Laxmi Chand Vs. Indore Improvement
Trust, Indore & Ors [1975] INSC 45 (24 February 1975)
GOSWAMI, P.K.
GOSWAMI, P.K.
MATHEW, KUTTYIL KURIEN KRISHNAIYER, V.R.
CITATION: 1975 AIR 1303 1975 SCR (3) 686 1975
SCC (1) 565
ACT:
Madhya Pradesh Town Improvement Trust Act
1960--Whether a housing scheme can contain features of industrial and other
non-housing scheme--Malafide acquisition in the absence of any provision
whether tribunal can award interest from the date of taking possession of the
property till the date of determination of compensation.
HEADNOTE:
The petitioner owned certain land. There was
an earlier attempt to acquire the land of the petitioner by sanctioning a
housing accommodation scheme bythe Indore Improvement Trust under the Madhya
Pradesh Town Improvement Trust Act, 1960. The said scheme was, however,
cancelled. The petitioner wanted to develop his land for industrial purposes
and, therefore, obtained No Objection Certificates from various Government
Departments as well as from the Trust. The petitioner got his land converted
from agricultural purpose to industrial purpose subject to the limitation that
the construction work had to be approved by the Trust. The Trust, however,
refused the No Objection Certificate for development of the land on individual
basis on the ground that a scheme was being approved for the land in question
and other neighbouring lands. The Trust framed a scheme which included the land
of the petitioner also.
The Trust served a notice to acquire the
petitioner's land for the purpose of the scheme. The petitioner submitted his
objection stating that the land was being developed into industrial area and
several small scale industries were functioning there and, as such, development
was alreadyin progress. Thereafter, the Trust published a notice acquiring the
said land. Before the Trust could take possession of the petitioner's land the
petitionerfiled a Writ Petition in this Court.
It was contended on behalf of the petitioners
:
(1) The Housing Accommodation Scheme is
invalid because it does not specify the class of inhabitants for whom the same
has been made.
(2) The scheme being a Housing Accommodation
Scheme it is for residential occupation only and it is not competent to include
plans for industrial purposes.
(3) Section 31 of the Act does not empower
the Trust to frame a scheme for industrial purposes at all.
(4) There is no application of the mind in
terms of section 45 in making the Scheme.
(5) The acquisition of the land for the
purpose of the Scheme is malafide.
(6) Since the Act makes no provision for
payment of interest from the date of delivery of possession of the land to the
Trust till the determination of compensation by the Tribunal, acquisition of
the land is violative of article 31(2) of the Constitution.
Petitioner has not challenged vires of any
provisions of the Act.
HELD : (1) Section 31 of the Act permits
combining two or more schemes or supplementing some special features of a
particular scheme in another scheme. There is no bar in framing a housing
accommodation scheme with some of the features of industrial scheme. A housing
accommodation scheme need not necessarily be residential scheme only. It can
admit of providing housing accommodation for any other purpose or object. There
is nothing in section 31 or any other provision of the Act disabling the Trust
from framing scheme for industrial purpose. [690E-G] 687 (2)Section 45 requires
that while framing the scheme the inherent utility, efficiency and adequacy of
the scheme and the objections and representations of the persons have to be
taken into consideration.' The scheme in question was open for inspection.
There was no ambiguity or vagueness of the scheme or its purpose. Where factual
satisfaction is evident formal recitals being omitted may not matter. At any
rate, section 52 (2) Puts a final seat of imprimatur on the scheme after
publication of the sanction of the Government. [691C-D) (3) Acquisition is not
malafide.. No oblique motive can be inputed to the Trust in making the impugned
scheme. There is no allegation of mala fide against the State Government whose
sanction was a, pre-requisite for the acquisition.
The order of acquisition cannot, therefore.
be characterised as I malafide. [691G-H] (4) It is true that there is no
provision for awarding interest unlike under the Land Acquisition Act. It is
submitted by the respondents that there is no bar under the Act against
awarding interest by the Tribunal. It is not possible to hold that the
compensation Tribunal which is at par with an arbitrator will be entitled to
award interest without any express provision in the Act. The petitioner is,
therefore. right in their contentionthat this Act does not provide for awarding
interest from the date of taking possession of the property to the date of
determination of compensation. However, it is not possible to quash the
acquisition in the absence of a challenge to the vires of the provisions of the
Act. The law being valid the attack will revaperate upon the quantum of
compensation pure and simple. It is sufficient to point out that the quantum of
compensation cannot be challenged under Article 31(2) of the Constitution.
