Satya Deo Prasad Gupta Vs. The State of
Bihar & Ors [1974] INSC 253 (27 November 1974)
BHAGWATI, P.N.
BHAGWATI, P.N.
UNTWALIA, N.L.
CITATION: 1975 AIR 367 1975 SCR (2) 854 1975
SCC (1) 736
CITATOR INFO:
R 1978 SC1155 (2)
ACT:
Preventive detention-Duty of Officers of
Government not to mislead Court -Unexplained delay in considering detenu's
representation-Effect of Constitution of India 1950, Art. 22(4)-Confirmation of
detention with a view to continue beyond 3 months-When should be made.
HEADNOTE:
The District Magistrate issued an order of
detention on June 11, 1974, under s. 3(2)(iii) of the Maintenance of Internal Security
Act, 1971 directing the detention of the petitioner and reported the fact to
the State Government. The petitioner was arrested on July 11, 1974. The State
Government approved the order of the detention and referred the case to the
Advisory Board on August 9, 1974. On August
16. the representation of the petitioner was
received by the State Government and the State Government sent it immediately
to the Advisory Board. The Advisory Board reported on August 20 to the State
Government that in its opinion there was sufficient cause to detain the peti-
tioner. On November 15, the State Government rejected the representation of the
petitioner and confirmed the order of detention, though. in the affidavit in
reply filed on behalf of the respondent and sworn to by a Deputy Collector on
October 14. it was stated that the State Government had already considered and
rejected the petitioner's representation.' Allowing the petition challenging
the petitioner's detention.
HELD : (1) No words can be too strong to
condemn the irresponsible attitude of such a high placed Officer as the Deputy
Collector in making a false and misleading statement on oath with a view to
wresting a favourable decision from the Court. [858C-D] (2) Where there is
inordinate delay on the part of the State Government in considering the
representation of a detenu and no satisfactory explanation is offered by the
State, Government for such delay, the constitutional obligation is violated and
the detention is rendered invalid. The constitutional requirement of affording
an opportunity to a detenu to make a representation against the order of
detention is intended to provide a safeguard against improper or unjustified
exercise of the power of detention and it is for this reason that this Court has
always insisted that the representation of the detenu should be considered
promptly and without undue delay, so that, if it is found by the detaining
authority, on ;considering the, representation. that the grounds on which the
order of detention has been made are incorrect or non-existent or irrelevant,
the detaining authority itself may cancel the order of detention at the
earliest opportunity. [858E-859A] In the present case, there wag an inordinate
delay of 3 months on the part of the State Government in considering the
representation of the petitioner and the State Government had not offered any
explanation for the delay.
[858E-F] Jayanarayan Sukul v. State of West
Bengal [1970] 3 S.C.R.
225, followed.
(3) Under Art. 22(4) of the Constitution, the
confirmation of the detention with a view to continue it beyond a period of 3
months, on receipt of the ,opinion of the Advisory Board, must be within 3
months from the date of detention.
But, in the present case, the order of
confirmation was made beyond 3 months from the date of detention and therefore,
the order of detention must "be held to be invalid. [859E-H] D. S. Roy v.
The State of West Bengal A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 1924, followed.
855
ORIGINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Writ
Petition No. 448 of 1974.
Petition under Article 32 of the
Constitution.
D. P. Singh. Rajesh Prasad Singh and R. K.
Jain for the Petitioner;
U. P. Singh for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
BHAGWATI, J. This is yet another instance where this Court is reluctently
compelled to set free from detention a person believed to be an economic
offender. We had occasion to point out in an earlier Judgment(1) that economic
offenders are a menace to the society and it is necessary in the interest of
the economic well being of the community to mercilessly stamp out such
pernicious, antisocial and highly reprehensible activities as boarding,
black-marketing and profiteering which are causing havoc to the economy of the
country and inflicting untold hardships on the common man and the Court would,
therefore, naturally be loath to interfere with an order of detention which is
calculated to put an economic offender out of action by way of social defence.
