Ram Bahadur Rai Vs. The State of Bihar
& Ors [1974] INSC 238 (12 November 1974)
CHANDRACHUD, Y.V.
CHANDRACHUD, Y.V.
BHAGWATI, P.N.
CITATION: 1975 AIR 223 1975 SCR (2) 732 1975
SCC (3) 710
ACT:
Preventive Detention-Effective representation
against order of detention,--Grounds of detention, when to be read as
inter-related-Petitioner, whether entitled to have notice of inter-play of one
ground on another.
Maintenance of Internal Security Act, Section
3(1) (a) (ii)-"Gujarat type of agitation in Bihar"-Expression, if
vague.
HEADNOTE:
On April 9, 1974, in the exercise of powers
conferred by section 3 (1) (a) (ii). of the Maintenance of Internal Security
Act, the District Magistrate, Patna, made an order directing that the
petitioner, who is a student leader, be detained with a view to preventing him
from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The
order of detention served on him on April 13, 1974, contained seven grounds.
The order was confirmed by the Governor of Bihar on May 28, 1974. The
petitioner filed a writ Petition in the High Court at Patna under Article 226
of the Constitution challenging the validity of the detention order on various
grounds. The petition was dismissed by the High Court. This Court granted
special leave to appeal from the judgment of the High Court. Rule was also
issued in the Writ Petition filed by the petitioner under Article 32 of the
Constitution.
It was contended for the petitioner that the
grounds of detention furnished to him are vague, that some of the allegations
contained in the grounds are ,false and that the grounds bear no relevance to
the object of detention, namely, the maintenance of public order.
Setting aside the order of detention and
making the Rule absolute.
HELD. (i) The grounds of detention do not
furnish intrinsic aid to justify ,the conclusion that all of them are inter-
related. Nor is there any material to ,come to the conclusion that the
petitioner can be said to have had notice of such interplay of one ground on
another. [737B] (ii) The first ground contains these particulars : (1) The
petitioner. in his capacity as Secretary of All India Vidyarthi Parishad,
attended a meeting of the Bihar Rajya Chatra Neta Sammelan held on 17th and
18th February, 1974, in the Patna University campus; (2) A decision was taken
in those meetings :at the instance of the petitioner that a Gujarat type
agitation should be started in Bihar; and (3) It was also decided in those
meetings to resort to hunger strike and to gherao the office of the Bihar Chief
Minister, the Patna District Magistrate and other officials. By the second
ground the following particulars were furnished to the petitioner (1) A meeting
of the Students Steering Com- mittee was held on March 1, 1974 under
President-ship of Shri Laloo Prasad Yadav; (2) it was decided in that meeting
to form a Sanchahalan Samiti for conducting the students agitation and (3) the
petitioner readily agreed in that meeting to become a member of the Sanchalan
Samiti. It is impossible by merely reading these particulars to decipher the
connection between grounds 1 and 2. Grounds 1 and 2 must be read disjunctively,
each one referring to a distinct episode. One is not a sequel to the other and
the validity of the two grounds has to be determined independently on the
merits of each. [737C-D] (iii)One of the allegations in ground no. 1 is that,
in the meeting of tile Bihar Rajya Chatra Neta, Sammelan, it was decided at the
instance of tile petitioner "to start a Gujarat type of agitation in
Bihar." The reference obviously is to the recent happenings in Gujarat
which culminated in the dissolution of the State Legislature and the
introduction of the Presidents Rule. The Court may and ought to take judicial
notice of well-known facts of con- temporary life. But it is very difficult to
comprehend the true connotation of 733 the so-called Gujarat type of agitation.
It may mean differently to different people and is, therefore, vague.
The court will be treading on a dangerous
ground if it attempted to interpret judicially the genesis of recent political
events. The court cannot assume that the decision to start a 'Gujarat type of
agitation' meant a clarion call to violence. If the charge be that the
petitioner had preached violence, the grounds of detention must say so. If the petitioner
was not apprised of what was truly alleged against him and if the accusation,
when reasonably read. was unintelligible, he was deprived of an opportunity to
make an effective representation against the detention order. [738E- G] (iv)The
second ground is irrelevant. An order of detention passer under any law
providing for preventive detention has to answer the test that there has to be
a nexus between the acts of the detenu founding the order of detention and the
purpose of detention. The purpose here is to prevent the petitioner from acting
in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The mere fact that
the petitioner was instrumental in forming the Sanchalan Samiti for conducting
the students agitation or that he readily agreed to become a member of that
Samiti cannot justify the conclusion that these acts are calculated to disturb
public order. Peaceful protests and the voicing of a contrary opinion are
powerful wholesome weapons in the democratic re- pertoire. It is therefore unconstitutional
to pick up a peaceful Protestant and to put him behind the prison bars.