[692D; 694C-G]
ORIGINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Writ
Petitions Nos. 517 of 1972 & 240 of 1973.
Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution
of India.
D. V. Patel (In WP. No. 240/73), S. P.
Phadnis and S. K. Gambhir, for the Petitioners (In both the Petitions).
I. N. Shroff, for the Respondent No. 1 (In
WP. No. 517/72).
S. M. Jain, for the Respondents Nos. 1-2 (In
WP. No. 2401 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Goswami, J. This
judgment will govern Writ Petitions Nos.
517 of 1972 and 240 of 1973.
The applications are directed against what is
described as a Housing Accommodation Scheme sanctioned by the Indore Improvement
Trust (briefly the Trust) under the Madhya Pradesh Town Improvement Trust Act
1960 (briefly the Act).
Brief facts of Writ Petition No. 517 of 1972
may alone be sufficient. There was an earlier attempt to acquire the land of
the petitioner by sanctioning a scheme in July 1961 but the same was cancelled
some time, in September 1962.
The petitioner personally wanted to develop
his land for industrial purposes and with that end in view obtained No
Objection Certificates from various Government Departments as well as from the
Trust. The petitioner also succeeded in converting his patta from agricultural
purpose to industrial purpose, subject, inter alia, to the limitation that the
construction work on the land shall be carried out in accordance with the plans
sanctioned by the same 688 Improvement Trust (Annexure 'G') Later, however the
petitioner found from a letter of the. Trust of October 26, 1964, that a scheme
was being approved for his land and other neighbouring lands and, therefore,
the, Trust was unable, to issue the, No Objection Certificate for development
of his land on individual basis. The Trust framed a Scheme No. 62 under section
46(1) of the Act and published a notice to that effect in the Gazette and in
local newspapers in 1965. The Scheme includes the, land of the petitioner. The
representations which the Petitioner made against the Scheme were of no avail.
The Trust served a notice dated February 10, 1965, upon the petitioner under
section 48(1) of the, Act proposing to acquire his land for the purpose of the
Scheme. The petitioner submitted his objections on April 15, 1965, stating,
inter alia, that the land was being developed into industrial area and several
small scale industries were functioning there and as such development was
already in progress. It was also stated that the land having been put to the
use of industrial purposes could not be re-converted for the purposes of
housing accommodation'. It was further stated that the land was mortgaged to
the State Bank for about Rs. 2 lakhs and the compensation that would be
required to be paid by the Trust would be necessarily higher than in the case
of other suitable vacant lands. The Petitioner was given a hearing but
ultimately the representations were , rejected. The Trust duly applied to the
State Government for sanction of the Scheme which was accorded on April 19,
1968, under section 51 of the Act. The Trust published a notice' dated July 12,
1968, under section 68(1) of the Act declaring its intention to acquire the
land. The petitioner filed his objections under section 68(2) against the
proposed acquisition of the land but these were rejected and the Trust obtained
sanction of the State Government (respondent No. 2) to acquire the land under
section 70 of the Act, and the Notification was duly published on September 27,
1968.
Therefore the Trust published a Notification
in the Government Gazette dated September 8, 1972, acquiring the said land and
under section 71(2) of the Act the land vested absolutely with the Trust free from
encumbrances from the date of the publication. Before the Trust could take
possession of the petitioner's land, he filed the writ application under
article 32 of the Constitution and obtained Rule Nisi and interim stay of
dispossession was granted pending disposal of the matter.
The following are the common submissions made
on behalf of the petitioners :
1. The Housing Accommodation Scheme' is
invalid because it does not specify the class of inhabitants for whom the same
has been made.
2. The Scheme being a Housing Accommodation
Scheme, it is for residential occupation only and it is not competent to
include plans for industrial purposes.
689
3. Section 31 of the Act does not empower the
Trust to frame a scheme for industrial purposes at all.
4. There is no application of the mind in
terms of section 45 in making the Scheme.
5. The acquisition of the land for the
purpose of the Scheme is mala fide.
6. Since the Act makes no provision for
payment of interest from the date of delivery of possession of the land to the
Trust to the, determination of compensation by the Tribunal acquisition of the
land is violative of Article 31(2) of the Constitution.
At the very outset it should be pointed out
that the Petitioners have not challenged the, vires of any provisions of the
Act.
In order to appreciate the first three
submissions, which may be taken up together, we may note a few relevant
provisions of the Net.