But here in the present case the attempt to curb this social menace has been
frustrated and set at naught by want of due care, promptness and attention on
the part of the State Government and the Court is left with no choice but to
strike down the detention of the petitioner. If only the State Government had
properly applied its mind to the correct legal position as laid down by various
decisions of this Court and shown greater concern and anxiety while exercising
the power of preventive detention, the infirmity vitiating the detention of the
petitioner could have been easily avoided. We hope and trust that the State
Government will be more careful in the future so that persons Who disrupt the
social and economic life of the community are effectively prevented from
carrying on their nefarious activities.
The petitioner is the karta of a Joint Hindu
family and as such karta he runs a shop for selling medicines and drugs under
the name of Popular Pharmacy in Ranchi. On 22nd April, 1974, at about 8 p.m.
one Vijoy Shankar accompanied by R. N. P. Dube, Executive Magistrate, went to
the shop of the petitioner and asked for certain medicines according to a
prescription made out by a House Surgeon of the Medical College, Ranchi. The
petitioner, who was present at the shop, asked Vijoy Shanker and R. N. P. Dube
to come at 8.30 p.m. and stated that he would then be able to supply the
medicines to them. Vijoy Shankar and Dube accordingly visited the shop again at
8.30 p.m. when the petitioner supplied most of the medicines mentioned in the
prescription. Amongst the medicines so supplied were two ampoules of pathedine
and one bottle of ether. The petitioner charged for these two ampoules of
pathedine Rs. 3/- as against the price of 90 paise per empoule shown in the
current price list and for the bottle of ether, which contained 450 grms., he
charged Rs. 20/as against the price of Rs. 6.85 shown in the current price
list. This (1) Dwarika Prasad Sahu V. State of Bihar, W. P. 346 of 1974,
decided on 12-11-1974.
856 was in contravention of paragraph 15 (2)
of the Drug (Price Control) Order, 1970. The petitioner also refused to issue
cash memo in respect of the two ampoules of pathedine and one bottle of ether
supplied by him, though he was bound to do so under paragraph 22 of the Drug
(Price Control) Order, 1970. When asked by Vijoy Shankar and R. N. P. Dube to
give his name, the petitioner falsely and deliberately gave his name as
Sailendra Kumar Gupta though his real name was Satya Deo Prasad Gupta.
It appears that on the following day, that
is, 23rd April, 1974, a group of persons claiming to be representatives of a
body known as Nao Nirman Samiti came to the petitioner's shop, forcibly took
him out and after placing a garland of shoes around his neck and affixing a
placard displaying the slogan : Main black marketeer hun. Chharupia ka ether
bees rupia men bechta hun-Ropular Medical, Bariat-u," paraded him through
the streets in a rickshaw with a rope tied around his waist. "The New
Republic", a local newspaper, published in its issue dated 27th April,
1974, a photograph of the petitioner as he was being paraded in this
procession. This incident exemplied the wrath and anger of the people against
the petitioner as they felt that he was black marketing and profiteering in
such essential commodities as medicines and drugs.
The District Magistrate, Ranchi thereafter
issued an order of detention under section 3 (2) (iii) of the Maintenance of Internal
Security Act, 1971 directing that Sailendra Kumar Gupta that being the name
given by the petitioner to Vijoy Shankar and R. N. P. Dube at the time when
they made purchases from him-should be detained as it was necessary so to do
with a view to preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the
maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community. This order of
detention had, however, to be cancelled since the real name of the petitioner
was Satya Deo Prasad Gupta and not Sailendra Kumar Gupta as mentioned in the
order of detention. The District Magistrate then issued another order dated
11th June, 1974 of detention under section 3(2)(iii) of the Act on the ground
that it was necessary to detain the petitioner with a view to preventing him
from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services
essential to the community. Pursuant to the order of detention the petitioner
was arrested on 11th July, 1974 and at the time of his arrest, grounds of
detention were served on him. These grounds related to the incident of 22nd
April, 1974 when the petitioner had sold two ampoules of pathedine and one
bottle of ether at prices exceeding those shown in the current list of prices
in contravention of paragraph (15)2 of the Drug (Price Control) Order, 1970 and
refused to issue cash memo in respect of these sales though required to do so
under paragraph 22 of that order and it was on the basis of these grounds of
detention that the Dis- trict Magistrate had arrived at the requisite
subjective satisfaction leading to the making of the order of detention. The
District Magistrate, immediately after making the order of detention, reported
the fact to the State Government and the order of detention was unproved by the
State Government within the period prescribed by section 3, sub-section (3).