[740F-G]
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition No. 347
of 1974.
Petition Under Article 32 of the Constitution
of India.
N. M. Ghatate and S. Balakrishnan for the
petitioner.
Babadra Prasad Advocate General for the State
of Bihar.
Birendra Prasad and U. P. Singh, for the
respondents.
The Judgment of the Court were delivered by
CHANDRACHUD, J.-These proceedings for the writ of habeas corpus are directed
against an, order passed by the District Magistrate, Patna, on April 9, 1974 in
the exercise of powers conferred by section 3 (1) (a) (ii) of the Maintenance
of Internal Security Act, 26 of 1971. The District Magistrate directed by the
aforesaid order that the petitioner, who is a student leader, be detained with
a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the
maintenance of public order.
The 'Grounds' of detention were served on the
petitioner on April 13, 1974. They read thus :
"1. Whereas the said Shri Ram Bahadur
Rai, in his capacity as Secretary of All India Vidyarthi Parishad, attended a
meeting of the Bihar Rajya Shatra Neta Sammelan held on the 17th and 18th
February, 1974, in Patna University campus, in which from amongst other things,
it was decided, at his instance, to start a Gujarat type of agitation in Bihar,
and whereas in the same meeting it was also decided to resort to hunger strike
and gherao of the office of the Chief Minister, Bihar, District Magistrate,
Patna and other officials.
2. Whereas a meeting of the Students Steering
Committee was held on the 1st March, 1974 under the President-ship of Shri
Laloo Prasad Yadav where it was decided 734 to form a Sanchalan Samiti for
conducting the students agitation, and whereas in the same meeting you readily
accepted to become one of the members of the Sanchalan Samiti;
3. Whereas the said Shri Ram Bahadur Rai
attended a meeting of the, Sanchalan Samiti on 4-3-74 at the Legislature Club
where he was instrumental in forcing a decision to Gherao the Assembly on the
18th March, 1974 and to prevent the Governor from addressing the Assembly on
the same date,
4. Whereas the said Shri Ram Bahadur Rai
further attended a meeting of the Bihar Rajya Chatra Sangharas Samiti on the
12th March, 1974 in the office of the Students Union, Patna University in which
it was decided, at his instance, to commence the gherao of the Assembly on the
18th March. 1974 from 8.30 A.M.
5. Whereas there are reports to indicate that
the said Shri Ram Bahadur Rai was actually leading and actively participating
in the gherao of the Assembly on the 18th Match, 1974; and
6. Whereas even after the 18th March 74, the
said shri Ram Bahadur Rai has been actively guiding the students agitation and
with this end in view he convened a meeting of the students in the National
Hall, Kadamkuan, Patna on the 8th April, 1974 wherein he exhorted them to
paralyse the functioning of the Government offices with effect from the 9th
April, 1974 by resorting to gherao dharna, etc.
7. Whereas the said Shri Ram Bahadur Rai
actually led a demonstration of the students on the 9th April, 1974 in defiance
of the prohibitory orders under Section 144 Cr.P.C.
with a clear intention and known objective to
gherao the Government officials particularly the Secretariat buildings;
8. I am, therefore, satisfied that in the
circumstances mentioned above if you are allowed to remain at large, you will
indulge in further activities prejudicial to the main- tenance of public order.
I. V. S. Dubey, District Magistrate, Patna therefore, consider it necessary to
detain you in custody with a view to preventing you from acting in any manner
prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order." The order of
detention was confirmed by the Governor of Bihar on May 29, 1974. By the order
of confirmation the petitioner is to remain In detention till April 8, 1975.
735 The petitioner filed a writ petition (No.
47 of 1974) in the High Court at Patna under Article 226 of the Constitution
challenging the validity of the detention order on various grounds. That
petition was dismissed by a Division Bench of the High Court on May 8, 1974.
This Court, on September 3, 1974 granted to the petitioner leave to appeal from
the judgment of the High Court.
On July 22, 1974 the petitioner filed in this
Court a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution challenging the
validity of the detention order. Rule was issued on this petition on the same
date on which special leave was granted to the petitioner to appeal from the
judgment of the High Court.
The appeal and the writ petition involve
common questions and can be disposed of together.