Chapter IV of the Act describes the contents
of improvement schemes. Section 30 provides that "an improvement scheme
may provide for all or any of the following matters, namely* * * * (i)the
provision for accommodation for any class of inhabitants : " Section 31
may be set out in full
31. "Types of improvement schemes.An
improvement scheme shall be of one of the following types or may combine any
two or more of such types or of special features thereof, that is to say(a) a
general improvement scheme;
(b) a re-building scheme;
(c) a re-housing scheme;
(d) a street scheme;
(e) a deferred street scheme;
(f) a development scheme;
(g) a housing accommodation scheme;
(h) a town expansion scheme;
(i)a drainage or drainage including sewage
disposal scheme; and (j) a playground, stadium and recreation ground
scheme." 690 Section 38. "Housing accommodation scheme.Whenever the
Trust is of opinion that it is expedient and for the public advantage to
provide housing accommodation for any class of the inhabitants within the Trust
area, the Trust may frame a housing accommodation scheme for such purpose."
Section 39. "Town expansion scheme.(1) Whenever the Trust is of opinion
that it is expedient and for the public advantage to control and provide for
the future improvement or expansion of a town to which this Act is applicable,
the Trust may frame a town expansion scheme for such town.
* * * * * * * (3) Such scheme shall show the
methods in which it is proposed to lay out the area to be developed and the
purposes for which the particular areas are to be utilised.".
* * * * * * * It is submitted on behalf of
the petitioners, that the impugned scheme is not a housing accommodation scheme
under section 38 but a scheme purely for industrial purposes. It is pointed out
that there is no reference in the Scheme to the class of inhabitants within the
Trust area for whose accommodation the Scheme has been framed under section 38.
Since it is a housing accommodation scheme it
cannot include plans for industrial purposes.
The argument fails to take count of section
31 which permits in terms for combining two or more schemes or supplementing
some special features of a particular scheme in another scheme. In other words
section 31 envisages composite schemes. Section 39 which provides for a town
expansion scheme authorises under sub-section (3) to indicate the method of
layout as well as the purposes for which particular areas under the scheme may
be utilised. This section goes to show that there is no legal bar in framing a
housing accomodation scheme with some of the features of a town expansion
scheme which will even indicate the purposes for which particular areas may be
utilised. There is nothing in the Act to ban industrial purposes from
consideration under section 39(3). The fact that a scheme is described merely
as a housing accommodation scheme does not prevent the adaptation of the scheme
to the incidental requirements which may be overlapping in another scheme. We
are also not satisfied that housing acoommodation scheme must necessarily be a
residential scheme only and that it cannot admit of providing housing
accommodation for any other purpose or object. The Madhya Pradesh High Court
took the same view in Beni Prasad Tandon and Others v. Jabalpur Improvement
Trust, Jabalpur(1).
Again it is difficult to appreciate how
section 31 prevents the Trust from framing an industrial scheme. We do not find
anything in section 31 or in any of the provisions of the Act disabling the (1)
[1970] M. P. L. J. 292.
691 Trust from framing a scheme for
industrial purposes. To mention only section 39, it is clear that under that
section a town expansion scheme may be framed even without the limits of the
town and that would indicate that a town expansion scheme may envisage
industrial expansion to meet the growing needs of the community. We, therefore,
do not see any substance in the aforesaid three submissions on behalf of the
petitioners.
With regard to the fourth submission of the
petitioners, it is difficult to accept the same. Section 45 requires 'certain
matters specified in (a) to (C)'therein to be considered when framing an
improvement scheme. The specified matters touch on the inherent utility,
efficiency and adequacy of the scheme and the objections and representations of
the persons affected will be, directed to negative such assumptions. The Scheme
in question was open to inspection. There was no ambiguity or vagueness about
the Scheme or its purposes. From even the nature of the representations and
objections it is apparent that the Trust did have all relevant matters in their
mind in framing the Scheme. Indeed without actually taking into consideration
the various matters specified in section 45 it may not her possible to frame a
scheme and finally to obtain sanction of the Government in the teeth of
objections and representations against the same. Where factual satisfaction is
evident formal recitals being omitted may not matter. At any rate sub-section
(2) of section 52 puts a final seal of imprimatur on the scheme after
publication of the sanction of the Government. The submission 'Is, therefore,
devoid of merit.
With regard to the fifth submission, which is
actually urged by the petitioner in writ petition No. 517 of 1972, we are not
satisfied that the acquisition of the land for the purpose of the present
Scheme is mala fide. It is submitted that the Trust by formulating the present
Scheme had an oblique motive to change the ownership of the land already under
a private scheme for development to let it out to tenants who will run the
existing enterprises already started on the land. We are not satisfied that any
oblique motive can be attributed to the, Trust in making the impugned Scheme.
