dismissed.
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