In his writ petition here and in the High
Court the petitioner has made these averments; The petitioner is a Secretary of
the All India Vidyarthi Parishad whose aim is to inculcate amongst the student
a sense of discipline, patriotism, character and devotion to studies. The
Vidyarthi Parishad has branches in various Indian colleges and Universities,
more than a lakh of students and teachers being members of the Parishad. The
Vidyarthi Parishad has been striving to bring about cordiality between the
teachers and the taught. The offices of the President and the Vice- President
of the Parishad are held by teachers while those of the Secretary and the Joint
Secretary are held by students. The Executive Committee consists of both the
teachers and fine students. The students of the Patna University placed certain
demands before the Chief Minister and the Education Minister of Bihar as also
before the District Magistrate of Patna impressing upon them that due to high
prices, articles of food were not available in the various hostels of Patna and
therefore it was necessary to issue ration cards for supply of food grains to
the students. A similar demand was made in regard to the non- availability of
text-books and writing material. Verbal assurances were given to the students
that their demands would be considered but the situation remained as before.
On February 17 and 18 a meeting of the
student leaders was held in the Patna University campus to consider the
problems facing the student community.
The petitioner says that the particulars
furnished to him in regard ,to what transpired in those meetings do not set out
as to what was said by him in those meetings The main grievance of the
petitioner as reflected in his writ petitions is that the grounds of detention
furnished to him are vague, that some of the allegations contained in the
grounds are false and that the grounds bear no relevance to the object of the
detention, namely the maintenance of public order.
The District Magistrate of Patna has filed an
affidavit in this Court in answer to the contentions of the petitioner.
The says that there were reliable reports
that the petitioner had attended meetings in the University campus on February
17 and 18, 1974, where at his instance, it was decided to start a "Gujarat
type agitation" in Bihar. The petitioner bad readily agreed to become a
member of the 16-L319 SupCI/75 736 Sanchalan Samiti which was formed for
conducting the students' agitation. The petitioner had attended a meeting of
the Sanchalan Samiti on March 4, 1974 at Legislature Club and he was
instrumental in enforcing the decision to gherao the Assembly on March 18 and
to prevent the Governor of Bihar from addressing the Assembly on that day. On
March, 18 the petitioner, according to reliable reports, had actually led the
gherao of the Assembly. Similar reports were received that the petitioner had
convened a meeting of the students in the National Hall, Kadamkuan, Patna on
April 8, 1974 where he had exhorted the students to paralyse the Functioning of
the Government offices with effect from April 9 by resorting to gharao and
dharna. On April 9 the petitioner, according to authentic reports, had led a
demonstration of students defying the prohibitory order issued by the District
Magistrate under section 144, Criminal Procedure Code. The petitioner was
arrested on that date, was taken to the Police Station at about 1 p.m., was
released from police custody at about 2 p.m. and was served with a detention
order at 4 p.m.
The learned Judges of the High Court
constituting the Division Bench delivered separate but concurring judgments.
Nagendra Prasad Singh J. held in the main
judgment that the grounds of detention supplied to the petitioner "are not
absolutely independent and unconnected"; that none of the grounds is vague
so as to affect the petitioner's right to make, a representation against the
order of detention; that gherao' per se involves an element of compulsion and
therefore any resistance on the part of the person gheraoed is bound to affect
public peace; that to agitate means 'to stir violently' and therefore students'
agitation would affect public order; and that the grounds of detention are
relevant and germane to the purpose of detention. A. N.
Mukherji J. by his concurring judgment held
that it was "well-known that large scale violence and arson were indulged
in Gujarat' and since the petitioner was the Secretary of All India Vidyarthi
Parishad, he would know what was meant by "Gujarat type of
agitation"; that a gherao may be accompanied with violence; that it is not
necessary for the detaining authority to incorporate in grounds of detention
the details. of what the petitioner said and did in meetings referred to in the
grounds; and that the grounds of detention were neither vague nor irrelevant.
Various contentions were raised before us by
learned counsel for the petitioner but we Propose to confine our attention to
certain basic considerations which are vital in habeas corpus petitions filed
to challenge detention orders passed under the Maintenance of Internal Security
Act.
The primary question in these proceedings
arising, no doubt, on their own facts is whether, as contended by the learned
Advocate-General appearing for the State of Bihar, the grounds of detention
ought to be read as one composite document or whether as contended by the
petitioner's counsel, each one of the grounds forms 737 a distinct and separate
reason for detention and ought to be examined separately on its own merits.