It is clear that the land was originally owned by the petitioner for
agricultural purposes and when he obtained a patta converting it to industrial
purpose, it was clearly made subject to a condition that construction work on
the land shall be carried out in accordance with the plans sanctioned by the
Trust. The petitioner had been given reasonable Opportunity to submit
representations and was given a hearing by a Committee constituted under the
Act. The State Government on the application of the Trust examined the Scheme
and sanctioned the acquisition of the land under section, 70 when it was
satisfied that the acquisition was in public interest. There is no particular
allegation of mala fide against the State Government whose sanction was a pre
requisite for the acquisition. The order of acquisition cannot, therefore, be
characterised as mala fide and the submission fails.
692 With regard to the sixth and last
submission there was a good deal of argument at the bar. The respondents urged
that this point was not specifically taken in the petitions.
Under section 72(1) of the Act where any land
is acquired by the Trust it shall pay for such acquisition "compensation
the amount of which shall be determined in accordance with the provisions
hereinafter contained". Under section 73 a Tribunal is constituted for the
purpose of determining the amount of compensation. Section 77 provides for
matters to be considered for determining compensation, namely, "firstly,
the market value of the land at the date of the publication of the notification
under sub-section (1), of section 68" and six other factors. It is also
provided in the same section that the Tribunal shall not take into consideration
certain factors mentioned under eight heads.
Under sub-section (2) of section 77 "in
addition to the market-value of the land as above provided, the Tribunal shall
in every case award a sum of fifteen per centum or such market-value in
consideration of the compulsory nature of the acquisition". There being no
provision for payment of interest from the date of compulsory acquisition of
the land upto the date of payment, acquisition, it is submitted, is invalid in
law.
it is true that there is no provision for
awarding interest unlike under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (see sections 28
and 34 of that Act). It is, however, submitted on behalf of the respondents
that there is no bar under the Act against awarding interest by the Tribunal
even though there is no enabling express provision to that effect under the
Act. It is stated that the Tribunal under section 78 exercises powers for
summoning witnesses and enforcing attendance etc.
in the same manner as provided in the case of
civil courts under the Code of Civil Procedure. Under section 147 an appeal
from the Tribunal lies to the High Court in cases where the value of the claim
exceeds Rs. 500/and in any other case to the District Judge. It is, therefore,
submitted that the Tribunal is empowered even as a civil court to award
interest under section 34 of the Civil Procedure Code. Section 34 of the Civil
Procedure Code, however, authorises the court to award interest from the date
of the suit to the date of the decree and thereafter to the date of payment.
Section 34, therefore, would not come to the aid of the Tribunal to award
interest from the date of delivery of possession of the land to the date of
determination of compensation.
The respondents relied upon the decision of
this Court in Satinder Singh and Others v. Amrao Singh and Others(1) In this
case this Court had to deal with section 5(e) of the East Punjab Acquisition
and Requisition of Immovable Property (Temporary Powers) Act, 1948 (briefly the
Punjab Act) which provided that an Arbitrator in making his award shall have
regard to the provisions of sub-section(1) of section 23 of the Land
Acquisition Act 1894 so far as the same can be made applicable. The submission
in that case was that since sub-section (1) of section 23 is alone mentioned,
sub-section (2) of section 23 is impliedly excluded and necessarily also
section 28 and (1) [1961] 3 S. C. R. 676.
693 section 34 stand excluded. The argument,
therefore, was that die Tribunal was not empowered to award interest under the
Punjab Act. Repelling the said argument this Court held as follows:-"It
would be legitimate to hold that by the application of S. 23(1) in terms the
provisions of S. 23(2) are by necessary implication excluded. If the
Legislature has provided that only one part of s. 23 should be applied it would
be reasonable to hold that the other part of s. 23 was not intended to be
applied; but we do not see how it would be reasonable to hold that by the
application of S. 23(1) the principles underlying the provisions of ss. 28 and
34 are also excluded.
Therefore, it is necessary to examine this
question on general grounds and principles without assuming that the
application of these general considerations is excluded by any of the
provisions of the Act".
This Court finally held as follows "The
power to award interest on equitable grounds or under any other provisions of
the law is expressly saved by the proviso to S. I (of the Interest Act
1839)...... we have already seen that the right to receive interest in lieu of
possession of immovable property taken away either by private treaty or by
compulsory acquisition is generally regarded by judicial decisions as an
equitable right; and so, the proviso to s. 1 of the Interest Act saves the said
right".