The State Government thereafter placed 857 the case of the petitioner before
the Advisory Board on 9th August, 1974 as required by section 10. It appears
that the representation of the petitioner against them. order of detention was
not received until, this date and it could not, therefore, be forwarded to the
Advisory Board at the time when the papers relating to the case of the
petitioner were forwarded to it. Subsequently, however, on 16th August, 1974
the representation of the petitioner was received and the State Government
immediately sent it to the Advisory Board for its consideration. The Advisory
Board, after considering the grounds of detention, the other material placed
before it and the representation of the petitioner made a report dated 20th
August, 1974 stating that in its opinion there was sufficient cause to detain
the petitioner. The State Government should have immediately thereafter
proceeded to consider- the representation of the petitioner and decided whether
or not to confirm the order of detention under section 12, sub-section (1) but
no such action was taken by the State Government for some time. The petitioner,
therefore, filed the present petition challenging. the validity of the
detention.
The only ground urged by Mr. D. P. Singh,
learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, against the validity of
the detention was that the State Government had failed to consider the
representation of the petitioner and to make the order of confirmation within a
reasonable time and the detention of the petitioner had, therefore. become
invalid.
Indeed Mr. D. P. Singh could not advance any
other ground, since it was apparent that, if the allegations contained in the
grounds of detention were true, the petitioner was a black marketer and
profiteer and it would not be open to this Court in the exercise of its limited
jurisdiction in cases of this kind to enquire into the truth or falsity of the
grounds of detention. When the petition originally came up for hearing before a
Bench of this Court consisting of Chandrachud, J, and one of us (Bhagwati, J.)
on 11th November. 1974. the attention of the Court was drawn to a statement
made by the Deputy Collector, Ranchi in paragraph 15 of his affidavit in reply
that "the State Government fully, rightly and sympathetically considered
the petition of the petitioner". The reference here obviously was to the
representation of the petitioner, because paragraph 26 of the petition to which
this was a reply alleged that the State Government had not "so far"
considered the repre- sentation of the petitioner "resulting in a clear
violation of the provisions of the Act". This statement was made in the
affidavit in reply which was sworn by the Deputy Collector, Ranchi on 14th
October, 1974. Now, ordinarily the Court would have acted on this statement
made by the Deputy Collector, Ranchi on oath, but no date was given in the
affidavit. in reply as to when the representation of the petitioner was.
considered and rejected by the State Government and the Court, therefore.
adjourned the hearing of the petition and directed Mr. U P. Singh, learned
Advocate appearing on behalf of the Government of Bihar to produce the original
record of the case so that the Court could satisfy itself that everything was
done. according to law.
L346 Sup./75 858 The petition thereafter came
up for hearing before us on 18th November. 1974. Mr, U. P. Singh on behalf of
the Government of Bihar placed before us the record of the case and on perusing
the record. we found that the order rejecting the representation of the
petitioner and confirming the order of detention was made by the Government as
late as 15th November, 1974 after the petition was adjourned to enable Mr. U.
P. Singh to produce the original record before us- This was a startling
revelation as it showed undoubtedly that the statement made by the Deputy
Collector, Ranchi in paragraph 15 of his affidavit in reply that the State
Government had "fully, rightly and sympathetically considered" the
representation of the petitioner prior to the date of the affidavit in reply,
that is before 14th October, 1974, was patently false and misleading. It is a
matter of regret that a highly placed officer like the Deputy Collector should
have made such a false and misleading statement on oath with a view to wresting
a favourable decision from the Court. This only shows how cavalierly and
irresponsibly the executive authorities in the present case seem inclined to
view questions concerning personal liberty and betrays complete lack of candour
and frankness with the Court. No words can be too strong to condemn such
irresponsible attitude.
We have already referred to the original
record of the case and that clearly shows that though the representation of the
petitioner was received by the State Government on 16th August, 1974 and the
Advisory Board, after considering the case of the petitioner and taking into
account his representation, gave its opinion on 20th August, 1974, the State
Government slept over the matter for a period of about three months and
considered the representation of the petitioner only on 15th November, 1974
after the hearing of the petition had been adjourned on 11th November, 1974.