Considering the facts stated in the various grounds, both parties have over-
pitched their respective ,cases. The grounds of detention do not furnish
intrinsic aid to justify ,the conclusion that all of them are inter-related. Nor
is any material placed before us from which we could conclude that the
petitioner can be said to have had notice of such inter-play of one ground on,
another.
The first ground contains, these particulars
: (1) The petitioner, in his capacity as Secretary of All India Vidyarthi
Parishad, attended a meeting of the Bihar Rajya Chatra Neta Sammelan held on
17th and 18th February, 1974, in the Patna University campus; (2) A decision
was taken in those meetings at the instance of the petitioner that a Gujarat type
agitation should be started in Bihar; and (3) it was also decided in those
meetings to resort to hunger strike and to gherao the office of the Bihar Chief
Minister, the Patna District Magistrate and other officials. By the second
grounds the following particulars were furnished to the petitioner : (1) A
meeting of the Students Steering Committee was held on March 1, 1974 under the
Presidentship of Shri Laloo Prasad Yadav; (2) it was decided in that meeting to
form a Sanchalan Samiti for conducting the students agitation; and (3) the
petitioner readily agreed in that meeting to become a member of the Sanchalan
Samiti.
We find it impossible, by merely reading
these particulars, to decipher the connection between grounds 1 and 2.
Calendar-wise the 1st of March
incontrovertibly falls after the 17th and 18th February but no one can for that
reason contend that the events of March are an aftermath of the events of
February. They may conceivably bear a causal connection but such a connection
must either be reflected in the recitals of particulars or else the detaining
authority must disclose in its affidavit the basis of its belief that the
events followed upon one another as cause and effect or as a part of the same
plan or movement. The petitioner has made an express averment in paragraph 22
of his writ petition here that the mere fact of his acceptance of the
membership of the Sanchalan Samiti referred to in ground No.
2 cannot justify the passing of a detention
order under section 3(1) (a) (ii) of the Act. The affidavit of the District
Magistrate does not deal with paragraph 22 of the petition at all. It deals
only with paragraphs 1 to 18 of the writ petition.
What is the tangible connection between the
meetings of the Bihar Rajya Chatra Neta Sammelan held in the University campus
on February 17 'and 18 and the meeting of the Students Steering Committee held
on March 1, 1974, under the Presidentship of Shri Laloo Prasad Yadav ? None is
alleged or shown to exist and we cannot fathom it. The Neta Sammelan of February
and the Students Steering Committee which met in March may perhaps have been
animated by a similar object and the two, without a common bond, may have been
striving to achieve a similar purpose. But the diffe- 738 rence between similar
and same purpose is well-known to trained minds and what we are asked to accept
by the Advocate-General is that the particulars stated in grounds 1 and 2 refer
to a series of continuous events woven together by a common intention. That
contention is impossible to accept. Grounds 1 and 2 must, in our opinion, be,
read disjunctively, each one referring to a distinct episode.
One is not a sequel to the other and the
validity of the two grounds has to be determined independently on the merits of
each.
But such a motivation can be seen in the
incidents referred to in the other grounds. Those grounds show that the
petitioner attended a meeting of the Sanchalan Samiti on March 4, 1974; that he
was instrumental in forcing a decision to gherao the Assembly on March 18 and
to prevent the Governor from addressing the Assembly on that date; that he
attended a meeting of the, Bihar Rajya Chatra Neta Sammelan on March 12 in
which it was decided at his instance to commence the gherao of the Assembly
from 8-30 a.m. on March 18; that he led the gherao on March 18; that on April 8
he, convened a meeting of the students and exhorted them to paralyse the
functioning of the Government offices by resorting to gherao, dharna etc. with
effect from April 9;
and that he led a demonstration of students on
April 9 in defiance of the prohibitory orders issued under section 144 Cr. P.C.
with the intention of gheraoing the Government offices, particularly the
secretariat buildings. Grounds 3 to 7 may therefore be read legitimately as
constituting a composite, inter-connected indictment comprising events which
followed in quick succession as a part of the same preplanned objective.
Counsel for the petitioner concentrated his
attack on the first ground by which it is alleged that on February 17 and 18 it
was decided at the instance of the petitioner to start a "Gujarat type of
agitation in Bihar". The reference obviously is to the recent happenings
in Gujarat which culminated in the dissolution of the State Legislature and the
introduction of the President's Rule. We may and ought to take judicial notice
of the well-known facts of contemporary life like 'the dissolution of the
Assembly or the introduction of President's Rule. But, frankly, we are unaware
of the true connotation of the so-called 'Gujarat type of agitation'. That is
not to feign ignorance of what the newspapers and journals reported but outside
the layman's way of thinking there is a distinction between what happened in
fact and what was intended to happen. The court will be treading on a dangerous
ground if it attempted to interpret judicially the genesis of recent political
events.