The Court in that case, therefore, awarded
interest to the claimants.
The petitioners on the other hand drew our
attention to a decision of this court in the Godhra Electricity Co. Ltd.
and another v. The State of Gujarat and
another (1) where one of us Mathew J., speaking for the Court held as follows:"There
can be no doubt about the correctness of the general rule under which a
purchaser who takes possession is charged with interest on his purchase money
from that time until it is paid. This rule has been applied to compulsory purposes
(see Satinder Singh v.
Amrao Singh) (supra). But the question is
whether the arbitrator has power under the Act to award interest on the
purchase price. In Toronto City Corpn. v. Toronto Rly. Corpn., [1925] AC 177 at
pp. 193-194 the Privy Council held that the general rule under which a
purchaser who takes possession is charged with interest on his purchase money
from that time until it is paid was well established, and bad on. many
occasions been applied to compulsory purchases but the duty of the arbitrators
in that case was not to determine all the rights of the company, but only to
ascertain the actual value of certain property at a certain time and that it
was a truism to say that such value could not include interest upon it and that
the liability for interest lay outside of the' arbitration for its
enforcement".
(1) A. T. R. 1975 (January) S. C. 32.
694 Although in the Godhra Electricity Co's
case (supra) the Court has noticed the decision in Satinder Singh's case
(supra), it may be observed that the Court's attention in the latter case was
not drawn to ,section 5 (g) of the Punjab Act to the following effect :
"Save as provided in this section and in
any rules there under, nothing in any law for the time being in force shall
apply to arbitration under this section".
And the Court, therefore, in that case
rendered the decision "without .assuming that the application of these
general considerations is excluded by any, of the provisions of the Act".
In view of the Godhra Electricity Co's case (supra) it is not possible to hold
that the Cornpensation Tribunal, which is at par with an Arbitrator, will be
entitled ,to award interest without any express provision in the Act.
This is particularly so since under the Act
the Tribunal is en-titled to take into consideration some given factors and to
peremptorily ignore certain other specified factors in determining the
compensation. it has also been empowered to grant solatium as similarly
provided for under the Land Acquisition Act. In the, entire scheme of the self contained
Act, in absence of a provision to authorise the Tribunal to award interest, it
is not possible to hold that it can award interest on the amount of
compensation determined by the Tribunal subsequent to the acquisition ,of the
land. The petitioners are, therefore, right in their contention that this Act
does not provide for awarding interest from the date of taking possession of
the property to the date of determination of cornpensation, which will always
be on a later date under the provisions of the Act (see sections 72 and 73).
The petitioners, however, have an indirect
object. They are not interested in the interest as such but want the land back
and will not be satisfied unless the order of acquisition is quashed.
Unfortunately, however, it is not possible for this Court to quash the
acquisition in these cases in absence of a challenge of the vires of the
provisions of the Act. Presumption of constitutionality will forbid casting an
evil eye on the Act in absence of a clear challenge. The Act must be assumed to
be valid for the purpose of these petitions and we wilt proceed on that basis.
Then law being valid the attack will reverberate upon the quantum of
compensation, pure and simple. It is sufficient to point out that the quantum
of compensation which may be determined according to the provisions of the Act
for acquisition of the land cannot be challenged under article 31(2) of the
Constitution. In that view of the matter this submission of the learned counsel
also fails.
ln Writ Petition No. 240 of 1973, Mr. Patel
additionally urged that publication of the notice of the Scheme Was not made in
accordance with section 46(2) of the Act which requires weekly publication in
the Gazette for three consecutive weeks. Apart from the fact, in this case,
that the petitioner was well aware of the Scheme and submitted objections and
representations, section 52(2) appears to be conclusive on the question. That
sub-section provides that the publication of a notification by the State
Government sanctioning the scheme shall be 695 conclusive evidence that the
scheme has been duly framed and sanctioned. In view of this, ticklish
skirmishes over publication on technical grounds at a distant date are
completely out of place. The submission is devoid of merit.
In the result both the Writ Petitions fail
and are dismissed with no order as to costs.
We should observe that Mr. Shroff pointed out
that in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Satinder Singh's case
(supra) and another decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Lakhanlal and
others v. Town Improvement Trust, Jabalpur and others,(1) the Tribunal has been
always awarding interest in acquisition cases under the Act and he undertakes
on behalf of the respondents, irrespective of our decision, to pay interest to
the petitioners at 6% per annum from the date of actual delivery of possession
upto the date of payment of the compensation.
P.H.P.
Petitions dismissed.
(1) [1970] M. P. L. J. 316.
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