There was obviously inordinate delay on the
part of the State Government in considering the representation of the
Petitioner. There is no explanation for this inordinate delay offered by the
State Government. We asked Mr. U. P.
Singh whether he was in a position on behalf
of the State Government to offer an explanation for this apparently
unreasonable delay. but he confessed his inability to do so.
We fail to see why the State Government
should not have been able to consider the representation of the petitioner for
about three months. This only shows callous disregard of the constitutional
provision which requires that the representation of a detenu must be considered
without avoidable delay. The constitutional requirement of affording an
opportunity to a detenu to make a representation against the order of detention
is intended to provide a safeguard against improver or unjustified exercise of
the power of detention and it is for this reason that the decisions of this
Court have always insisted that the representation of the detenu should be
considered promptly and without undue delay. so that if it is found by the
detaining authority, ,on considering the representation.
that the grounds on which the order of
detention has been made are incorrect or non-existent or irrelevant, the
detaining authority itself may cancel the order of detention and the detenu may
be freed from unjustified detention at 859 the earliest opportunity. Here,
there was absolutely no justification--at least none could be pointed out-why
the State Government could not consider the representation of the petitioner
for about three months. It is now well settled by the decision of a Bench of
five Judges of this Court in Jayanarayan Sukul v. State of West Bengal(2) that
where there is inordinate delay on the part of the State Government in
considering the representation of a detenu and no satisfactory explanation is
offered by the State Government for such delay, the constitutional obligation
is violated and the detention is rendered invalid. Ray, J., as he then was,
speaking on behalf of the Court pointed, out in that case :
"In the present case, the State of West
Bengal is guilty of infraction of the constitutional provision not only by
inordinate delay of the consideration of the representation but also by putting
off the consideration till after the receipt of the opinion of the Advisory
Board. As we have already observed there is no explanation for this inordinate
delay. The Superintendent who made the enquiry did not affirm an affidavit. The
State has given no information as to why this long delay occurred- The
inescapable conclusion in the present case is that the appropriate authority
failed to discharge its constitutional obligation by inactivity and lack of
independent judgment." Therefore. on this ground alone, the detention of
the petitioner must be held to be invalid.
There is also another ground which must
result in invalidation of the detention of the petitioner. The law is now well
settled as a result of a decision of this Court in D. S. Roy v. The State of
West Bengal(2) that on a proper interpretation of Art. 22, clause (4) of the
Constitution, the confirmation of the detention with a view to continue it
beyond a period of three months, on receipt of the opinion of the Advisory
Board, must be within three months from the date of detention. The confirmation
of the detention must, therefore. follow within three months from the date of
detention. Here, in the present case, the petitioner was detained pursuant to
the order of detention on 11th July, 1974 and the order confirming the
detention should, therefore, have been passed at the latest on 11th October.
1974. But the State Government, though it
received the opinion of the Advisory Board as far back as 20th August, 1974,
did not bestir itself for well nigh three months and it was only on 15th
November, 1,974 that it suddenly woke up to make the order of confirmation. The
order of confirmation was clearly made beyond three months from the date of
detention and there is, therefore, no escape from the conclusion that the order
of detention must be held to be invalid. We may point out that the decision of
this Court in D. S. Roy v. The State of West Bengal(2) was given as far back as
(1) [1970] 3 S.C.R. 225.
(2) A. 1. R. 1972 S. C. 1924.
860 7th December, 1971 and Yet the State
Government in the present case acted in contravention of the constitutional
mandate enunciated and explained in that decision. Taking a charitable view of
the matter we may presume that the State Government was not aware of this
decision. But-that can hardly be an excuse for violation of the law. We think
it would be desirable if some machinery is set up by the Government of India or
the State Government by which the decisions of this Court in cases of
preventive detention are brought to the notice of the executive authorities as
soon as they are handed down so that the executive authorities know what is the
law laid down by this Court and they can conform to it.
We are thus' left with no choice but to hold
the detention of the petitioner invalid. We, accordingly, allow the petition
and make the rule absolute and direct that the petitioner should be set at
liberty forthwith.
V.P.S.
Petition allowed.
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