Often, the tint of glasses furnishes a
preconceived answer to such problems and the glasses of the court have no tint.
Some one claimed that the Gujarat agitation
was essentially an anti price-rise stir which went out of hand because of
supervening circumstances. Someone else claimed that the movement in its
inception was and was intended to be a violent means of creating chaos and
public disorder. The fence-sitters saw sense in both points of view while the
independent politician, not committed to this or that ideology, discovered yet
new dimensions 739 of the problem rejected alike by those who launched the
movement and those who opposed it. So conflicting are the popular verdicts. It
would be wholly improper for a court to pronounce on the prognosis of such
political events. We shall therefore not assume that the decision to start a
'Gujarat type of agitation' meant a clarion 'call to violence.
If the charge be that the petitioner had
breached violence, the grounds of detention must say so. Such a serious
accusation ought not to be left to mere speculation. And if there is not a
whisper of violence in the grounds of detention or in the affidavit of the
District Magistrate, how can the court conclude that the petitioner exhorted
the student community to take to the path of violence in the pursuit of its
demands ? The judgment of the High Court shows that in March 1974 Bihar was in
the grip of violence.
But we cannot argue back and hold that since
the Chatra Neta Sammelan took a certain decision in February and the violence
erupted in March therefore one was the cause and the other the consequence.
Such an inference may perhaps be permissible in respect of historical events which
have been subjected to an expert and dispassionate examination by historians.
But green facts of contemporary life are an un- sure foundation for raising
such an inference.
'Gujarat type of agitation being thus a
phrase of vague and uncertain import, the petitioner could have had no
opportunity to make an effective representation against the order of detention.
Article 22(5) of the Constitution requires that the detenu shall be afforded
the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order of
detention. By a long series of decisions, this right has to be real and
effective, not illusive or empty. If the petitioner was not apprised of what
was truly alleged against him and if the accusation, reasonably, was
unintelligible, he was deprived of an opportunity to make an effective
representation against the detention order.
Anything said by him to clear his conduct
would then, at best, be a fishing answer to meet a roving charge. Such a
representation involves the risk of being rejected out of hand as being beside-
the point.
The District Magistrate says in his affidavit
that 'Gujarat type of agitation is a matter of common knowledge and the
petitioner being Secretary of All India Vidyarthi Parishad and a good student
throughout his career, as stated by the petitioner himself, it is preposterous
to-imagine that the words 'Gujarat type of agitation' would be unintelligible
to him". In the first place, common knowledge like commonsense is not so
common and, at any rate, what may be said to be common knowledge is the fact of
happenings in Gujarat and not what is meant by ',Gujarat type of agitation'.
Saying that any one and everyone knows what is meant by 'Gujarat type of
agitation' is not a legal answer to the contention that the petitioner did not
and could not know what is meant by the particular phrase. The Secretaryship of
the Vidyarthi Parishad or the petitioner's claim to scholarship has no- bearing
on the question whether the phrase has 740 a fixed connotation. The point of
the matter is that it would mean differently to different people and is
therefore vague., Inability to comprehend the meaning of vague expression
cannot surely be dubbed as 'preposterous'.
The learned Advocate-General urged that the
petitioner had taken a leading part in the two meetings of February and has
stated in ground No. 1, "it was decided at his instance" to start a
'Gujarat type of agitation' in Bihar. The petitioner had therefore adopted the
expression "Gujarat type of agitation' and, it is urged, that he cannot be
heard to say that his own words carry no meaning for him. We cannot accept this
new slant on what the petitioner did in the meeting. The ground does not allege
that the petitioner himself used the particular expression. The counter-
affidavit of the District Magistrate also does not say that the petitioner
himself used the particular words. It seeks to justify the use of the
expression it the ground by saying that to a clever student leader like the
petitioner, the expression must have been intelligible.
Ground No. 2 has a different facet : whereas
the first ground vague, the second is irrelevant. It is alleged in this latter
ground than in the meeting of the Steering Committee held on March 1, 1974, (i)
it was decided to form a Sanchalan Samiti for conducting the students
agitation;
and (ii) that the petitioner readily agreed
in that meeting to become a member of the Samiti. The formation of an
Association for the ventilation of grievances in a lawful manner is a part of
the Constitutional right of free speech and expression, the right to assemble
peaceably and without areas and the right to form association guaranteed by
Article 19(1) (a), (b) and (c) of the Constitution. The State, under clauses
(2), (3) and (4) of Article 19 has the right to make laws for imposing
reasonable restrictions on the exercise of those rights in the interests, inter
alia, of public order. That power lends illegality to preventive detentions
under the authority of a law. But an order of detention passed under any such
law has again to answer the test that there has to be a nexus between the acts
of the detenu founding the order of detention and the purpose of detention. The
purpose here is to prevent the petitioner from acting in a manner prejudicial
to the maintenance of public order. The mere fact that the petitioner was
instrumental in forming the Sanchalan Samiti for conducting the students
agitation or that he readily agreed to become a member of that Samiti cannot
justify the conclusion that these acts are calculated to disturb public order.
Peaceful protests and the voicing of a contrary opinion are powerful wholesome
weapons in the democratic repertoire. It is therefore unconstitutional to pick
up a peaceful Protestant and to put him behind the prison bars. The right to repine
can be taken away only for a Constitutionally recognised purpose, as for
example in the interests of public order.
That nexus is lacking in this case.
The District Magistrate says in his affidavit
that the "Sanchalan Samiti was formed for conducting the students
agitation and, therefore, the contention of the petitioner that this ground has
nothing 741 to do with any breach or contravention of any law is erroneous, as
_the word agitation itself implies violence and threat to public order".
The High Court relied on the authority of Chamber's Twentieth Century
Dictionary in support of its conclusion that to ,agitate' is to stir
violently'. it is, in our opinion, wrong to treat every agitation as implying
violence on a priori considerations.
The glorious history of our freedom movement
exemplifies that agitations may be primarily be intended to be and can be
peaceful. In this regard Gandhiji's life work has perhaps no parallel. Nor
indeed in the West, of Dr. Martin Luther King. But agitations can also be meant
to be violent under an apparently lawful cloak and there is ample rower to
equal these. As for dictionaries, Webster's Third New International Dictionary
(1961 Ed., p. 42) says that to 'agitate' is 'to stir up'; to arouse public
feeling or influence public opinion (as by constant discussion)'.
'Agitation' is defined to mean 'the
persistent and sustained attempt to arouse public feeling or influence public
opinion (as by appeals, discussions, or demonstrations)'. The Random House
Dictionary (.1970 Ed., p. 28) says that to 'agitate' is 'to call attention to
by speech or writing;
discuss; debate.'; to arouse or attempt to
arouse public interest, as in some political or social question'.
'Agitation' accordingly moans 'persistent
urging of a political or social question before the public'. The Shorter Oxford
English Dictionary (1964 Ed., Vol. I, p. 36) says that to 'agitate' means 'To
perturb, excite or stir up by appeals'; 'To discuss or push forward'.
Dictionaries give various shades of meanings and the effort has to be to choose
the meaning which is appropriate in the context.
When "the wind agitates the sea",
the meaning of the word agitate is 'to move or force into violent, irregular
action'. When a crowd is " agitated to a frenzy by impassioned
oratory", the meaning of the word is 'to disturb or excite emotionally'.
But in regard to social or political questions, the normal meaning of the word
is 'to arouse or attempt to arouse public interest' (See The Random House
Dictionary, 1970 Ed., p. 28). When "the ladies sigh and agitate Their
fans" the meaning of the word 'agitate' is simply 'to move to and fro'.
But when one is "agitating for the schools and the vote" the meaning
is- 'to arouse public feeling or influence public opinion (as by constant
discussion)' (See the Webster's Third New International Dictionary, 1961 Ed.,
p. 42).
The second ground therefore has no bearing on
the maintenance of public order and is irrelevant for attaining that purpose.
The first ground being vague and the second
irrelevant, the order of detention is liable to be set aside. It is too late in
the day to 742 contend, as the learned Advocate-General, did, that the
detaining authority assesses the cumulative effect of the activities of the
detenu while passing the order of detention. Where the order of detention is
founded on distinct and separate grounds if any one of the grounds is vague or
irrelevant the entire order must fall. The satisfaction of the detaining
authority being subjective, it is impossible to predicate whether the order
would have been passed in the absence of vague or irrelevant data.
For these reasons, we set aside the order of
detention, make the Rule absolute and direct that the petitioner shall be set
at liberty forthwith.
V.M.K. Petition allowed.
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